

AN OFFER HE CAN'T REFUSE: VIRTUE IN THE MARKETPLACE IN PLATO'S SYMPOSIUM

B.W.D HEYSTEE

Once the participants in Plato's *Symposium* decide to speak on Eros, they elect Phaedrus to go first because he is the "father of the topic" (177d).¹ Unfortunately Phaedrus does not do the topic justice. Bury calls his speech "poor in substance...[and] in no respect raised above the level of the average citizen" (Bury xxv).² Uncharitable as this may be, it is not groundless; among other faults,³ Phaedrus carelessly praises all Eros without distinction. Pausanias seeks to correct this oversight in his speech; he aims to distinguish noble Eros from its base counterpart. This description of noble Eros, however, is thoroughly grounded in the public sphere; it is characterized by νομός and πράξις. He describes a relationship between έραστής and παιδικά most suited to the marketplace. The έραστής will teach virtue to the παιδικά in exchange for gratification. Only in this way can the παιδικά act nobly. The παιδικά is obligated to gratify his έραστής because he cannot neglect the great value afforded by virtue. In presenting the relationship this way, Pausanias tries to convince Agathon to grant him sexual favours as his moral duty. Although Pausanias' speech at first seems to be a correction of Phaedrus' speech, it is actually a subtle seduction of his beloved tragedian.

Before we consider Pausanias' speech itself, we must consider the circumstances under which the speech is given and the character of Pausanias, that is, its dramatic context. Because the *Symposium* is among Plato's most dramatic dialogues, these features are especially important. On interpreting Platonic dialogues, Leo Strauss aptly notes that in every case "a human individual, a man with a proper name, a member of this or that society, is the one who talks about [the object of inquiry]" (Strauss 57).⁴ No doubt he is correct in this assertion. The speeches are not given in a vacuum.

We should first note that Pausanias is in love with Agathon. As Bury notes, although little else is known of this Pausanias, his love for the tragedian is notorious (Bury xxvi). Bury shows that this is especially clear in Xenophon's *Symposium*.⁵ We do not, however, have to leave the

¹ All citations are from Kenneth Dover's edition of the *Symposium*. (Plato. *Symposium*. Ed. Kenneth Dover. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980.) All translations are my own, though I have consulted Howatson and Sheffield's excellent edition and quoted it once where noted. (Plato. *The Symposium*. Ed. M.C. Howatson and C.C. Sheffield. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008.)

² Bury, R.G. *The Symposium of Plato*. 2nd. Cambridge: W. Heffer and Sons Ltd, 1932.

³ Bury notes a handful of inconsistencies. For example, "the self-sacrifice of Achilles, the παιδικά, is cited in support of the contention that οί έρωτες μόνου are capable of such self-sacrifice."

⁴ Strauss, Leo. *On Plato's Symposium*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001.

⁵ "Παυσανίας γε ό Αγάθωνος τοῦ ποιητοῦ έραστής άπολογούμενος ὑπέρ τῶν άκρασία έγκαλινδουμένων" (Xenophon, *Symposium*, viii. 32). Bury remarks that although both Plato and Xenophon present Pausanias as an apologist for pederasty, Xenophon is far less charitable, as the preceding quotation suggests.

Platonic corpus to find confirmation of what Aristophanes later suggests in his speech (193b7).⁶ In the *Protagoras*, upon entering the home of Callias, Socrates sees a wide array of Sophists and their adoring students. One such student, of course, is Pausanias. With him there is the boy Agathon, whom Socrates already suspects is Pausanias' beloved: “οὐκ ἄν θαυμάζοιμι εἰ παιδικὰ Πausανίου τυγχάνει ὤν” (“I would not be amazed if he happened to be the beloved of Pausanias”; *Protagoras* 315e; Neumann 261-2).⁷

This particular scene in the *Protagoras* is telling. Just like everyone else there, Pausanias is trying to learn from an eminent sophist. Pausanias sits with his παιδικά at the feet of Prodicus (*Protagoras* 315d; Strauss 62). Noting that Pausanias is a student of this sophist, we should surmise that he would have an especial command over words. Word choice is precise and important for him. This is clearly reflected in the speech he gives.

