

Aristotle's *Eudemus* and *Protrepticus*: Are They Really Two Different Works?

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Ever since modern scholarship undertook the renewed investigation of the remnants of the lost works of Aristotle, it has been thought that, in addition to fragments of his works *De Bono*, *De Ideis* and the *De Philosophia*, a considerable number of fragments and testimonies concerning at least two other writings have also been preserved, namely an 'Exhortation to philosophy' entitled *Protrepticus* and a work 'On the soul' or *Eudemus*.^{*} In his celebrated book on the development of Aristotle's thought W. Jaeger dedicated separate chapters to the *Eudemus*, the *Protrepticus* and the *De Philosophia*. E. Berti did the same in a large-scale study of the so-called exoteric writings. In their editions of the fragments and testimonies of the lost works V. Rose, R. Walzer and W. D. Ross used separate entries for the above-mentioned writings.¹ Both I. Düring and A. H. Chroust undertook a reconstruction of the *Protrepticus*, translating and commenting on the texts they thought belonged to that work.² It was planned that O. Gigon would prepare an edition with commentary on the *Eudemus*, as a sister-work for the impressive study produced by Düring.³ In a recently published book by B.

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Aristotelis qui ferebantur librorum fragmenta, coll. V. Rose (Leipzig 1886, repr. Stuttgart 1967).

Aristotelis fragmenta in usum scholarum, ed. R. Walzer (Florence 1934).

The works of Aristotle, translated under the editorship of W. D. Ross, Vol. XII *Selected fragments*, transl. by W. D. Ross (Oxford 1952).

Aristotelis fragmenta selecta, recogn. W. D. Ross (Oxford 1955, repr. 1964).

Aristotle's Protrepticus: An attempt at reconstruction, by I. Düring (Göteborg 1961).

Aristotle's Protrepticus: A reconstruction, by A. H. Chroust (Notre Dame 1964).

Esortazione alla Filosofia di Aristotele, ed. E. Berti (Padua 1967).

Der Protreptikos des Aristoteles, Einl., Übers. und Komm. von I. Düring (Frankfurt 1969).

1. For these works see the list given above.

2. *Ibid.*

3. Cf. O. Gigon, *Prolegomena to an edition of the Eudemus*, in I. Düring and G. E. L. Owen, *Aristotle and Plato in the mid-fourth century* (Göteborg 1960), 19-33.

Dumoulin the *Eudemus*, the *De Philosophia* and the *Protrepticus* once more receive extensive, separate treatment.⁴

In time it has become clear, however, that it is no easy matter to distinguish between the fragments of the *Eudemus* and the *Protrepticus*, and to decide to which of the two works they should be assigned. One might indeed suspect that the subject-matter of both writings, because it shows a certain amount of overlapping, may have encouraged such a lack of clarity. In the *Protrepticus* Aristotle's intention was to exhort the addressee, King Themison, and other readers of the work to choose for the ideal of the philosophical life. In order to achieve this aim he will have wished to persuade them of the (relative) worthlessness of all corruptible, earthly things, such as bodily beauty, material prosperity, and so on. At the same time, by way of contrast, he wanted to show the desirability, but also the accessibility, of the contemplative life. For this man had to concentrate his attention on his true self. The *Eudemus*, a dialogue 'On the soul', dealt with the relation of soul and body, their divergent nature and characteristics, and the consequences of their being joined together and eventually separated. In the anthropology developed in this work Aristotle must have spoken at some length on the higher value of the spiritual (and intellectual) side of human existence, as opposed to its bodily (and material) aspect.

A clear demonstration that philosophical protreptic and a discussion on the nature of the soul can go hand in hand is given by Plato's dialogue 'On the soul', the *Phaedo*.⁵ The man who has truly recognized the intrinsic value of the human soul will henceforth live in accordance with the insight he has acquired. He will be won over to a life of 'caring for his soul', i.e. a life of contemplation. It is thus highly likely that a dialogue of Aristotle on the same topic, as the *Eudemus* appears to have been, would also show pronounced protreptic features.

If the existence of two separate works with the titles *Eudemus* and *Protrepticus* could be shown beyond any doubt, the remarks we have just made would make a certain amount of overlapping between both writings quite plausible. If, however, doubts concerning the separate existence of the works can be shown to be justified, the same arguments would lend support to the hypothesis that

4. B. Dümoulin, *Recherches sur le premier Aristote: Eudème, De la Philosophie, Protreptique* (Paris 1981). Note also the recent discussion of the same three exoteric writings by W. K. C. Guthrie, *A history of Greek philosophy*, VI (Cambridge 1981), 66-88.

5. Cf. A. J. Festugière, *Les Trois 'Protreptiques' de Platon: Euthydème, Phédon, Epinomis* (Paris 1973).

remnants of a single work have been handed down under the heading of two different titles. In this article, therefore, we wish to focus attention on the following question: what are the arguments which induce us to speak of two separate works of Aristotle with the titles of '*Eudemus*' and '*Protrepticus*' respectively, and how compelling are those arguments?

It was W. Jaeger who gave the study of the lost works of Aristotle a decisive impulse.⁶ In the detailed inquiry presented in his celebrated monograph he defended their great value for the interpretation of the preserved works of the Stagirite. Through his penetrating analysis of what he considered to be remnants of the *Eudemus* and the *Protrepticus* respectively, he made a fundamental contribution to the differentiation of these works, with the result that after him the separation was accepted as a matter of course.

According to Jaeger Aristotle only wrote dialogues in the early period of his activity, giving them a structure which differed from the example Plato had set.⁷ He rejected the maieutic form of philosophical discussion and replaced it by continuous expositions on a chosen subject by speakers who defend opposing points of view.⁸ Apparently Aristotle gave himself a part in such discussions, often even as leading speaker.⁹ Jaeger points to the parallelism between some of Plato's works and those of his pupil, for instance between the *Phaedo* and the *Eudemus*, and also between the *Protrepticus* (which according to the German scholar was not a dialogue) and the protreptic parts of the *Euthydemus*.¹⁰ In his opinion the exoteric writings differed from the esoteric corpus in that they presented an earlier view of the Stagirite which he abandoned later on.¹¹

With regard to the *Eudemus*, it emerges already in the first lines of Jaeger's discussion of that work how easily he connects up pieces of evidence in order to draw conclusions from them in a way that is not warranted by the actual texts. He calls *Eudemus* a 'pupil

6. *Aristoteles: Grundlegung einer Geschichte seiner Entwicklung* (Berlin 1923). We will use the English translation, *Aristotle: Fundamentals of the history of his development* (Oxford 1943, 1948²). Research done in the years before Jaeger is dealt with by A. H. Chroust, *Aristotle: New light on his life and on some of his lost works* 2 vols. (London 1973), II 86ff.

7. *Op. cit.* 24.

8. *Op. cit.* 28.

9. But in the *Eudemus* Aristotle did not act as one of the discussion partners (*op. cit.* 29n.2).

10. *Op. cit.* 30.

11. *Op. cit.* 32-34.

of Plato's, banished from his country'.¹² But Cicero, our source, tells us no more than that Eudemus, while on a trip to Macedonia, had a dream in Pherae, the place where he fell ill. According to that dream he could expect to return to his home-country Cyprus after a period of five years. There is thus insufficient evidence for the conclusion that Eudemus left Cyprus under compulsion. On the contrary, the fact that he appears to have been a member of Plato's Academy¹³ at least admits the supposition that he went to Athens to complete his studies in that city, just as had been the case for Aristotle himself.

The friendship between Eudemus and Aristotle is heavily emphasized by Jaeger. In the dialogue named after Eudemus 'Aristotle immortalized the memory of his beloved friend and sought comfort for his sorrow', i.e. 'the *Eudemus* was a book of consolation'. The possibility that the theme of the death of a friend could have been used at a much later period in a literary setting, in the way the execution of Socrates had been used by Plato in his *Phaedo* many years afterwards, is dismissed out of hand. Whoever tries to defend that position wholly fails, in Jaeger's view, to notice the difference between the warmth of the *Eudemus* and 'a frigid stylistic exercise in the manner of the *Phaedo*'.¹⁴

In the analysis of the *Protrepticus* we are again struck by Jaeger's sweeping manner of dealing with his subject-matter. Writing about Themison, the king of Cyprus, to whom the work was addressed, he says: 'although we know nothing further of this man and his circumstances, it is easy to imagine what sort of person a small enlightened despot would be at the beginning of the Hellenistic age'.¹⁵ He deals with the literary form of the work in the same trenchant manner. The protreptic genre is not the result of the Socratic method, but a product of the activities of the Sophists. A protreptic work might be written in the form of a dialogue, but

12. *Op. cit.* 39, with reference to Cicero *De divinatione* 1.53 = *Eudemus* fr. 1a Ross. See also I. Düring, *Aristotle's Protrepticus: An attempt at reconstruction* (Göteborg 1961), 175: 'Eudemus, the exile from Cyprus . . .'. It is, however, remarkable that Jaeger does not ask himself whether Aristotle may have gained acquaintance with the Cyprian king Themison through the intermediation of his friend Eudemus. In that case Themison must have been king of another city than the city from which (according to Jaeger) Eudemus was exiled.

13. Plutarch *Dion* 22.3 = *Eudemus* fr. 1b Ross, in combination with *Carmen* 2 (Ross *Frag. Sel.* p. 146). On this see K. Gaiser, *Die Elegie des Aristoteles an Eudemus*, MH 23 (1966), 93; W. Spoerri, *Prosopographica*, MH 23 (1966), 46 and nt. 60.

14. *Op. cit.* 39-40.

15. *Op. cit.* 54.

also as a continuous *logos* or a personal letter. In the *Protrepticus* Aristotle follows Plato with regard to the contents of his work, but in its literary form he takes sides with the rhetor Isocrates.¹⁶ Cicero, who utilized Aristotle's work in his dialogue, the *Hortensius*, drew attention to the difference in literary form by choosing a different kind of title.¹⁷ The *Protrepticus* of Iamblichus, on the other hand, should be regarded as a collection of classic exhortatory texts grouped together in a continuous essay, i.e. following the method of the work of Aristotle that was its model.¹⁸

With respect to the philosophy of Aristotle in that early period, Jaeger thinks the *Protrepticus* to be just as profoundly pessimistic in its teaching on human life on earth and earthly things as the *Eudemus*; both works thus give evidence of a Platonizing position. Nevertheless he does note the following as a difference between these works: 'Whereas the *Eudemus*, with its doctrine of the soul and of immortality, is predominantly speculative, the *Protrepticus* introduces us to a more personal atmosphere'.¹⁹

The authoritative position acquired by Jaeger's study enabled it comfortably to withstand the frontal attack launched in 1957 by W. G. Rabinowitz, who in a detailed study tried to show that virtually nothing can be said with any certainty on Aristotle's *Protrepticus*.²⁰ Utterly convinced that Rabinowitz was on the wrong track, I. Düring four years later published his important work *Aristotle's Protrepticus: an attempt at Reconstruction*.²¹ He regards it as an established fact that the *Protrepticus* was not a dialogue but a continuous speech, modelled after 'die sophistische Werberede' (K. Gaiser) and directed especially towards young people.²² Another point that Düring regards as 'pretty certain' is that the final conclusion of the *Protrepticus* has been preserved in Iamblichus' work of the same name (fragment

16. *Op. cit.* 55. On the history of the protreptic genre see now S. R. Slings, *A commentary of the Platonic Clitophon* (diss. Amsterdam V. U. 1981), 70ff.

