

On the Limits of Contemporary
Reflection on Freedom:
An Analysis of Marxist and
Existentialist Responses to Hegel

Kenneth Kierans

In a famous passage of the *Lectures on the Philosophy of History*, Hegel announces that the history of the world consists in the progress of the consciousness of freedom.¹ It appears that human freedom is irreversibly and fully present in the modern world. The argument for this incorporates a definition: that freedom itself is a definite principle or cause of existence.² But the argument only begins at this point; Hegel has much to make explicit. For if human freedom in the world seems complete, necessary and self-related, Hegel also maintains that the whole of history depends on a principle which is beyond history itself. At the conclusion of his treatment of history the seeming independence of the historical and of human works gives way to reveal an absolute dependence on the divine.³

Contemporary commentators maintain that Hegel's concept of freedom and of human dependence on the divine need not and cannot be put together.⁴ The reference to a divine "principle" of history is seen as a religious prejudice that rightly or wrongly limits the concept of human freedom. This view of Hegel's text makes it conform to a revolutionary assumption that history is not only without God but is essentially man's work. If

1. G.W.F. Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*, in *Werke in zwanzig Bänden*, Theorie Werkausgabe, ed. by Eva Moldenhauer and Karl Markus Michel (Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp Verlag, 1970), xii. 32.

2. *Ibid.*, 30-2.

3. *Ibid.*, 540.

4. A detailed consideration of contemporary commentators follows these opening remarks. See especially the treatment of Marx and Heidegger. Emil Fackenheim, in his *The Religious Dimension in Hegel's Thought* (Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1967), p. 236, expresses well how in a contemporary light Hegel's confidence in modern freedom seems to stand against his interest in religion: "Only in a single sphere — science and scientific technology — the old modern self-confidence still survives, and even here, since Auschwitz and Hiroshima, it is mixed with terror. From so fragmented a world the Hegelian philosophy would be forced to flee, as surely as Neoplatonism was forced into flight from Imperial Rome. Only thus could it maintain itself as a serene unity of thought free of fragmentation." This article suggests that, for Hegel, philosophy can remain with both modern freedom and the Christian religion not despite but because of the terror and destructiveness which they involve.

commentators distinguish Hegel from this revolutionary view of historical humanity, they do so only relative to the assertion of a purely subjective freedom.⁵ But, from Hegel's point of view, this is not a dispute about the independence of humanity but about whether this independence lies in the individual or in wider historical institutions.⁶

The assumption of contemporary thought is that modern freedom, for good or ill, is self-justifying and self-explanatory, which makes a divine principle in Hegel's sense unnecessary. When Hegel defines freedom as self-related existence, he does indeed seem to clear the way for an absolutely independent human activity in the world.⁷ This does not mean that religion is not present in Hegel's argument. As he explains the principle of freedom in terms of world history, so he asserts the incompleteness of explanation simply in these terms.⁸ But it is well known that the thinkers who came after Hegel insisted that this dependence of the human upon God was an unfounded assertion.

Thus Karl Marx felt free to treat Hegelian Christianity as a primary source for understanding the revolutionary destruction of religion and older institutions.⁹ Commentators in this century have generally affirmed that Marx derived the form of revolutionary freedom from Hegelian philosophy. For if modern men enjoy a wholly inward freedom in the world, what prevents them from turning away from religion? This is the point where the charge of religious and conservative prejudice arises against Hegel.¹⁰ But this makes it difficult to consider Hegel's relation to modern

5. See, for example, Martin Heidegger's discussion in *Nietzsche* (Pfullingen, Neske, 1961), ii. 302, and the emphasis he places on the relation of subjectivity to objective reason in Hegelian philosophy, which means that it does not attain the pure subjective form of Nietzsche's will to power.

6. A clear distinction between objective and absolute spirit is to be seen in the treatment of world history at the end of Hegel's *Philosophy of Right*.

7. The post-Hegelian collapse of "theism" into "atheism" seems to underlie Heidegger's effort in *Sein und Zeit* (Frankfurt am Main, Klostermann, 1977), pp. 565-75, to avoid the distinction of human and divine in Hegel's account of historical spirit by denying it outright and opposing to it the ambiguous temporality and finitude of human existence.

8. See Hans-Georg Gadamer's suggestive discussion of Hegel's "reconciliation with ruin" in *Hegels Dialektik: fünf hermeneutische Studien* (Tübingen, J.C.B. Mohr, Paul Siebeck, 1971), pp. 92-3.

9. See Karl Marx, *National Ökonomie und Philosophie* (usually entitled *Ökonomisch-philosophische Manuskripte* and hereinafter called *Manuskripte*), in *Die Früheschriften*, ed. Siegfried Landshut (Stuttgart, Alfred Kröner Verlag, 1953).

10. See, for example, Geoffrey Hawthorn, *Enlightenment and Despair: A History of Sociology* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1976), pp. 44-5 and pp. 52-5.

freedom and institutions in a manner which is independent of Marx's revolutionary doctrine.

Much recent interest in Hegel has to do with the perceived instability and destructiveness of modern freedom as this emerges in Marx.¹¹ Non-Marxist commentators have traced the excesses of revolutionary confidence to Hegel at the same time as they allow that he sought to restore reason and institutions in the face of that freedom which they deplore. But the difficulty is that Hegel emerges as both an inspiration of revolution and a severe critic of it. What is obscure is how those commentators who stress revolution and those who stress the criticism of it differ in their view of Hegel and the older moderns. We are far from grasping the far-reaching consequences of the revolutionary interpretation of Hegel and of modern freedom generally.

Contemporary commentators do not uniformly reduce Hegelian philosophy to the revolutionary freedom of Marx. Among scholars of a continental European tradition there are existentialists who see Hegel's excellence in his distinction between Christianity and its older notion of institutional authority, on the one side, and the restless desire of moderns to live more naturally in the secular world, on the other.¹² But existentialists commonly assume with Marxists that Hegel gives immense impetus to the revolution against Christian belief and institutional authority. What seems very much alive in Hegel is his attempt to sustain religion and institutions in the face of revolutionary secular forces which prove so destructive. But it seems strange to argue that Hegel's views on belief and institutional life are of continuing interest if one believes with Marx that they excite and provoke the very atheism and revolution they would contain.

What contemporary commentators have yet to do is to connect the destructiveness of modern freedom, which they see especially in Marx, with Hegel's view that secular men must be subordinated

11. See George Lichtheim, *Marxism in Modern France* (New York, Columbia University Press, 1966), pp. 85-6. See too my discussion of Jean Hyppolite below. Other French commentators who turn to Hegel at least partly in reaction to Marx include: Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Sens et Non-Sens*, Collection Pensées (Paris, Éditions Nagel, 1948); Jean-Paul Sartre, *Matérialisme et Révolution*, in *Situations III* (Paris, Gallimard, 1949); Sartre, *L'Existentialisme est un Humanisme*, Collection Pensées (Paris, Editions Nagel, 1946); Lucien Goldmann, *Recherches dialectiques* (Paris, Gallimard, 1959).

12. See Ludwig Landgrebe, *Major Problems in Contemporary European Philosophy: from Dilthey to Heidegger* (New York, Frederick Ungar, 1966), pp. 161-2. See too Landgrebe, "Die Philosophie und die Verantwortung des Wissenschaften", *Deutscher Kongreß für Philosophie* (Meisenheim am Glan, Anton Hain, 1972), ix. 10-1.

to the divine and, in some sense, to historical institutions.¹³ Marxist and existentialist commentators acknowledge that Hegel shares with the western tradition as a whole the confidence that men may reasonably control and direct their interest in nature relative to the divine realm and its institutional expression. But existentialists follow Marx in protesting against Hegel that modern freedom proves far more corrosive of rational restraint than the worldly interests of former times. Existentialists are clearer than Marxists in affirming that this corrosion of institutional authority involves not so much technical advance as new and dangerous assumptions about what is first and prior in human life. But existentialist commentary does not so far separate itself from Marx that Hegel's argument for the compatibility of modern freedom with religion and institutions might be seen.¹⁴

This broad view of the contemporary response to Hegel reveals a historical spirit which, as against Hegel, has no need of a higher principle. The contemporary assumption of an absolutely independent historical life depends upon a revolutionary change in the human relation to the divine. A fundamental characteristic of contemporary thought is that man need not rise through historical forms to know the divine. There is either no need for such a rise or possibility only of direct and immediate contact with divinity. Without considering this division in contemporary thought in itself, I shall try in this article to determine how it has come to dominate the interpretation of Hegel. The limits of our own assumptions about modern freedom appear in the light of the contemporary response to the Hegelian texts.

The Marxist Response

Contemporary commentators, especially those of the continental European tradition, tend to interpret Hegel in the light of his assumed connection with Marx. It does indeed seem desirable to study separately the historical and religious aspects of the Hegelian philosophy. With regard to the revolutionary developments of the nineteenth century, one easily concludes that divinity and historical humanity have no intrinsic connection with each other. Any systematic unity of divinity and humanity appears mistaken and naive in view of their violent conflict since Hegel's death. Whether contemporary thinkers view Hegel from the side of the

13. This necessary subordination to the divine and historical institutions is the sense of the transition in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* from chapter V to chapter VI.