In reporting the speeches, Aristodemus notes that there were several speeches between those of Phaedrus and Pausanias, but that these have been omitted. Apollodorus tells his companion, “μετὰ δὲ Φαῖδρον ἄλλους τινὰς εἶναι ὧν οὐ πάνυ διεμνημόνευε” (“after Phaedrus there were some other [speeches] which he [Aristodemus] did not altogether remember”; 180c). There has been a significant gap between the inaugural speech of Phaedrus and that of Pausanias. Somehow these other speeches are not significant enough to warrant remembering. Since these speeches are omitted, we can conclude that Pausanias' speech must merit its retelling by making a significant distinction or development.

Pausanias begins his speech by addressing Phaedrus, saying that the topic has not been set out well. Pausanias claims he will correct the error that everyone else has made thus far. On account of their exclusion, we should group all the previous speeches together with that of Phaedrus. As Pausanias sees it, the crucial error has been present from the beginning; the previous speeches have been too general (180c). They simply praise love without distinction. Pausanias' Prodician education shows through here. Pausanias wants to correct them by making an important (perhaps the most important) distinction: that between good and bad.

More particularly, Pausanias wants to distinguish between correct and incorrect—between ὀρθός and οὐκ ὀρθός. In giving a speech, Pausanias' first stated mission is to correct the method of praising Eros. He says, “μὴ ὄντος δὲ ἐνὸς ὀρθότερόν ἐστι πρότερον προρρηθῆναι ὅποιον δεῖ ἐπαινεῖν. ἐγὼ οὖν περᾶσομαι τοῦτο ἐπανορθώσασθαι” (“Since there is not one [Eros], it is **more correct** first to say beforehand what sort it is necessary to praise. So I will try **to correct** this”; 180c7-2, emphasis added). From the outset Pausanias focuses on correction. He wants to make both his speech and those that follow ὀρθοῖ. Such a standpoint implies that there is one correct manner of praising Eros and that all others are incorrect.

Pausanias reaffirms this narrow scope of praise by appealing to necessity. He tells them, “ἐπεὶ δὲ δὴ δύο ἐστὸν, δύο ἀνάγκη καὶ Ἐρωτε εἶναι” (“But since there are indeed two

⁶ Aristophanes defends his myth of globular people, a third of whom are male (and thus are the origin for homosexual relationships): “I hope Eryximachus won't treat my speech as comedy and take it that I am alluding to Pausanias and Agathon. It may be that those two really do belong to this category [i.e. the homosexual one] and are both wholly male in origin, but I am really talking about men and women everywhere” (Howatson and Sheffield's translation; all other translations are my own).

⁷ Neumann, Harry. "On the Sophistry of Plato's Pausanias." *Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association*. 95. (1964): 261-267.

[Aphrodites], it is necessity that there are two Erotes”; 180d5-6). All must recognize the principle that Pausanias establishes, since it is neither merely a possibility nor opinion, but rather a necessity. Anything that disregards this necessity is incorrect. Upon this principle of dual Aphrodites and Erotes, Pausanias further concludes that they must associate each Eros with one of the two Aphrodites. He says,

“ἡ μὲν γέ που πρεσβυτέρα καὶ ἀμήτωρ Οὐρανοῦ θυγάτηρ, ἣν δὴ καὶ Οὐρανίαν ἐπονομάζομεν: ἡ δὲ νεωτέρα Διὸς καὶ Διώνης, ἣν δὴ Πάνδημον καλοῦμεν. ἀναγκαῖον δὴ καὶ ἔρωτα τὸν μὲν τῆ ἑτέρα συνεργὸν Πάνδημον ὀρθῶς καλεῖσθαι, τὸν δὲ Οὐράνιον” (“Anyway, the older one is the motherless daughter of Uranus, the one we name Ouranian; the younger one is the daughter of Zeus and Dione, the one we call Vulgar.⁸ It is indeed necessary that the Eros working with this other [Aphrodite] be correctly called Vulgar, and the [first one] Ouranian”; 180d6-e2).

The chiasmic structure places the two different Erotes side by side with their respective Aphrodites. On the one hand, there is the Ouranian Aphrodite with the Ouranian Eros, and on the other hand, there is the Vulgar Aphrodite with the Vulgar Eros. Demonstrating their respective associations clearly, Pausanias shows that it is compulsory to name the Erotes correctly. Anything but this arrangement, which he produces through an appeal to necessity, would be patently incorrect. As Pausanias sees it, all praise of Eros must meet at least this one condition that he has just laid out; all that differ from it are necessarily incorrect. This preoccupation with the ‘one correct manner’ resurfaces later in Pausanias’ speech when he speaks of gratifying one’s lover.

