

*Supremum Caput: Richard Hooker's Theology of Ecclesiastical Dominion**

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In the final book of his treatise in defence of the Elizabethan religious settlement, *Of the Lawes of Ecclesiasticall Politie*¹, Richard Hooker constructs an elaborate *theological* defence of the 'title of Headship which we give to the kings of England in relation unto the church'. (*LEP* 8.4.1.) The argument of the chapter takes the form of a response to a series of fundamental doctrinal objections raised against the royal headship by the pre-eminent

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Disciplinarian-Puritan divine Thomas Cartwright.² Indeed, towards the end of the famous Admonition Controversy of the 1570s, in his *Second Replie against Master Whitgifte's Second Answer*, Cartwright had escalated the debate over the Royal Supremacy to a test of basic doctrinal orthodoxy.³ He charged that the royal headship 'cut off quite/ that part off the Kingly office off Christ/ which consisteth in owtward government off his Church . . .' (TC 2:441), that 'the title of Head off the Church [belongs] onley to our Saviour Christ' and therefore 'the cyvill magistrate is head of the comonwealthe/ and not of the church'. (TC 2:411) Cartwright objected that the assertion of the royal title of headship was inconsistent with Christological and Trinitarian orthodoxy. He further challenged the Royal Supremacy as a contradiction of the keystone of reformed ecclesiological orthodoxy, namely the doctrine of the 'Two Kingdoms' or 'Two Realms'⁴ with their corresponding 'Two Regiments':

For to overthrowe this doctrine that Christe alone is Head of his Church/ this distinction is browghte/ that according to the inward influence off grace/ Christ onley is Head: but according to the owtward government/ the being of Head is comen with him to others. For answer wherunto/ I referre my selfe in part to what I have written before/ of the absurd distinction between the government of the Church by the mynisterie of

2. The principal works of Thomas Cartwright in the course of his debates with Archbishop John Whitgift in the Admonition Controversy are: TC 1, *A Replie to an Answer Made of M. Doctor Whitgift*, (Wandsworth, 1574); TC 2, *The Second Replie against Master Whitgifte's Second Answer*, (Zurich, 1575); TC 3, *The Rest of the Seconde Replie*, (s.l., 1577). Cartwright was one of the leading Disciplinarian or presbyterian ideologues of his generation. His life and works are ably portrayed by A. F. Scott Pearson in *Thomas Cartwright and Elizabethan Puritanism* (London, 1925). Cartwright has been accorded a certain degree of attention by more recent Elizabethan ecclesiastical historiography. See Patrick Collinson, *The Elizabethan Puritan Movement* (London, 1967) for a more recent study of Cartwright's role in the Admonition Controversy. Strangely little has been written by Hooker scholars on the subject of Hooker's polemical struggle with Cartwright despite the frequent appearance in the *Lawes* of the latter's arguments as representative of the Disciplinarian-Puritan case. One notable exception is Rudolph Almasy's 'The Purpose of Richard Hooker's Polemic', *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 39 (1978), 251-270.

3. See D. J. McGinn, *The Admonition Controversy* (New Brunswick, 1949) *passim*; also Patrick McGrath, *Papists and Puritans under Elizabeth I* (London, 1967), 133ff., and M. M. Knappen, *Tudor Puritanism* (Chicago, 1939), 217-247.

4. The only thorough treatment of Cartwright's version of the Reformation doctrine of the 'Two Kingdoms' is to be found in A. F. Scott Pearson, *Church and State: Political Aspects of Sixteenth-Century Puritanism* (Cambridge, 1928) ch. 2.

men/instituted of our Saviour Christ/and his spiritual government. (TC 2:414)

Thus Cartwright elevated the controversy over the civil magistrate's claim to the title 'Head of the Church' to the level of a profound theological dispute over first principles. At stake in the controversy was a reputation for standing on the high ground of reformed doctrinal orthodoxy. A more radical attack on the established order of the Elizabethan Church could hardly have been conceived.

Hooker's reply was as radical as the attack: he sought to demonstrate that the Disciplinarians were themselves doctrinally unsound in that their theology was not that of the 'magisterial' reformation of John Calvin and was an attempt to introduce into England the ideas of the 'radical' reformation of the Anabaptists and Sectaries.⁵ For Hooker, Cartwright's insistence on a conflict between the 'scepter of Christ's discipline' and the authority of the Crown in ecclesiastical 'affayres and causes' was grounded in a theology which was faulty by the test of strict Calvinist orthodoxy. Indeed, in the course of his argument, Hooker turned the challenge around full-circle to demonstrate that Cartwright's own arguments against the Royal Supremacy were inconsistent in the first instance with Christological and Trinitarian orthodoxy;⁶ secondly with ecclesiological norms established by the magisterial reformers;⁷ and, thirdly with the famous distinction of the two realms and two regiments, and consequently inconsistent with the entire structure of reformed soteriology.⁸ The common assumption which underlies the usual glib application of the label 'Erastian' to Hooker's argument is that he himself *confounds* temporal and spiritual authority.⁹ Contrary to the views of many modern commentators, we shall argue that Hooker viewed the

5. Hooker very seldom employed the term 'Puritan' in referring to Cartwright, to Walter Travers, or to any of 'them that seeke (as they tearme it) the reformation of Lawes, and orders Ecclesiasticall, in the Church of England' (LEP Pref. 1.1). Much has been written on the origins of the term 'Puritan' and its polemical use is of some significance in the interpretation of Hooker's apologetic purpose. See P. Collinson, 'A Comment concerning the Name Puritan', *Journal of Ecclesiastical History* 31 (1980), which is itself a comment on a larger piece by P. Christianson, 'Reformers and the Church of England under Elizabeth I and the early Stuarts', *JEH* 31(1980), 463-482. Cartwright himself condemns the 'heresie off Anabaptistes/ Donatists/ or puritanes': TC 2: sig.) () (i).

6. LEP 8.4.6.

7. LEP 8.4.7.

8. LEP 8.4.8, 9 and 10.

9. For example, see Claire Cross, *The Royal Supremacy in the Elizabethan Church* (London, 1969), 27-37.

Royal Supremacy as the principal means of securing and stabilising a right *distinction* between the spiritual and temporal realms.

In the first chapter of Book Eight, Hooker resorts to the categories and distinctions of systematic theology to explain the union of Church and Commonwealth 'in a free Christian state or kingdom'. (*LEP* 8.3.5; *FLE* 3:355) The whole purpose of the argument is to demonstrate how Church and Commonwealth together constitute a single 'state' or 'politique societie' and yet remain distinct from one another.¹⁰ The difficult problem of how to unite these two forms of association in spite of their fundamental differences is treated by Hooker according to the ancient patristic categories of Christological discourse:

A *Church* and a *Commonwealth* we graunt are thinges in *nature* [my italics] the one distinguished from the other, a *Commonwealth* is one way, and a *Church* another way defined. . . We may speake of them as two, we may sever the rights and causes of the one well enough from the other in regard of that difference which we graunt there is between them, albeit we make no *personal* [my italics] difference. For the truth is the *Church* and the *Commonwealth* are names which import thinges really different. But those thinges are accidentes and such accidentes as may and should alwayes lovingly dwell together in one subject. (*LEP* 8.1.2, 5; *FLE* 3:318, 324)

The language of 'person' and 'nature' quite explicitly harks back to Hooker's careful survey in his fifth book of the terms and definitions of Patristic Christological orthodoxy. Indeed, in that book Hooker has taken great pains to outline the fourth-century development of the church's orthodox doctrine and to demonstrate that the crucial issue had been the manner in which the divine and human 'natures' are united in the one 'person' of Christ.¹¹ The Christological categories of person and nature, and their attendant logic of subject and accident, are deployed throughout Hooker's examination of Cartwright's objections to the union of Church and Commonwealth in 'one politique society':

10. It is interesting to note that Hooker never sets 'church' and 'state' in opposition. He views the 'state' as a 'personal subsistencie' which *contains* within it the Church and the Commonwealth as 'accidentes'. See *LEP* 8.1.5.

11. In his 'Dedication' of the fifth book of the *Lawes*, Hooker refers to the fourth-century Christological controversies: '. . . the waightiest conflicts the Church hath had were those which touched the head, the person of our Saviour Christ . . .' (*LEP* 5.Ded.3). See especially Hooker's discussion in *LEP* 5.53.1-4. See also *LEP* 5.42.13 where he defends the public recitation of the Athanasian creed: 'So manifestlie true is that which one of the ancient hath concerning Arrianisme, *Mortuis authoribus hujus veneni scelerata tamen eorum doctrina non moritur.*'

They [the Disciplinarians] hold the necessitie of *personall* separation which cleane excludeth the power of one mans dealing in both, we of *naturall* which doth not hinder, but that one and the same *person* may in both beare a principall sway. (*LEP* 8.1.2; *FLE* 3:320)

By his studied use of these categories, Hooker invoked a powerful and traditional theological model for his defence of the Tudor constitution and, by implication, impugned the Disciplinarian opposition to the union of Church and Commonwealth as itself doctrinally unsound. In the course of this essay we shall seek to demonstrate that this Christological paradigm provides a key to the interpretation of Hooker's doctrine of the Royal Supremacy. (See *LEP* 5.51.1-5.56.13)

The most cursory perusal of these passages reveals that the terms of the controversy over the royal headship are basically theological in character. Cartwright and Hooker were clearly agreed at least on one principal point, namely that the doctrine of Royal Supremacy was to be understood and judged within the categories of contemporary theological discourse. With both divines there is an assumption that political matters come within the special sphere of the trained theologian, and are to be argued theologically. Norman Sykes once remarked that: 'At this distance of time and amid such different conditions of ecclesiastical and political development, the Reformation apotheosis of "the godly prince" strikes an unfamiliar, if not actually uncongenial, note on our ears; and there is a strong resultant tendency to discount the prominence and centrality of this theme in the theology, no less than the ecclesiology of the sixteenth century'.¹² To this one might well add that the theme strikes not only an unfamiliar note, but that a theological basis for political argument is indeed quite alien to modern assumptions and is admittedly beyond the competence of many political theorists. The most difficult task in our attempt to understand the full significance of Hooker's defence of the royal headship of the Church is to yield ourselves to the theological scope of his argument. A principal aim of this essay, therefore, is to strive for a sympathetic understanding of the alien *mentalité* of the late Elizabethan world of ecclesiological controversy.¹³

The essentially theological character of Hooker's approach to the problem of the Royal Supremacy is nowhere more explicit than in his discussion of the 'title of Headship which we give to the Kings of England in relation unto the Church' in the fourth chapter of

12. Norman Sykes, *Old Priest and New Presbyter* (Cambridge, 1957), 2, 3.

13. In his article, 'Meaning and Understanding in History of Ideas', *History and Theory*, 8(1969), 8, Quentin Skinner discusses this important aspect of historical methodology.

Book VIII of the *Lawes*. The structure of the argument in this chapter follows the general pattern of Hooker's methodology throughout the treatise. He begins by setting down a summary of certain principal objections raised by the Disciplinary reformers as represented by the writings of Cartwright. As in the preceding books of the *Lawes*, Hooker concentrates his attention upon Cartwright's *Second Replie* written in response to Archbishop Whitgift's *Defense of the Answer to the Admonition*.¹⁴ In this essay, our aim is to examine Hooker's defence of the royal headship of the Church in the light of his theological principles. As we shall see, his adherence to the received, orthodox formulations of systematic doctrine, especially on Trinitarian and Christological points, together with his views on hermeneutical, ecclesiological, and soteriological doctrine are crucial to the coherence of his political argument. The discussion therefore begins with an examination of Hooker's analysis of the principal theological elements of the headship debate. There follows a brief consideration of the polemical background of the issue in the Admonition Controversy. Finally there is a discussion of Hooker's response to Cartwright's theological objections to the royal headship. This response breaks down into the following major headings: first, the Trinitarian problem, secondly the Christological problem, thirdly the ecclesiological problem, and finally the problem of the species of regiment.