14. Hegel brings into view the compatibility of modern freedom and religion in the transition in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* from chapter VI to chapter VII.

human or the divine, they find Marx reasonable in dismissing any principle which can unite them or derive their conflict from itself.

There are, however, two distinct contemporary responses to Hegel's concept of the modern historical spirit. As indicated above, commentators emphasize either natural and historical institutions or the free "subject" whose right relation to this larger order is a concern throughout the early modern period. There is, of course, a huge mass of scholarly literature on Hegel. But it seems legitimate to draw a simple distinction between commentators who assume a revolutionary subjectivity and those who assume the overcoming of this subjectivity relative to natural and historical existence. There are, at any rate, two groups of commentators of interest to the argument in this article: those who follow Marx in emphasizing the collapse of divinity into modern free subjectivity; and the existentialists who emphasize the collapse of modern subjectivity into an independent nature and history.

There can be no doubt that the more influential group dissolves the unity of Hegelian philosophy in favour of a revolutionary human subjectivity. The relation of the human to the divine in the Hegelian texts is not logically necessary but the result of a contingent personal attachment to religion and established institutions in Hegel, a Christian believer. This view appears in its clearest form in Marx's *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts* of 1844.¹⁵ Ever since their publication in 1932, and especially since the Second World War, major European commentators have responded in some form to the young Marx's treatment of Hegel. This is above all true of his treatment of Hegel's phenomenological argument.¹⁶

Marx's interpretation of Hegel's phenomenology is much affected by his reading of Hegel's systematic logical works and their Christian presupposition. He finds that the primary characteristic

15. See the translation of Marx's *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts* (hereinafter called the *Manuscripts*) in *Karl Marx: Early Writings*, trans. and ed. T.B. Bottomore (New York, McGraw-Hill, 1964), pp. 61-219.

16. Almost a full decade before the young Marx's treatment of the Hegelian phenomenology became available, Georg Lukács published a remarkable study of Marx's concept of class consciousness from a Hegelian perspective. See his *Geschichte und Klassenbewußtsein*, in *Georg Lukács Werke, Frühschriften II* (Neuwied und Berlin, Hermann Luchterhand, 1968), ii. 161-517. Lukács prepared the ground for the later consideration of Marx in the light of the Hegelian argument. See especially Karl Korsch, *Marxismus und Philosophie*, ed. Erich Gerlach (Frankfurt am Main, Europäische Verlagsanstalt, 1966); and Herbert Marcuse, *Hegels Ontologie und die Grundlegung einer Theorie der Geschichtlichkeit* (Frankfurt am Main, Vittorio Klostermann, 1968).

of the Hegelian logic is to affirm the freedom of historical humanity on the basis of the restoration of religion and philosophy. In the *Manuscripts*, he writes:

Hegel begins from the alienation of substance (logically, from the infinite, the abstract universal) from the absolute and fixed abstraction; i.e. in ordinary language, from religion and theology. Secondly, he supersedes the infinite, and posits the real, the perceptible, the finite, and the particular. (Philosophy, supersession of religion and theology.) Thirdly, he then supersedes the positive and re-establishes the abstraction, the infinite. (Re-establishment of religion and theology).¹⁷

From this point of view, there is no real establishment of the natural and finite human world in Hegel, for he presupposes throughout an original negation and estrangement of nature. Nature and human freedom in it fall outside of the Hegelian principle and its starting-point in religion and theology.

Marx defines his own starting-point in relation to the Hegelian phenomenology where he finds a true consideration of nature and humanity prior to their abolition in Christian belief and philosophy.

The outstanding achievement of Hegel's *Phenomenology* — the dialectic of negativity as the moving and creating principle — is, first, that Hegel grasps the self-creation of man as a process, objectification as loss of the object, as alienation and transcendence of this alienation, and that he, therefore, grasps the nature of *labour*, and conceives objective man (true, because real man) as the result of his *own labour*.¹⁸

17. "Hegel geht aus von der Entfremdung (logisch: dem Unendlichen, abstrakt Allgemeinen), der Substanz, der absoluten und fixierten Abstraktion. — D.h. populär ausgedrückt: er geht von der Religion und Theologie aus. Zweitens: Er hebt das Unendliche auf, setzt das Wirkliche, Sinnliche, Reale, Endliche, Besondere. (Philosophie, Aufhebung der Religion und Theologie.) Drittens: Er hebt das Positive wieder auf, stellt die Abstraktion, das Unendliche wieder her. (Wiederherstellung der Religion und Theologie.)" Marx, *Manuskripte*, p. 251; *Manuscripts*, p. 198.

18. "Das Große an der Hegelschen *Phänomenologie* und ihrem Endresultate — der Dialektik, der Negativität als dem bewegenden und erzeugenden Prinzip — ist also, einmal daß Hegel die Selbsterzeugung des Menschen als einen Prozeß faßt, die Vergegenständlichung als Entgegenständlichung, als Entäußerung, und als Aufhebung dieser Entäußerung; daß er also das Wesen der *Arbeit* faßt und den gegenständlichen Menschen, wahren, weil wirklichen Menschen, als Resultat seiner *eigenen Arbeit* begreift." — Marx, *Manuskripte*, p. 269; *Manuscripts*, p. 202.

Marx does not think that this true conception of human self-activity finds right expression in the state and other historical institutions, let alone in more inward contemplative forms. He rather follows Hegel's argument insofar as it seems to describe the return of humanity to nature from out of the alienation from it in established institutions. This overcoming of man's alienation from nature is, furthermore, achieved through man's own strength and activity rather than through a divine and rational principle set apart as prior and determining.

What Marx primarily objects to is Hegel's uncompromising effort to build every natural and merely human beginning into the rational and divine. But it is in relation to Hegel's extreme destruction of every natural and historical starting point that Marx claims to discover a truly human world.

Neither objective nature nor subjective nature is directly presented in a form adequate to the *human* being. And as everything natural must have its *origin* so *man* has his process of genesis, *history*, which is for him, however, a conscious process and thus one which is consciously self-transcending.¹⁹

Marx learns from Hegel that humanity is infinitely free in nature and history. It is not accidental, then, that Marx was inclined to consider his connection with Hegel at least as important as his difference from him.²⁰

Despite Marx's aversion to the Hegelian philosophy, he somehow finds in relation to it the basis on which humanity can affirm its freedom in the natural realm and without the limits and constraints of older times. In a familiar passage from the *Manuscripts*, he announces that communism is the overcoming of man's alienation from nature and conscious return to a community of naturally free individuals.

Communism as a fully developed naturalism is humanism and as a fully developed humanism is naturalism. It is the *definitive* resolution of the antagonism between man and nature, and

19. "Weder die Natur — objektiv — noch die Natur subjektiv ist unmittelbar dem *menschlichen* Wesen adäquat vorhanden. Und wie alles Natürliche *entstehen* muß, so hat auch der *Mensch* seinen Entstehungsakt, die *Geschichte*, die aber für ihn eine gewußte und darum als Entstehungsakt mit Bewußtsein sich aufhebender Entstehungsakt ist. Die Geschichte ist die wahre Naturgeschichte des Menschen." Marx, *Manuskripte*, p. 275; *Manuscripts*, p. 208.

20. Noting that there are commentators in late nineteenth century Germany who treat Hegel as a "dead dog," Marx announces: "I therefore openly declare myself the pupil of that great thinker. . . ." "Nachwort zur zweiten Auflage," in *Das Kapital: Kritik der politischen Ökonomie* (n.p., Europäische Verlagsanstalt, 1967), i. 27.

between man and man. It is the true solution of the conflict between existence and essence, between objectification and self-affirmation, between freedom and necessity, between individual and species. It is the solution of the riddle of history and knows itself to be this solution.²¹

Marx thinks that the labour and education of history has as its end the harmony of natural existence and human community. This may indeed be close to Hegel, even though Marx maintains against Hegel that all history is without God and is essentially the work of men.

Alexandre Kojève, for example, tries to show that the difference between Hegel and Marx is trivial compared to what they hold in common. With Marx in mind, Kojève says of Hegel:

En fait, la fin du Temps humain ou de l'Histoire, c'est-à-dire l'anéantissement définitif de l'Homme proprement dit ou de l'Individu libre et historique, signifie tout simplement la cessation de l'Action au sens fort du terme. Ce qui veut dire pratiquement: — la disparition des guerres et des révolutions sanglantes. Et encore la disparition de la *Philosophie*; car l'Homme ne changeant plus essentiellement lui-même, il n'y a plus de raison de changer les principes (vrais) qui sont à la base de sa connaissance du Monde et de soi. Mais tout le reste peut se maintenir indéfiniment: l'art, l'amour, le jeu, etc., etc.; bref, tout ce qui rend l'Homme *heureux*. — Rappelons que ce thème hégélien, parmi beaucoup d'autres, a été repris par Marx.²²

It appears to Kojève that both Hegel and Marx wish to overcome the opposition between subjective freedom and natural and historical life. They both see the education to this totally realized human community through the long conflict in western history between natural interests and rational freedom. That Hegel in some sense refers this history to the divine providence is, for Kojève, a secondary consideration.