This narrowing does not, however, limit one to a single activity at the exclusion of all others. Its focus is rather the way in which things are done. Pausanias says that actions themselves are value-neutral and gain nobility or shamefulness depending on *how* they are done. He says, “πᾶσα γὰρ πράξις ὧδ’ ἔχει: αὐτὴ ἐφ’ ἑαυτῆς πραττομένη οὔτε καλὴ οὔτε αἰσχρά” (“All action is thus: acted itself by itself it is neither noble nor base”; 180e4-5). The action itself is not the issue at hand. What matters is whether it is done nobly or basely: “καλῶς μὲν γὰρ πραττόμενον καὶ ὀρθῶς καλὸν γίγνεται, μὴ ὀρθῶς δὲ αἰσχρόν” (“that which is done nobly and correctly becomes noble, but that which is not done correctly becomes shameful”; 181a3-4). Once something is accomplished, we can examine in what way it was done and then attribute shame or nobility to it.

Upon the basis of the division between acts done nobly and shamefully, Pausanias determines that the love produced by the respective Erotes must be examined and evaluated. As he says, “οὕτω δὴ καὶ τὸ ἐρᾶν καὶ ὁ Ἔρωσ οὐ πᾶς ἐστι καλὸς οὐδὲ ἄξιος ἐγκωμιάζεσθαι, ἀλλὰ ὁ καλῶς προτρέπων ἐρᾶν” (“In this way neither all loving nor all Eros is noble and worthy to be

⁸ Vulgar, which implies both commonality and moral corruption, is an apt translation of Pandemos here. As Bury notes in his commentary, “It is doubtful whether the title originally attached to her as the common deity of the deme, or as the patroness of the *ἐταῖραι*. But whatever its origin, the recognized use of the title at the close of the 5th century was to indicate *Venus meretrix*” (Bury 31).

praised, but that which compels us to love nobly”; 181a4-5). Accordingly, he must lay out the love inspired by each Eros and laud it in light of that.

Pausanias first explains the nature of the Vulgar Eros. This Eros, he explains, lacks determination. Its inspiration lacks regard for and is indifferent to the ‘correct manner’. He tells his companions, “ὁ μὲν οὖν τῆς Πανδήμου Ἀφροδίτης ὡς ἀληθῶς πάνδημός ἐστι καὶ ἐξεργάζεται ὅτι ἂν τύχη” (“the Eros of the Vulgar Aphrodite is in truth vulgar and works at random”; (181a7-b1). This Eros aims at whatever is available, although it tends towards worse things should the opportunity arise:

“ἐρῶσι δὲ οἱ τοιοῦτοι πρῶτον μὲν οὐχ ἦττον γυναικῶν ἢ παίδων, ἔπειτα ὧν καὶ ἐρῶσι τῶν σωμάτων μᾶλλον ἢ τῶν ψυχῶν, ἔπειτα ὡς ἂν δύνωνται ἀνοητοτάτων, πρὸς τὸ διαπράξασθαι μόνον βλέποντες, ἀμελοῦντες δὲ τοῦ καλῶς ἢ μή” (“first such men [who are inspired by the vulgar Eros] love women no less than boys, then they love the bodies more than the souls, looking only to ‘doing it’, then the most unintelligent as they are able, since they care not whether they do it nobly or not”; 181b1-5).

This Eros does not necessarily act badly; it might very well chance upon something good. It simply takes no notice of whether or not it acts well. Its only preoccupation is sexual gratification and it chooses the path of least resistance.⁹ The difference between a noble action and a base one is strictly incidental for this Eros. No doubt part (though not all) of Pausanias’ scorn for this Eros stems from its indifference to correctness.

In contrast to this is the Ouranian Eros. Unlike its vulgar counterpart, the Ouranian Eros directs itself toward very particular ends. While the Vulgar is satisfied with anything, the Ouranian has specific desires that it will not compromise. In considering its effects, Pausanias says,

“ἐπὶ τὸ ἄρρεν τρέπονται οἱ ἐκ τούτου τοῦ ἔρωτος ἐπιπνοὶ, τὸ φύσει ἐρρωμενέστερον καὶ νοῦν μᾶλλον ἔχον ἀγαπῶντες” (“those inspired by this eros turn themselves to the male, loving that which is more vigorous by nature and has more intelligence”; (181c5-6).