17. W. Jaeger *op. cit.* 55.

18. *Op. cit.* 61. It is evident, however, that Iamblichus took large parts of his work from the Platonic dialogues. That at least suggests the possibility that he also took extracts from the Aristotelian dialogues.

19. *Op. cit.* 98-99.

20. W. G. Rabinowitz, *Aristotle's Protrepticus and the sources of its reconstruction* (Berkeley 1957). In his sceptical attitude he is followed by A. Jannone, *Les oeuvres de jeunesse d'Aristote et les Λόγοι Ἐξωτερικοί*, RCCM 1(1959), 197ff., who concludes: 'Les témoignages des oeuvres de jeunesse sont presque tous indirects et incertains'.

21. I. Düring, *op. cit.* (n. 12). He depicts the situation before the publication of his book: 'As to the philosophical interpretation, the situation can be described as *quot professores tot Protreptici*' (13).

22. Cf. *Ad Demonicum*, an anonymous protreptic discourse that wishes to show ὡν χρηὶ τοῦς νεωτέρους ὀρέγεσθαι (I. Düring *op. cit.* 23).

B110).²³ As to the possibility, however, of further restoring the order of the relevant texts, he remains rather sceptical.²⁴

In the meantime O. Gigon had raised a number of pertinent questions with regard to the *Eudemus*, which arose from the preparatory work he was doing for an edition of its fragments.²⁵ Whom, for example, was Eudemus intending to visit when he travelled to Macedonia in 359 B.C. (fr. 1 Ross)? Was it Aristotle?²⁶ In connection with fr. 2 he wonders whether Cicero's texts on the fifth element as substance of the soul, usually ascribed to the *De Philosophia* (fr. 27 Ross), in fact could be based on the *Eudemus*.²⁷ He is certain that the work contained a 'great myth', recounting the fate of the soul after death and so comparable to the myth in Plato's *Phaedo*. Information on this myth could possibly be gained from passages in Tertullian and Plutarch.²⁸

It is also worth noting a number of methodological observations which Gigon makes with regard to the collection of fragments on which the new edition should be based. The hitherto accepted group, going back ultimately to Rose's edition, has not deserved the universal acceptance which it has gained. It is quite doubtful whether all the Aristotelian material found in Iamblichus' *Protrepticus* should be assigned to the work of the same name. Some passages, such as fr. 10 and the second half of fr. 15, he believes are taken from the *Eudemus*.²⁹ The fragments of Cicero's *Hortensius* should also be carefully sifted for material from the *Eudemus*. Not only could Aristotle's own esoteric writings yield new evidence, but also authors such as Theopompus, Theophrastus, Crantor and Plutarch. It is important to keep in mind the relation of the *Eudemus* to other works on similar themes. Among these Plato's *Phaedo* has pride of place, for it too was concerned with the theme of the immortality and fate of the soul, and also had the characteristics of an

23. *Op. cit.* 37. Already affirmed by A. D. Leeman *De Aristotelis Protreptico somni Scipionis exemplo*, *Mnemosyne* 4.11 (1958), 147n. 1 (cf. also G. Schneeweiss, *Der Protreptikos des Aristoteles* (Bamberg 1966), 43). The only evidence that Düring has for this view is that the difference in style of the passage in question indicates the characteristics of a peroration. Note, however, that if the *Protrepticus* possessed a dialogic structure and consisted of a number of different speeches, then more than one passage of the work could have had the stylistic features of a peroration. As will appear later on, we have a different opinion on what passage may have concluded the work.

24. *Op. cit.* 37.

25. O. Gigon, *art. cit.* (n. 3).

26. *Art. cit.* 22.

27. *Art. cit.* 23. Cf. H. J. Easterling, *Quinta natura* MH 21 (1964) 79-80.

28. *Art. cit.* 24-26, referring to Tertullian *De anima* 46.10 (on which see J. H. Waszink, *Traces of Aristotle's lost dialogues in Tertullian*, *VChr* 1(1947) 137-149 and *The dreaming Kronos in the Corpus Hermeticum*, *AIPhO* 10 (1959) 639-650) and Plutarch *De facie in orbe lunae* 940F-945D.

29. *Art. cit.* 27-28.

'exhortation to philosophy' and a '*consolatio*'.³⁰

Much of the scholarly discussion up to this time was incorporated in the comprehensive study on the early Aristotle published by E. Berti in 1962.³¹ Thereafter we have to wait nearly two decades for another study that sets out to deal with more than just individual problems. It will be worthwhile to look a little more closely at the method and results of this study, which was recently produced in 1981 by B. Dumoulin.³²

In opposition to I. Düring's arguments against an evolutionary approach towards the Aristotelian corpus, Dumoulin harks back to the method of scholars like W. Jaeger and F. Nuyens. He considers that important differences in Aristotle's philosophical position should be recognized not only between the exoteric writings and the *Corpus Aristotelicum* as we know it, but also *within* the group of exoteric works itself.

Worthy of note in Dumoulin's method is his expressed wish to go further than scholars usually do when they deal with fragmentary texts. Too often, impelled by the 'positivistic ideal' of obtaining absolute certainty in their results, scholars content themselves with a sophisticated but essentially myopic exegesis of loose, fragmentary texts. Dumoulin for his part regards it as a legitimate task for scholars to reconstruct an encompassing perspective within which the various pieces of evidence can be given a meaningful place.³³

It is, however, rather disappointing that the '*vue globale*' which Dumoulin sets before us seems quite unconvincing. One of the reasons for this must be located in the fact that Dumoulin confines his research to the material admitted as evidence by Düring, Untersteiner and Ross and regarded by these scholars as belonging to the remains of the three lost writings on which he concentrates his attention.³⁴ But he himself had already pointed out that the interpretation of partial evidence is dependent on the recognition of a total perspective. It is thus quite well possible that the reconstructions of the above-mentioned three scholars are deficient precisely because they failed to develop a sound '*vue globale*'. And such deficiencies would have as practical result that they refused to accept certain texts as providing relevant information. In that case Dumoulin, in limiting his evidence to the texts accepted by all three scholars, might do no more than perpetuate, or even aggravate, the mistakes that had already been made.

Dumoulin summarizes his conclusions as follows: he wants to

30. *Art. cit.* 29-30.

31. E. Berti, *La filosofia del primo Aristotele* (Padua 1962), 410-436, 453-544.

32. B. Dumoulin, *op. cit.* (n. 4).

33. *Op. cit.* 9-10.

34. *Op. cit.* 9-10, 113.

demonstrate an affinity between the *Eudemus* and the *De Philosophia* which does not exist between those two works and the *Protrepticus*; for in that work Aristotle embarks on a wholly new direction that Dumoulin describes as 'Anaxagorean intellectualism'.³⁵ In his study, which is very rich in stimulating ideas, Dumoulin makes frequent use of two concepts borrowed from the theory of music, namely 'transposition' and 'détransposition'. 'Transposition' is defined as 'une reprise sur un autre registre de courants plus anciens',³⁶ a concept which is, in our opinion, potentially very useful in the description of diachronical constancy in the field of philosophy. According to Dumoulin old themes of Orphic theology and Pythagoreanism have had their contents *transposed* by Plato — in his *Phaedo* and *Timaeus* respectively — through the introduction of the theory of Ideas, while their form has been *transposed* through the use of his new, strictly rational method.³⁷ Remarkably enough, Aristotle endeavours to undo this Platonic transposition in a 'back-transposition' of his own,³⁸ as worked out in his *Eudemus* and *De Philosophia* respectively.³⁸ Not until the time of the *Protrepticus*, which is to be dated to a later period, did Aristotle reach a philosophical viewpoint of his own, differing from Plato's but also involving a distantiating from his earlier writings. Inasmuch as older motifs are now used in a new manner, Dumoulin thinks it legitimate to speak of a new, i.e. Aristotelian transposition.³⁹

It is especially this point that, in our view, gives rise to serious objections. We cannot accept that Aristotle in two of his earliest writings did no more than react to two works of Plato written at very different times, while his own conception only emerged later in a third essay.⁴⁰ In our opinion it is possible to describe the intention of Aristotle in each of his earlier writings as a 'continuing transposition', that is to say, that Aristotle reworks the insights of Plato's *Phaedo* from a new point of view, in which process he can profit from all the discussions held since the publication of the *Phaedo* on the relation of soul and intellect to each other

35. *Op. cit.* 16.

36. *Op. cit.* 15. The term had previously been used by A. Diès (cf. 15&n. 1).

37. *Op. cit.* 16.

38. 'Détransposition', *op. cit.* 41.

39. *Op. cit.* 111: '... nous parlerions volontiers d'une "retransposition" opérée dans le *Protreptique* à la suite d'Anaxagore'.

40. In the above-mentioned works 'le mythe à l'état brut a d'abord constitué l'essentiel de la sagesse' (28, cf. 16, 30, 39, 90, 102). Later 'sa philosophie s'est constituée en rejetant le mythe' (28). Cf. also 163: in contrast to the *Eudemus* and the *De Philosophia* 'le *Protreptique* rejette la croyance en l'origine surnaturelle des rêves et la valorisation de la folie; il exalte la connaissance claire et distincte'; cf. 27.

and on the theory of knowledge.⁴¹ It is unlikely that this disagreement between Dumoulin and the present writer can be decided by means of a discussion of some selected texts. It is more likely to occur through a comparison of the respective reconstructions of the whole of the relevant material. In the following sections, therefore, our intention will be to give priority to a tentative reconstruction in which all the texts commonly related to the *Eudemus* and the *Protrepticus* might find a place, rather than to a discussion of the different opinions held on parts of the relevant texts.