Cartwright's initial objection to the royal headship is grounded in what Hooker in Book II of the *Lawes* refers to as a 'negative argument' from Scripture.¹⁵ The title 'Head of the Church', on this view, is thought to be applied exclusively to Christ in Scripture, from which Cartwright infers that as such it 'cannot be without bold presumption applied unto any mortall man'. (WW 2:82; LEP 8.4.2). He defends his objection by an appeal to the prescriptive authority of divine revelation in matters concerning the structure of ecclesiastical government.¹⁶

14. In *The Works of John Whitgift, D. D., Archbishop of Canterbury*, ed. by John Ayre for the Parker Society, (Cambridge, 1851), (WW).

15. See especially LEP 2.5.7. where Hooker quotes Cartwright's argument in TC 2:81, viz. 'the argument of the scriptures *negatively* holdeth, not only in doctrine and ecclesiasticall discipline, but even in matters arbitrarie and variable by the advice of the Church.' The whole intent of Book 2 of the *Lawes* is to show the limits of scriptural authority. For a full and clear discussion of the problem see J. S. Coolidge, *The Pauline Renaissance in England: Puritanism and the Bible* (Oxford, 1970), ch. I. See also Egil Grisliis, 'The Hermeneutical Problem in Richard Hooker', *Studies in Richard Hooker*, ed. W. S. Hill (London, 1972), 183-198.

16. See LEP 8.4.2, 3 for Hooker's summary of the principal scriptural reasons urged against the royal headship. Hooker refers chiefly to the following passage in Cartwright's *Second Replie* (TC 2: 411, 12):

It is the heart of Cartwright's position that Christ's title of headship as defined by Scripture precludes the possibility of any other claim to the title whatsoever. Scripture affirms the title solely in relation to Christ; therefore no other affirmations outside the bounds of Scriptural authority can be allowed. This follows the so-called 'negative' argument from the authority of Scripture: that which scripture does not positively affirm concerning the polity of the Church must therefore be denied.

Having broached the general nature of the controversy over the royal headship, Hooker proceeds to an analysis of the specific scriptural reasons alleged against a finite, territorial and visible headship distinct from Christ's infinite, universal and invisible rule. Cartwright appeals to the authority of St. Paul for whom Christ's title of headship signifies His elevation above 'all powres/ rules/ and domynions' (TC 2:411; LEP 8.4.2); thus to term Christ 'Head' of the Church is to acknowledge the special character of his power as 'divine' and therefore as above all derivative or created powers. Hence on this view the royal claim to the headship of the Church imposes an external limitation upon a universal power which by its very nature cannot admit of any external limits whatsoever. For Cartwright, the title 'Head of the church' is identified precisely with what distinguishes Christ's infinite, divine power from all finite, human powers. (TC 2:411) Secondly, he asserts the exclusive application of the title of headship to Christ on the grounds of what he considers to be doctrinally impossible consequences which necessarily follow from the appropriation of the same by an earthly prince. For by doing so the prince

Here remaineth onely to prove/ the title Head off the church/ to be-
longe *onely* to our Saviour Christe. . . . If Christe be onely head: then
that I set downe/ that the cyvill magistrate is head of the comonwealthe/
and not of the church/ standeth. But if the magistrate be head off the
church: then Christe is not onelie. Howbeit having for feare off the
owttry off all/ made a litle curtesie unto the truthe: he [i.e. Archbishop
Whitgift] forthwith lifteth up his heele against it/ and will have the civill
magistrate head also off the church/ wherupon muste followe infynite ab-
surdities. Firste the doctrine off the Apostle is by this means cleane over-
throwen/ which sheweth that this tittle Head of the church/ was gyven to
our Sav[iour] Christe/ to lifte him above all powres/ rules/ and domynions/
ether in heaven/ or earth. Where if this title belonge also unto the cyvill
magistrate: then yt ys manifeste/ that there is a powre in earth/ wherunto
our Saviour Christe is not in this pointe superior. And by the same rea-
son that he maie gyve the cyvill magistrate this title/ he maye gyve him
also that he ys the fyrste begotten of all creatures/ the fyrste begotten off
the dead/ yea the redemer of his people which he governeth. . . . Againe
if the church be the bodie of Christe/ and of the cyvill magistrate/ yt shall
have two heades: which being monstrous is to the great dishonour off
Christe and his church. [my italics] See also TC 3: 153 and WW 3:189.

would appear to arrogate to himself certain corollary powers associated by Scripture with the title of head — for example, the titles ‘first begotten of all creatures’, ‘the Redeemer of his people’, ‘the consubstantial Word of God’. (*LEP* 8.4.3; *TC* 2:411ff.) Thus Cartwright identifies Christ’s title of headship itself with his peculiar dignity as the Redeemer.¹⁷ Cartwright therefore represents the Royal Supremacy as a denial of Christ’s proper sovereign power in relation to the Church. Thirdly, Cartwright argues that St. Paul refers to Christ as *sole* head of the Church. (*TC* 2:412) Hence the communication of the title of headship to the civil magistrate implies a limitation of the absolute universality of Christ’s presence with the whole body of his people. For Cartwright, Christ does not need a ‘subordinate/ and mynisteriall head off the church’: ‘Christe is never severed from his body/ nor from any parte off yt/ and is able/ and doth performe that wherfore he is called head/ unto all his church.’ (*TC* 2:413)

Among those quoted by Cartwright in support of his assertion of Christ’s ‘sole’ claim to the headship of the Church is John Jewel, Bishop of Salisbury and Hooker’s one-time patron. Jewel, as is well known, preferred the title of ‘Supreme Governor’ to ‘Head of the Church’ when applied to the royal power of ecclesiastical dominion, and was at some pains to argue the unsuitability of the title of headship in relation to the Queen.¹⁸ With a certain evident pleasure Cartwright was able to quote in his controversy with Whitgift that ‘Cyprian saith/ there is but one head off the church. The bishop off Salsburie affirmeth the same. *Apol.*2.2’. (*TC* 2:413) According to Bishop Jewel, such a title for princes was ‘not to be found in Holy Scripture’.¹⁹ It was perhaps to be expected that in the heat of battle Cartwright should choose not to include a reference to Jewel’s proviso immediately following this remark:

And, notwithstanding the name of Head of the Church belong peculiarly and only unto Christ, as his only right and inheritance, (for, as the Church is the body, so Christ is the head); yet may the same sometimes also be applied in sober

17. See esp. *TC* 2: 417. ‘Let it be considered first that our Sav. Christe is in one respect creator and preserver of mankind/ and in another redeemer, and upholder of his church. For he created once/ and preserveth daily as God co-equall with his Father and Holy Spirite: but he both redeemed once and daily gathereth his church/ as mediatur of God and man . . .’

18. *The Works of John Jewel*, ed. John Ayre, Parker Society (*PS*), (Cambridge, 1845-50) 4, 974. Compare *WW* 2:89. See John E. Booty, *John Jewel as Apologist of the Church of England* (London, 1963).

19. Jewel, *PS* 4: 974.

meaning and good sense, not only to princes, but also unto others far inferior to princes.²⁰

It is Hooker's purpose in Book VIII to explore more deeply 'in sober meaning and good sense' the manner in which the title of headship may lawfully be ascribed to the civil magistrate, according to principles of orthodox theological reasoning acknowledged by both parties to the dispute. This aim must be interpreted within the context of the argument of the *Lawes* as a whole. As it is Hooker's general purpose in each of the earlier books to demonstrate the essential agreement of various aspects of the Elizabethan ecclesiastical settlement with the precepts of reformed doctrinal and ecclesiological orthodoxy, so this same governing principle can be seen in the construction of his argument in defence of the doctrine of the royal headship.

Having challenged the underlying assumption of Cartwright's objections — namely, that it is necessary to argue 'negatively' from the authority of Scripture in matters of church polity, and thereby to restrict the application of the title of 'Head of the Church' to Christ alone — Hooker proceeds to distinguish and analyse three basic differences between the title of headship as applied on the one hand to Christ, and as applied on the other to the Civil Magistrate.²¹ For Hooker, the title is not inherently 'univocal', but rather 'equivocal'; what is required, in his view, is closer analysis of the logic governing the application of the title. The title may be applied to both Christ and earthly princes so long as the theological difference between the 'two kinds of Headship' is made clear and upheld. For Hooker, there is a threefold distinction between the 'two kinds of Headship' which follows a rigorous logic; they correspond to the categories of 'order, measure, and kind'. (*LEP* 8.4.5) These three modes of distinction correspond, as we shall see, to the three relevant branches of theological discourse, namely systematic doctrine, ecclesiology, and soteriology. In making the case in favour of a difference in 'order' between Christ's headship and the ecclesiastical headship of earthly princes, Hooker appeals to the distinctions of fundamental Trinitarian and Christological doctrine. The introduction of a difference of 'measure' or 'degree' of power raises fundamental issues of an ecclesiological nature, with special reference to the distinction between the mystical and visible Churches. Finally, the question of the 'two kinds of power' raises the prominent soteriological issue of the Reformation, namely the doctrine of the two realms and two regiments.

20. Jewel, *PS* 4: 975.

21. *LEP* 8.4.5.

According to Hooker's first category of distinction between the two 'orders' of headship, Christ is said to be head of the Church according to his participation of divine nature, whereas the headship of the prince is according to a finite, human 'order':

It is not simplie the *title of Head* which lifteth our *Saviour* above all powers, but the *title of Head* in such sort understood, as the *Apostle* himself ment it, so that the same being imparted in an other sense unto others [i.e. the Civil Magistrate] doth not any way make those others therein equalles in as much as diversitie of thinges is usuall to be understood, even when of wordes there is no diversitie and it is only the adding of one and the self same thing unto diverse persons which doth argue equalitie in them. Yf I terme *Christ* and *Caesar Lords* yet this is no equalling of *Caesar* with *Christ*, because it is not thereby intended. *To terme the Emperour Lord* (sayth *Tertullian*) *I for myn own part will not refuse so that I be not required to term him Lord in the same sense that God is so termed.* (LEP 8.4.3)

The power which Christ holds as head of the Church is understood by Hooker, in the first instance, relative to his participation in the divine substance:

God hath given him to his *Church* for the Head *ὑπὲρ πάντα*, above all *ὑπεράνω πάσης τῆς ἀρχῆς*, Farr above all principalitie and power . . . whereas the power which others have is subordinated unto his. (LEP 8.4.5)

The divine sovereignty is infinite by virtue of its being entirely *self-limiting*: 'the being of God is a kind of law to his working: for that perfection which God is giveth perfection to that he doth'. (LEP 1.2.2) All other powers are distinguished by 'order' from the divine power by virtue of being contained and limited by that highest power which is alone self-limiting. Hooker's discussion of this distinction of 'order' suggests the influence of a Neoplatonic logic consistent with his generic division of the laws in Book I.²² Power is the necessary instrument of order and where there is a

22. He summarises his conception of order quite succinctly at an earlier stage in the argument of Book VIII. See LEP 8.2.1., for example: 'And if thinges and persons be ordered, this doth imlie that they are distinguished by degrees. For order is a graduall disposition. The whole world consisting of partes so manie so different is by this only thing upheld, he which framed them hath sett them in order. Yea the very deitie it self both keepeth and requireth for ever this to be kept as a law, that wheresoever, there is a coagmentation of many, the lowest be knitt to the highest by that which being interjacent may cause each to cleave unto other and so all to continue one.' For an analysis of this concept of 'order' see W. H. Greenleaf, *Order, Empiricism and Politics: Two Traditions of English Political Thought 1500-1700* (London, 1964) ch. 2; see also David Little, *Religion, Order and Law: A Study in Pre-Revolutionary England* (Oxford, 1970), 147-66.

distinction of 'orders' there is a corresponding distinction of 'powers'. Thus for Hooker the error of Cartwright's first objection to the royal headship of the Church is grounded in a failure to distinguish the orders of being, and consequently their respective and distinct powers. So long as the distinction is preserved between an 'infinite' power corresponding to an infinite substance or divine order on the one hand, and a finite power on the level of a finite, human order on the other, the title of headship may reasonably be applied to both levels simultaneously. Thus 'in sober meaning and good theological sense' there is a distinction of infinite and finite, divine and human headships according to their difference of order.