This arrangement is the opposite of that of the vulgar. The object of its affection must be male; its love is on account of what is present in the soul, not the body; it prefers not what has less νοῦς, but more. In its contrast to the Vulgar Eros, the Ouranian’s loving gaze is thoroughly determined.

In light of these distinctions, Pausanias explains to everyone the specific effects and actions of the two kinds of lovers. Those inspired by Ouranian Eros love youths only when “ἄρχωνται νοῦν ἴσχειν” (“they begin to have mind”; 181d2), which is marked by the growth of a

⁹ We might suppose an explanation of the way Vulgar Eros chooses its beloved: women are easier to couple with because the boys are guarded by tutors and parental discretion; bodies are easier to identify than souls because their qualities are immediately manifest; those who are unintelligent resist a lover’s advance less than intelligent people would.

beard. These Ouranian lovers are ready and willing to spend their entire lives with their beloveds. Those of the Vulgar Eros instead operate through deception (ἔξαπατήσαντες; 181d5) and abandon their beloveds while they are still young, “ἐν ἀφροσύνη λαβόντες” (“leaving them in thoughtlessness”; 181d6).¹⁰ In short, each inspired by Ouranian Eros treats his beloved well, while each inspired by Vulgar Eros inevitably abuses the relationship.

With these considerations, Pausanias says that there must be a νομός to regulate such relationships. Specifically, he says that “χρῆν δὲ καὶ νόμον εἶναι μὴ ἐρᾶν παίδων” (“It is necessary that there be a law not to love boys”; 181d7-e1). There should be a law in order to curb natural tendencies. This law, however, will not have the same source for everyone:

“οἱ μὲν οὖν ἀγαθοὶ τὸν νόμον τοῦτον αὐτοὶ αὐτοῖς ἐκόντες τίθενται, χρῆν δὲ καὶ τούτους τοὺς πανδήμους ἐραστὰς προσαναγκάζειν τὸ τοιοῦτον” (“On the one hand, good men themselves willingly set up this law for themselves, but, on the other hand, it is necessary to compel those vulgar lovers to do this”; 181e3-5)

In both cases, the regulating principle is a νομός. The νομός must be forced upon licentious people while the good willingly legislate it for themselves, but it remains a νομός nonetheless. Neumann notes that this is a “subordination of nature (*physis*) to conventional law or custom (*nomos*)” (Neumann 262). Good relationships are not produced naturally. They are a product of deliberate and conscious convention.

In characterizing good relationships by their grounding in νομός, Pausanias suggests that they are most properly a part of the public, political realm. His particular word choice emphasizes this. Pausanias’ reference to νομός is not incidental. He has a veritable preoccupation with the word. He describes blameless deeds as done “κοσμίως γε καὶ νομίμως” (“orderly and lawfully”; 182a5). When considering other cities and their practice of pedersasty, he considers “ὁ περὶ τὸν ἔρωτα νόμος” (“the law concerning eros”; 182a7). In examination of Athenian practices, he reflects upon what the νομός gives (182e2), what it says (183c2), and how it tests (184a1). The manifold examples continue. νομός in its various forms is mentioned no fewer than eleven times in Pausanias’ speech, not counting other cognates (e.g. νομίμως or νομίζω).

Pausanias is equally preoccupied with πράξις. He is forever concerned with action and how things are actually done. It is worthwhile to comment on a few of the many occurrences of πράξις and πράττειν in Pausanias’ speech. As we shall see, these words have both mercantile and sexual implications. In his prefatory division of noble and base action, Pausanias says of various activities, “οὐκ ἔστι τούτων αὐτὸ καλὸν οὐδέν, ἀλλ’ ἐν τῇ πράξει, ὡς ἂν πραχθῆ, τοιοῦτον ἀπέβη: καλῶς μὲν γὰρ πραττόμενον καὶ ὀρθῶς καλὸν γίγνεται” (“none of these is itself noble, each turns out to be such in the doing, as it might be done; for being done nobly and correctly it becomes noble”; 181a2-4). Neither drinking, nor singing, nor conversation is noble until it is πράξις and πραττόμενον. Likewise, in considering someone acting slavishly for reasons other than love, Pausanias remarks, “ἐμποδίζοιτο ἂν μὴ πράττειν οὕτω τὴν πράξιν” (“he would be prevented from doing the action”; 183a7-8). In contrast to this disgrace, for the lover “δέδοται

¹⁰ We should contrast this ‘ἐν ἀφροσύνη’ with Pausanias’ later description of the lover educating the παιδικὰ to virtue.