With regard to the corpus of texts selected by Dumoulin as a basis for his research, it has already been observed that he accepts only those texts that were thought authentic by both W. D. Ross and I. Düring.⁴² In the case of *Protrepticus* fr. 10b Ross, which contains the horror-story of the Etruscan pirates, Dumoulin has taken note of J. Brunshwig's argument that this fragment 'appartenait au niveau de l'*Eudème*'. Nevertheless he insists that it stems from Aristotle's *Protrepticus*.⁴³ He also rejects *Protrepticus* fr. 13 Ross = B48-50 Düring.⁴⁴

The hitherto accepted hypothesis of two separate works

It is time now to investigate what the reasons were that have led scholars to assume the existence of two separate works written by Aristotle and bearing the above-mentioned names. It would seem that only two answers can be given to this question:

1. We find them mentioned in separate entries in the bibliographical lists. In the catalogue given by Diogenes Laërtius V 21ff. there

41. One might say that the focal point of the discussion is located in the following question. Did Aristotle in the *Eudemus* describe the *whole* of the non-visible component of man as '*psyche*', though in a later period (e.g. in the *De anima*) distinguishing between *psyche* and *nous* (cf. Dumoulin *op. cit.* 32), or did he already in the *Eudemus* make a distinction which allows pure intellectuality to be clearly separated from human emotionality and vital instincts? In the first case Aristotle would have, in a reactionary way, kept to the level of anthropological discussion of the *Phaedo*, even though Plato had developed at great length, in the *Republic* and in later works, a number of subtle distinctions between non-corporeal human functions. Because we can be certain that in the *Protrepticus* the distinction between *psyche* and *nous* was put to extensive use, it is evident that the position of Dumoulin can be defended only on the basis of the presupposition that the *Eudemus* and the *Protrepticus* are two separate works.

42. *Op. cit.* 113. In consequence Dumoulin makes no mention of Tertullian's testimony about a dreaming Kronos (*Protrepticus* fr. 20 Ross); cf. 25.

43. *Op. cit.* 12, 25ff., 122. Dumoulin appears not to have known the discussion of H. J. Drossaart Lulofs, *De ogen van Lynkeus* inaug. addr. Amsterdam (Leiden 1967), which we shall look at more closely below. Dumoulin himself is convinced of a close connection between the fragments 10a, 10b and 10c Ross (27).

44. *Op. cit.* 140.

is mentioned a *προτρεπτικός α'* and a *περὶ ψυχῆς α'* immediately following each other. In Hesychius' list we find a reversed order: a *περὶ ψυχῆς α'* is followed by a *προτρεπτικός α'*. The entry in Ptolemy el-Garib, *προτρεπτικός φιλοσοφίας* (in three books), is very problematic indeed (no mention is made in this list of a *περὶ ψυχῆς α'*).

2. A second reason could be based on the fact that it is explicitly stated that the work 'On the Soul' was a dialogue written to the memory of Eudemus of Cyprus⁴⁵ and that its dialogic structure is still to be seen in one of its fragments.⁴⁶ On the other hand, the same cannot be proved beyond all doubt with regard to the texts related to the *Protrepticus*, and a considerable number of scholars accept a non-dialogic character for that work.

What is the validity of these arguments? With regard to the first we are in the fortunate circumstance of having at our disposal the standard work on the bibliographical lists written by P. Moraux.⁴⁷ This scholar has convincingly shown that there are serious corruptions in the lists handed down to us. Let us give some examples. On account of their location in the catalogue of Diogenes Laërtius, Moraux concluded that the two titles *περὶ κινήσεως α'* (no. 45 Moraux) and *προτάσεις α'* (no. 46) should be taken as the description of only one treatise, viz. a *περὶ κινήσεως προτάσεις α'*.⁴⁸ A little later the list makes mention of a *πάθη α'* (no. 61) and a *διαίρητικὸν α'* (no. 62). Both have their place within a series of titles of dialectical (logical) works of Aristotle. Accordingly, Moraux suggests a correction in the same way as before. The separate title *διαίρητικὸν α'* had its origin in a generic description of the preceding title.⁴⁹ Dealing with the nos. 66-69 of the bibliographical list Moraux conjectures that *προτάσεις α'* (no. 67) functioned as the indicator of the genre of the other three.⁵⁰

Taking into consideration the results of Moraux' research on the bibliographical lists, we might ask ourselves whether the same kind of corruption could have happened elsewhere. Could it be that a composite title *περὶ ψυχῆς α' προτρεπτικὸν* was accidentally broken up and henceforth thought to indicate not one but two separate works, e.g. as listed in the *Vita Menagiana* (Hesychius) under no. 13 *περὶ ψυχῆς α'* and no. 14 *προτρεπτικὸν α'* respectively? In this connection one might look at the comprehensive method of cataloguing used by Thrasyllus, the ancient editor of the works

45. Plutarch *Dion* 22.3 = *Eudemus* fr. 1b Ross.

46. (Ps.) Plutarch *Consolatio ad Apollonium, Mor.* 115b-e = *Eudemus* fr. 6 Ross.

47. P. Moraux, *Les listes anciennes des ouvrages d'Aristote* (Louvain 1951).

48. *Op. cit.* 86, 191.

49. *Op. cit.* 92, 191.

50. *Op. cit.* 93-94, 191.

of Plato. For each Platonic dialogue he indicated the *name* of a participant in the discussion, the main *subject* and also the *genre* to which the dialogue was to be assigned.⁵¹ The possibility that the title 'Protreptikos' was used in combination with another title indicating the main subject discussed emerges in the list of the writings of Antisthenes given by Diogenes Laertius (VI 16): Περὶ δικαιοσύνης καὶ ἀνδρείας προτρεπτικός πρῶτος, δεῦτερος, τρίτος. (Note that earlier on (VI 1) he makes it quite clear that these works were *dialogues*: οὗτος . . . τὸ ῥητορικὸν εἶδος ἐν τοῖς διαλόγοις ἐπιφέρει καὶ μάλιστα ἐν τῇ Ἀληθείᾳ καὶ τοῖς Προτρεπτικοῖς.)

Furthermore it must be observed that, from the moment that the list of the *Vita Menagiana* received the so-called Appendix (nos. 140ff.) with among them a *περὶ ψυχῆς γ'* (no. 152), there was a compelling motive for the use of a more elaborate title to distinguish between the dialogue *περὶ ψυχῆς* and the esoteric treatise *De Anima* in three books. Finally it is worth noting that apparently the name of Eudemus was not used as a title in the bibliographical lists. But there is nothing remarkable in the fact that this name later on came to be used as the title of the dialogue, considering the central place that the story of his life and death took in the Aristotelian work. We shall also have to take into consideration that in the ancient world references to literary works were given in a much less standardized form than is nowadays demanded in scholarly and scientific literature.⁵² In connection with this the possibility should not be overlooked that the bibliographical lists need not exclusively represent the inventory of papyrus rolls present in the Alexandrian library. If it was found that a book of Aristotle was cited under a title that was not present in the library, the list may well have been 'made complete' by the addition of the title as an independent item, whereas in fact it already stood on the list under another name.

There remains the question of the literary form of the *Protrepticus*. Now the fact that the texts of Iamblichus which were allegedly taken from the *Protrepticus* of Aristotle do not present any trace of dialogic structure certainly is not a sufficient reason for the

51. Cf. Diogenes Laërtius III 57-60.

52. See E. Nachmanson, *Der griechische Buchtitel: einige Beobachtungen* (Göteborg 1941) 8, 10, 13-14; cf. also P. Moraux, *op. cit.* (n. 47), 7n. 17. The fact that at *Pol.* 284b and 286b Plato refers to his other work, the *Sophistes*, by that title, is in the *Corpus Platonicum* quite exceptional, and can be at least partially explained by the close relationship between the *Sophistes* and the *Politicus* as writings which both belong to the same planned trilogy. Although by the 5th and 4th centuries the book trade began to encourage the use of book titles (on this subject cf. E. Schmalzriedt, *Peri Physeos: zur Frühgeschichte der Buchtitel* (München 1970) 51 & ff.), nevertheless it is by

conclusion that they cannot have originated in a dialogue. The quite numerous and extensive citations from the works of Plato are transformed by Iamblichus into continuous speech as well. Moreover we are explicitly informed that at least some of the dialogues of Aristotle were structured differently from those of his master.⁵³ Not only did Aristotle introduce himself as participant (sometimes as leader) in the discussion, but he also seems to have constructed his dialogues to a much greater extent out of monologues held by the different speakers. In this the Stagirite went on the path which Plato explored in later dialogues, such as the *Timaeus* and the *Laws*. (Compare also the philosophical dialogues of Cicero, which were at least partially modelled on the Aristotelian example.) For these reasons, and because it was supposed that all of Aristotle's early writings had been dialogues, many scholars retained the view that the *Protrepticus* must have been a dialogue as well.⁵⁴ G. Müller even saw a positive indication for the dialogic structure of the *Protrepticus* in the text at Iamblichus *De Comm.Math.disc.* 26, in which various people are introduced who argue against the usefulness and value of philosophy.⁵⁵

It goes without saying that we are not exclusively dependent on the biographical lists for the titles of the two alleged Aristotelian works. References to the *Protrepticus* are found in Alexander of Aphrodisias, Johannes Stobaeus, Olympiodorus, Elias and David.⁵⁶ The title 'Eudemus' can be found even more frequently, in (Ps.) Plutarch's *Consolatio*, Themistius, Philoponus (four times), Simplicius (twice), Olympiodorus, and Sophonias. Finally there is the title 'Peri psychēs', which we come across in Plutarch's Dion, (Ps) Plutarch's *Consolatio*, and Simplicius. It should be noted that Olympiodorus

no means certain that Plato and Aristotle themselves gave their works a title at the actual time of *ekdosis*. The Stagirite cites the *Phaedo* under that title in *Met.* A. 9 991b3, while in *Pl. Ep.* XIII 363a it is referred to as Περὶ ψυχῆς. The remark of F. Dirlmeier, *Merkwürdige Zitate in der Eudemischen Ethik des Aristoteles*, SHAW 1962 40, that Aristotle could have easily cited his own work with the title *Eudemus* is somewhat rash, given the fact that none of the bibliographical lists have handed down that title.

53. Cf. W. Jaeger, *op. cit.* (n. 6), 28ff.

54. A. H. Chroust, *op. cit.* (n. 6), 97 mentions I. Bywater, V. Rose, P. Hartlich, H. Diels, H. Usener, W. D. Ross, D. J. Allan, H. Langerbeck, and others. Cf. D. J. Allan, *Critical and explanatory notes on some passages assigned to Aristotle's Protrepticus*, *Phronesis* 21(1976), 224n. 5, who thinks that Düring underestimates 'the internal and stylistic signs of dialogue form'. Among those who reject a dialogic structure are E. Heitz, R. Hirzel, E. Zeller, O. Hamelin, W. Jaeger, P. Moraux and I. Düring. Cf. E. Berti, *op. cit.* (n. 31), 458.

55. G. Müller, *Probleme der aristotelischen Eudaimonielehre*, *MH* 17 (1960), 132-133.

56. Cf. A. H. Chroust, *op. cit.* (n. 6), 86.

is the only source who mentions *both* the titles *Protrepticus* and *Eudemus*, and that these occur in two different works. Nowhere are there any references in which some detail from the *Protrepticus* is contrasted with information derived from the *Eudemus* or vice versa. This will become clear as we now give a more detailed presentation of all the references to the two works.