21. "Dieser Kommunismus ist als vollendeter Naturalismus = Humanismus als vollendeter Humanismus = Naturalismus; er ist die *wahrhafte* Auflösung des Widerstreits zwischen dem Menschen mit der Natur, und mit dem Menschen, die wahre Auflösung des Streits zwischen Existenz und Wesen, zwischen Vergegenständlichung und Selbstbestätigung, zwischen Freiheit und Notwendigkeit, zwischen Individuum und Gattung. Er ist das aufgelöste Rätsel der Geschichte und weiß sich als diese Lösung." Marx, *Manuskripte*, p. 235; *Manuscripts*, p. 155.

22. Alexandre Kojève, *Introduction à la Lecture de Hegel* (6th ed., Paris, Gallimard, 1947), p. 435 n.

L'Homme parfait, c'est-à-dire satisfait pleinement et définitivement par ce qu'il est, étant la réalisation de l'idée chrétienne de l'Individualité, — la révélation de cet Homme par le Savoir absolu a le même contenu que la Théologie chrétienne, moins la notion de la *transcendance*: il suffit de dire de l'Homme tout ce que le Chrétien dit de son Dieu pour passer de la Théologie absolue ou chrétienne à la philosophie absolue ou *Science* de Hegel.²³

Kojève sees the inner connection between Hegel and Marx in their criticism of the older eighteenth century Enlightenment. The common rationality of men then took the form of an objective limitation of their private and natural interests through religious and political institutions. But the liberation of these interests in the nineteenth century was inevitable since enlightened institutions were humanity's own work and therefore through revolution could be easily put aside. This, for Kojève, is Hegel's relation to the Napoleonic state.

Cette réalité "totale", "définitive" est l'Empire napoléonien. Pour Hegel (1806) c'est un État *universel et homogène*: il réunit l'humanité tout entière (du moins celle qui compte historiquement) et "supprime" (*aufhebt*) en son sein toutes les "différences spécifiques" (*Besonderheit*): nations, classes sociales, familles. (Le Christianisme étant lui-aussi "supprimé", plus de dualisme entre l'Église et l'État.) Donc: les guerres et les révolutions sont désormais impossibles. C'est dire que cet État ne se modifiera plus, restera éternellement identique à lui-même. Or l'Homme est formé par l'État où il vit et agit. L'Homme ne changera donc plus lui non plus. Et la Nature (sans Négativité) est de toute façon "achevée" depuis toujours.²⁴

Both Hegel and Marx have before them a post-enlightened revolutionary Europe which affirms unlimited natural interests relative to a universal or rational community that can be the object without restriction of all humanity.

Kojève follows Marx in thinking that the older enlightened conflict between rational freedom and natural interests was necessary only in order to complete the total liberation of individuals. He insists that Hegel too reduces the older structures of rational government to the will of free individuals.

Le Particulier (moi) se rapporte directement à l'Universel (État), sans qu'il y ait des écrans formés par les "différences spécifiques" (*Besonderheiten*: familles, classes, nations).

23. *Ibid.*, p. 267.

24. *Ibid.*, p. 145.

C'est dire que dans le Monde post-révolutionnaire se réalise (pour la première fois) l'Individualité. Or être un Individu, c'est-à-dire Homme proprement dit, — c'est être "satisfait", c'est ne plus vouloir, donc ne plus pouvoir, se "transcender": devenir autre qu'on est. Se comprendre soi-même, — c'est alors comprendre l'Homme intégral, définitif, "parfait". C'est ce que fait Hegel dans et par son Système.²⁵

Hegel, like Marx, here is supposed to affirm that the individual is perfectly natural and perfectly rational and as such can and must overcome any attempt to limit him. So too Kojève, in a Marxist fashion, uses the language of master and slave to describe Hegel's attitude to the division of rational and natural in the older political theory, be it Hobbesian, Rousseauian or whatever.²⁶

There is something to be said in favour of Kojève's attempt to collapse the difference between Hegel and Marx. He seems to have both in mind when he rightly relates the affirmation of unlimited natural interests to the Christian confidence that nature perfectly conforms to individual human ends. Of Hegel's "existentialist idea" of freedom, he tells us:

Cette idée se révèle d'abord à l'Homme sous la forme de la notion théologique (chrétienne) de l'individualité (divine) du Christ ou du Dieu-homme. Et cette idée-idéal se réalise dans et par la Révolution française. . . . L'opposition réelle du Particulier et de l'Universel étant ainsi supprimée, le conflit idéal entre l'anthropologie "philosophique" et la théologie religieuse disparaît lui-aussi.²⁷

What is absolutely central to Marx is the overcoming of all previous alienation from nature in communism. Hence Kojève rightly stresses the Hegelian argument that western history, especially since Christian times, consists in the individual's deepening consciousness of the rationality of nature.

It must also be said, however, that Kojève is blind to the fundamental difference between Hegel and Marx. Kojève himself acknowledges that what free individuals agree to find at once natural and rational and satisfying can vary.

25. *Ibid.*, p. 146.

26. Compare Gadamer's more balanced presentation of Hegel's views on the master and slave in his *Hegel's Dialectic: five hermeneutical studies*, trans. P. Christopher Smith (New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 1976), pp. 54-74.

27. Kojève, *Lecture de Hegel*, p. 266.

To remain human, Man must remain a "Subject *opposed* to the Object, " even if "Action negating the given and Error" disappears. This means that, while henceforth speaking in an *adequate* fashion of everything that is given to him, post-historical Man must continue to *detach* "form" from "content," doing so no longer in order actively to transform the latter, but so that he may *oppose* himself as pure "form" to himself and to others taken as "content" of any sort.²⁸

The liberated individuals of western societies may agree that their common economic needs are the basis of community. They may also insist on racial, linguistic or any other content and then one has the possibility of conflict up to any extreme. But Kojève does not go so far as to consider, with Hegel, whether this conflict has its origin in the common irrationality of men who think that they are immediately and directly justified in their natural interests.²⁹

To raise this problem with Kojève is only to suggest that in emphasizing the connection with Marx there is a danger that one never pursues far enough the distinguishing features of the Hegelian argument. Even when he distances himself from Marx, a commentator like Kojève still asserts that the Hegelian texts have more to do with Marx than they have a life of their own. Kojève, as against Marx, seems to affirm the necessity of extreme conflict even in a community of free individuals. He traces the origin of this to an unliberated but inescapable reason that limits natural interests and determines the original differences of men.³⁰ But Kojève does not ask whether, for Hegel, this continuing conflict between free subjectivity and nature shows the limits of the historical spirit and the necessity for a religious standpoint.

28. Kojève, *Introduction to the Reading of Hegel* (rev. ed., New York, Basic Books, 1969), p. 162, n.

29. On this point see Jean Wahl, "A propos de l'Introduction à la Phénoménologie de Hegel par A. Kojève", *Deucalion*, v. (1955), 77-9, where he insists on the necessity of the religious standpoint in Hegel with regard to an unstable human freedom in the world. Wahl maintains that, for Hegel, man is justified and achieves happiness only by virtue of the divine activity that is prior to temporal historical existence (p. 99). But he does not ask how the divine standpoint that Hegelian philosophy attains relates back to the unstable freedom that makes such a standpoint necessary. Wahl here seems close to the position of Leo Strauss as considered in the note which immediately follows.

30. See Leo Strauss, *On Tyranny* (London, Collier-MacMillan, 1963), p. 223, for a discussion of Kojève's departure from Marx. Strauss refers to Nietzsche's "last man" in describing Kojève's vision of the end of history. When Kojève speaks of continuing conflict in the post-historical world of Marx, Strauss takes this in a Nietzschean or Heideggerian sense as the necessity for a flight to antiquity and away from modern freedom altogether (*ibid.*, p. 225). Unlike Nietzsche or Heidegger, however, Strauss is interested in Platonic rather than Eleatic philosophy.

He simply assumes that the continuing problem of competition and alienation falls outside of Hegel's logic as much as Marx's.

Herbert Marcuse, like Kojève, resists raising this problem and pursuing these questions in his interpretation of Hegel. His *Reason and Revolution* suggests how the pre-Hegelian context, in which individual subjectivity and nature were separated, makes Hegel and Marx seem so close. No doubt with Marx in mind as well, Marcuse opposes Hegel to an older modern reason that externally limits the natural interests of individuals.