The second difference between Christ's infinite and the civil magistrate's finite headship affirmed by Hooker concerns 'measure of power' or 'degree'. (*LEP* 8.4.5; *FLE* 3:361). Whilst Christ's authority reaches 'over all places, persons, and things', and continues forever to be exercised by him, the power of the Magistrate is limited by the territory over which his finite sovereignty extends: 'Christ is sayd to be universally Head, and King no further then within his own dominions'. (*LEP* 8.4.7) For Cartwright, on the other side, the so-called 'ubiquity' of Christ's power itself renders the civil magistrate's claim to the title of headship superfluous.²³ Furthermore, he argues, it belongs 'to his kingly office/ which god his heavenly Father annointed hym unto' to appoint 'the owtward governement of his church'. (*TC* 2: 440) In his response to this objection, Hooker draws upon the ecclesiological principles developed in the earlier books of his treatise in order to demonstrate the need to distinguish the headship of the visible church within a limited territory from that of the universal visible church throughout the world.²⁴ He suggests that Cartwright's confusion of the 'two churches' leads inevitably to his rejection of the royal headship. At issue is the doctrine of Christ's 'ubiquity', a Christological point which bitterly divided the magisterial reformers even among themselves.²⁵ As we shall see in our consideration below of the Christological implications of the headship debate, Hooker upholds the orthodox Reformed teaching in this matter.

The third and final distinction posited by Hooker, that which he himself calls the 'weightiest' of the three, concerns 'the very kinde

23. See *TC* 2: 413: 'Christ is never severed from his body/ nor from any parte of yt/ and is able/ and doeth perform that wherefore he is called head/ unto all his church.'

24. Especially Book III of the *Lawes*.

25. François Wendel, *Calvin*, 223-4, 345-50. See also E. D. Willis, *Calvin's Catholic Christology: The Function of the so-called extra-Calvinisticum in Calvin's Theology* (Leiden, 1966) 9-25.

of their power'. (LEP 8.4.5) Christ's power is exercised invisibly and spiritually insofar as 'his corporeall residence is in heaven', whereas the power of the Civil Magistrate is visible and outward:

The Headship which we give unto Kings is altogether *visibly* exercised and ordereth only the *externall* frame of the Churches affayres heer amongst us, so that it plainly differeth from Christs even in very nature and kinde. (LEP 8.4.5) [my italics]

This last difference between visible and invisible power, between 'two kinds of Dominion' based upon a distinction of two realms — the spiritual and the external or the *forum conscientiae* and the *forum externum* — constitutes the cornerstone of Hooker's attack upon the soteriological assumptions of Cartwright and the Disciplinarians. Throughout the chapter Hooker appeals to the principles of reformed orthodoxy with regard to the two realms doctrine in order to turn the disciplinarians' arguments back against themselves. He appeals yet again to the doctrine called the '*extra-Calvinisticum*' that is to say that Christ's 'corporeall residence is in heaven'.²⁶ He accuses Cartwright of confusing the two distinct kinds of power in his assertion of Christ's ruling presence in the visible church, and thereby overturning the due distinction of the properties peculiar to the divine and human natures of Christ.

*The Admonition Controversy and the Doctrine of Headship*²⁷

The principal theological elements of the question of headship emerge in the course of Thomas Cartwright's polemical exchanges with Archbishop Whitgift in the so-called Admonition Controversy 1570s. A review of the development of their respective positions will set Hooker's analysis of the issue in the context of contemporary debate. The *Admonition to the Parliament* of 1572 had identified the establishment of the three essential 'marks' of the church — word, sacraments, and discipline — with Christ's own jurisdiction. The Establishment is urged by the Admonitioners 'to go forward to a thorough and a speedy reformation' and to 'altogether remove whole anti-christ, both head, body, and branch, and perfectly plant that purity of the word, that simplicity of the sacraments, and that severity of discipline which Christ hath commanded and commended to his Church.' (WW3: 314). Cartwright

26. I am considerably indebted to E. D. Willis's analysis of the function of the doctrine so named in reformed theology. See *Calvin's Catholic Christology*, 1-7.

27. There is a brief but succinct discussion of the question of headship in the Admonition Controversy in A. F. Scott Pearson, *Church and State*, 28-38. See also D. J. McGinn, *The Admonition Controversy*, (New Brunswick, 1949), ch. 7. esp. 117.

expands upon this theme of the 'third mark' of 'discipline' in *A Replie* with the statement that the reformation of the Church cannot be complete until

our Saviour Christ sitteth wholly and fully, not only in his chair to teach, but also in his throne to rule, not alone in the hearts of every one by his Spirit, but also generally and in the visible government of his Church, by those laws of discipline which he hath prescribed. (TC 1:155; WW 3: 315)

Cartwright's insistence on the jurisdiction of Christ in the external government of the church sets the stage for the conflict over the title of headship. Whitgift's response is directed to the soteriological and ecclesiological assumptions implicit in such a view. He appeals to the doctrine of the two realms and two regiments in order to demonstrate that Christ's headship is restricted to the inward, mystical government of the church.²⁸

Cartwright rejects this traditional magisterial interpretation of the two realms logic. The soteriological significance of the disagreement over the title of headship is readily apparent in the following passage from his *Second Replie*:

For to overthrowe this doctrine that Christe alone is head of his church/ this distinction is browghte/ that according to the *inward influence off grace*/ Christe onely is head: but according to the *outward government*/ the being of head is commen with him to others. For answer wherunto I referre my self in parte to that I have written before/ off the *absurde distinction* betwene the government off the church by the mynisterie off men/ instituted off our Sav[iour] Christ/ and his spirituall governmente. For that if there be no head but Christe/ in respecte of the spirituall governmente: there is no head but he in respecte of the *worde/ sacramentes/ and discipline* administred by those whom he hath appoincted/ *forasmuch as that is also his spirituall governmente*. . . yt followeth that *even in the outwarde societie/ and meetinges off the church/ no symple man can be called the head of it*. Seeing that our Saviour Christe doinge the whole office off the head him selfe alone: leaveth nothing to men/ by doing wheroff they maie obtaine that tytyle. (TC 2:414) [my italics]

28. See WW 3: 419. 'Christ is the head of the church, and spiritually governeth the same in the conscience; but because it hath an outward and visible form, therefore it requireth an outward and visible government, which Christ doth execute as well by the civil magistrate, as he does by the ecclesiastical minister; and therefore the government of the church, in respect of the external and visible form of it, is not only spiritual. Christ governeth by himself spiritually only, and by his ministers both spiritually and externally.'

Both parties address the problem of the visible headship initially in relation to archiepiscopal and episcopal authority. Against Whitgift and in support of the Admonitioners, Cartwright allows that Christ alone is 'arch-shepherd', and that 'he is not only said the head, and yet notwithstanding there is not more heads of the church but he'. (TC 1:61) There was never any such 'superiority of ministers' prescribed in the New Testament. In defence of this repudiation of ecclesiastical hierarchy, Cartwright rejects the well-established distinction of reformed ecclesiology between the spiritual and external realms of order:

The D[octo]r[s] answer unto the second proposition by distinction . . . is full of disorder/ and hath nothing sound. First yt faulteth in that yt rendeth a sunder thinges which can not be seperated/ and that two waies: one in separating the government of the church by pastors/ doctors/ etc. from the spirituall. For when the ecclesiasticall ministrie hath respecte to the sowle/ and conscience: when yt is called the mynisterie off the spirite/ spirituall: when they which execute yt/ are called mynisters in the kingdom off heaven: when the owtward preaching/ excommunication/ and other discipline which they use/ be spirituall: *this seperation off the owtward government off the church from the spirituall*, and making off them opposite members/ doth not distinguishe but *destroie the government off Christe*. (TC 2:409, 410) [my italics]

Whitgift strongly opposed this confusion of the two orders of government. In his *Defense of the Answer* he clarifies this distinction later taken up by Hooker, namely between two distinct kinds of regiment:

[Christ] is only 'Archbishop' and Bishop in respect of his spiritual government, which he keepeth only unto himself, and in the respect that all other be under him, and have their authority from him. But this name may also aptly be given unto those that have the oversight of other bishops in the external government of the church. (WW 2:85)

Thus episcopal regiment or jurisdiction is analysed strictly in accordance with the ecclesiological distinction between the Church as 'mystical body' and as 'politic body'. The mystical episcopal power of Christ is to be kept clearly distinct from the external jurisdiction of bishops in the visible church. In the course of this dispute with Whitgift over the title, jurisdiction, and hierarchy of bishops and archbishops, Cartwright develops the *theological* standpoint from which he was later to attack the royal headship of the Church. For him the concept of episcopal hierarchy derogates from the peculiar mediatorial office of Christ.²⁹ Indeed the

29. See TC 1:61; WW 2:81 'It is unlawful for any man to take upon him

whole controversy between Cartwright and Whitgift centres upon the precise *manner* in which Christ's authority over the Church is exercised, that is to say whether it is mediated or unmediated by finite, external means and persons. It is of great consequence to the ultimate coherence of the Disciplinary ecclesiology that Christ, and no other, should exercise episcopal authority over his body the Church. Christ's unmediated headship is of such great importance that Cartwright sees it as a matter of fundamental doctrinal orthodoxy. So also Disciplinary resistance to the Civil Magistrate's claim to the title of ecclesiastical headship is deeply rooted in these same theological principles.

Disputation between Cartwright and Whitgift on the subject of the lay-headship emerged at various points in the course of the Admonition Controversy. The question is discussed in the context of the definition of jurisdictional powers claimed by the Disciplinary Eldership³⁰, in the debate over the performance of civil functions of ecclesiastical persons³¹, and in relation to other 'topics' of the controversy as well.³² The particular element of that debate which is of special interest in our present inquiry, however, is that which gave rise to Cartwright's appeal to the authority of certain distinctions of received Trinitarian and Christological orthodoxy in support of his theory of the headship. For Cartwright, the structure of authority in the Church is ultimately a theological problem. Hooker evidently agrees with Cartwright's estimation of the theological nature of the issue. Indeed, he chooses to employ Cartwright's own theological-doctrinal framing of the question as a starting-point for his own analysis of the royal headship.

As we have shown, the dispute over the authority of bishops in the Church provided the occasion for Cartwright's initial theological observations on the concept of headship of the Church. Cartwright insists that 'the title of an archbishop is only proper to our Saviour Christ; therefore none may take that unto him'. (TC 1:61; WW 2:81) Following the lead of the Admonitioners,

those titles which are proper to our Saviour Christ; but the title of an archbishop is only proper to our Saviour Christ; therefore none may take that unto him. That it is proper to our Saviour Christ appeareth by that which St. Peter saith, where he calleth him ἀρχιποίμην which is 'arch-shepherd', or archbishop; for bishop and shepherd are all one . . . which titles are never found to be given unto any, but unto our Saviour Christ, and are proper titles of his mediation, and therefore cannot be without bold presumption applied unto any mortal man.'