1. References to the 'Protrepticus'

In Alexander of Aphrodisias,⁵⁷ the most famous commentator of the Aristotelian corpus who lived about 200 A.D., we find in the commentary on the *Topica* the reference: ὡς εἶπεν αὐτὸς ἐν τῷ Προτρεπτικῷ. It is usually assumed that Alexander still had access to several writings of Aristotle that now are no longer extant, and that he cited directly from them in compiling his commentaries. The same cannot be affirmed about the commentators from later times. They thought it their task to make use of all the commentaries already available, especially the most recent ones, and where possible to improve on them by making additions or regrouping the relevant material. When they refer to the same topic with an identical reference, as in the case of *Protrepticus* fr. 2a-e Ross = A2-6 Düring, there is not the slightest indication that these later scholars had personal access to the work being referred to.⁵⁸ A scholion to the *Analytica Priora*⁵⁹ gives the same information as Alexander, while adding: τοιοῦτος δὲ καὶ ὁ Ἀριστοτέλους λόγος ἐν τῷ Προτρεπτικῷ. In the same way Olympiodorus⁶⁰ in his *In Alcib.* writes: καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης μὲν ἐν τῷ Προτρεπτικῷ . . . The same theme is referred to once again by Elias,⁶¹ who adds: ὡς φησὶν Ἀριστοτέλης ἐν τῷ Προτρεπτικῷ ἐπιγεγραμμένῳ, ἐν ᾧ προτρέπει τοὺς νέους πρὸς φιλοσοφίαν. Here one might ask what information led him to make the addition about the exhortation to young people. The Christian and Neoplatonist David (6th century A.D.)⁶² joins Elias: καὶ ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης δὲ ἐν τινὶ προτρεπτικῷ αὐτοῦ συγγράμματι, ἐν ᾧ προτρέπεται τοὺς νέους ἐπὶ φιλοσοφίαν. Finally there remains the reference of Stobaeus,⁶³ who informs us that Zeno the Stoic told a story about Crates reciting the *Protrepticus*: . . . Κράτητα ἀναγινώσκειν . . . τὸν Ἀριστοτέλους Προτρεπτικόν, ὃν ἔγραψε πρὸς Θεμισώνα . . .

57. Alexander of Aphrodisias *In Topica* 149.9-17 = fr. 2a Ross, A2 Düring.

58. For that reason O. Gigon *art. cit.* (n. 3), 19 states: 'there are only two clear and independent quotations from the *Protrepticus*'.

59. *Cod. Parisinus* 2064 f. 263a = fr. 2b Ross, A3 Düring.

60. 144 Creuzer = fr. 2c Ross, A4 Düring.

61. *In Porph.* 3. 17-23 = fr. 2d Ross, A5 Düring.

62. *Prolegomena* 9.2-12 = fr. 2e Ross, A6 Düring.

63. Stobaeus 4.32.21 = fr. 1 Ross, A1 B1 Düring.

2. References to the dialogue 'Peri psychēs' or 'Eudemus'

In his *Life of Dion* Plutarch⁶⁴ mentions τὸν περὶ ψυχῆς διάλογον. Secondly we find in the *Consolatio ad Apollonium*,⁶⁵ a work included in the *Moralia* but generally regarded as inauthentic, the statement: φησὶ δὴ ἐν τῷ Εὐδήμῳ ἐπιγραφομένῳ ἢ περὶ ψυχῆς ταυτί. Some centuries later Simplicius in his commentary on the *De anima*⁶⁶ uses the words: ἐν τῷ Εὐδήμῳ τῷ περὶ ψυχῆς αὐτῷ γεγραμμένῳ διαλόγῳ. The title 'Eudemus' without addition we have in Simplicius,⁶⁷ τοὺς ὑπ' αὐτοῦ ἐν τῷ διαλόγῳ τῷ Εὐδήμῳ γραφέντας; in Themistius,⁶⁸ ὥσπερ γε καὶ τῶν ὑπ' αὐτοῦ Ἀριστοτέλους ἐξεργασμένων ἐν τῷ Εὐδήμῳ; and in Philoponus⁶⁹ four times in a rather extensive discussion, ἐν τῷ Εὐδήμῳ διαλόγῳ, ἐν τῷ Εὐδήμῳ τῷ διαλόγῳ, τὸ εἰρημένον ἐν τῷ Εὐδήμῳ, τῶν ἐν τῷ Εὐδήμῳ. Olympiodorus' contribution⁷⁰ is along the same lines: ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης ἐν τῷ Εὐδήμῳ . . . Last on our list is Sophonias in his commentary on the *De anima*,⁷¹ in which he makes a contrast between τῶν πρὸς Εὐδημον ἡμετέρων and the *Phaedo* of the Platonic tradition. Here too there are no convincing reasons for supposing a direct knowledge of the *Eudemus* among the later commentators. E. Berti rightly emphasizes that in all likelihood these men derived their information from Alexander of Aphrodisias, who seems to have been one of the last scholars able to read the lost work.⁷²

It is our conviction that all these references which we have collected do not in themselves give sufficient grounds for continuing to speak of two separate works. In the *Eudemus* or *On the soul* the figure of Eudemus was contrasted with people of the Midas type or with figures such as Sardanapallus and Alexander of Phrae. Nothing prevents us from supposing that in this same work Aristotle is exhorting the Cyprian king Themison by means of this opposition of the different types of life, to choose for himself the way of life of Eudemus, his glorious compatriot. Nor can the possibility be excluded that the (rather sophistic) argument to the effect that, in order to know whether one should philosophize or not, one

64. *Dion* 22.3 = *Eudemus* fr. 1b Ross. Plutarch also mentions Eudemus: ὁ τε Κύπριος Εὐδημος, εἰς ὃν Ἀριστοτέλης ἀποθανόντα τὸν περὶ ψυχῆς διάλογον ἐποίησε . . .

65. *Mor.* 115b-e = fr. 6 Ross.

66. *In De anima* 221.20-33 = fr. 8 Ross.

67. *In De anima* 53.1-4 = fr. 7b Ross.

68. *In De anima* 106.29-107.5 = fr. 2 Ross.

69. *In De anima* 141.22ff. = fr. 7a Ross.

70. *In Phaed.* 173.20 = fr. 7b Ross.

71. *In De anima* 25.4-8 = fr. 7c Ross.

72. E. Berti, *op. cit.* (n. 31), 424; also already O. Gigon *art. cit.* (n. 3), 33.

must first of all philosophize, could have been used in a discussion 'On the soul', just as it would not have been out of place in a work like Plato's *Phaedo*.

It should be furthermore borne in mind that a title 'On the soul' for a dialogue of Aristotle would have had distinctive value only while none but the exoteric works of that author were publicly available. When, however, another Aristotelian work 'On the soul' in three books began to circulate, that is at least from the time of Andronicus onwards, the need for a more precise means of reference would have been immediately felt. For that reason the name of one of the key figures in the dialogue (and perhaps a partner in the discussion)⁷³ could have then come into use. It is also possible that later on more attention was paid to the purpose of the work, which in the introduction had proclaimed its goal as being to exhort the addressee Themison to a life of philosophical activity. That protreptic intention could have been strongly underlined once more in the final part of the dialogue, in the story of the life and death of Eudemus.

However this may be, it seems to us that all the evidence that has been set out above can be explained if Eudemus was a good friend of Aristotle in whose memory (εἰς ὃν . . . ἀποθανόντα) he wrote the protreptic dialogue 'On the soul', which he furthermore addressed to Eudemus' compatriot, the Cyprian king Themison (ὃν ἔγραψε πρὸς Θεμισώνα).⁷⁴

73. If indeed the *Eudemus* and the *Protrepticus* were one and the same work, one might consider that, apart from the introduction and the concluding part, it contained a discussion between Eudemus and Aristotle, both members of Plato's Academy but at different stages of their career. The latter had already for some years been an associate of Plato, the former was still young and without much philosophical training. Finally — but here the evidence fails us entirely — one could play with the idea that Eudemus was the son of Themison, and that the dialogue had the function of both a *protreptikos logos* and of a *consolatio philosophiae*.

74. See the passages cited in n. 64 & 63. It is worth noting in this context that in the list that Diog. Laert. X 28 gives of the works of Epicurus we find on two occasions that a treatise is indicated by the name of a person plus the name of another person to whom it is addressed: Νεοκλήης πρὸς Θεμισταν and Εὐρύλοχος πρὸς Μητρόδωρον (cf. Epicuro, *Opere* ed. G. Arrighetti (Torino 1967) 12; also *Opere di Epicuro a cura di M. Isnardi Parente* (Torino 1974) 107 and A. Laks, *Edition critique et commentée de la "Vie d'Epicure" dans Diogène Laërce (X 1-34)* in *Études sur l'Epicurisme antique* (Lille 1976), 26 and 99). The same source (VII 190) ascribes to Chrysippus a series of writings indicated by the subject discussed plus the name of the addressee. The evidence given by Cicero *Ep. ad Att.* 4.16 clearly demonstrates that certain of Aristotle's works contained relatively independent introductory/dedicatory sections: *quoniam in singulis libris utor prohoemiis, ut Aristoteles in eis quos ἔξωτερικούς vocat.*

Problems in the assignment of texts

Another problem area, which so far has only been lightly touched upon, must now be examined in more detail. In the scholarly debate on the lost works of Aristotle certain 'unlabelled' texts have produced a great amount of difficulties when the attempt was made to assign them to either the *Protrepticus* or the *Eudemus*. In reviewing some of the 'problems of assignment' that have given rise to controversy in the past thirty years, we shall at the same time gain more insight into the various philosophical themes discussed by Aristotle in these allegedly separate works.

We commence with a study of G. Méautis in which an attempt is made to trace Orphic themes used by Aristotle in his *Eudemus*.⁷⁵ Méautis points to the fact that the whole story of the life of Eudemus, as told in the dialogue named after him, is dominated by the theme of the *nostos* (the journey back home) and the longing for one's own beloved country (the *nostalgia*) connected with it.⁷⁶ The same theme occupies a central place in Orphic mythology, with its great emphasis on the yearning of the Dionysiac element in man for release from the Titanic body. In this perspective the idea of exile fits very well. Not surprisingly, therefore, Méautis believes that banishment was the reason for Eudemus' protracted stay on the mainland of Greece and later on in Sicily, far from his Cyprian homeland.⁷⁷

Silenus, in the famous account of his meeting with king Midas, quite explicitly reveals the same (Orphic) view of human earthly life. Man is held in detention in his body, but yearns all the while to get back home.⁷⁸ Méautis presumes that this passage was located at the end of the dialogue and that Eudemus himself was the one to whom the story was told.⁷⁹ Moreover he points out the close connection of the two themes of longing for and returning to a lost country with a third, namely the depiction of earthly existence as the most serious illness that can befall man.⁸⁰

In our opinion the essay of Méautis is a very useful exposition of the main themes and the central focus of the *Eudemus*. In the next paragraph it will become clear that scholars have found evidence for the same kinds of ideas in certain passages that have usually been assigned to Aristotle's *Protrepticus*.