The contrast between universal and individual took on an aggravated form when, in the modern era, slogans of general freedom were raised and it was held that an appropriate social order could be brought about only through the knowledge and activity of emancipated individuals. All men were declared free and equal; yet, in acting according to their knowledge and in the pursuit of their interest, they created and experienced an order of dependence, injustice and recurring crises. The general competition between free economic subjects did not establish a rational community which might safeguard and gratify the wants and desires of all men.³¹

This enlightened rationality assumes a given and prior realm of nature which individuals try to dominate and control. Hegel, on the other hand, shows how the apparent independence of this natural realm breaks down before a will to universal and rational freedom.

Of special interest to Marcuse is Hegel's distance from the nineteenth century assumption that natural interests are simply given and that reason must reflect their endless fragmentation. Again, with Marx never far from mind, Marcuse sees in Hegel the revolutionary demand for a totally active reason that can master the natural and historical world.

In the middle of the nineteenth century, and primarily in response to the destructive tendencies of rationalism, positivism assumed the peculiar form of an all-embracing 'positive philosophy,' which was to replace traditional metaphysics. The protagonists of this positivism took great pains to stress the conservative and affirmative attitude of their philosophy: it induces thought to be satisfied with the facts, to renounce any transgression beyond them, and to bow to the given state of affairs. To Hegel, the facts in themselves possess no authority. They are 'posited' (*gesetzt*) by the subject that has mediated them with the comprehensive process of its development. Verification rests, in the last analysis, with this process to

31. Marcuse, *Reason and Revolution* (New York, Humanities Press, 1954), p. 17.

which all facts are related and which determines their content. Everything that is given has to be justified before reason, which is but the totality of nature's and man's capacities.³²

Between a "positive" reason and an open infinity of natural interests Hegel can somehow find mediation or equality. In relation to Hegel, Marx too can affirm the true object of human freedom that is hidden in dispersed individual natural interests.

Marx focused his theory on the labor process and by so doing held to and consummated the principle of the Hegelian dialectic that the structure of the content (reality) determines the structure of the theory. . . . All men are free, but the mechanisms of the labor process govern the freedom of them all. The study of the labor process is, in the last analysis, absolutely necessary in order to discover the conditions for realizing reason and freedom in the real sense. A critical analysis of that process thus yields the final theme of philosophy.³³

Marcuse can distinguish Hegel's philosophy from Marx's economics although both affirm a universal freedom.³⁴ But his tendency to interpret Hegel in the light of Marx obscures Hegel's distinctive account of the condition in which individuals fall under the discipline and correction of historical institutions. Marcuse also can describe how, for Hegel, the limitation of subjective freedom to natural interests destroys rather than liberates individuals. But there is a difficulty.

Hegel recognized the great forward surges that must be generated by the prevailing order of society — the development of material as well as cultural productivity; the destruction of obsolete power relations that hampered the advance of mankind; and the emancipation of the individual so that he might be the free subject of his life. When he stated that every 'immediate unity' (which does not imply an opposition between its component parts) is, with regard to the possibilities of human development, inferior to a unity produced by integrating real antagonisms, he was thinking of the society of his own time. The reconciliation of the individual and the universal seemed impossible without the full unfolding of those antagonisms which push the prevailing forms of life to a point where they openly contradict their content.³⁵

32. *Ibid.*, p. 27.

33. *Ibid.*, pp. 272-3.

34. *Ibid.*, p. 294.

35. *Ibid.*, pp. 88-9.

This passage suggests a strong connection between Hegel and Marx, but does not explain why Hegel considers an immediate or natural community of individuals to be inferior and antagonistic.

This tendency to interpret the Hegelian texts with a view to what they contribute to an understanding of Marx takes the force away from arguments which Hegel intended to be tightly connected. Marcuse can thus gloss over Hegel's move to religion and philosophy with a psychological account of his conservative temperament.

We may assume that his experience of the breakdown of liberal ideas in the history of his own time drove Hegel to take refuge in the pure mind, and that for philosophy's sake he preferred reconciliation with the prevailing system to the terrible contingencies of a new upheaval.³⁶

But this makes Hegel's rise to the religious standpoint seem unsupported and absurd.

At the end of the road, pure thought again seems to swallow up living freedom: the realm of 'absolute knowledge' is enthroned above the historical struggle that closed when the French Revolution was liquidated. The self-certainty of philosophy comprehending the world triumphs over the practice that changes it.³⁷

This is said after working through Hegel's phenomenological argument. But this argument reveals an "absolute" principle that is greater than anything in nature or history not in distinction from but in and through the terrible upheavals of modern freedom.

Hegel's phenomenological texts, therefore, are not allowed to show their full content. Again, Marcuse stresses that Hegel's account of the rise of self-consciousness shows the possibility of an infinitely free human community.

Self-consciousness thus finds itself in a 'state of desire' (*Be-gierde*): man, awakened to self-consciousness, desires the objects around him, appropriates and uses them. But in the process he comes to feel that the objects are not the true end of his desire, but that his needs can be fulfilled only through association with other individuals.³⁸

36. *Ibid.*, p. 92.

37. *Ibid.*, p. 120.

38. *Ibid.*, p. 114.

But this leaves unasked why the individual is not satisfied with the natural objects around him and unexplained why a free association with other individuals can quell the "life-and-death" struggle which leads to it. Hegel, on the other hand, claims to contain the extreme conflict of individuals only from the standpoint of a principle that can explain why the conflict arises in the first place.

Jürgen Habermas also emphasizes Hegel's connection with Marx, but his interest in Hegel is as nostalgic as it is revolutionary. Habermas, unlike Kojève and Marcuse, not only flees from all previous historical forms but also seeks them. His is a remarkable example of a conservative tendency from within the group of commentators who see Marx as Hegel's true heir. He gives us the following criticism of Marx:

Marx's brilliant insight into the dialectical relationship between the forces of production and the relations of production could very quickly be misinterpreted in a mechanistic manner. Today, when the attempt is being undertaken to reorganize the communicative nexus of interactions, no matter how much they have hardened into quasi-natural forms, according to the model of technically progressive systems of rational goal-directed action, we have reason enough to keep these two dimensions more rigorously separated. . . . *Liberation from hunger and misery* does not necessarily converge with *liberation from servitude and degradation*, for there is no automatic developmental relation between labor and interaction.³⁹

Marx goes too far in collapsing the older distinction between free interaction and technical life, between rational community and economic interests.

Through his reading of Hegel, Habermas rises to a critical grasp of the Marxist tradition and adds substantially to its self-understanding. The great merit of his work is to show that Marx was insufficiently aware of the contradiction between economic

39. "Darum konnte auch die geniale Einsicht in den dialektischen Zusammenhang von Produktivkräften und Produktionsverhältnissen alsbald mechanistisch mißdeutet werden.

Heute, da der Versuch unternommen wird, die kommunikativen Zusammenhänge wie immer auch naturwüchsig verfestigter Interaktionen nach dem Muster technisch fortschreitender Systeme zweckrationalen Handelns zu reorganisieren, haben wir Grund genug, beide Momente strenger auseinanderzuhalten. ... Die *Befreiung von Hunger und Mühsal* konvergiert nicht notwendig mit der *Befreiung von Knechtschaft und Erniedrigung*, denn ein entwicklungsautomatischer Zusammenhang zwischen Arbeit und Interaktion besteht nicht." Jürgen Habermas, "Arbeit und Interaktion: Bemerkungen zu Hegels Jenenser 'Philosophie des Geistes', in *Technik und Wissenschaft als 'Ideologie'*", edition suhrkamp, (2nd ed., Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp Verlag, 1968), p. 46; Habermas, *Theory and Practice*, trans. John Viertel (London, Heinemann, 1974), p. 169.

freedom and rational community. Hegel, on the other hand, has much to say concerning the separation of political reason from revolutionary economic interests and the dangers that arise in trying to overcome it. Of Hegel's political writings, Habermas writes:

He sees state power threatened in its very substance if social interests are translated directly onto the level of political decision. . . . To "mistake the state for civil society" and thereby define the state solely as "for the protection of property and personal liberty and for security" (*Philosophy of Right*, section 257) is a danger which again becomes acute as a result of the July Revolution. In France voting rights were democratized, and an electoral reform was impending in England. So Hegel concluded his pamphlet against the English Reform Bill with an entreaty, warning of the power of the people and of an opposition which could be misled into "seeking its strength in the people and bringing about a revolution instead of a reform."⁴⁰

Habermas would learn from Hegel why technical and economic freedom must be distinguished from a rational and universal community. The difference from Marx is that Habermas does not simply reduce institutions to economic activity; he lies somewhere between Hegel and Marx, between the old and the new.