30. WW 3:150ff.

31. WW 3:404ff.

32. See, for example, Cartwright's and Whitgift's opposed interpretations of Matt. 20, 'whether Christ forbiddeth rule and superiority unto the ministers', WW 1:148-174.

Cartwright grounds this view in the negative authority of Scripture. (WW 2:79) Cartwright cites a variety of scriptural texts which refer to Christ's episcopal role, such as the 'arch-leader of life and of salvation' or 'the great Shepherd of the sheep'. (TC 1:61; WW 2:82) Whitgift's response to this argument is to insist on a clear distinction between the spiritual and the external regiment of the Church:

In the spiritual regiment Christ is only the Pastor; and all other be his sheep: in the external regiment there be many other pastors. In the spiritual regiment Christ is only the Archbishop, and governeth all, to whom all other must make their account; but in the external government there may be many archbishops, as the state of every church requireth. (WW 2:83,84)

A great deal in this debate turns upon this distinction of the spiritual and the external realms; this is also most certainly the case for Hooker, as we shall see. Indeed, Whitgift distinguished with an almost Cartesian clarity between the spiritual and external realms, between what later philosophers would term *res cogitans* and *res extensa*³³, or what Calvin himself referred to as the *forum conscientiae* and the *forum externum*.³⁴ Whitgift's defence of the concept of ecclesiastical hierarchy in general and of the office of bishops and archbishops in particular stems from this clear separation of an external realm of human association subject to coercive law and outward rule, on the one hand, and an internal realm of spiritual association governed by the inward-working of Grace and the Holy Ghost.³⁵ This sharp distinction between the mystical or inward realm and the political or external realm provides the underlying logic for Whitgift's subsequent defence of the Civil Magistrate's sovereign authority over the Church.

Cartwright responds to Whitgift's argument by rejecting this distinction between spiritual and external authority outright. In his view the external government of the Church is 'spiritual', and the distinction between the two regiments urged by Whitgift undermines 'the government of Christ'. (TC 2:410) The issue is the

33. R. Descartes, 'Meditations on First Philosophy' in *The Philosophical Writings*, translated by John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch, 2 vols. (Cambridge, 1984) ii, 1-50.

34. *Inst.* 3.19.15.

35. WW 1:6 'It is to be understood that there is a double government of the church, the one *spiritual*, the other external. Christ only, and none other, by the operation of his Spirit and direction of his word, spiritually governeth his church, and reigning *in the consciences* of the faithful guideth their minds . . . The *external* government hath both a substance and a matter about which it is occupied, and also a form to attain the same, consisting in certain offices and functions . . .' [my italics].

manner of interpreting the precise nature of the distinction and connection of the two realms. The theological problem underlying the royal headship of the Church arises, for Cartwright, in the context of controversy concerning the nature of episcopal authority. He moves directly from his attack on the archiepiscopal office within the visible structure of the Church to question the royal headship itself. As we shall see, there is a very close connection within Cartwright's theology between Christ's pastoral 'shepherding' role and his sovereign 'kingly' role, and hence between the conceptions of episcopacy and royal supremacy, insofar as 'Princes are said to be Heads under Christ' as well as bishops:

And, if any man will reply and say that it is not said that our Saviour Christ is only archbishop, I answer that he is not only said the head, and yet notwithstanding there is no more heads of the church but he. And, if it be further said that these archbishops are but under and as it were subordinate archbishops, I say that a man may as well say that men may be also under-heads of the church; which is the same which is alleged for the pope. (TC 1:61; WW 2:84)

In response, Whitgift presses further with his distinction of the two realms and draws into the discussion the final, remaining element in the debate over the admissibility of ecclesiastical hierarchy, viz. the civil magistrate as head:

Christ is 'the only Head of the Church': if by the head you understand that which giveth the body life, sense, and motion; for Christ only by his Spirit doth give life and nutriment to his body: he only doth pour spiritual blessings into it, and doth inwardly direct and govern it. Likewise, he is only the Head of the whole church; for that title cannot agree to any other. But, if by 'the head' you understand an external ruler and governor of any particular nation or church (in which signification head is usually taken), then I do not perceive why the magistrate may not as well be called the head of the church, that is, the chief governor of it in the external policy, as he is called the head of the people, and of the commonwealth. (WW 2:85)

Thus the fundamental doctrinal distinction of the two realms is stabilised and upheld in the theory of headship by the distinction between the spiritual rule of Christ in the ecclesiastical *forum conscientiae* and the external, political rule of the godly prince in the ecclesiastical *forum exterum*.

So far we have examined Cartwright's position as set forth in his initial *Replie to an Answer Made of Doctor Whitgift* (TC 1). It is, however, in his *Second Replie against Master Whitgift's Second Answer* (TC 2 and 3), written in response to Whitgift's *Defence of*

the Answer, that Cartwright expounds most fully the explicitly doctrinal grounds of his objections. He does so in a direct response to the position argued by Whitgift in the passage from the *Defence* quoted immediately above, where he urged that the Civil Magistrate may be regarded as head of the Church 'under Christ' according to the crucial distinction of the spiritual and external realms or orders of rule. (WW 2:85) In his rejoinder (TC 2:411ff.), Cartwright accuses Whitgift of achieving precisely the opposite of his professed intention of holding apart the spiritual and the external realms. Just as in the case of the title archbishop, the title of headship is, for Cartwright, proper to Christ alone, and 'therefore cannot be without bold presumption applied unto any mortal man'. (TC 1:61) In order to establish firmly his assertion of Christ's *sole* headship of the Church, Cartwright launches a direct attack on the theological foundation of Whitgift's distinction between the spiritual and external realms and regiments. For Cartwright this involves a remarkable re-definition of the 'spiritual' government of the Church:

Seing therefore the externall government off Christ in his church is spirituall/ and even that inward towch off the spirite of God/ is not ordinarily/ but by the subordinate ministeries which God hath appointed in his church: yt is manifest that the distinction/ that *Christ hath no subordinate pastors underneath him in spiritual government*, is false. (TC 2:410)

For Cartwright it was Whitgift's error to have treated the external ministrations of the Church, including its government, as not spiritual. Thus he repudiates Whitgift's distinction by emphasizing the immediate union of the spiritual end and the external means.

Cartwright's justification for this 'spiritualised' external ministry, under the 'unmediated' headship of Christ, is sustained by a direct appeal to the categories of Trinitarian and Christological discourse. Cartwright's purpose is to establish the Disciplinary view of Christ's *sole* headship of the Church in the stronghold of basic systematic doctrine.³⁶ Thus his argument proceeds to challenge Whitgift's basic Christological assumptions:

The other faulte of this distinction [i.e. between spiritual and external government of the Church] is/ that yt confoundeth and shuffleth together the autoritie of our Saviour Christ/ as he is the sonne off God onely before all wordes/ coequall with his father: with that which he hath gyven off his father and which he exerciseth in respecte he is mediator betwene God and us. For in the government off the church/ and superioritytie over the officers off it/ our Saviour Christ himselfe hath a superior/

36. See especially TC 2: 410-419; compare TC 1: 145, 155 and TC 3: 151-70.

which is his father: but in the government off kingdomes/ and other commonwealthes/ and in the superiority which he hath over kinges/ and judges/ he hath no superior/ but immediate authoritie with his father. Therefore the mouldinge upp off the two estates/ and governementes together/ is to lay the foundations of many errors. (TC 2:411)

By means of this association of his own interpretation of the problem of headship with such high doctrine, Cartwright implies that the Establishment's view is grounded in fundamentally heterodox theological assumptions. This is the highest possible level of argument that Cartwright could have chosen to take and is clearly indicative of the theological significance attached by him to the question of the Royal Supremacy.

According to Cartwright's position, then, Christ has a *double* role or function as the 'God-man'. On the one hand, he is the source of all authority in the secular political order by virtue of his being the Son of God; on the other hand, he exercises ultimate power as head of his body, the Church, through his Manhood. Cartwright's bases his twofold distinction of Christ's ruling functions on the fundamental Christological distinction between the human and divine natures in the single person of Christ. On the one hand, Christ *qua* Son of Man and Redeemer, that is to say, according to his human nature, is inferior to the Father. (TC 2: 417) For it is through his assumption of the human nature that Christ is able to mediate between God and men. And for Cartwright, Christ's mediatorial role as Redeemer is identified with his specific function as head of the Church. On the other hand, Christ's relation of equality with the Father stems from his participation in the divine nature. Cartwright proceeds to apply this distinction of the two natures of Christ — the human and the divine — to the question of headship and to the closely related matter of the nature of the association between the Church and secular political community. Power and authority in the Church, he argues, has its ultimate source in Christ as the Son of Man, the Mediator, and therefore Christ as he is 'subordinate to the Father'. By contrast, authority in the civil community is not derived from Christ as man and mediator, but rather from Christ as the Divine Son, 'co-equal with the Father'. As the supreme source of all civil jurisdiction, Christ is not viewed as subordinate to the Father. For the Disciplinarian, Christ's humanity is the source of ecclesiastical government whereas all other worldly government derives directly from his deity. Thus Cartwright argues for a division of civil and ecclesiastical jurisdiction corresponding directly to the distinction between the divine and human natures of Christ. The importance of this doctrinal justification to the understanding

of Cartwright's interpretation of the headship question can hardly be overestimated. As we shall see, Hooker's own analysis of the question of the royal headship in Book VIII is a detailed commentary upon, and criticism of, this theological excursus by Cartwright in the *Second Replie*.

Hooker's Response to Cartwright's Theological Objections

Hooker's response to Cartwright's claims concerning the exclusive nature of Christ's headship of the Church addresses the underlying theological crux of the Royal Supremacy debate. Cartwright's distinction between Christ's authority over the Church from his universal authority over secular political communities according to the distinction of his two natures is viewed by Hooker as the theological pivot of the Disciplinary objection to the royal headship. Were these basic theological assumptions shown to be in error then the entire Disciplinary case against the royal headship would collapse. Such a challenge of orthodoxy is precisely Hooker's approach to Cartwright's arguments. Hooker begins by questioning the Disciplinary premise that 'for the Civil Magistrate his office belongeth unto kingdomes and commonwealths, neither is he therein an under or subordinate Head of Christ considering that *his authoritie commeth from God simple and immediately even as our Saviour Christ's doth*'. (TC 2:418; q.v. FLE 3:366) That is to say, civil authority derives from the Godhead without the mediation of Christ, the 'God-man', and is thus fundamentally distinguished from ecclesiastical authority. Cartwright's assertion of a 'twofold superioritie' in Christ according to his twofold nature ensures that ecclesiastical and civil jurisdiction coincide solely in the person of Christ himself, who alone is the perfect union of Godhead and Manhood. Ecclesiastical jurisdiction originates in Christ according to his *human* nature; civil jurisdiction originates in Christ simply as he is the second *divine* person of the Trinity. Cartwright's assertion of such a doctrinal basis for the derivation of authority requires that ecclesiastical and civil authority remain wholly distinct and separate *in the world*:

For the church is governed with that kind of government which the philosophers that write of the best commonwealths affirm to be the best. For, in respect of Christ the head, it is a monarchy; and, in respect of the ancients and pastors that govern in common and with like authority amongst themselves, it is an aristocracy, or the rule of the best men; and, in respect that the people are not secluded, but have their interest in church-matters, it is a democracy, or a popular estate. An image whereof appeareth also in the policy of this realm; for as, in respect of the queen her majesty, it is a monarchy, so,

in respect of the most honourable council, it is an aristocracy, and having regard to the parliament, which is assembled of all estates, it is a democracy. (TC 1:35; WW 1:390)

Here the civil and ecclesiastical polities are *parallel*, each with a complete constitution and head of its own. Cartwright compares the Church and the Commonwealth 'unto Hippocrates' twins, which were sick together and well together, laughed together, and weeped together, and always like affected'. (WW 1:23) The analogy suggests a close relationship of Church and Commonwealth, yet there is a 'personal' separation — two heads, two separate corporate subsistences, two *societates perfectae*.³⁷ For Hooker such a separation within the source of authority, and its consequent 'personal' separation of the civil from the ecclesiastical community implies an inevitable de-Christianising of the secular political order. He seeks to show his opponent that this separation is based upon a mistaken set of soteriological, ecclesiological and Christological assumptions. Hooker's whole consideration of Cartwright's objections to the royal headship, as with his treatment of the relation of Church and Commonwealth, is concentrated in a comprehensive analysis of Cartwright's fundamental doctrinal claims. It is Hooker's purpose to expose Cartwright's assumptions respecting the two realms doctrine as founded upon 'manifest error', 'misconceit', and 'slipp of judgement' (LEP 8.4.6, 7) — all in relation to his appeal to the authority of basic doctrine.