75. G. Méautis, *L'orphisme dans l'Eudème d'Aristote*, REA 57 (1955), 254-266.

76. *Art. cit.* 254, 261.

77. *Art. cit.* 259. As already noted above, there is no clear evidence that Eudemus was ever exiled.

78. *Art. cit.* 261.

79. *Art. cit.* 263.

80. *Eudemus* fr. 6 Ross.

In the *Protrepticus* of Iamblichus there is a passage that can be identified as Aristotelian because the philosopher's name is mentioned by Augustine when he tells the same story.⁸¹ It recounts an old tradition according to which man's presence on earth is the result of his being punished for heinous crimes. This punishment consists of the attachment of his immortal soul to a mortal body in the way Etruscan pirates were said to deal with their captives, tying them face to face on dead bodies so as to torture them in an agonizing and disgustingly brutal way. In a most stimulating article J. Brunschwig⁸² has convincingly shown the intimate connection that exists between this text and the Orphic myth about the Titans and the god of liberation Dionysus, as well as the intimate relation with the famous text from the *Eudemus* concerning Midas and Silenus, the follower of Dionysus.⁸³ An intriguing detail to which he draws attention is that, according to the seventh *Homeric Hymn*, Dionysus too had been captured by Etruscan sailors.

Brunschwig is well aware that the passage about the Etruscan pirates has always been assigned to the *Protrepticus*, but concludes that this has been done on insufficient grounds. Iamblichus did not exclusively use the *Protrepticus* of Aristotle, while Cicero (who had been Augustine's source for the story) surely knew the *Eudemus* and the *De Philosophia* (whether directly or indirectly) as well as the *Protrepticus*.⁸⁴ Brunschwig therefore proposes to assign the text about the methods of torture of the Etruscan pirates to the *Eudemus*.⁸⁵

Before we pass on, it is worth observing that, if the arguments of Brunschwig are accepted, the consequence must be recognized that other texts in Iamblichus with strong Aristotelian characteristics may also have originated from works other than the *Protrepticus*.

In his attempt to make a reconstruction of Aristotle's *Protrepticus*, I. Düring encountered some significant difficulties when dealing with another text from the *Protrepticus* of Iamblichus.⁸⁶ This short section forms the tail-piece to a longer passage which Düring does

81. Iamblichus *Protrepticus* 8 (47.21-48.9 Pistelli) = Aristotle *Protrepticus* fr. 10b Ross, B106-107 Düring; Augustine *Contra Julianum Pelag.* 4.15.78 = Aristotle *Protrepticus* fr. 10b Ross, C106:2 Düring.

82. J. Brunschwig, *Aristote et les pirates Tyrrhéniens (à propos des fragments 60 Rose du Protreptique)*, *RPhilos* 88 (1963), 171-190.

83. *Art. cit.* 187.

84. *Art. cit.* 185-186.

85. *Art. cit.* 189. Cf. O. Gigon *art. cit.* (n. 3) 28.

86. Ed. Pistelli 60.10-15: ἀλλ' ἐνταῦθα μὲν διὰ τὸ παρὰ φύσιν ἴσως εἶναι τὸ γένος ἡμῶν χαλεπὸν τὸ μανθάνειν τι καὶ σκοπεῖν ἔστι, καὶ μόλις ἀνὰ αἰσκάνοιτο, διὰ τὴν ἀφυΐαν καὶ τὴν παρὰ φύσιν ζωὴν· ἂν δέ ποτε δυνηθῶμεν σωθῆναι πάλιν ὅθεν ἐληλύθαμεν, δῆλον ὡς ἥδιον καὶ ῥᾶον αὐτὸ ποιήσομεν πάντες.

accept as an authentic fragment of the Aristotelian work.⁸⁷ Previously Jaeger had declared the whole passage to belong to the *Protrepticus*.⁸⁸ R. Walzer and W. D. Ross had seen no objection to this and gave it a place in their editions (fr. 15).

In an earlier publication Düring himself had proposed to assign the short section under discussion to the *Eudemus*.⁸⁹ This view, however, had awkward implications for the hypothesis which forms one of the pillars on which Düring constructs the whole of his reconstruction of the *Protrepticus*, namely that Iamblichus restricted himself to one work of Aristotle and did not abruptly change from one source to another in his adaptation. We see, therefore, that by 1961 Düring had decisively changed his mind. 'An unprejudiced reader . . . will see immediately', he says, 'that this sentence is an excerpt from another context than the preceding paragraphs. The language is different, and in the first part of the sentence the Greek is bad; what the text says is strange. Neither Plato nor Aristotle can have written anything like this.'⁹⁰

But a close examination of the text as printed by Walzer and Ross reveals not the slightest discontinuity in the train of Iamblichus' thought. Having dwelt on the theme that one should strive after wisdom as the sole guarantee of real happiness, the Neoplatonist makes a quite natural transition to the theme of the state of bliss in which earthly existence, viewed here as contrary to nature (*παρὰ φύσιν*), has been changed for the better, when all impediments for the acquisition of insight and wisdom have been cleared away. Düring's objections to this part of the text look quite arbitrary. It is not at all self-evident that 'neither Plato nor Aristotle can have written anything like this.' One might appeal to the judgment of C. J. de Vogel, who sees 'hardly anything unacceptable' in the text under discussion, and compares the section rejected by Düring to several other texts located in the exoteric writings and accepted by most scholars (including Düring) as genuinely Aristotelian.⁹¹

It is our opinion, therefore, that if anyone shows himself prejudiced here it is Düring himself. The same preconceived judgment we can see at work in his comment on fr. B16 (Düring)

87. Iamblichus *Protrepticus* 59.19-60.10 Pistelli = B93-96 Düring.

88. W. Jaeger *op. cit.* (n. 6) 100n.1.

89. I. Düring, *Problems in Aristotle's Protrepticus*, *Eranos* 52(1954), 168, followed by S. Mansion, *Contemplation and action in the Protrepticus* in I. Düring and G. E. L. Owen *op. cit.* (n. 3) 66n. 3.

90. I. Düring *op. cit.* (n. 12) 257.

91. C. J. de Vogel, *Did Aristotle ever accept Plato's theory of transcendent ideas? Problems around a new edition of the Protrepticus*, *AGPh* 47(1965), 274, pointing to *Eudemus* fr. 5 Ross, *Protrepticus* fr. 10b Ross (= B43 Düring). Cf. also J. D. Monan, *La connaissance morale dans le Protreptique d'Aristote* *RPhL* 58(1960), 200 & n.50-51.

of the *Protrepticus*. There it prevents him from doing justice to a remark which in passing also refers to a 'metaphysical' view of the human condition.⁹² We might presume that it is for the same reason that the Swedish scholar shows little enthusiasm for the connection that J. H. Waszink proposes between the theme of the 'dreaming Kronos' and the *Protrepticus*.⁹³

In what follows we hope to make it clear that the transition from a eulogy of *phronēsis* to a description of a world in which all hindrances connected with man's earthly existence have been removed — as is the case in the Isles of the Blessed in the neighbourhood of Kronos — can be excellently placed in a work in which Aristotle derived the value of the philosophical life from an analysis of the value of man's immortal soul. For these reasons we consider Düring's rejection of the final section of fr. 15 Ross of the *Protrepticus* to be unjustified.⁹⁴ The disputed text finds a comfortable place in the whole of both the *Protrepticus* and the *Eudemus*.

An important contribution to the discussion on the remnants of the *Protrepticus* and the *Eudemus* was made by the German scholar H. Flashar.⁹⁵ His aim was to examine critically the very foundation of Düring's reconstruction of the *Protrepticus*, namely the hypothesis that Iamblichus in his exhortatory treatise used one work by Aristotle only, the *Protrepticus*. Flashar points out that we are in the fortunate position of being able to determine the way Iamblichus dealt with the works of Plato, and that he appears to have transcribed in a quite literal fashion numerous parts of various Platonic dialogues. The possibility must therefore be seriously considered that he did the same with protreptic texts which he had found in different works of Aristotle. Parts of writings like the *Eudemus*, *On Philosophy* and the *Politicus* would have lent themselves admirably to revision and transcription into a protreptic text.

Of two passages, which follow one another in Iamblichus'

92. I. Düring *op.cit.* (n.12) 53 translates the words εἴ τις αὐτῶν τὰ πολλὰ παρὰ φύσιν οἶεται γεγενῆσθαι, διὰ τινα φθορὰν καὶ μοχθηρίαν as 'if someone thinks most animals have come into being contrary to nature, namely to destroy and do mischief'. But comparison with *Protrepticus* fr. 15 Ross shows that the meaning must be 'on account of a kind of degeneration and wickedness' and that reference is made to the same Orphic-Pythagorean themes which are also present in B106 Düring (= fr. 10b Ross).

93. J. H. Waszink *art.cit.* (n.28) 145-149, with reference to Tertullian *De anima* 46.10 Waszink (= *Protrepticus* fr. 20 Ross). Cf. I. Düring *op.cit.* (n.12) 168.

94. O. Gigon *art.cit.* (n.3) 28 suspects derivation from the *Eudemus*. H. J. Drossaart Lulofs *art.cit.* (n.43) 30n.23, also considers that possible.

95. H. Flashar, *Platon und Aristoteles im Protreptikos des Iamblichos*, AGPh 47(1965), 53-79.

Protrepticus, Flashar strongly suspects that they had their place of origin in the *Eudemus*.⁹⁶ The first deals with the beauty of human bodies, which appears to be only a kind of superficial 'cosmetic' to the man who beholds it with 'the eyes of Lynkeus', the second with the Etruscan pirates and their cruelty.⁹⁷ The fact that Cicero in his *Hortensius* also used the story of the Etruscan pirates⁹⁸ does not compel the conclusion that it was taken from the *Protrepticus*.

The author realizes that his conclusions, if accepted, would mean a severe set-back for any attempt to make a reliable reconstruction of the Aristotelian *Protrepticus*.⁹⁹ In the meantime he himself makes the following attempt to distinguish between the contents of the *Eudemus* and the *Protrepticus* as a whole: the *Protrepticus* was written in a positive and optimistic key, while the *Eudemus* had a more negative and pessimistic tone.¹⁰⁰

In his inaugural address given in 1967 H. J. Drossaart Lulofs continued where Brunschwig and Flashar had left off.¹⁰¹ Taking as his starting-point the text about the penetrating eyes of Lynkeus that enable one to look through the external beauty of a man like Alcibiades, he argues that this text, just as in the case of the one about the Etruscan pirates and their victims, does not characterize a separate phase in Aristotle's thought. Drossaart Lulofs thinks the negative view of corporeal reality found in these texts to be no more than the natural correlative of Aristotle's extreme spiritualism.¹⁰² He further underlines the thematic connections between the story about the Etruscan pirates with their captives and the revelation by Silenus, the captive of king Midas.¹⁰³ In agreement with Brunschwig, he points out the subtle line that runs from the Etruscan sailors who in early times had held the god

96. *Art.cit.* 71.