But Habermas agrees with Marx that Hegel overestimates the power of older institutions, sacred and secular, to discipline the infinite modern interest in nature. He sees in the Hegelian argument no necessity to order an expanding economic life under authoritative institutions. With reference to Hegel's apparent "pessimism" in his old age, Habermas concludes:

Hegel seems to have felt that his critique was now no longer directed against a subjectivism made obsolete by the course of world-history, as it had been in 1817, but against the consequences of the same revolution which he had acclaimed, as long as the principles of abstract Right remained confined within the limits of bourgeois private law and did not extend to the right of political equality. For the last time the critique into which philosophy had been translated in the hands of Hegel the journalist changes its position: again it turns, as it had in the days of his youth, against the objectivity of actual conditions, but this time not, as formerly, against the state of a world petrified in positivity, but against the living spirit of the revolution continuing to propagate itself. The wind which Hegel feels no longer is at his back.⁴¹

40. Habermas, "On Hegel's Political Writings", *Theory and Practice*, pp. 188-9.

41. *Ibid.*, pp. 192-3.

Habermas assumes that Hegel supports established institutions despite the extreme destructiveness of individual economic interests and the revolutionary tendency to unite them. But he also tries to recall Hegel's teaching that economic activity is unstable enough to require distinctive political enlightenment.⁴²

In emphasizing the conflict of economic interests and the revolutionary drive to unite them, Habermas, like Marx, thinks he attains a principle which Hegel's argument does not contain. But his criticism of Marx suggests the possibility of an interpretation of Hegel that is independent of Marx. Habermas maintains against Marx that if human freedom is taken at a simply economic level, the conflict between this freedom and the rational order will never actually be resolved. The conflict persists for the reason already discussed, namely, that the economic means to human freedom endlessly frustrate the individual's certainty that he is always already free. But, since Habermas questions whether economic life can ever satisfy individual subjectivity, he is able to separate Hegel from Marx's interest in economic and technological liberation.⁴³ It only remains to be asked whether historical life itself can satisfy the individual in order to separate Hegel from the Marxist interest in a merely human freedom.

The Existentialist Response

Karl Löwith, in his commentary on Hegel, hopes to overcome the limitations of Marxist interpretation. He belongs to the second group of commentators, as mentioned above, who resist the assumptions of subjective freedom when approaching the Hegelian texts. If the commentators in the first group follow Marx, Löwith is deeply critical of the revolutionary appropriation of Hegel. He gives us a thoughtful treatment of the religious

42. This is the tension that runs throughout Habermas' account of Hegel's relation to the French Revolution in his *Theorie und Praxis* (Berlin, Luchterhand, 1969), pp. 89-107. He praises Hegel's insight into the necessity for going beyond the private and economic realm and reconciling individual freedom with universal enlightenment (*ibid.*, p. 95). But he criticizes Hegel for seeking reconciliation in contemplative forms which limit the social and historical realm (*ibid.*, pp. 105-6). Habermas does not consider whether or why the conflict within the economic and the rise to religion and philosophy are, for Hegel, forms of the same movement.

43. Habermas' criticism of Marx does not go so far as existentialist criticism, which leads one to look beyond modernity altogether to ancient and medieval forms of life and thought. Habermas on this point sharply distinguishes himself from Karl Löwith (*ibid.*, pp. 352-70). Habermas, unlike Löwith, does not carry the insight into an unstable and destructive freedom so far as to question the possibility of a merely human freedom. (See my remarks on Löwith in the pages which immediately follow.)

dimension in Hegel and of his distance from Marx and other of his successors. He concludes, however, by rejecting not only Marx's approach to Hegel but Hegel himself. With Marx in view, Löwith protests against Hegel that modern freedom as such turns revolutionary and destroys both natural and historical life.

Although Löwith stresses the deeply conservative and religious intention of the Hegelian philosophy, he ultimately judges it in the light of its apparent Marxist result. He sees in Marx an intensely destructive form of the Hegelian belief that Christianity moves men to dominate nature and establish total secular freedom. Hegel saw his affirmation of modern freedom as the fulfillment of the inwardness of Protestant belief. But Löwith maintains that this freedom easily and naturally assumes atheistic forms. This dissolution of the Hegelian standpoint in warring religious and humanistic elements is the starting-point for Löwith's whole treatment of the nineteenth century.

Löwith shares with Marxism the conviction that Hegel's explication of religion and institutions is excessively rational and inescapably succumbs to a revolutionary modern freedom.

Through the freedom of its form, knowledge revolutionizes even its substantial content. The philosophy which perfects itself becomes the birthplace of the spirit, which then presses on to a new, real configuration. And, in actual fact, Hegel's summation of the history of knowledge becomes the birthplace from which the intellectual and political developments of the nineteenth century arise.⁴⁴

Löwith differs from Marx in his conservative attitude towards the atheistic spirit and revolutionary freedom that seems to emerge from Hegel. But he no less assumes the truth of the revolutionary interpretation of Hegel when he opposes the authority of Christianity and institutions to the secular realm and modern freedom in it.

However extravagant Hegel's systematization of history as "progress in consciousness of freedom" appears in light of its immediate, empirical aspect, the reason it could become

44. "Das Wissen revolutioniert durch seine freie Form auch den substanziellen Gehalt. Die sich vollendende Philosophie wird zur Geburtsstätte des Geistes, der später zu einer wirklichen, neuen Gestaltung drängt. Und in der Tat ist Hegels Abschluß der Geschichte des Wissens die Geburtsstätte geworden, aus der das geistige und politische Geschehen des 19. Jahrhunderts entsprang." Karl Löwith, *Von Hegel zu Nietzsche: Der revolutionäre Bruch im Denken des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts* (5th ed., Stuttgart, Kohlhammer, 1964), p. 56; Löwith, *From Hegel to Nietzsche: the revolution in nineteenth-century thought*, trans. David E. Green (New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1964), p. 43.

so popular lies in its own kernel, from which the Christian theological hull can be stripped off.⁴⁵

It seems that there is much to distinguish Löwith's conservative interest in an older religiosity and authority from the revolutionary forces of secular freedom. But between these opposed positions there is the common view that Hegel demanded such an excessive and impossibly rational union of the human with the divine that he provoked an equally extreme rebellion against it.

The critical acuity of the left-wing Hegelians has its historical measure in the completeness of Hegel's reconciliation. The reconciliation found its most intelligible expression in his political and religious philosophy. Its destruction was the goal of his pupils' efforts, precisely because they were concerned with the "real" state and with "real" Christianity.⁴⁶

It would appear that Hegel's reconciliation of religious and political tradition with the modern world was bound to fail. Löwith fears that the rationality of the modern world has become simply economic and therefore destructive of religious and other institutions.⁴⁷

Löwith's criticism of Hegel may not be too far removed from the revival earlier in this century in English-speaking countries of the tradition of Locke and Hume and others.⁴⁸ But through

45. "So extravagant Hegels Konstruktion der Geschichte als eines 'Fortschritts im Bewußtsein der Freiheit' im Vergleich zu nächsten, empirischen Ansicht ist, so liegt doch der Grund, warum sie so populär werden konnte, in ihrem eigenen Kern, von dem die christlich-theologische Hülle abstreifbar ist." Löwith, *Von Hegel zu Nietzsche*, pp. 237-8; *From Hegel to Nietzsche*, p. 218.

46. "Die kritische Schärfe der Linkshegelianer hat ihren geschichtlichen Maßstab an der Entschiedenheit von Hegels Versöhnung. Ihren faßlichsten Ausdruck fand sie in seiner Staats- und Religionsphilosophie. Auf deren Destruktion zielen auch die Bestrebungen seiner Schüler, gerade weil es ihnen um den "wirklichen" Staat und das "wirkliche" Christentum ging." Löwith, *Von Hegel zu Nietzsche*, p. 58; *From Hegel to Nietzsche*, p. 45.

47. Löwith considers that Hegel's account of work as "educative" (*Von Hegel zu Nietzsche*, pp. 286-91) has been superseded by Nietzsche's account of work as the "dissolution of devotion and contemplation" (*ibid.*, pp. 308-11).

48. See, for example, J.N. Findlay, *Hegel: A Re-examination* (London, George Allen and Unwin, 1958). Findlay deplors the tendency of the English speaking public in the first half of the twentieth century to relate Hegel to the mystical and destructive aspects of modern life and thought. This, he thinks, is due to a confusion of Hegel with certain conservative and revolutionary doctrines which come out of the Victorian era (pp. 21-7). Findlay emphasizes the "wholly 'immanent'" character of Hegel's system of thought (p. 350), and spends much time trying to reconcile Hegel with

the existentialist philosophy of recent times Löwith is more comprehensive and explicit about his rejection of Hegel and of the older moderns. With reference to Hegel's summation of the older modern period and the nineteenth century appropriation of it, Löwith writes:

This traditional connection between the idea of man and the Christian doctrine of the incarnate God led also to the exaltation of man as a self-sufficient being, in opposition to the Christian religion. But if the notion of man and humanity was originally connected with Christianity, then mere humanness is called into question as soon as it loses its Christian foundation. At first, the nineteenth century believed it possible to replace Christianity with humanity and humanism (Feuerbach, Ruge, Marx), but with the result that faith was finally lost in humanity (Stirner, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche). A further consequence of the doubt in a humanity emancipated from Christianity is the present "dehumanization" of man.⁴⁹

Löwith sees his commentary on Hegel as a useful and direct way in which to determine the collapse of Christian belief into a self-destructive secular humanism.