Hooker's answer to Cartwright's 'opposition against the first difference whereby Christ being Head simple Princes are sayd to be Heads under Christ' begins as follows:

First that as *Christ* being *Lord* or *Head* over all doth by vertue of that *Soveraigntie* rule all, so he hath no more a superiour in governing his *Church* then in exercising *soveraigne Dominion* upon the rest of the world besides. Secondly, that all authoritie as well civill as *Ecclesiasticall* is subordinate unto his: And thirdly that the *Civill Magistrate* . . . is an Head even subordinated of and to *Christ*. (LEP 8.4.6)

The ensuing analysis of Cartwright's appeal to the fundamental principles of doctrinal orthodoxy breaks down in the following manner: first Hooker considers the Trinitarian implications of the question, namely the manner in which God is in Christ, and Christ in God; secondly he moves on to the Christological issue of how the divine and human natures are united in Christ; thirdly he

37. This analogy is discussed by A. F. Scott Pearson, in *Church and State: Political Aspects of Sixteenth-Century Puritanism*, (Cambridge, 1928), 19, 20. See TC 1:35; WW 1:390 where Church and Commonwealth are portrayed as *parallel* 'mixed' polities.

analyses the nature of the union between Christ and his body, the Church; and finally, he considers the royal headship in light of the two realms logic. On each of these levels of doctrine — namely the Trinitarian, the Christological, the ecclesiological, and the soteriological — Hooker aims to expose critical flaws in Cartwright's doctrinal orthodoxy. By means of Cartwright's own polemical device, namely the appeal to systematic doctrine, Hooker sets out to turn the charge of heterodoxy completely around. It is his purpose to show that the Disciplinary argument rests upon an extremely dubious doctrinal base at best; at worst, Cartwright will be exposed as an unscrupulous ideologue willing to distort the orthodox teaching of the Church in order to justify a programme of partisan practical reforms. For both Whitgift and Hooker, the hallmark of the Disciplinary theology is a confusion of matters 'essential' to salvation with matters 'accessory'. (*WW* 1:185; *LEP* 3.3.1-4) This argument is crucial to their identification of the Establishment's cause with the magisterial Reformation and of the Disciplinary with the radical position.³⁸

The Trinitarian Question

In his *Second Replie* Cartwright sets out to justify his assertion of Christ's sole headship of the Church on the grounds of Trinitarian orthodoxy. In his analysis of the Trinitarian implications of the headship question, he is intent on the demonstration of three principles. First he argues that Christ exercises an essentially divided authority over human community — a 'twofold superioritie'. (*TC* 2:411) On the one hand, in his government of the Church, Christ rules 'in respecte he is mediator betwene God and us', and thus 'hath a superior/ which is his father'; on the other hand, 'in the governement off kingdomes/ and other commen wealthes', Christ rules solely by virtue of his being 'the sonne off God *onely* before all worldes/ coequall with his father'. (*TC* 2:411) Thus Christ exercises one kind of power as a divine person of the Trinity, 'as God co-equall with his Father and the Holy Spirit' and another 'as me-

38. It should be noted here that Hooker's division of the principal theological issues parallels his discussion of key principles of systematic theology immediately preceding a discussion of the Sacraments in Book V. The close logical connection between the systematic theology of Book V and the problem of headship will become clearer in the ensuing discussion. See *LEP* 5.51.1 for the Trinitarian analysis: 'That God is in Christ by the personall incarnation of the Sonne who is very God'; 5.52.1 for the Christological analysis: 'The misinterpretations which heresie hath made of the maner how God and man are united in one Christ', and also 5.53-55; finally, 5.56.1 for the ecclesiological analysis: 'The union or mutuall participation which is betwene Christ and the Church of Christ in this present worlde.'

diatour of God and man/ in which respect even yet in his infinite glory he enjoyeth/ he is and shall be under his father, and holy ghoste'. (TC 2: 417) Having drawn this primary distinction of powers within Christ as the ultimate source of authority in all forms of community, Cartwright deduces his second principle: civil power is derived from the divine nature *immediately* and simply, while ecclesiastical authority is dependent on Christ as a participant of human nature.³⁹ In this respect he makes no difference between pagan and Christian civil authority.⁴⁰ Thirdly, Cartwright denies by way of conclusion from these premises that the Civil Magistrate may claim the headship of the Church *under* Christ. Christ Himself retains this role exclusively and stands in the same 'subordinate' relation to God *qua* head of the Church as the Civil Magistrate does *qua* head of the Commonwealth.⁴¹ Church and Commonwealth are thus united hypostatically in Christ's own person, in an 'invisible' monarchy which alone unites the divine and human natures and consequently supreme ecclesiastical and civil jurisdictions. Thus Cartwright seeks to justify the separation of civil and ecclesiastical jurisdiction in the visible Christian community on the high doctrinal ground of preserving the distinction between Christ as a divine person of the Trinity *equal* to the other two persons and Christ as *unequall* in his role as Redeemer.

Hooker impugns Cartwright's interpretation of Trinitarian orthodoxy on the following grounds:

That which the Father doth work as *Lord* and *King* over all he worketh not without but by the sonne who through coeternall generation receiveth of the Father that power which the Father hath of himself. (LEP 8.4.6)

39. TC 2: 417. 'To wyt that as God simply he hath ordeined certain means to serve his providence in the preservation of mankind: so as God and man/ he hath ordeined other certain for the gathering and keeping of his church . . . our Sav. Christe in respect of his mediaturship towards us/ exerciseth not the civill sword.'

40. See TC 2: 417, 418. 'And in that the authoritie of the sword in heathen princes (although not alike used) is the same ordinance of God as that in Christian: the one proceeding of God immediately/ and not from our Sav. Christe as mediatur, thother doth likewise.' See also WW 3:297-8.

41. See TC 1:145; WW 3:198. 'It is sufficient to admonish you that, although it be granted that the government of one be the best in the commonwealth, yet it cannot be in the church. [i.e. the visible church] For the prince may well be monarch immediately between God and Commonwealth; but no one can be monarch between God and his church but Christ, which is the only Head therof. Therefore the monarchy over the whole church, and over every particular church, and over every singular member in the church, is in Christ alone.'

As we have seen, Cartwright asserted in the *Second Replie* that Christ's sovereign authority was divided in two. On the one hand, Christ rules as the Son of Man over the Church and therefore as 'subordinate to the Father'; on the other hand he rules as God over all the rest of the world, over all kingdoms, wherein he acts as 'coequal with the Father'. (TC 2:411ff) For Hooker, this in effect renders Christ 'unequall to himself'. (LEP 8.4.6.; FLE 3:366) He responds that 'all power in heaven and earth', not simply power over secular political institutions, belongs to Christ as the 'consubstantial Word of God'. This universality of Christ's authority derives expressly from his divine nature. Cartwright's suggestion that Christ exercises his headship of the Church apart from his divine Sonship, solely through his subordinate relation to the Father *qua* Mediator, undermines the orthodox doctrine of the Trinity. Christ's authority as 'king' is for Hooker an attribute of his divinity:

The Father by the Sonne both did create and guide all. Wherefore *Christ* hath supreme dominion over the whole universall world. *Christ* is *God*, *Christ* is λόγος the consubstantiall word of *God*. (LEP 8.4.6; FLE 3:364)

For Hooker, Christ's universal headship of the Church cannot be severed from his divine power. Cartwright's suggestion that Christ exercises his power of Dominion solely through his manhood and not his divine nature leads to a distortion of basic Trinitarian dogma:

Wherefore unlesse it can be proved that all the workes of our Saviours government in the Church are done by the meer and only force of his humane nature, there is no remedie but to acknowledg it a manifest error that *Christ* in the government of the world is equall unto the Father but not in the government of the *Church*. Indeed to the honour of this *Dominion* it cannot be sayd that God did exalt him otherwise then only according to that humane nature wherin he was made low. For as the Sonne of God there could no advancement or exaltation grow unto him. And yet the dominion wherunto he was in his humane nature lifted up is not without divine power exercised. (LEP 8.4.6; FLE 3:367)

Hooker attributes Cartwright's error in this matter to his mistaken premise that 'Christ as Mediatour' is the well-spring of 'all the works of regiment' in the Church. (LEP 8.4.6; FLE 3:364) This premise implies a confusion of Christ's regal power with his priestly or mediatorial function: 'in truth government doth belong to his *Kingly* office, *mediatorship* to his priestly'. (LEP 8.4.6) Both civil and ecclesiastical government are included by Hooker

in Christ's kingship. While in his role as mediator between God and man, Christ acts properly in his character as 'Sonne of Man', that is to say, accordingly to his human nature; nevertheless, even in this case, mediation is possible only by virtue of the so-called 'grace of union' whereby Christ's manhood is conjoined to his deity. (*LEP* 5.54.3,4)

Hooker's strong emphasis here upon Trinitarian orthodoxy echoes the discussion in Book V, chapter 51. Here he sets down in clear terms his adherence to the doctrine of Christ's so-called 'consubstantial equality' with the Father as defined in the *Thirty-Nine Articles of Religion* and the Athanasian creed⁴²:

For the substance of God with this propertie *to be of none* doth make the person of the father; the verie selfe same substance in number with this propertie *to be of the father* maketh the person of the Sonne; the same substance having added unto it the propertie of *proceedinge from the other two* maketh the person of the holie Ghost. So that in everie person there is implied both the substance of God which is one, and also that propertie which causeth the same person, reallie and trulie to differ from the other two. Everie person hath his owne subsistence which no other besides hath, although there be others that are of the same substance . . . Notwithstandinge for as much as the worde and deitie are one subject, wee must beware wee exclude not the nature of God from incarnation and so make the Sonne of God incarnate not to be verie God. For undoubtedly even the nature of God it selfe in the only person of the Sonne is incarnate and hath taken to it selfe flesh. (*LEP* 5.51.1,2)⁴³

Just as it was Cartwright's own intention to impugn Archbishop Whitgift's doctrinal orthodoxy in the *Second Replie*, so here in the *Lawes* Hooker himself sets out to turn these theological objections completely around in order to establish the theological reasonableness of the Royal Supremacy. For it is indeed the theological reasonableness of the royal title of headship of the Church which Hooker aims to establish by his careful response to Cartwright's polemic. Hooker's appeal to the fundamentals of orthodox systematic doctrine provides the most convincing, irenic argument to win over even the staunchest upholders of the Calvinist *Disciplina* to a conscientious submission to the Elizabethan Establishment. Hooker does not retreat from employing the biggest guns at his disposal. In his rebuttal of Cartwright's objections to the royal headship, he seeks to clarify the consistency of the Royal