97. Iamblichus *Protrepticus* 8 (47.5-21 Pistelli) = Aristotle *Protrepticus* fr. 10a Ross, B105 Düring; Iamblichus *Protrepticus* 8 (47.21-48.9 Pistelli) = Aristotle *Protrepticus* 10b Ross, B106-107 Düring.

98. Cf. Augustinus *Contra Julianum Pelag.* 4.15.78 = Aristotle *Protrepticus* fr. 10b Ross, C106:2 Düring.

99. *Art.cit.* 73.

100. *Art.cit.* 72.

101. H. J. Drossaart Lulofs *op.cit.* (n.43).

102. *Art.cit.* 19. It is thus in his view not possible to make a distinction in tone between the *Eudemus* and the *Protrepticus*.

103. *Art.cit.* 17-18. Aristotle is playing a literary game with the images of 'prison', 'chains' and 'being bound', just as Plato had done in the *Phaedo*. The author sees in the appearance of Alcibiades and Silenus together in the *Eudemus* a poking fun at Plato's *Symposium*, in which Alcibiades compares Socrates' exterior with a Silenus image containing a figurine of a god hidden inside it. In this way the texts on Lynceus and on the meeting of Midas and Silenus are seen to belong together, and so we have evidence for the assignment of the Lynceus passage to the *Eudemus*.

Dionysus in captivity, to Silenus, the follower of that god, who is held in detention by Midas.

Finally we note that according to Drossaart Lulofs the story about Eudemus' death formed the introductory part of Aristotle's discussion 'On the soul'.¹⁰⁴ His entire analysis of the *Eudemus* gives an excellent demonstration of the clever literary techniques used by Aristotle in the composition of the work, as seen above all in the subtle hints made to several dialogues of Plato: 'The poised and nuanced content of the *Eudemus* is a mixture of drama, subtlety and hidden irony that certainly does not appear to be the work of a pessimist.'¹⁰⁵

The hypothesis of the identity of the Eudemus and the Protrepticus

We commenced this study with a review of the unanimous and strongly held conviction of modern scholars that in the ancient world two separate works of Aristotle were in circulation with the titles 'On the soul' and 'Protrepticus' respectively. Of these the second was addressed to a Cyprian king Themison and was characterized as an exhortation to philosophy; the other dealt with questions concerning the human soul and contained the story of Eudemus, a friend of the author who also came from Cyprus. Proceeding then to an examination of the historical data upon which the conviction of two separate works was built, we found that there appeared to be only a very narrow basis for this opinion. It was strong enough if no indications were found for a contrasting view, but certainly not decisive if there was important evidence leading in another direction. Finally a brief look was taken at the problems encountered by various scholars in attempting to assign certain texts to either of the two Aristotelian works under discussion.

In the light of the results gained so far we consider that it may prove remunerative to take another hypothesis into consideration, namely that the titles 'Protrepticus' and 'Eudemus or On the soul' refer not to two separate works but to one single Aristotelian work, and that all the texts discussed so far are to be assigned to this one dialogic work. Naturally, if this new hypothesis is to be attractive, it must be able to explain certain pieces of evidence more satisfactorily than the traditional view, and moreover eliminate certain interpretative problems inherent in the traditional explanation of the text-material. Let us start with two minor advantages that would result from an acceptance of the hypothesis of a single dialogic work.

104. *Art.cit.* 8,14. Note that Cicero's report gives no support for this placement.

105. *Art.cit.* 18.

1. Aristotle's exoteric writings were repeatedly described in antiquity as 'the dialogic works'.¹⁰⁶ Never was an exception made for a published exoteric treatise with a non-dialogic character, such as an Exhortatory address to Themison would have had.

2. It is rather remarkable that in one Aristotelian work the figure of Eudemus of Cyprus should play a leading role, while another treatise was dedicated to another Cypriot, (the otherwise unknown) Themison. If the *Protrepticus* and the *Eudemus* are identical this double 'Cyprian connection' of the Stagirite can be much more easily explained, for it would be reasonable to assume a meaningful relation between Themison and his outstanding compatriot Eudemus, who had met his death in such a tragic manner.

A more important consequence of our new hypothesis is that the 'problems of assignment' which were outlined in the previous section would entirely disappear. The difficulties confronted by scholars in assigning texts to either of the two works in question can be explained by the fact that the various philosophical themes involved were indeed intrinsically related to each other and found their rightful place in a single work which combined these themes in a well-structured whole.

« It is to the structure of the work that we now must turn. For the most important result of our hypothesis, if it is to find acceptance, must be that it enables us to make a more convincing reconstruction of all the relevant texts so far discussed, a reconstruction which does justice not only to the literary craftsmanship which Aristotle displayed in his published writings but also to the important philosophical themes which were discussed in them. In the following paragraph we shall present a sketch of a possible arrangement of all the available texts within one encompassing framework. In the present context only brief references can be given to the texts involved. In a later study we intend to deal with the texts and the problems they contain in greater detail.

Sketch of a possible reconstruction

Aristotle's protreptic dialogue *Περὶ ψυχῆς*, addressed to the Cyprian king Themison and containing the story of the life and death of Eudemus of Cyprus.

1 *The prologue*

In the opening section the work was addressed and dedicated to Themison, king of a city of Cyprus. We may suppose that this

106. Cf. Cicero *Ad Att.* 4.16.2; Basil *Ep.* 135; Ammonius in *Categ.* 6.25-7.4; Elias in *Categ.* 114.15, 124.3-6.

prologue had the form of a speech or address directed to Themison himself. [Through the information supplied by Cicero we know that Aristotle's dialogues, in their literary method and structural features, bore a closer resemblance to the works of the Roman author than the dialogues of Plato. Just as in the case of the *Hortensius*, *De finibus* and *De natura deorum* of Cicero, the Aristotelian work we are discussing would have had a separate prologue, while the actual discussion consisted of a succession of monologues. In this prologue there must have been some details about the occasion of the discussion that was going to form the main part of the dialogue. It is to be expected that this discussion was composed of several 'rounds', analogous to the debate between Socrates and his friends in the *Phaedo*. There remains one highly intriguing question: who were the discussion partners in the main part? Could it have been a report of a penetrating discussion between Aristotle himself¹⁰⁷ and the young Eudemus, which had taken place when they were both members of the Academy?¹⁰⁸]

Texts to be assigned to this section: *Protrepticus* B1 Düring.

107. W. Jaeger rejected the suggestion that Aristotle figured as one of the main participants in the *Eudemus* (*op.cit.* (n.6) 29n.2). O. Gigon *art.cit.* (n.3) 22 takes the opposite view: 'It seems likely that Aristotle himself was the principal speaker'. But this opinion was once again firmly denied by G. E. L. Owen, *The Platonism of Aristotle*, PBA 51(1965), 129.

108. We recall here the (admittedly speculative) suggestion made above that Eudemus was not only a compatriot of Themison but perhaps also his son and therefore a (crown-) prince. In *Eudemus* fr. 6 Ross the main speaker appears to address his partner with the words ὁ κράτιστε πάντων καὶ μακαριστότατε. O. Gigon *art.cit.* (n.3) 26 regards it as out of the question that a human being could be addressed in this way. In our opinion it is important to observe that Aristotle does *not* use the form of address μακαριώτατε, which would objectively attribute happiness to the person concerned. The word used still retains its association with the verb μακαρίζω ('deem happy'). The person in question is 'he who is deemed happiest of all men'. In other words, the uneducated crowd regard him as 'happy' (cf. *Pl.Phdr.* 256c τὴν ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν μακαριστὴν αἴρεσιν), but whether he is truly so is quite a different matter! Note also that fr. 11 Ross speaks of a 'Greek king' who has experiences that bear much resemblance to what we are told about Eudemus. On this fragment see R. Walzer, *Un frammento nuovo di Aristotele*, SIFC n.s. 14(1937) 125-137, and J. H. Waszink *art.cit.* (n.28) 144. W. Jaeger *op.cit.* (n.6) 39 regarded Eudemus as a pupil of Plato. But recently F. L. Peccorini, *Divinity and immortality in Aristotle: a demythologized myth*, *Thomist* 43(1979) 225, has called him one of the beloved disciples of Aristotle himself. Finally we observe that the discussion was apparently recounted by a third person, a literary technique that is also found in the older dialogues of Plato; cf. F. Nuyens, *L'évolution de la psychologie d'Aristote* (Louvain 1948) 86n.15.

2 *Different views on 'what is the highest good for man'*

Directly after the opening part there followed, we suspect, an exposition of the manifest differences between people resulting from their disagreement on the question of what is man's highest good. Three types of life were pictured in bright colours and illustrated with famous examples from legend and history: Sardanapallus as prototype of the hedonist and sensualist; Alcibiades (?) and Midas as types of those who strive after wealth and honour; in sharp contrast Anaxagoras, Hermotimos¹⁰⁹ and Pythagoras as representatives of the philosophical ideal of life.

Texts: Protrepticus B2-5 Düring.

3 *Demonstration of the higher value of the soul*

Next there was a demonstration of the higher value of the soul and all that is related to soul in comparison with the body. The nucleus of this demonstration will have been the proofs for the immortality of the soul and, more specifically, of the intellect.

Texts: Eudemus fr. 2,3,7,8 Ross.

4 *The good to be attained only by means of nous and phronēsis*

The discussion of the fore-going section will have ended with the trenchant conclusion: 'the good' cannot be located in the *bona externa*, nor in the *bona corporalia*, but only in the soul and above all in the highest and most perfect part of the soul.

Texts: Protrepticus B7-27 Düring.

5 *The eulogy of the contemplative life*

In a speech which must have left the reader quite overwhelmed and speechless, Aristotle described in idealistic terms the contemplative life in all its aspects. The 'reversal of values' which is typical for all protreptic literature was advocated in various ways, and especially by means of a demonstration that only the contemplative life was a life that can really be enjoyed — in contrast to what people of the sort represented by Sardanapallus, Alcibiades or Midas imagine to be pleasurable. The earth-born man, however,

109. Cf. O. Gigon *art.cit.*(n.3) 30.

cannot succeed in continuously attaining this state of blessedness, for his mode of being is contrary to nature (*παρὰ φύσιν*), trapped as he is in his bodily existence and enclosed in a world of becoming and passing away. If man's existence is viewed at a distance from a 'meta-physical' perspective, it becomes apparent that his bodily and ephemeral condition is not that for which he was originally destined.

Texts: Protrepticus B6, 28-40, 41-45, 46-57, 58-96 (including the final part of fr. 15 Ross!), 97-110 Düring.