Löwith's primary concern is to show the necessity of affirming the merely human and economic content of Hegel's translation or collapse of divine into human.

The historical consequence of Hegel's ambiguous "translation" was an absolute destruction of Christian philosophy and of the Christian religion.⁵⁰

the empiricist attitude of the older modern philosophy (pp. 267-74 and 350-4). But Findlay, unlike Löwith, does not make primary the problem of determining the relation of Hegel's Christianity to the destructiveness of modern freedom (see pp. 353-4).

49. "Auf Grund dieses traditionellen Zusammenhangs der Idee des Menschen mit der christlichen Lehre vom Gottmenschen hat sich andererseits aber auch die *Verselbständigung* des Menschen im *Gegensatz zur christlichen Religion* entwickelt. Wenn aber der Begriff des Menschen und der Humanität in einer ursprünglichen Verbindung mit dem Christentum stand, dann wird die bloße Menschlichkeit notwendig fragwürdig, sobald der christliche Gehalt aus ihr schwindet. Zunächst hat man zwar im 19. Jahrhundert das Christentum durch Humanität zu ersetzen geglaubt (Feuerbach, Ruge, Marx) — aber mit dem Ergebnis, daß man schließlich auch der Humanität mißtraut (Stirner, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche). Eine weitere Folge des Fraglichwerdens der vom Christentum emanzipierten Humanität ist jetzt die "Dehumanisierung" des Menschen." Löwith, *Von Hegel zu Nietzsche*, pp. 332-3; *From Hegel to Nietzsche*, p. 310.

50. "Denn was aus Hegels zweideutiger "Aufhebung" geschichtlich hervorging, war eine *entschiedene Destruktion der christlichen Philosophie* und der *christlichen Religion*." Löwith, *Von Hegel zu Nietzsche*, p. 356; *From Hegel to Nietzsche*, p. 333.

It occurs to Marxists that the classical world in which Hegel shared has so far collapsed into a historical humanity that secular and economic reason is the only common tradition of Europeans. Löwith affirms, contrary to Marx, a continuing attachment to religious and political aspects of the older order. But he fundamentally agrees with Marx that Hegel's religious and political relation to the older modern period provokes a revolution against it. The difference is Löwith's more radical rejection of Hegel and determination to expose modern secular freedom as destructive of both Christianity and itself.

In Löwith's view, the problem of a self-destroying modernity not only falls outside of the Hegelian philosophy but is the unforeseen result of its attempt to unify divine and human, eternity and time.⁵¹

The way in which Hegel, and even Marx, viewed the system of our world was limited; only in the course of the nineteenth century did "eruption of energy" set in, which ultimately led to the World War and the upheavals following in its wake; Hegel could not foresee this at all, and Marx only insofar as it pertained to capitalism.⁵²

But the problem of freedom as it appears to Löwith may be only in secondary ways different from the problem that Hegel addresses from the beginning of his philosophy. Löwith's existentialist relation to Hegel seems mainly a reaction to the Marxist appropriation of the Hegelian concept of modern freedom.⁵³ But if one were to press even further the distinction between Hegel and Marx one might discover that the problem of modern freedom falls more firmly within the Hegelian philosophy than even existentialists assume.

51. "Indem Hegel als Philosoph der christlich-germanischen Welt den Geist als Wille und Freiheit begriff, bleibt das Verhältnis des Geistes zur Zeit, die er griechisch als immerwährende Gegenwart und als Kreislauf bestimmt, in der Tat ein Widerspruch und ein Rätsel, das erst Hegels Schüler zu Gunsten der Freiheit des Willens, für das die Zukunft den Vorrang hat, aufgelöst haben." Löwith, *Von Hegel zu Nietzsche*, p. 229.

52. "Die Art, wie Hegel und auch noch Marx das System unserer Welt ansahen, war begrenzt, weil erst im 19. Jahrhundert jener "Ausbruch der Energien" einsetzte, dessen vorerst letzte Erscheinung der Weltkrieg und die aus ihm hervorgegangenen Umwälzungen sind, die Hegel überhaupt nicht und Marx nur in der Begrenzung auf den Kapitalismus voraussehen konnte." Löwith, *Von Hegel zu Nietzsche*, p. 148; *From Hegel to Nietzsche*, p. 131.

53. Löwith in retrospect views the nineteenth century through the Nietzschean existentialism, which allows him to see that Marx confined himself to the secular side of Hegel's secular-divine dialectic. The destructive consequences of this move Löwith not to broaden the dialectic but to abandon it altogether. *Von Hegel zu Nietzsche*, pp. 178-9.

Löwith does not pursue very far the possibility of a connection between the rebellious modern freedom that he deplores and Hegel's account of the rational union of human and divine. He recognizes that there is a relation between Hegel's view of Christianity and secular life and Marx's form of revolutionary freedom. But he does not consider that insight into the problem of a revolutionary reduction of religion and institutions may lie at the basis of Hegel's rational account of them.

The spirit, as subject and substance of history, is no longer a foundation, but, at best, a problem. Hegel's historical relativism has as its beginning and end "absolute knowledge," in relation to which every stage in the unfolding of the spirit is a mark of progress in consciousness of freedom; . . . But because the equation of philosophy with the "spirit of the age" gained its revolutionary power through Hegel's pupils, a study of the age from Hegel to Nietzsche ultimately will have to yield the question: Is the essence and "meaning" of history determined absolutely from within history itself; and, if not, then how?⁵⁴

Hegelian philosophy here seems to dissolve into a radical atheism or simply independent historical life.

So too Jean Hyppolite's study of Hegel's phenomenological argument follows it only to the point where a revolutionary freedom seems to emerge. But this makes Hegel's transition from historical life to religion difficult to explain.

Mais alors il n'y a plus aucune transcendance en dehors du devenir historique. Dans ces conditions, la pensée hégélienne — en dépit de certaines formules — nous paraît très loin de la religion. Toute la phénoménologie apparaît comme un effort héroïque pour réduire la "transcendance verticale" à une "transcendance horizontale".⁵⁵

54. "Der Geist als Subjekt und Substanz der Geschichte ist nicht mehr ein Fundament, sondern bestenfalls ein Problem. Hegels historischer Relativismus hat zum Anfang und Ende das "absolute Wissens", in bezug auf welches jeder Schritt in der Entfaltung des Geistes ein Fortschritt im Bewußtsein der Freiheit ist. . . . Weil aber die Gleichsetzung der Philosophie mit dem "Geist der Zeit" ihre revolutionierende Kraft durch Hegels Schüler gewann, wird zumal eine Studie über die Zeit von Hegel bis Nietzsche am Ende die Frage aufwerfen müssen: bestimmt sich das Sein und der "Sinn" der Geschichte überhaupt aus ihr selbst, und wenn nicht, woraus dann?" Löwith, *Von Hegel zu Nietzsche*, pp. 7-8; *From Hegel to Nietzsche*, vi.

55. Jean Hyppolite, *Genèse et Structure de la Phénoménologie de l'Esprit de Hegel* (Paris, Aubier Montaigne, 1946), p. 525, n.

If moderns have overcome the older divisions of religious and historical life, why then should they preserve them? Although Hyppolite acknowledges a certain mystical and religious tendency in Hegel, he reduces the Hegelian contemplation of the divine to infinite human freedom.

Quand Marx écrira un jour "les philosophes n'ont fait jusqu'ici qu'interpréter le monde, maintenant il faut le transformer", il ne sera pas tellement infidèle à la pensée hégélienne.⁵⁶

Hyppolite departs from Marx when he describes Hegel's view of the instability of modern freedom in the world.

Il y a donc un certain dualisme dans la philosophie hégélienne Mais ce dualisme n'est pas la juxtaposition de deux substances, par exemple le Logos et la Nature, il est l'oeuvre de Soi qui se pose et en tant qu'il se pose dans une détermination s'oppose à soi-même. . . . Ainsi la dialectique du Logos et de la Nature est la perpétuelle position de soi de leur unité vivante qui est l'Esprit.⁵⁷

This dualism and endless striving suggest a certain dissatisfaction which might move moderns to a truly religious standpoint. But Hyppolite does not consider that this dissatisfaction is so great that Hegel's concept of modern freedom transcends the limits of the historical and merely human. Despite his effort to follow the Hegelian argument to its end, he fundamentally agrees with Marx's revolutionary interpretation of it.

Hyppolite, to be sure, does not directly reduce Hegelian philosophy to the divinized human freedom which Marx envisaged. He recognizes in Hegel a profound criticism of the modern will to live fully in nature and history.