42. See articles 1 and 2. See also *LEP* 5.56.2 and 5.42.1-13.

43. Compare *LEP* 5.54.1, 2.

Supremacy with the established norms of Trinitarian orthodoxy acknowledged by both parties to the dispute.⁴⁴

The Christological Question

In his *Dedication* of Book V to his patron Archbishop Whitgift, Hooker observes that 'the waightiest conflicts the Church hath had were those which touched the person of our Saviour Christ'.⁴⁵ In a famous series of chapters later in the same book, Hooker explores in considerable detail the course of the great Christological controversies of the Early Church.⁴⁶

And for as much as there is no union of God with man without that meane betwene both which is both, it seemeth requisite that wee first consider how God is in Christ, then how Christ is in us, and how the sacramentes doe serve to make us pertakers of Christ. (*LEP* 5.50.3)

Christocentrism and strong emphasis upon the central dogmatic tradition of Christology has been viewed by some as the 'theological centre' of Hooker's thought.⁴⁷ The theological precision of the Christological discourse in Book V is presupposed by his theological analysis of the problem of headship in Book VIII. It ought to be kept in mind that these matters of Trinitarian and Christological orthodoxy were the subject of considerable controversy amongst the Reformers generally. Calvin was himself a great defender of the ancient received doctrine of the Church against such heretics as Servetus and Socinus.⁴⁸ According to François Wendel:

Calvin had made the traditional trinitarian teaching his own without the slightest reservation. The same attachment to the dogmatic tradition is prominent in his Christology. What is original in his contribution to this never touches the fundamental affirmations of the Councils of the ancient Church. He adopts in full the dogma of the two natures of Christ and the current explanations of the relation between the two natures.⁴⁹

44. That Hooker's Disciplinary critics acknowledge unconditionally the authority of the *Articles of Religion* in matters of systematic doctrine is revealed by the tone of *A Christian Letter* throughout. See *FLE* 4: 6ff.

45. See Hooker's *Dedication* of the fifth book of the *Lawes* in *FLE* 2:2.

46. *LEP* 5.52.1-5.55.9.

47. For example, Lionel Thornton, *Richard Hooker: A Study of his Theology* (London, 1924), 54ff.

48. *Inst.* 2.14.5-8. Compare *LEP* 5.42.13 where Hooker impugns the Christological orthodoxy of those who follow 'the course of extreame reformation'.

49. *Calvin*, 215.

Calvin appeals to the principles of Chalcedonian orthodoxy in support of his own theological differences with Zwingli and Luther on the doctrine of the Sacraments.⁵⁰ As Wendel clearly demonstrates, it was Calvin's purpose to hold strictly to the distinction of the two natures against the tendency of the Lutherans to a 'Euty-chian fusion' (Inst. 4.17.30) of them in the course of their defence of the ubiquity of Christ's natural body:

What mattered above all to Calvin was to avoid anything that might be interpreted as a confusion of the divinity with the humanity, even at the centre of the personality of Christ.⁵¹

Alternately, against Zwingli's tendency towards a 'Nestorian separation' of the two natures (Inst. 4.17.7), Calvin upholds their radical unity in accordance with the traditional dogma of the *communicatio idiomatum*.⁵² In Book V, Hooker follows Calvin very closely in avoiding the Scylla of a Lutheran tendency to a 'Euty-chian'⁵³ confusion of the divine and human natures in Christ and the Charybdis of a Zwinglian tendency to a 'Nestorian'⁵⁴ separation or 'hypostasising' of the two natures. Indeed, we might well laud Hooker's scruples with respect to these Christological niceties as 'Calvinian'.⁵⁵ It is on this high ground of traditional Christological orthodoxy that Hooker mounts his refutation of Cartwright's Nestorian assertion of the personal division of Christ's sovereignty over the Church and the secular political order. Contrary to this view, Hooker upholds the unity of Christ's person as the source of all power, both ecclesiastical and civil. Thus Christ as God *and* man is the source of authority in both Church and Commonwealth. Civil authority is from God 'mediately through Christ'. (LEP 8.4.6), and therefore dependent upon both his human and divine natures by the *communicatio idiomatum*. Similarly ecclesiastical jurisdiction is dependent upon Christ, although not as 'inferiour unto his Father', but as coequal in the divine nature. The Commonwealth is as much under the 'Dominion of Christ' as is the Church:

He raigneth over this world as *King* and doth those thinges wherin none is superior unto him wither we respect the workes of his providence over kingdomes or of his regiment over the *Church* . . . Wherefore to the end it may more plainly

50. See also E. D. Willis, *Calvin's Catholic Christology*, 1.

51. Wendel, *Calvin*, 220.

52. *Ibid.*, 222.

53. *Inst.* 2.14.1.

54. *Inst.* 2.14.4.

55. The term 'Calvinist' is avoided deliberately on account of its loaded associations with the history of Disciplinary Puritanism.

appeare how all authoritie of man is derived from God through *Christ* and must by *Christian* men be acknowledged to be no otherwise held then of and under him. (LEP 8.4.6)

In response to one side of Cartwright's distinction, namely that Christ is head of the Church in subordination to the Father, and therefore as the 'Sonne of Man', Hooker appeals to the doctrine of the 'communication of idioms':

. . .the dominion wherunto he was in his humane nature lifted up is not without divine power exercised. It is by divine power that the Sonne of man, who sitteth in heaven doth work, as *King* and *Lord* upon us which are on earth. (LEP 8.4.6; FLE 3:367.⁵⁶)

Hooker and Cartwright are agreed that 'all power comes from God'.⁵⁷ Their disagreement focuses rather on the manner in which this original, divine power is communicated to human community. For Hooker it is contrary to the accepted norms of Christological orthodoxy that, in the exercise of his power, the two natures of Christ could be separated in such a way that civil rule proceeds solely from his divinity and ecclesiastical from his humanity:

'That which the Father doth work as *Lord* and *King* over all he worketh not without but by the sonne who through coeternall generation receiveth of the Father that power which the Father hath of himself'. (LEP 8.4.6; FLE 3:364)

Christ's power of 'supreme Dominion' is undivided just as his person is undivided: 'Session at the right hand of God is the actual exercise of that regencie and dominion wherein the manhood of Christ is joyned and matchet with the deitie of the Sonne of God'. (LEP 5.55.8) The unity of Christ's two natures is essential to the universality of his power: '*Christ* hath supreme dominion over the whole universall world. *Christ* is *God*, *Christ* is the consubstantiall word of *God*; *Christ* is also that consubstantiall word made man'. (LEP 8.4.6) Only in a secondary sense can this undivided sovereign power — undivided as Christ's person is undivided — be distinguished into the two regiments proper to Church and Commonwealth. The two regiments are invisibly unified in

56. Compare LEP 5.53.3, 4 where Hooker refers to the 'mutual commutation' or 'mutual circulation' of the properties of the divine and human natures which is the consequence of the 'personal' union in Christ. Hooker's interpretation of Chalcedonian orthodoxy on this point is in full agreement with Calvin's - see *Inst.* 4.17.30.

57. E. G. LEP 5.56.5: 'So that all thinges which God hath made are in that respect the ofspring of God, they are *in him* as effectes in their highest cause, he likewise actualle is *in them*, thassistance and influence of his deitie is *their life*.'

Christ, their source; they are visibly unified through the Royal Supremacy. Cartwright's sharp distinction between Christ's regal authority over secular political community through his divine nature on the one hand, and his mediatorial authority over the Church through his human nature on the other, effectively removes the Church from the sphere of Christ's kingship. This spiritual kingship, as Calvin argues in the *Institutes*,⁵⁸ can only be performed by a divine, mystical power 'wherein he hath no superiour'.⁵⁹ On this Christological point Hooker is altogether on the side of Calvin and the magisterial Reformation as against the radical Disciplinarians. The Church and secular political community are both subject to Christ's kingly office, and thus both are subject to his rule as God and man.

Equally, on the other side, Hooker objects that it cannot be the case that Christ should exercise his sovereign power over the secular political order solely as 'Sonne of God'. Hooker appeals to the Christological principles enunciated earlier in the argument of Book V:

The workes of supreme Dominion which have been since the first begining wrought by the power of the Sonne of God are now most truly and properly the workes of the Sonne of man. The *word* made *flesh* doth sitt for ever and reign as Sovereigne Lord over all. (*LEP* 8.4.6; *FLE* 3:364,5)

This passage resembles closely *Lawes* 5.55.8 quoted immediately above. Over against Cartwright's Nestorian separation of the two natures, Hooker appeals to the doctrine of the 'communication of idioms', and thus to the unity of the natures of Christ's person, in order to affirm the prior 'personal' unity of civil and ecclesiastical jurisdiction. By means of the 'grace of union' (*LEP* 5.54.4), attributes which are proper to Christ's divinity cannot be wholly separated from association and cooperation with his humanity.⁶⁰ In order to understand the theological depth of the argument at this point it is useful to recall Hooker's formulation of this doctrine in Book V:

These two natures are as causes and originall groundes of all thinges which Christ hath don. Wherefore some thinges he doth as God, because his deitie alone is the well-springe from which they flowe; some thinges as man, because they issue from his meere humane nature; some thinges jointlie as both God and man, because both natures concurre as principles thereunto. (*LEP* 5.53.3)

58. *Inst.* 2.15.3.

59. *LEP* 8.4.6; *FLE* 3:367.

60. *LEP* 5.53.3.

Hooker's whole argument is intended to demonstrate that the 'power of supreme Dominion' is exercised by Christ 'jointlie as both God and man'.⁶¹ At the same time this cooperation of the two natures towards a single end need not result in the 'confounding' or 'shuffling together' of Christ's divine and human 'authoritie', of which Cartwright complained against Whitgift in his *Second Replie*.⁶² Hooker's logic of 'union in and through distinction'⁶³ is illustrated by further reference to the same Christological discourse:

For albeit the properties of ech *nature* doe cleave onlie to that nature whereof they are properties, and therefore Christ cannot *naturallie* be as God the same which he *naturallie* is as man, yeat both natures may verie well concurre unto *one effect* and Christ in that respect be trulie said to *worke* both as God and as man one and the selfe same thinge. Lett us therefore sett it downe for a rule or principle so necessarie as nothinge more to the plaine decidinge of all doubttes and questions about the union of natures in Christ, that of both natures there is a *co-operation* often, an *association* alwayes, but never any mutuall *participation* whereby the properties of the one are infused into the other. (LEP 5.53.3)

Thus Hooker seeks to show that there is no theological necessity for Cartwright's rigid 'personal' separation of the powers of Christ's two natures in order to preserve their integrity. On the contrary, such a separation overturns the received ancient formulation of orthodox Christology. Cartwright divides Christ's power between rule over the Church as Son of Man, and rule over *civil* polities as Son of God. Hooker saw this as 'manifest errour'.⁶⁴ Cartwright's suggestion that Christ was equal to the Father in the government of the world and subordinate to Him in the government of the Church is thus Christologically unsound. With a certain degree of irony Hooker invites Cartwright to show the scriptural basis of his subtle Christological device:

in what Evangelist, Apostle, or Prophett is it found, that *Christ Supreme Governour of the Church* should be so unequall to himself as he is supreme Governour of *Kingdomes* . . . as *God* and *man* he worketh in *Church* regiment, and consequently hath no more therein any superiour then in government of *Commonwealths*. (LEP 8.4.6; FLE 3:366)

Hooker ascribes the power of supreme jurisdiction or Dominion over men to Christ's Kingly office as distinct from his mediatorial

61. LEP 8.4.6; FLE 3:366.

62. TC 2:411.

63. 'Their distinction can not possiblie admitt separation', LEP 5.56.2.