6 *Silenus' revelation on human misery*

The preceding discourse was then heavily accentuated and accredited with divine authority, as it were, by the story of Silenus' revelation to Midas on the misery of mankind. The misery referred to by Silenus must be understood as precisely the misery of people like Sardanapallus and Midas, who, for all their riches and power, still remain the captives of their passions and the perishable objects around them. For these people the highest life that can be attained will be a life with the least possible grief.

Texts: Eudemus Fr. 6,5 Ross.

7 *The myth about Kronos*

We may suppose that Silenus continued his exposition by recounting the lives of people who have been *liberated* from all those needs and desires that make human life so burdensome.¹¹⁰ There then followed a story about beings that live far away, people like the Meropians about whom, according to Theopompus, Silenus told a fascinating story to Midas.¹¹¹ These were a people living 'on the

110. As noted above, O. Gigon *art.cit.*24 (cf. *idem*, *Hermes* (87/1959) 161) maintains that the *Eudemus* contained an account of the experiences that happen to the soul after death, presented in the form of a myth in the Platonic manner. He even considers the possibility (22,24) that in this mythical section a description was given of a meeting of the souls of the tyrant Alexander of Pherae and of Eudemus himself. But we fail to see how it could be rendered plausible that information was available on the experiences of the soul of a man who had so recently died.

111. Cf. Theopompus *FGH* 115F75; cf. O. Gigon *art.cit.* (n.3) 31. The relation between the two revelations of Silenus remains obscure. H. J. Drossaart Lulofs *op.cit.* (n.43) 32n.44 affirms that the revelation on the condition of man was not placed in the mouth of Silenus before Aristotle. But whether Theopompus took over the theme from Aristotle is uncertain, even though J. H. Waszink *art.cit.* (n.28) 139 ff. asserted with confidence that the motif of a revelation by Silenus must have been derived from Aristotle's *Eudemus*. The same author also observes that the exposition of Silenus, such as we have it in fr. 6 Ross, must have had a continuation. Cf. R. Walzer's n.2 on fr. 13 in his edition. Drossaart Lulofs suggests for this a second example of a divine admonition.

Isles of the Blessed', in the immediate neighbourhood of the god Kronos and his *daimones*. It is possible that at this point the theme of the 'dreaming of Kronos' (whose sleep resulted from his being fettered by the avenging Zeus) introduced the notion of a *second* stage of protreptic therapy and of philosophical awakening. Those who are freed from bodily existence and the labours connected with it are still not *completely* freed! Liberation will only definitely be achieved by the man who has dispelled the mist which enshrouds him because of the irrational passions of his soul, preoccupied as it is on the objects of material reality.¹¹² It is only he who has ascended to the purely intellectual activity of contemplation and has removed all the vestigial memories of his earthly, corporeal existence that will finally reach the state of highest bliss and true divinity.

The revelation of Silenus may thus be suitably connected with the themes of a 'second death' (i.e. the second stage of liberation)¹¹³ and 'supervised detention', the theme of 'paideusis by means of punishment', the motif of Endymion and the motif of *anamnesis*.

Texts: Protrepiticus fr. 20 Ross; *Eudemus* fr. 4,9-12 Ross. Also fr. 193 Rose³ (=Clem. Alex. *Stromateis* 6.6.53).¹¹⁴

8 *The death of Eudemus in the service of philosophy*

After this grand mythic section the dialogue came to a final conclusion, we would suggest, with the moving story of the

112. Many scholars regard the *Eudemus* as a philosophically rather feeble imitation of Plato's *Phaedo*. Drossaart Lulofs *art.cit.* (n.43) 20, however, correctly points out that Aristotle cannot possibly have ignored the developments which had occurred in Plato's psychology. His teacher had increasingly emphasized the conflict within the soul between a rational and a sub-rational part, a crucial change which left its mark on the Aristotelian dialogue. See also above n. 41.

113. R. Heinze, *Xenokrates* (Leipzig 1892) 123ff. argued that this theme found in Plutarch should be traced back to Xenocrates (with whom Aristotle was on very good terms for some time, if we consider that they resided together in Assos in the years 347 B.C. and following).

114. F. Nuyens *op.cit.* (n.108) 89 (following E. Heitz, *Fragmenta Aristotelis* (Paris 1886)) considers this text to belong to the *Eudemus*, as does O. Gigon *art.cit.* (n.3) 28.

liberation of Eudemus from his labours far from his home-country. It may be assumed that his death, which occurred while he was engaged in an attempt to liberate Sicily from its tyrannical rule, was described in a most impressive manner.¹¹⁵ It had been predicted in a dream he had received five years before, but at the time he had interpreted the dream in an 'earthly' way. Certainly this part of the dialogue, which was intended as a climax, would have been suitably prepared in previous sections, and especially in the prologue. And so, after all that has preceded in the dialogue, the recollection of Eudemus' death will no longer cause Aristotle and Themison grief. One cannot grudge beloved ones the attainment of the highest bliss. At the same time the life and death of Eudemus now stand before Themison as an example he can imitate. *Protreptic* and *consolatio philosophiae* here converge.¹¹⁶ Probably the final section of the dialogue was again directed to Themison.

Texts: Eudemus fr. 1 Ross.

Dreams and oracles in the protreptic dialogue On the soul

It goes without saying that the hypothesis that we have put forward gives rise to far more questions than can be adequately discussed within the scope of one article. In this final section we shall confine ourselves to a brief discussion of a theme which might be thought to give rise to a serious objection against our hypothesis. In a part of Iamblichus' *Protrepticus* we come across the following remark:¹¹⁷

For this reason too, though sleep is a very pleasant thing, it is not a thing to choose, even if we suppose the sleeper to have all possible pleasures, because the images of sleep are false, while those of waking life are true. For sleep and waking differ in nothing else but the fact that the soul when awake often knows

115 In general scholars consider that the story of Eudemus' life and death must have been set out in the opening section of the work to which Plutarch gives his name as title. Cf. I. Düring *op.cit.* (n.12) 175. On the same page Düring is sceptical about Eudemus' interest in philosophy: 'There is no indication that he was a "philosopher"'. This goes much too far in our opinion. His relations with Dion (fr. 1b Ross) and with Aristotle, as well as the fact that he is remembered at such length in the dialogue *Περὶ ψυχῆς*, fully justify the assumption of a positive interest of Eudemus in philosophy, even if he must have been primarily involved in political affairs.

116. Cf. the remarks by O. Gigon *art.cit.* (n.3) on Plato's *Phaedo*: 'Sometimes Plato speaks about the value of knowing eternal things and the means of achieving such knowledge in a manner that the dialogue almost assumes the character of an exhortation to philosophy. The dramatic setting makes it at the same time a *consolatio*.'

117. *Protrepticus* B101 Düring (whose translation we cite) = fr. 9 Ross.

the truth, but in sleep is always deceived; for the whole nature of dreams is an image and unreal.

Is it not astonishing that this passage was contained in a work that gave such a central place to the story of a dream experienced by Eudemus and may also have dealt at length with the oracular dreams of the god Kronos? In order to answer this possible objection we must take a closer look at the theme of dreams and oracles in the Aristotelian work such as we have reconstructed it.

If our new hypothesis finds favour, it may be concluded that at various stages in his protreptic dialogue *On the soul* Aristotle dwelt on the themes of 'being asleep and being awake', of 'acquiring and losing knowledge', of 'being alive and being dead', of 'being healthy and being sick'. Concerning Eudemus we are told that he fell seriously ill at Pherae and, when in a critical condition, experienced a dream that later appeared to contain highly trustworthy information. At the time of the dream Eudemus' mental capacity was seriously disturbed by the attack of fever, but afterwards, when he had miraculously recovered, he apparently remembered its contents and was able to tell the details to his friends. Rather striking correspondences with this account are found in the story of *Eudemus* fr. 11 Ross, which has come down to us in an Arabian text. We read of a 'Greek king', whose soul reached a state of ecstasy, so that it almost seemed as if it had left its body for good. But this Greek king also returned to his normal self and gave detailed information about what he had experienced and learnt. And so he was able to forecast natural disasters and predict the exact dates on which people he knew would die.

It appears that, also concerning the god Kronos, Aristotle seems to have told a story in which the god was presented as dreaming.¹¹⁸ Because we lack any further details on the way that Aristotle dealt with this topic, we regard it as justified to investigate another story about Kronos and his dreams which is found in Plutarch, and ask ourselves if a story similar to that one might have had a meaningful place in an Aristotelian context.¹¹⁹ It is clear that in so doing we

118. H. J. Drossaart Lulofs *art.cit.* (n.43) 33n.55 already remarked that 'more stories about dreams are connected with the one dialogue *Eudemus* than with any other work' (with reference to the articles of J. H. Waszink and O. Gigon).

119. In a following study we hope to substantiate this claim. At this point we do no more than note the thematic connections between the bondage of Kronos and the captivity of both Silenus and the prisoners of the Etruscan pirates, and also between the 'dreaming of Kronos' and the dreams of Eudemus and the 'Greek king'.

should at all times bear in mind the hypothetical character of such an investigation.

Plutarch tells us that the god Kronos, while asleep and dreaming, passes on to the demons that surround him 'all that Zeus premeditates'.¹²⁰ Moreover in this dreaming-activity there is, according to the text of Plutarch's myth as constituted by H. Cherniss, a kind of periodicity. Sometimes Kronos is overpowered by his Titanic passions; at other times he relaxes and enjoys the perfect rest of a healthy sleep.¹²¹ There is no question, however, of Kronos ever waking up. Sleep is the invincible fetter with which Zeus has eternally subdued him within the enclosure of a spacious cavern that shines like gold.¹²² The question naturally arises: in which of Kronos' two mental conditions does he pass on his oracles? In our opinion there is only one acceptable solution. It occurs at those times when his Titanic nature asserts itself and he starts to rave in his sleep talking aloud unconsciously but with a measure of coherence.¹²³ There are other periods, however, when his passions die away like a receding fever and the god returns to a state of rest. In that condition one can imagine that Kronos' mind is able without any hindrances to contemplate the eternal truth, the vision of which is the prerogative of Zeus (and of all perfectly divine beings).

Straight away one starts to suspect that the Titanic nature of Kronos, which is itself the *cause* of his being punished by Zeus, is at the same time the *instrument of the punishment*. Already in Hesiod's explanation of the name of the Titans we find guilt and penance brought in close relation to each other.¹²⁴ Plato further exploited the same idea. In his works wrongdoing and punishment are always so closely connected that only in a mythical context does it seem

120. Plutarch *De facie in orbe lunae* 942A, ὅσα γὰρ ὁ Ζεὺς προδιανοεῖται ταῦτ' ὄνειροπολεῖν τὸν Κρόνον . . . J. H. Waszink *art.cit.* (n.28) 146 errs in declaring that 'in his dreams thoughts arise in him, which special demons convey to Zeus, who makes use of them for his government of the Universe'. Cf. the remark of H. Cherniss, who in his edition of the Plutarchean work says in a note *ad loc.* that this is 'the opposite of what Plutarch's words imply'.