ὑπὸ τοῦ νόμου ἄνευ ὀνειδῶν πράττειν” (“it is given by law to act without reproach”; 183b3-4). πράττειν here is acting slavishly to one’s beloved. The law makes possible this slavish action. Pausanias’ attention is continually directed toward πράττειν.

This reference to νομός in the last example only serves to reinforce what is already implied in the word πράξις. Although the word in some cases is merely ‘action’, it is difficult to separate it from implying the public sphere. More commonly it is translated as ‘business’, ‘transaction’, or an ‘act’. Sometimes it even bears a sense of ‘public office’. Although such connotations are not explicit in Pausanias’ speech, it would be hard for any listener to efface from the word all associations with action in the political or public realm given the frequency of the word. That νομός should allow one to πράττειν further suggests that πράξις is somehow under the jurisdiction of public opinion and law.

In addition, πράττειν carries sexual connotations. In speaking of the vulgar lovers, Pausanias says that they are “πρὸς τὸ διαπράξασθαι μόνον βλέποντες” (“looking only to ‘doing it’”; 181b5-6). Bury notes that διαπράξασθαι is “a polite euphemism for the sexual act” (Bury 32). Because the vulgar lovers care not if what they do is shameful, “ὄθεν δὴ συμβαίνει αὐτοῖς ὅτι ἂν τύχωσι τοῦτο **πράττειν**” (“hence it falls to them **to do** this at random”; 181b6-7, emphasis added). Here again πράττειν is used as a substitute for ‘the sexual act’.

Such considerations would suggest a relationship or similarity between pederasty and the public sphere. We should not dismiss this as a mere coincidence. Someone educated by Prodicus would surely not neglect word choice and its implications. If Pausanias was at all a good student, and I am inclined to believe he was, then surely he would appreciate the uses of πράξις and its various cognates. The association between sex and public action is no accident.

Attention to Pausanias’ depiction of a noble relationship serves to confirm this. In justifying the establishment of a νομός for relationships, Pausanias explains that men should restrain themselves from young boys,

“ἵνα μὴ εἰς ἄδηλον πολλὴ σπουδὴ ἀνηλίσκετο: τὸ γὰρ τῶν παιδῶν τέλος ἄδηλον οἷ τελευτᾷ κακίας καὶ ἀρετῆς ψυχῆς τε πέρι καὶ σώματος” (“in order that much effort not be spent on something unclear; for with young boys it is uncertain how well or badly concerning body and soul they will turn out”; 181e1-3).

Put otherwise, men should not concern themselves with young boys lest they end up wasting their time. In a sense, the ἐραστής is making an investment in the young boy and he should restrain himself so that he can act with more security. Such talk is appropriate to the business world of means and ends. The relationship Pausanias anticipates here is one of a mercantile exchange of goods and services. The word πράξις, then, is especially appropriate. It carries connotations of both marketplace activity and sexual innuendo.

This mercantile exchange, as Pausanias sees it, is the ‘one correct manner’ for the pursuit of a παιδικά and the reciprocal gratification of an ἐραστής. It is only in this kind of arrangement that those with noble Eros will act. Pausanias considers the three different kinds of νομοί in the Greek world concerning Eros. Two are simple and thus easy to understand, one is more complicated. The νομός in Elis and Boeotia considers it noble to gratify one’s lover in all cases,

while the νομός in Ionia always condemns it as shameful. The laws in Athens¹¹, on the other hand, are quite complex; sometimes it is shameful and sometimes not.