64. LEP. 8.4.6.

or priestly office. In full agreement with Calvin once again, he distinguishes Christ's office of Kingship from the other principal roles belonging to his God-manhood: 'Dominion belongeth unto the *Kingly* office of *Christ* as propitiation and mediation unto his priestly, instruction unto his pastorall or propheticall office'. (LEP 8.4.6; FLE 3:365) Calvin distinguishes Christ's three primary offices according to the same formula in a chapter of the *Institutes* which follows immediately upon his own discourse on Christology.⁶⁵ Hooker upholds Calvin's distinction in this matter, and shows that the 'cause of error' behind the Disciplinary objections to the royal headship of the Church stems from a confusion of Christ's kingly and priestly offices. Cartwright in his *Second Replie* argues that the title of headship in relation to the Church belongs to Christ as Mediator, and therefore to his priestly office. (TC 2:411) Although Christ the 'High Priest' or Mediator between God and men is viewed primarily in the aspect of his so-called 'subordination to the Father', that is to say through his human nature, nevertheless, in his office of mediator, Christ cannot act solely by virtue of his manhood.⁶⁶ The success of the procurement of divine favour on behalf of humanity depends upon the personal union of that manhood to his divinity.⁶⁷ Equally, Christ's regal power is exercised through the unity of his person, as God and man together. Thus Christ does not rule in one sphere as 'Redeemer', through his human nature, and in another as 'Creator', through his divine nature. 'Dominion' belongs rather to the unity of his person:

And yet the dominion wherunto he was in his humane nature lifted up is not without divine power exercised. It is by divine power that the Sonne of man, who sitteth in heaven doth work as *King* and *Lord* upon us which are on earth. (LEP 8.4.6; FLE 3:367)

Thus Hooker's defence of the royal headship builds upon the principles of orthodox Christology comparable to those enunciated by Calvin in the *Institutes*.⁶⁸ Hooker's insistence upon the underlying unity of the two natures in the person of Christ in the exercise of

65. *Inst.* 2.15.1-6. Calvin treats the 'propheticall office of Christ' in ss. 1.2, the 'nature of the kingly power of Christ' in ss. 3-5, and 'the Priesthood of Christ' in section 6. See E. D. Willis, *Calvin's Catholic Christology*, 78-98.

66. See *Inst.* 2.14.3: 'Let us, therefore, regard it as the key to true interpretation, that those things which refer to the office of Mediator are not spoken of the divine or human nature simply.' Compare TC 2:416.

67. *Inst.* 2.15.6: 'This honour we extend to his whole character of Mediator, so that he who was born of a Virgin, and on the cross offered himself in sacrifice to the Father, is truly and properly the Son of God. . .'

68. Compare *Inst.* 2.14.1; 2.15.3-5.

in the *Second Replie* is based on an appeal to certain fundamental principles of systematic doctrine. Hooker answers his opponent's attack on the same high theological ground. So far we have examined Cartwright's Trinitarian and Christological objections to the doctrine of the Royal Supremacy. Cartwright's resistance to Whitgift's argument for a 'mediated' headship through a distinction of 'orders' of power is only the first stage of his opposition. At the outset of this chapter we referred to Hooker's threefold classification of Cartwright's objections. In addition to rejecting the theory of a subordinate or mediated headship, Cartwright objects also to 'the second difference whereby Christ is sayd to be universally Head, the King [Head] no further then within his own dominions'. (*LEP* 8.4.7) This second distinction between the headship of Christ and that of the Civil Magistrate asserted by Whitgift rests upon the ecclesiological difference between the mystical and external Churches. For Hooker, Christ's infinite, universal dominion is inclusive of, yet distinct from, the finite, territorial dominion of the Civil Magistrate. In his *Second Replie* to Whitgift, Cartwright appeals to the ubiquity of Christ's power as head of the Church in order to show the superfluity of a head with a limited jurisdiction:

. . . if the church be the bodie of Christe/ and of the civill magistrate/ yt shall have two heades: which being monstrous is to the great dishonor off Christe/ and his church. (*TC* 2:412)

In this second objection Cartwright concentrates on the issue of degree of jurisdiction, the quantitative category of distinction. Here as well Cartwright adamantly resists the introduction of any distinction which in any way threatens Christ's sole, undivided headship of the Church: Christ does not need 'a subordinate/ and mynisteriall head off the church'. (*TC* 2:413) For Whitgift, on the other side, Christ is regarded as 'Head of the Church Universal'. This, however, is no bar to the introduction of finite heads for finite constituent parts of the universal Church. Cartwright insists that the ubiquity of Christ's presence with the Church obviates the need for any form of headship with a limited sphere of authority:

But forasmuche as Christe is never severed from his body/ nor from any parte off yt/ and is able/ and doth performe that wherfore he is called head/ unto *all* his churche: yt owghte not to seme strange that *there may be a subordinate head in the commen wealth/ where there can be none in the church.* (*TC* 2:413) [my italics]

This passage introduces the core of the ecclesiological problem which lay at the centre of the Admonition Controversy into the Royal Supremacy debate, namely the nature of the distinction between the true Church and the visible Church.

Cartwright's opposition to the royal headship of the Church is founded on the premise that Church and Commonwealth are wholly distinct species of association. Whereas:

the magistrate beinge head off the commen wealthe/hath other which maye be called under heades beneath hym: he muste understand that those heades are appointed/ because the cheife magistrate can not be presente with the whole body off his people/ nor in his owne person performe the office of a head unto them all. (TC 2:413)

Christ, on the other hand, 'is never severed from his body/nor from any part off yt.' (*ibid.*) In relation to the Church, Christ performs 'the whole office off the head him selfe alone' and 'leaveth nothing to men/ by doing wheroff they maie obtaine that tittle.' (TC 2:415) Thus for Cartwright, the supreme source of authority in the Church is indivisible and immediately communicated to all parts. There is therefore no need to distinguish a limited sphere of supreme jurisdiction insofar as the universal Church is united under Christ's own supreme authority. Cartwright denies the distinction of universal and territorial ecclesiastical supremacies or 'Dominions' correspondent to the fundamental ecclesiological distinction between the Church as a mystical association and the Church as a visible 'politique societie'.⁷⁰ He denies the need for a finite, limited headship on the grounds that such would imply that Christ was not actually 'everie where present' (LEP 5.55.7) with the whole body of the Church. As a result Cartwright is driven by his own logic to deny the validity of the distinction between Christ's mystical headship which is universal and the limited headship of Archbishops or Civil Magistrates which is territorial. Christ's all-inclusive power, extending to all parts and all members of the visible Church, obviates the need for any limited power:

And even in the owtward societie/ and assemblies off the church/ where one or two are gathered in his name/ ether for hearing off the word/or for praier or any other church exercise/ our Saviour Christe being in the myddeste off them as mediatour/ muste needes be there as head: and if he be there not idle/ but doinge the office off the head fully: yt followeth that even in the owtward societie/ and meetings off the church no symple man can be called the head off it. Seing that our Saviour Christe doinge the whole office off the head him selfe alone: leaveth nothing to men by doing wheroff they maie obtaine that title.(TC 2:415)

70. See LEP 3.1.14.

Hooker's response to this objection against the royal headship draws upon the ecclesiological principles set forth in Book III of the *Lawes*. In substance his response to these objections constitutes a direct appeal to the norms of reformed ecclesiological orthodoxy as against the 'manifest error' (*FLE* 3:367) of Cartwright's doctrinal assumptions. Hooker seeks to demonstrate that the Disciplinary mixes together and confuses the spiritual, invisible, and mystical character of the Church on the one hand, with its temporal, visible and external form on the other. Out of this ecclesiological confusion, the universal, mystical dominion of Christ is incorrectly deemed sufficient for the ordering of the external structure of the Church as a 'visible, politique societie'. This inevitably leads to a confusion of the two natures of the Church, contrary to reformed ecclesiological orthodoxy. In order that Christ may be 'everie where present' with his Church, it is evident, Hooker argues, that this presence can only be of a spiritual or mystical character. Christ's universal presence as the one supreme head of the entire visible order of the Church raises certain logical difficulties concerning the nature of external ecclesiastical authority:

Besides howsoever *Christ* be spiritually alwayes united unto every part of his body which is the *Church*: nevertheless we doe all knowe and they themselves who alleage this will (I doubt not) confesse also that from every *Church* heer visible, *Christ* touching visible and corporall presence is removed as farr as heaven from earth is distant. Visible government is a thing necessarie for the *Church*. And it doth not appeare how the exercise of visible government over such multitudes every where dispersed throughout the world should consist without sundrie visible governours whose power being the greatest in that kinde so farr as it reacheth they are in consideration thereof termed so farr *Heads*, wherfore notwithstanding that perpetuall conjunction by vertue wherof our Saviour remaineth alwayes spiritually united unto the partes of his mysticall body; *Heads* indued with supreme power extending unto a certaine compasse are for the exercise of visible regiment not unnecessary. (*LEP* 8.4.7; *FLE* 3:370)

Just as he resists the Disciplinary tendency to spiritualise the visible Church, that is by the assertion that its nature is wholly different from all other forms of political association, so here also Hooker resists Cartwright's spiritualising of ecclesiastical power. Cartwright's opposition to a distinction between the universal headship exercised by Christ, on the one hand, and a limited headship exercised by the Civil Magistrate on the other, is shown by Hooker to be based on a failure to distinguish between mystical and merely external, coercive authority, between the headship essential to salvation and the headship over matters either accessory

to salvation or indifferent. The problem of ecclesiology primarily concerns the nature of the connection *and* distinction of Christ's mystical body and the Church as a visible, temporal association of men: the question of the two Churches is thus the foundation of the question of the two headships.

While Hooker allows that the Church as a mystical body is one and indivisible, the Church as a visible body is divided into parts. The rule of diverse heads over diverse parts of the visible body cannot impair the uniqueness and universality of Christ's mystical headship since this latter is exercised in another realm. Christ's ubiquity does not abolish the need for 'Heads indued with supreme power extending unto a certaine compasse . . . for the exercise of visible regiment'. (LEP 8.4.7; FLE 3:371) In making this ecclesiological point, Hooker appeals to the famous doctrine called the *extra-Calvinisticum* in support of his crucial distinction of two 'degrees' of headship:

. . . we doe all knowe and they themselves who alleage this will (I doubt not) confesse also that from every *Church* heer visible, *Christ* touching visible and corporall presence is removed as far as heaven from earth is distant. (LEP 8.4.7)

Christological orthodoxy spells out clearly the distance of Christ's visible presence.⁷¹ It is precisely this distance which requires a 'visible and corporall' subordinate in the performance of the office of headship. As we have seen in other instances, Hooker is anxious to maintain high standards of orthodoxy with respect to all matters of basic systematic doctrine. It was consistent with orthodox Christology to insist that ubiquity or universal presence are properties peculiar to Christ's divine nature, and hence to the spiritual realm.⁷² Calvin was highly critical of the tendency of Lutherans to press the *communicatio idiomatum* beyond the accepted bounds of patristic orthodoxy.⁷³

While Luther had taken the unity of the person of Christ as his point of departure and, by extending the traditional notions of communication of idioms and of ubiquity, finished up admitting the ubiquity not only of the divine, but also of the human nature of Christ.⁷⁴

Calvin thus rejects the participation of the human nature of Christ in the peculiarly divine property of ubiquity. For Hooker, Cartwright's assertion of Christ's exclusive headship of the visible

71. LEP 5.57.4.

72. E. D. Willis, *Calvin's Catholic Christology*, 61-99.

73. *Inst.* 4.17.30. See Wendel, *Calvin*, 219-224.