Mais si Hegel paraît incliner vers cet humanisme, il se refuse à cette réduction complète de Dieu à l'homme. Il maintient toujours un certain dépassement nécessaire de l'homme. La grande douleur de l'homme — une forme de la conscience malheureuse — c'est d'être réduit à lui seul, d'avoir absorbé le divin en soi.⁵⁸

Hyppolite follows recent existentialist philosophy in criticizing a revolutionary humanism that would abolish the restless dissatisfaction within the historical.⁵⁹ But it seems strange to look to Hegel

56. *Ibid.*, p. 577.

57. *Ibid.*, p. 581.

58. *Ibid.*, p. 524.

59. "Si Dieu lui-même est mort, que rest-t-il? Pensée profonde et qui annonce les thèmes d'un Nietzsche ou d'un Heidegger — sur l'absence de Dieu et sur la nécessité pour l'homme de se transcender." *Ibid.*

for insights into this continuing dissatisfaction if one believes with Marx that he excites hopes for a peace altogether within nature and history.

Hyppolite, like Löwith, tends to relate Hegel to contemporary existentialism in order to distinguish him from his revolutionary successors, including Marx. This is why he thinks that the most interesting developments in Hegel may be seen in the phenomenological account of religion and especially of Christianity.⁶⁰ For here Hegel incorporates the destructiveness and negativity of freedom into his vision of human existence.

Le Soi est *négativité* absolue, et cette *négativité* transparaît dans sa *position* comme être. Si le Soi est être, c'est que l'être comme tel se nie lui-même, et si l'être est le Soi, c'est qu'il est en soi cette négation de lui-même.⁶¹

What Hyppolite principally learns from the Hegelian texts is that there is nothing given in nature and history, but, like Marx, he sees in them no need to press the endless striving of modern freedom to the point where a stable divine principle appears.

L'inégalité de la conscience à la substance est cette différence du savoir et de son objet qui est l'appel à une perpétuelle transcendance de soi dans la *Phénoménologie*.⁶²

Emil Fackenheim is apparently better able to treat Hegel independently of Marx. But he also finds that Hegel's view of Christianity and institutional order necessarily gives way to a revolutionary secular freedom.

On the grounds of such a turn of thought, Hegel's secular freedom is preserved and indeed transfigured by the death of God for which it is responsible, and so is free philosophical thought. At the same time, the loss of Hegel's Christian content deprives both this postreligious secular world, and this post-Hegelian philosophic thought, of all hopes to finality. Free secular life becomes infinitely dynamic, hence inherently revolutionary and bourgeois no longer and philosophic thought becomes the forever fragmented herald of a forever fragmented future.⁶³

60. *Ibid.*, pp. 512-4.

61. *Ibid.*, p. 569.

62. *Ibid.*, p. 559.

63. Fackenheim, *Religious Dimension*, p. 239.

Fackenheim's approach to Hegel is more conservative and religiously inspired than Hyppolite's, but he no less endorses the truth of the revolutionary interpretation. Hegel's support of religion and institutional authority here cannot be reconciled with his support of modern freedom.

Fackenheim is close to Löwith in his account of Hegel's relation to divinity and institutions. He too cannot think how Hegelian philosophy can fulfill its intention to put together religious authority and modern subjective freedom.

No wisdom is required today for the insight that the Hegelian synthesis, if ever a genuine possibility, has broken down beyond all possible recovery. . . . Modern secular self-confidence, if surviving at all, has lost its titanic quality, and the God who speaks to present-day faith speaks ambiguously if He is not wholly silent. This writer — a Jew committed to Judaism — would in any case be at odds with the Hegelian synthesis, which, after all, is Christian or post-Christian. In the world of today, no one can accept this synthesis — Christian, post-Christian, or non-Christian.⁶⁴

Hegel's is an excessive and humanly impossible rationality which cannot bridge the extremes of religious conservatism and revolutionary freedom which it embraces. The modern world is essentially revolutionary and destructive of the religious and political order Hegel would save.

But Fackenheim is more radical than Löwith in his rejection of modern freedom and turn to older contemplative forms. His existentialism moves him to reject Christianity as such, even in its medieval and patristic forms.

What, then, is the effect of this inevitable failure upon post-Hegelian thought? One possible answer is: there is no essential effect, for the Hegelian philosophy, and indeed the idealistic tradition which it completes, is a mere episode in the history of Western thought — an aberration which deserves to be forgotten. At least in the sphere of religious thought this answer is not convincing, for one can deny neither the existence of a uniquely modern secular-religious problem, nor the significance of the Hegelian attempt to cope with it. Thus it is in vain that the religious believer pretends that the modern secular world is no different from its premodern precursors: he can maintain himself neither in a simple other-worldliness nor in a simple unworldliness, nor can he simply abide in the modern world by premodern, but now undermined, sacred authorities.⁶⁵

64. *Ibid.*, p. 12.

65. *Ibid.*, p. 236.

Fackenheim, unlike Löwith, thinks that the Christian religion itself, not just the modern world to which it gives rise, is a self-destroying reality. Modern secular humanism destroys itself, but one must not forget that modernity comes out of Christianity, which therefore is implicated in this destructiveness.

The central point of Fackenheim's commentary is that the Hegelian philosophy so accurately summarizes orthodox Christianity and modern secular freedom that its failure is also the failure of its elements.

Thus modern faith may well directly contradict Hegel on the ultimate issue; asserting, after all, a radical incommensurability between the Word of God and the word of man, it may begin with a radical "No!" to the modern world, said in behalf of the Word of God. But modern faith cannot remain with this sheer "No!"; and if it does so remain, it shrinks into a worldless pietism turned upon itself: a faith whose nemesis is a secularism which would appropriate the life of faith itself.⁶⁶

To "right-wing" Hegelians the collapse of divine into human is so destructive of Christianity that it must flee the natural and historical world altogether. To "left-wing" Hegelians, including Marx, Christianity so far strengthens worldly and historical humanity that it can stand on its own ground.

Again, modern secularity may seek to withdraw into a finite sphere, i.e., into a humanism simply innocent of divinity. But it cannot return to agnostic innocence; beginning with affirming the life of the human, it ends up affirming the death of the Divine.⁶⁷

As against these extremes, Fackenheim seeks to escape the fate of Hegelianism by turning radically away from modern freedom and the Christianity which excites and provokes it.

Fackenheim is clear that Hegel never despaired of modernity because he did not live to see how secular freedom would destroy Christianity and threaten all religion. Of this problem, Fackenheim concludes:

Were Hegel alive today, he would be forced to regard it as central. For our contemporary Christian West, unlike Hegel's own, is characterized by a fragmentation which is all-pervasive and inescapable. On the one hand, the Divine today speaks at most obscurely and intermittently to the believer; and this latter, if he is a Christian, can no longer ignore, or simply seek to convert a rising world which is non-Western, non-Christian and nonwhite: he exists in a post-Christian world. On the

66. *Ibid.*, p. 13.

67. *Ibid.*

other hand, our secular world too is postmodern; for the old modern Western self-confidence has been shaken to the core in this century.⁶⁸

The problem of modern freedom in its extreme form is therefore not contained by Hegel's divine principle but conflicts with it. But, as against Fackenheim, the problem of a "post-modern" revolutionary humanity as it appears in this century may not be fundamentally different from how it appeared to Hegel. This requires, however, that one consider the possibility of a deeper connection between the destructive secular freedom that Fackenheim perceives and the Hegelian relation to divinity.

Fackenheim does not see a necessary link between Hegel's treatment of modern freedom and his move to religion and philosophy. He sees the connection between Hegelianism and Marx's affirmation of a total human freedom in the world. But Hegel's consideration of religion and institutions he thinks was not and could not be founded upon the extreme nineteenth century rebellion against them.

Nor could Hegel, were he alive today, remain with his own nineteenth-century synthesis. For if a truly modern philosophic thought must stay with the world rather than flee from it, then a twentieth-century Hegelianism would have to stay with a fragmented world.⁶⁹

The fatal limitation of the Hegelian philosophy is that it reflects an older Christian Europe that has since been fragmented by revolutionary developments.

Thus, although Fackenheim successfully demonstrates Hegel's interest in uniting secular freedom and Christian faith, he is convinced that such a reconciliation is impossible. From Hegel's standpoint, modernity perfects rather than destroys the religion and institutions of pre-revolutionary Europe. But Fackenheim, in accord with contemporary existentialism, affirms that secular freedom, in its modern form, destroys the good of religion and its institutional expressions. The contemporary experience of fragmentation moves Fackenheim to assert that Hegel himself would abandon his own philosophical synthesis in the effort to reflect the reality of life.

Protests against any contemporary synthesis such as the protests implicit in the work of Barth and Buber, Sartre and Heidegger are therefore wholly in accord with Hegelian teaching, and it is entirely safe to say Hegel, were he alive today, would not be a Hegelian.⁷⁰

68. *Ibid.*, pp. 235-6.

69. *Ibid.*, p. 12.