Pausanias rejects the open love found in Elis and Boeotia. There, he says, one is free to take anyone as a lover. Nobody would ever condemn such an action: “οὐκ ἄν τις εἴποι οὔτε νέος οὔτε παλαιὸς ὡς αἰσχρόν” (“no one young or old would say that it is shameful” (182b3-4). People of all ages are all in agreement in this matter. Pausanias explains this phenomenon by claiming that lovers are unable to justify themselves (since they are ἀδύνατοι λέγειν; 182b5-6) and accordingly want to make matters as easy as possible for themselves. We might characterize this policy’s indiscriminateness as that of the Vulgar Eros. Although in satisfying its urges it does not necessarily harm the παιδικά, the Vulgar Eros has no regard for what is noble. The παιδικά receives just as much, if not more, harm as benefit from this arrangement. The lover merely wants to take the path of least resistance to sexual gratification. Pausanias cannot tolerate such disregard and carelessness.

In direct opposition to these uncultured lands is Ionia, ruled by tyrants. In Ionia it is always shameful to take a lover. Pausanias claims that this is a product of the political climate: “τοῖς γὰρ βαρβάροις διὰ τὰς τυραννίδας αἰσχρόν τοῦτό γε” (“this is shameful for the barbarians on account of tyrannies”; 182b7-8). The political structure cannot tolerate such relationships to exist. Along with erotic relationships, the tyrants also proscribe philosophy and philogymnasia. Pausanias explains this threefold proscription: “οὐ γὰρ οἶμαι συμφέρει τοῖς ἄρχουσι φρονήματα μεγάλα ἐγγίγνεσθαι τῶν ἀρχομένων” (“It would not, I suppose, be expedient to those ruling for there to be lofty thoughts in their subjects”; 182c1-3). That is to say, the rulers cannot tolerate their subjects to possess ἀρετή, whether of body or soul—the very things which philosophy and philogymnasia would produce. The tyrants ban these along with erotic relationships for fear of psychic and somatic virtue.

Athens, so Pausanias claims, is able to find a mean between these two extremes and thus is able to find the one correct manner for beloveds to take on lovers. In Athens, “πολὺ τούτων κάλλιον νενομοθέτηται” (“it has been legislated much more beautifully than those [other laws]”; 182d4). Broadly speaking, there are two νομοί concerning Eros in Athens, one for the ἐραστής and one for the παιδικά.

The ἐραστής is given license by the νομός to do absolutely anything in pursuit of his παιδικά. In pursuing the παιδικά, the lover must act openly: “λέγεται κάλλιον τὸ φανερώς ἐρᾶν τοῦ λάθρᾳ” (“it is said that it is better to love openly than to love secretly”; 182d6). So long as he does this, however, all actions are regarded as noble, even when otherwise they would bring the greatest shame upon the lover. If a lover were to do these very things for any other reasons, “ἢ χρήματα βουλόμενος παρά του λαβεῖν ἢ ἀρχὴν ἄρξαι” (“wishing either to get money from someone or to have political office”; 183a2-3), he would be thoroughly rebuked; his enemies would reproach him (ὄνειδιζόντων; 183b1) and his friends would admonish him (νουθετούντων;

¹¹ For “καὶ ἐν Λακεδαίμονι” Bury comments, “I follow Winckelmann and others...in bracketing these words: possibly they should be transposed to a place in the next clause, either after γὰρ or after βοιωτοῖς ... It is certainly unlikely that a ποικίλος νομός would be ascribed to the Laconians, and unlikely too that they would be classed apart from the μὴ σοφοὶ λέγειν” (Bury 35). Strauss, in contrast, remarks, “The reason [Pausanias] mentions Sparta is because Sparta adds luster to his law; the praise of the law is greater if it includes both Athens and Sparta” (Strauss 69). Whatever the reason for this curious inclusion of Sparta, it is quickly dropped, never to be considered again.

183b2). Public opinion in Athens even frees the lover from his oaths: “ὁ δὲ δεινότατον, ὡς γε λέγουσιν οἱ πολλοί, ὅτι καὶ ὁμνύντι μόνῳ συγγνώμη παρὰ θεῶν ἐκβάντι τῶν ὄρκων” (“but the most wondrous thing, as the many do say, is that there is forgiveness from the gods for the lover alone swearing oaths”; 183b5-7). This Athenian νομός gives complete freedom to the ἐραστής from authorities temporal and divine.