121. *De facie in orbe lunae* 942A-B. The interpretation of P. Raingeard in his edition of the work (Paris 1935, 140) must certainly be rejected: 'τὰ τιτανικὰ πάθη peut désigner les souffrances que Zeus médite d'infliger à ses ennemis; Cronos les prévoit et d'épouvante il se dresse.'

122. *Ibid.* 941F.

123. Cf. B. A. Van Groningen cited in J. H. Waszink *art.cit.* (n.28) 651.

124. Hesiod *Theogony* 207-210.

possible to distinguish between cause and effect. Plato's real intention, when he speaks about the 'fall of the soul' and about the 'flight or return of the soul' to a more blissful realm, is strongly to emphasize the coincidence of crime and punishment.¹²⁵ A soul that cleaves to the corporeal world is being tortured just like Tantalus, and he who lives for earthly pleasures and lust only is *eo ipso* a forced-labourer just like the Danaids with their leaky jar. The man who lives as a tourist, motivated only by curiosity, not only deserves a no better fate than that of Sisyphus, but is already actually undergoing that fate. The prisoners in the cave, whose situation is so vividly portrayed in Plato's *Republic*, can be said to deserve their imprisonment because of the criminal behaviour they show towards those who descend into their gloomy sub-terrestrial location and try to rescue them; but at the same time the cause of their grave lack of insight is the fact of their living down there in the first place. In an analogous way the condition of Kronos is characteristic for the life of those whose intellectual capacity (their *nous*) has been chained and locked up by that which disturbs the proper functioning of that *nous*, namely by the emotive and instinctive faculties of the soul.

If it is indeed permissible to see a continuity between the exoteric works of Aristotle and Plutarch's *De Facie*, one could conclude that in this way too Aristotle in his protreptic work the *Eudemus* manages to overtrump the *Phaedo* of his teacher Plato, i.e. in that he adds a new dimension to the topic of 'imprisonment'. In his dialogue Plato introduced the theme of man as a prisoner: god has confined the human soul to the prison of the body for purposes of punishment and re-education.¹²⁶ Aristotle made use of the same topic, perhaps making his portrayal even grimmer by means of his image of the prisoners of the Etruscan pirates.¹²⁷ But apparently he also imagined a confinement 'on a higher level', the condition in which the body and bodily existence is no longer a hindrance, but the passions of the soul still prevent it from attaining perfect intellectuality.¹²⁸

125. Cf. Plato *Phd.* 82e6, *Phdr.* 248c2ff., *Tim.* 41e1ff., *Laws* 904c6ff.

126. *Phaedo* 62b ὡς ἔν τινι φρουρᾷ ἔσμεν οἱ ἄνθρωποι, combined with the conviction that θεοὺς εἶναι ἡμῶν ἐπιμελουμένους.

127. *Protrepticus* 10b Ross = B106-107 Düring, a text which J. Brunschwig *art.cit.* (n.82) 189, H. Flashar *art.cit.* (n.95) 71 and H. J. Drossaart Lulofs *art.cit.* (n.43) 17-18 assign to the *Eudemus*.

128. V. Rose and W. D. Ross suspected that the theme of the φρουρά was present in Aristotle's *Protrepticus* on account of the passage in Augustine *De trinitate* 14.19.26, where he speaks of *reditus in caelum 'cum in his artibus vixerimus'*. To support their view they emend the word *artibus* to *arcibus*; cf. *Protrepticus* fr. 10c Ross. D. J. Allan *art.cit.* (n.54) 235 recommends a more cautious approach and declares the reading of the mss. to be tenable.

Thus the illness of Eudemus and his mental black-out, which was caused by *bodily* disturbances, appears to have been complemented in an important way by the story about the dreaming-activity of Kronos, whose sleeping is to be interpreted as an image of the disturbances of the intellect by *psychic* diseases and indicates the need for *psych-i*atric treatment. In both stories an important element is that in the transition to a healthy condition the functioning of memory remains intact, while the transition to illness and fever causes a serious disorientation. (The same theme gives a plausible explanation for the fact that the administration of the universe, which takes place in accordance with the oracles that come from Kronos, shows so many shortcomings. The unity and order of things as thought out by Zeus becomes seriously disturbed in the oracles emitted by the titanically distraught Kronos, in the same way that the utterances of a highly feverish patient are hopelessly confused.) The remarks that Aristotle makes in his *Eudemus* about *anamnesis* fit perfectly in such a context. He apparently explained the absence of any memory of a pre-existence in man by pointing out that being born is for man the most serious and most deadly illness he ever contracts. Being born entails the need for continuous therapeutical care.¹²⁹ And this care will be needed from the cradle to the grave, or even from the cradle to the 'second death'! Only philosophy will be able to supply this intensive and continuous care. For only philosophy will be able to diagnose what is wrong and procure the *gnosis* that alone can heal the patient and bring him to salvation! The abhorrence that is felt for illness and disease is matched by the high desirability of a healthy condition. And so the most strenuous efforts will be made to secure the only medicine for that disease which exists, *phronēsis*.¹³⁰

If the line of argument sketched in the preceding section is followed, it becomes acceptable that in one and the same work Aristotle should maintain seemingly opposed views on the value

129. H. J. Drossaart Lulofs *art.cit.*(n.43) 10 concludes his discussion of *Eudemus* fr. 5 Ross with the remark: 'If one recalls the imaginative grandeur of Plato's eschatological myth (in *Rep.* 10 - A.P.B.), Aristotle's bald down to earth approach seems almost distressing.' For the rest, however, Drossaart Lulofs' address is meant to demonstrate the high literary value of Aristotle's *Eudemus*. In our view it is possible to suspect that Aristotle also employed the image of the 'therapy' of both body and soul in a very subtle and clever way (also from the literary and structural point of view), thereby making a connection with the final words of Socrates in Plato's *Phaedo*, τῷ Ἀσκληπιῷ ὀφείλομεν ἀλεκτρυόνα (118a7). Compare *Eudemus* fr. 5 Ross with the purport of fr.6 Ross and *Protrepticus* B34 Düring. 130. Cf. *Protrepticus* B99 Düring.

of dreams. On the one hand he takes up as a central motif the dream of Eudemus, the message of which was so exactly fulfilled, and even goes so far as to relate the administration of the universe to the dream-oracles passed on by the god Kronos. On the other hand he declares that no reasonable man would like to sleep all the time, because the soul when awake often gains knowledge of the truth, but a sleeping person is always enveloped in the world of appearances. It can be argued without difficulty that there is no real contradiction involved here.

Eudemus and all the people to whom he told the contents of his dream had been wholly convinced that he would return to Cyprus, his earthly homeland, five years after his illness at Pherae. But when the predicted time came he died, fighting before the walls of Syracuse in Sicily. The truth of the dream was thus a deeply concealed and a hidden one, utterly unsuitable as a foundation for human action!¹³¹ In the same way it should be recognized that the dream-oracles of Kronos are not just the cause of the cosmic order, but equally the cause of the chaos and disorder in the sub-lunary world. For in those dream-oracles the cosmic plan is not clearly revealed, but is transmitted amidst a lot of disturbance and 'interference', because the sleeping god's Titanic passions impede a clear and perfect transmission. Kronos' situation is that of a 'cosmic god', confined within the totality of physical reality. Both his status and the level of his knowledge are lower than that of the metaphysical deity Zeus. And, although the dream oracles have their source in the divine world-plan thought out by Zeus, they themselves represent only a very dim and imperfect expression of it, so that the unity of the world-order has become almost wholly concealed from view.

According to Aristotle in his exoteric works the dream is to be placed on the same level as myth. Both often have truth as their point of departure. Both often contain truth.¹³² But that truth is packaged in all manner of things that make it virtually unrecognizable. For that reason people who orientate themselves on sensible reality or on oracular dreams or on the mythical tales

131. Cf. H. J. Drossaart Lulofs *art.cit.* 8: 'an ambiguous prediction which — contrary to all expectation — turns out to be true in a disastrous way. . .'

132. In this context the remark that Tertullian makes in *De anima* 46.3 (i.e. just before he mentions the 'dreaming Kronos') gains in interest: '*Aristoteles maiore (m partem) [sc. somniorum] mendacio reputans, agnoscit et verum*' (text J. H. Waszink). For a further discussion of Aristotle's views on myth see now my article, '*Aristotle on myth and philosophy*', *Philosophia Reformata* 48(1983)1-18.

of tradition look at reality 'as through a mirror in riddles'. The *Eudemus* retains its protreptic character right to the end. Its purport must have been pellucidly clear. Man in his earthly existence has only one compass by means of which he can gain his bearings, rediscover the lost vision of Truth and see it face to face. And that compass is PHILOSOPHY!¹³³

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133. We find ourselves in agreement with the solution proposed by A. H. Chroust, *Aristotle's Protrepticus versus Aristotle's On Philosophy: a controversy over the nature of dreams*, *Theta-Pi* 3(1974)168-178. This scholar draws attention to the contrast between the rejection of the reliability of dreams in *Protrepticus* fr. 9 Ross (= B101 Düring), as well as in the *De divinatione per somnum*, and the positive evaluation found in *De Philosophia* fr. 12a Ross. At the end of his comments he remarks (176-177): 'It might be suggested, therefore, that in *On Philosophy* Aristotle had maintained the following: a knowledge of the divine . . . might come to people directly in visions, revelations or dreams, while other people, using their power of reasoning, derive this knowledge inferentially from the perfect orderliness and matchless beauty of the heavenly phenomena and of the universe in general. But since visions, so-called revelations or dreams are frequently deceptive, Aristotle is of the opinion that the inferential or rational realization of God and his existence is more reliable and more 'scientific' and, hence should be preferred over inspirations or visions.' E. Berti *op.cit.* (n.31) 413-414 also denies that a marked opposition exists between Aristotle's exoteric and esoteric writings with regard to the predictive character of certain dreams. Radically opposed to the above-mentioned views and our own opinion is the view of B. Effe, *Studien zur Kosmologie und Theologie der Aristotelischen Schrift 'Über die Philosophie'* (München 1970) 78-88 'Exkurs III Die Traumantik bei Aristoteles'. This author regards the dream of Eudemus (*Eudemus* fr. 1) as a purely literary motif (p. 80). He explains *De Philos.* fr. 12a on predictions in dreams as not representing Aristotle's own opinion (p. 85), and, in connection with this, argues that the themes like that of the 'dreaming Kronos' were indeed included in the discussions recorded in the *De Philosophia*, but should be seen as examples of a theory which was defended by Aristotle's partners in the dialogue. Against Effe we note here only the fact that he was unable to observe the striking analogies between the stories concerning Eudemus and Kronos, because he still regards Kronos in Plutarch's *De facie* 942a as the highest god, following in this the example of J. H. Waszink *art.cit.* (n.28) 145 ff. and not drawing benefit from the correction introduced by H. Cherniss *ad loc.*