74. Wendel, 224.

Church contradicts the *extra-Calvinisticum* by its implied confusion of the temporal and mystical spheres of Christ's operation.

Ironically, Cartwright's insistence upon Christ's sole, unmediated headship by virtue of his universal presence undermines his previous argument that Christ is head of the Church as 'Sonne of Man'. Christ's ubiquity, according to orthodox Christology, is a property of his divine nature. As Hooker points out:

To conclude, wee hold it in regarde of the forealleaged proofes a most infallible truth that Christ as man is not everie where present . . . His humane substance in it selfe is naturallie absent from the earth, his soule and bodie not on earth but in heaven onlie. (LEP 5.55.7)

Christ's humanity is universally present *solely* by virtue of its hypostatic union with the divine nature:

Yeat because this substance [the human] is inseparablie joyned to that personall worde which by his verie divine essence is present with all thinges, the nature which cannot have in it selfe universall presence hath it *after a sorte* by beinge *no where severed* from that which everie where is present. (LEP 5.55.7)

Thus Cartwright's ecclesiological objection to the royal headship of the Church on the grounds of Christ's ubiquity undermines the argument of his previous Christological objection.

The Question of the Two Realms and Two Regiments

It remains only to examine the third and final category of distinction 'between the title of *Head* when we gave it unto *Christ* and when we gave it to other Governours'. (LEP 8.4.8) For Hooker, this 'last and the weightiest difference between him [Christ] and them [Civil Magistrates] is in the very *kinde* of their power'. (LEP 8.4.5) [my italics] Thus the discussion moves from an ecclesiological perspective to a more purely soteriological consideration of the 'power of Dominion' in the context of the famous two realms doctrine. Once again, Cartwright objects to any distinction which derogates from Christ's immediate and exclusive tenure of the title 'Head of the Church'. In this instance, the distinction urged by the Establishment divines is between 'headship spirituall and mysticall in *Jesus Christ*, Ministeriall and outward in others besides *Christ*'. (LEP 8.4.8)⁷⁵

75. Compare WW 1:6; 2:84, 85.

In a very real sense, the logical core of the dispute between Establishment defenders and Disciplinary critics of the Royal Supremacy is summarized in their respective interpretations of the doctrine of the two realms. Hooker seeks to justify the royal headship by an appeal to the magisterial reformers' soteriological distinction of the two realms and their corresponding regiments. Indeed the concept of the *corpus Christianum*, the doctrine of the two churches, and the soteriological foundations of Hooker's thought are closely linked by the concept of the two realms. In the final sections of his treatment of the question of headship Hooker applies his interpretation of the reformed doctrine of the two realms in his analysis of Cartwright's third major objection:

Christ is Head as being the fountaine of life and ghostly nutriment, the welspring of spirituall blessinges powred into the body of the *Church*, these *Heads* as being his principall instrumentes for the *Churches* outward government. (LEP 8.4.8)

In this passage Hooker indicates that the royal headship is justified according to the distinction of the outward and visible realm from the inward, invisible realm. Cartwright's assertion of Christ's exclusive headship of the Church is thus shown by Hooker to imply a soteriologically unorthodox *confusion* of the mystical and external realms.

Hooker argues that 'manifest truth', namely the orthodox reformed doctrine of the two realms, ought not to be reproached on account of its having been upheld by men proven to hold other 'popish' errors. (LEP 8.4.8; FLE 3:375) Hooker affirms the distinction of kind drawn by the papists Thomas Harding and Albertus Pighius between the 'headship spirituall and *mysticall* in Jesus Christ, Ministerial and *outward* in others besides Christ':

By this distinction they have both truly and sufficiently proved that the name of *Head* importing power of dominion over the *Church* might be given unto others besides *Christ* without prejudice unto any part of his honour. That which they should have made manifest was that the name of *Head* importing the power of *Universall* dominion over the whole *Church* of *Christ* militant doth and that by divine right appertaine unto the *Pope of Rome*. They did prove it lawfull to graunt unto others besides *Christ* the power of *Headship* in a different kinde from his . . . Their fault was therefore in exacting wrongfully so great power as they challenged in that kinde and *not* in making two kindes of power. . . (LEP 8.4.8)

Hooker's defence of the royal headship is thus established on an appeal to a clear and sharp distinction between 'two kindes of

power'. On the one hand, there is the spiritual power proper to Christ alone; on the other hand, there is a visible and external power. There are thus two kinds of Dominion and two distinct headships. For Hooker, the external ministry of the visible Church embodied in 'Word, Sacraments, and Discipline' is not a part of Christ's unmediated spiritual rule, as the Disciplinarians argued, but belongs to the outward administration of spiritual things. (LEP 8.4.9; FLE 3:377) He castigates the Disciplinarians for such a clumsy conflation of the two realms:

Can they be ignorant how little it booteth to overcast so cleer a light with some mist of ambiguitie in the name of spirituall regiment? To make things therefore so plaine that henceforth a Childes capacity may serve rightly to conceive our meaning, we make the *Spirituall* regiment of *Christ* to be generally that wherby his *Church* is ruled and governed in thinges spirituall. Of this generall we make two distinct kindes, the one *invisibly* exercised by *Christ* himself in his own person, the other *outwardly* administered by them whom *Christ* doth allow to be the *Rulers* and guiders of his *Church*. (LEP 8.4.9) [my italics]

Cartwright's denial of the royal headship is thus shown by Hooker to depend on the mistaken premise that Christ's spiritual government is *indistinguishable* from the external administration of spiritual things.⁷⁶ Hooker's argument here echoes Luther's distinction between *geistliches Reich* and *weltliches Reich*, the mixing or confusion of which is the source of grave soteriological error: '*Duplex enim est forum politicum et theologicum.*' (WA 39.1,230) Hooker's logic embraces equally the dialectic of the two realms as represented by Calvin in the *Institutes*, where he too seeks to consolidate the critical distinction between the *forum conscientiae* and the *forum externum*.⁷⁷

Hooker is clearly concerned to uphold the pivotal distinction of reformed soteriology on this question of the *locus* of ecclesiastical authority in the visible Church. Christ is head in a special sense — his immediate government is *geistlich*, he rules in the *forum conscientiae*, 'as being the fountaine of life and ghostly nutriment' (LEP 8.4.8; FLE 3:374):

Him only therefore we doe acknowledg to be that *Lord* which dwelleth liveth and raigneth in our hartes; *him* only to be that *Head* which giveth salvation and life unto his body; *him* only to be that fountaine, from whence the influence of heavenly grace distilleth. . . (LEP 8.4.9)

76. TC 2:409.

77. *Inst.* 3.19.15; 4.10.3-6.

The administration of word, sacraments and discipline are indeed spiritual — but they are not unequivocally so. They are spiritual insofar as Christ is their author, but they are not '*Spirituell* as that which is inwardly and invisibly exercised nor *His*, as that which He himselfe in person doth exercise'. (LEP 8.4.9) Just as the word, sacraments, and discipline of the Church have both an inward, spiritual content and an external, visible form through the power of order, so also there is a twofold character in the power and office of headship:

Again that power of dominion which is indeed the pointe of this *Controversie* and doth also belong to the second kinde of *Spirituell regiment*, namely unto that regiment which is *externall* and *visible*, this likewise being *Spirituell* in regard of the matter about which it dealeth and being *His* inasmuch as *He* approveth whatsoever is done by it, must notwithstanding be distinguished also from that power wherby he himselfe in person administreth the former kinde of his own spirituell regiment [that is to say, the invisible, mystical kind] because he himselfe in person doth not administer this. (LEP 8.4.9) [my italics]

There are thus two classes of power which must be kept wholly separate and distinct, for they are 'severed in nature'. One class is external, visible, and human; the other is mystical, invisible, and divine. The former derives its authority from the latter, but must not be confused with it. The Civil Magistrate's ecclesiastical power is derived from Christ's, but must be viewed as subordinate to his, limited in the extent or degree of its sway, and finally, distinct from Christ's power in kind. Cartwright's theological error is to have confused the unmediated spiritual authority of Christ with that spiritual authority mediated through external means, and known in its several forms as the power of order, the power of spiritual jurisdiction, and the power of dominion or supreme jurisdiction. Christ's proper spiritual power 'worketh secretly inwardly and invisibly' in the *forum conscientiae*, in men's hearts. Christ alone can exercise this unmediated spiritual power. The Civil Magistrate exercises a mediated spiritual regiment, 'outwardly administered' in the *forum externum*. Thus in answer to Cartwright's objection, Hooker responds with an appeal for the strict application of the reformed doctrine of the two realms and two regiments:

We doe not therefore vainly imagine but truly and rightly discern a power externall and visible in the *Church* exercised by men and severed in nature from that *spirituell* power of Christes own regiment, which power is termed *spirituell* because it worketh secretly inwardly and invisibly: *His*, because

none doth or can it personally exercise either besides or together with him. So that *Him* only we may name our *Head* in regard of this and yet in regard of that other power differing from this, terme other also besides him *Heads* without any contradiction at all. (*LEP* 8.4.9; *FLE* 3:378)

One of the purposes of this study was to show that Hooker's doctrine of the Royal Supremacy deserves to be examined in the full light of his theological assumptions. It would be difficult indeed, if not impossible, to offer a coherent portrait of his treatment of the royal title of headship without a thorough inquiry into his theology. That the question of the Royal Supremacy was profoundly theological for both Hooker and his contemporary allies and opponents appears now to be beyond dispute. The principal aim of this essay has been to inquire further into the specific doctrinal elements in this episode of the great Elizabethan ecclesiological debate. We have seen that Hooker and his Disciplinary opponents viewed the Royal Supremacy as the focus of a test of the most basic doctrinal orthodoxy. The questions of the precise nature of the relation between Christ and his Father as persons of the Trinity and between the human and divine natures in their hypostatic union according to the formulations of the general councils of the early church were undoubtedly crucial, in the estimation of both Hooker and Thomas Cartwright, in the determination of the headship issue. The soteriological distinction between the realms of passive and active righteousness, and hence between the famous Two Kingdoms and Two Regiments of Reformation political thought, also occupies a central place in the Royal Supremacy debate. The ecclesiological disagreement over the 'marks' of the church and the authority of scripture in the determination of ecclesiastical political structures was the third area of theological debate which influenced Hooker's approach to the doctrine of the Royal Supremacy.

It has been our intent throughout to attempt to reconstruct the intellectual order of Hooker's approach to this political question, that is to say moving *from* his 'general theological meditations' *to* their application in the 'particular decision' which unites in the Crown supreme jurisdiction in both civil and ecclesiastical 'affaires and causes'. In this attention to the order and structure of Hooker's thought there is a response to the most recent criticism which views the *Lawes* either as logically incoherent or as a unified polemic without any deep-seated philosophical integrity. It has therefore been one of the aims of this essay to point to Hooker's Christological paradigm as a prominent connecting device at virtually every important turn of his argument. The hypostatic union of the two natures which yet continue distinct from

one another is the paradoxical pattern of logic which continually recurs in Hooker's soteriology, ecclesiology, and ultimately in his analysis of the union of civil and ecclesiastical jurisdiction in the person of the Prince. The coherence of Hooker's doctrine of the Royal Supremacy with his thought in general is ultimately established upon this theological foundation.

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