This νομός is starkly contrasted to that of the παιδικά. Many limitations are placed on the παιδικά so that he has a very narrow course to run. Pausanias recounts the many obstacles the παιδικά faces, including his father, his tutor and his peers. He reminds his audience, however, that submission to a lover is not necessarily shameful, but that it depends upon how it is done:

“οὐχ ἀπλοῦν ἐστίν, ὅπερ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐλέχθη οὔτε καλὸν εἶναι αὐτὸ καθ’ αὐτὸ οὔτε αἰσχρὸν, ἀλλὰ καλῶς μὲν πραττόμενον καλόν, αἰσχρῶς δὲ αἰσχρὸν. αἰσχρῶς μὲν οὔν ἐστὶ πονηρῶ τε καὶ πονηρῶς χαρίζεσθαι, καλῶς δὲ χρηστῶ τε καὶ καλῶς” (“it is not simple, just as it was said at the beginning that itself by itself it is neither noble nor shameful, but done nobly it is noble, and done shamefully it is shameful. It is shameful to gratify¹² a bad man in a bad way, but noble to gratify a good man in a good way”; 183d4-8).

The repetition of particular vocabulary (e.g. καλὸν...καλῶς...καλόν), as well as the highly ordered structure of these phrases leads one to believe it is well-rehearsed.¹³ The chiasmus sets up a side-by-side comparison suggesting that the παιδικά either behaves one way, nobly, or the other, basely; Pausanias’ chiastic structure heightens the difference emphatically making the point especially clear to his listeners. We should also note the τε καὶ structure. In order to act well, the παιδικά must both be gratifying a good man (one in possession of virtue) and be doing it in a noble way.

The only way to gratify nobly is directed at ἀρετή. Pausanias compares the actions of lovers to that of slaves and then comments, “οὔτω δὴ καὶ ἄλλη μία μόνη δουλεία ἐκούσιος λείπεται οὐκ ἐπονείδιστος: αὕτη δ’ ἐστὶν ἡ περὶ τὴν ἀρετήν” (“in this way there remains only one other willing slavery that is not reproachful: that which is for the sake of virtue”; 184c2-3). The only way for the παιδικά to avoid shame is to submit to a virtuous ἐραστής in order to procure virtue. We have thus found the ‘one correct manner’ of taking on a lover. The lover will seek sexual favours and the beloved will offer them in exchange for instruction in virtue. Only this, Pausanias suggests, is ὀρθός.

Thus we return to the relationship that is a mercantile exchange of goods and services. The ἐραστής and the παιδικά may as well be vendors in the market exchanging wares; the one offers virtue in its various forms, the other sexual favours. In coming together, they conduct their

¹² ‘To gratify’ seems the best translation of χαρίζεσθαι. As Howatson and Sheffield note, Plato certainly uses χαρίζεσθαι euphemistically in the same way that Anglophones would use ‘gratify’ (Howatson and Sheffield 13, n. 61).

¹³ Another well-rehearsed phrase appears just a short while later. The sentence beginning at 184d2 is an architectural masterpiece. Bury comments, “Notice the balance and rhythm of the clauses in this sentence—(a1) ὅταν...ἐκάτερος, (b1) ὁ μὲν...ὑπηρετῶν, (b2) ὁ δὲ...ὑπουργῶν, (c1) ὁ μὲν...ξυμβάλλεσθαι, (c2) ὁ δὲ...κτᾶσθαι, (a2) τότε δὴ...ἐνταῦθα, (a3) ξυμπίπτει...οὐδαμοῦ” (Bury 42). Surely phrases like this inspired Apollodorus’ snide remark.

‘business’, or *διάπραξις*. Some additional considerations serve to confirm that this relationship is mercantile. First we should note that in speaking of the lover’s behaviour, Pausanias says it would be appalling were it for any other reason (183a); the specific comparisons he makes are with respect to matters of business. Although he distinguishes the favours of the *παιδικά* from all other goods, he seems to present them as just a superlative kind of ware, though a ware all the same. Further, the reproach (*ὄνειδος*) the lover would earn for acting so slavishly in a business deal is the same reproach the *παιδικά* would earn from his friends were he to take up a lover: “ἠλικιώται δὲ καὶ ἑταῖροι ὄνειδίζουσιν” (“his peers and companions would reproach him”; 183c7); this suggests that the *παιδικά* is also part of a business deal. When Pausanias summarizes the whole arrangement, he says,

“ὁ δὲ δεόμενος εἰς παιδευσιν καὶ τὴν ἄλλην σοφίαν **κτᾶσθαι**... μοναχοῦ ἔνταῦθα συμπίπτει τὸ καλὸν εἶναι παιδικὰ ἐραστῆ ἡχάρισσασθαι” (“[when] he wants to **procure** other wisdom through education... only then does it happen that it is noble that the beloved gratify his lover”; 184e1-4, emphasis added).

The use of *κτᾶσθαι* is not accidental. This word does not suit *σοφία* or other forms of *ἀρετή*. Rather, it is most often used with respect to chattel. It is ‘procurement’ of wares, property or wages. The virtue the *παιδικά* pursues is thus presented as another product in the marketplace, albeit a product of great value.

Unlike other products, however, *ἀρετή* cannot be neglected. It is not only a product of great value, but of the greatest value. Its pursuit is not a matter to be accepted or rejected lightly. The acquisition of *ἀρετή* is the moral obligation of every person. To neglect such a ‘product’ would bear the utmost disgrace.

For this reason, submission to the *ἐραστής* becomes compulsory for the *παιδικά*. Because submission to the *ἐραστής* is the way one acquires virtue, to not submit would be tantamount to declining to pursue virtue, to the wilful acceptance of vice. Neumann comments, “Boys may and should do anything for the sake of spiritual progress... This means that it would be disgraceful for them to reject [a lover’s] demands” (Neumann 265). In the face of virtue, the *παιδικά* is morally obligated to submit to the lover’s advances.

Not only that, but the *παιδικά* must submit in this very particular way that Pausanias outlines. Pausanias thoroughly presents this arrangement as the ‘one correct manner’. The mercantile exchange of gratification for instruction in virtue is the only correct way for the *ἐραστής* and *παιδικά* to behave. This exchange, as we have already noted, is the narrow course between the vicious extremes of the backwards customs of Boeotia and Elis and the oppressive regimes of Ionia. It is this way and this way alone that submission is not completely disgraceful. The *παιδικά* must pursue virtue and he must do it in this one particular manner that Pausanias has described. It is his moral obligation to do so.

Throughout all this, it is important to remember Pausanias’s lover, Agathon, is present in the room. Everything that Pausanias says must be considered with respect to this relationship. All remarks on the *ἐραστής* and the *παιδικά* are also remarks on Pausanias and Agathon. When Pausanias speaks it is with his *παιδικά* in the back of his mind and the corner of his eye.

In speaking to his παιδικά, Pausanias is effectively (and deliberately) trying to convince Agathon to submit and gratify. As the older gentleman, Pausanias presents himself as a knowledgeable instructor of virtue; he knows the one correct way for a lover and beloved to behave in order that they might avoid disgrace. If Agathon believes Pausanias to have this knowledge, then he will be morally obligated to gratify him. It is irrelevant whether or not Pausanias is virtuous, it is only important that Agathon believes him to be so (185a *ff.*). If Pausanias is able to convince his παιδικά both that the exchange of virtue for gratification is noble and that he himself is wise and virtuous, Agathon will have no choice but to submit. In doing this, Pausanias would secure gratification from his lover. It would become Agathon's moral duty to gratify Pausanias.¹⁴

Pausanias' understanding of the relationship between έραστής and παιδικά is thoroughly grounded in the public sphere. His preoccupation with νομός and πράξις confirms this. This serves to ground pederasty as a mercantile exchange. The παιδικά will gratify the έραστής and in return the έραστής will teach virtue. Such an arrangement obliges the παιδικά to submit. In addressing this speech in part to his beloved Agathon, Pausanias is trying to curry sexual favours through his implied knowledge of virtue. This tactic, however, is not without its dangers. In the same way that a buyer in the marketplace is largely indifferent to the vendor so long as the product is good, the beloved would be attached only to the virtues the lover possesses, though not the lover himself. With Socrates, who is more than willing to teach virtue for free, lying on the couch next to Agathon, one wonders if Pausanias' product will still hold any appeal when it carries such a high price.

¹⁴ We might even see Pausanias even tailoring the argument to his own position. He emphasizes the importance of testing the lover by forcing him to wait for many years (184 *ff.*). As mentioned above, Socrates witnessed Pausanias and Agathon together in Callias' home in the *Protagoras*. That was sixteen years prior to the *Symposium* and Pausanias is still chasing his beloved (Neumann 262). If endurance deserves recognition, then Pausanias would be a successful candidate.