70. *Ibid.*

What remains is an existentialist contemplation that somehow moves beyond the subjective confidence of individuals relative to the consciousness of a larger worldly existence.

As Martin Buber teaches, the meeting of the Divine and the human occurs, if it occurs at all, not in a separate sphere cut off from the world. It occurs in the world in which men meet each other.

These developments indicate that philosophic thought must move beyond the extremes of partisan commitments, and grope for what may be called a fragmented middle.⁷¹

The difficulty with Fackenheim's interpretation of Hegel, as distinguished from his existentialism considered in itself, concerns the account of the older modern freedom. He explains that, for Hegel, both religion and philosophy disclose the basic intellectual reality, but not that the content of religion is only partly common with that of philosophy.⁷² What Hegelian philosophy intends to contain, beyond religion, is the full content of the secular realm. But Fackenheim does not describe Hegel's account of the rise of secular freedom in relation to its Christian origins. He thinks that Hegel rather too directly depends upon the authority of faith so that the extreme opposition of subjective freedom to Christianity in our time falls outside of his philosophical principle.⁷³

It seems that Fackenheim does not escape the prejudices of contemporary assumptions. He can separate Hegel's intention from a naively secularized Christianity that is indistinguishable from revolutionary liberation. But his account of Hegel's concept of modern freedom assumes the given self-subsistence of the subjective individual in a manner which commentators have done

71. *Ibid.*, pp. 241-2.

72. Consider the following text from Hegel cited in James Doull, review of *The Religious Dimension in Hegel's Thought*, by Emil Fackenheim, in *Dialogue*, 7 (1968-9), 487: ". . . the content of philosophy and religion is identical except for the more specific content of external nature and finite spirit which does not fall into the sphere of religion" (*Encyclopedia*, section 573)." Doull argues against Fackenheim that Hegelian science frees itself from its starting-point in religion.

73. See Doull's argument that Hegel freed himself not only of his starting-point in religion but of his starting-point in modern secular freedom: "Hegel indeed believed in European culture, but the competing aggressive states of Europe that were despoiling the rest of the world in their interest were not to his mind the final expression of that culture. Europeans — so he teaches in the *Philosophy of Right* and elsewhere — would only understand their own freedom when they ceased to dominate other peoples, and knew their form of life as resting on other forms right back to the primitive. And he thought Americans, being freer of a particular national history, might come to this understanding more easily than Europeans." *Ibid.*, p. 490.

since Marx. At least in relation to Hegel, Fackenheim has no reason to assume that modern freedom is simply given and underived.

Like other commentators who treat Hegel's work in the light of its apparent revolutionary result, Fackenheim overlooks the deeper possibilities of the argument. He avoids reducing Hegel's texts to a "patchwork" of insights but equally does not press the connections to reveal the necessity that Hegel intends. This comes out perhaps most clearly when Fackenheim stops short of Hegel's move to philosophy in the phenomenological argument.

When finally the Notion appears on the scene in its own right, it does not expand its scope explicitly over the whole vast panorama of life previously viewed. It is merely tersely asserted — as a staggering demand.⁷⁴

Between the extremes of Hegel's philosophical thought (the Notion) and modern freedom there seems to be an unresolved tension. But this leaves unasked why Hegel's argument brings out so strongly the destructive possibilities of modernity.

One should note, in answering, that Hegel's entire effort is to show that the destructiveness of the modern relation to nature and the move to religion and philosophy belong to one total view. His deepest intention is to overcome the chasm between the contemplative consciousness of nature and history and modern freedom. But he does this by finding in the infinite confidence of individuals both the necessity of modern alienation and the possibility of overcoming it. It seems impossible to Hegel to separate such confidence from the divine principle, since one would be left with a modern freedom without any determination whatsoever. Fackenheim's rhetorical question on this point serves his purpose:

A radical gap, after all, remains between the standpoint of absolute thought and even those standpoints of life which are closest to it. Why — this might be asked not only by Fichteans but also, *mutatis mutandis*, by Marxists — should the standpoint of moral self-activity grasp the ladder to the scientific standpoint when, having done so, it finds its certainty of what is forever yet to be done point to a Truth which already is done?⁷⁵

74. Fackenheim, *Religious Dimension*, p. 72.

75. *Ibid.*, pp. 70-1.

But this fails to consider that moral self-activity, or modern subjectivity, suffers from a conflict with natural and historical life which points to an underlying unity that is neither side by itself but the total view.

The Missing Connection

Manfred Riedel, in his *Theorie und Praxis im Denken Hegels*, reflects the deeply ambiguous contemporary attitude towards Hegel. On the one side, he looks back to Hegel as the culmination of the Enlightenment and the beginning of the revolutionary nineteenth century. Thus Hegelian metaphysics underlies Marx's affirmation of active human relations to the world with its momentous consequences for all of Europe.

In this consists the transition from Hegel's metaphysical determinations to the analysis of active human relations to the world, which with Marx will become fully developed and the specific measure for the determination of human essence. So long as there still is a "lying opposite" of the object in being, the ground of subjectivity lacks grounding, and its driving force is just because of that driven to subordinate objectivity and to posit subjectivity in being instead of the activity of being itself. The metaphysical grounding of what is living consists precisely in this and in nothing else.⁷⁶

Marx seems only to further and complete Hegel's metaphysical account of the subjective will and its rational possession of the world, natural and human.

There is, however, another side to Riedel's relation to Hegelian philosophy. He also sees in it the beginning of the nineteenth century reaction against the rationality which inspired modern freedom. For Riedel, Hegel's aim is not only to justify modernity but to recover features of the ancient and medieval contemplation which moderns seem to have destroyed.

76. "Hierin besheht der Übergang der metaphysischen Bestimmungen Hegels in die bei ihm schon vorhandenen Analysen des menschlichen Tätigkeitsverhältnisses zur Welt, die bei Marx zu voller Entfaltung kommen und zur einzigen Maßgabe für die Bestimmung des menschlichen Wesens werden. Solange noch ein "Gegenüberliegen" des Objekts im Sein ist, mangelt dem Grund der Subjektivität die Gründung, und ihr Trieb wird eben darauf getrieben, die Objektivität zu unterwerfen und mittels der Tätigkeit an ihr die Subjektivität ins Sein zu setzen — das metaphysische Grundgeschehen der Lebendigkeit besteht eben darin und in nichts anderem." Manfred Riedel, *Theorie und Praxis im Denken Hegels: Interpretationen zu den Grundstellungen der neuzeitlichen Subjektivität* (Stuttgart, Kohlhammer, 1965), p. 132.

Only because Hegel in this way thinks being as the truth and posits both as one, and because he first let the essence of man be grounded in this truth, does he repeat once more — although apart from the experience of the practical and of the human essence of work — the meaning of theory *qua* philosophy which comes down to us from the ancients, namely, that it brings man into the truth of being.⁷⁷

Riedel finds in Hegel not only the affirmation of modern subjectivity but the transcendence of it relative to a theoretical consciousness of a larger natural and historical existence.

Riedel maintains that Hegel embraces both positive and negative attitudes to modern freedom. In order to avoid a merely polemical standpoint, he seeks to describe the inner logic of the Hegelian argument. He finds a certain consistency of purpose in texts dealing with modern practical freedom, and he relates this to Hegel's interest in the theoretical or contemplative consciousness of nature.

The fundamental context of desire and activity would not be properly understood, if one reduced it to the practical act of enjoyment, use and possession. Much more, with Hegel, this context points beyond the physical realm to the fact of negativity, which is posited in the being of everything alive. The activity which springs out of need, desire and drive seems, with Hegel, to have an absolutely universal "ontological" significance.⁷⁸

Throughout his commentary, Riedel stresses Hegel's intention to unite modern practical freedom with a pre-modern consciousness of the being of nature. This seems to give him a total view of the divisions of contemporary scholarship.⁷⁹

But, in Riedel's case, it becomes clear that the content and order of the Hegelian texts are not to be taken as their author intended.

77. "Nur weil Hegel in dieser Weise das Sein als die Wahrheit denkt und beide in eins setzt, und weil er das Wesen des Menschen in dieser Wahrheit erst gründen läßt, wiederholt er noch einmal — obzwar gebrochen von der Erfahrung des Praktischen und des menschlichen Werkwesens — den von alters her überlieferten Sinn von *theorie qua Philosophie* — daß sie den Menschen in die Wahrheit des Seins bringt." Riedel, *Theorie und Praxis*, p. 193.

78. "Der grundlegende Zusammenhang von Begierde und Tätigkeit würde nicht angemessen verstanden werden können, reduzierte man ihn auf das praktische Tun für Genuß, Gebrauch und Besitz. Vielmehr verweist er bei Hegel über das physische Faktum hinaus auf die Faktizität der Negativität, die mit dem Sein alles Lebendigen gesetzt ist. Der aus Bedürfnis, Begierde, Trieb entspringenden Tätigkeit kommt bei Hegel eine schlechthin allgemeine "ontologische" Bedeutung zu." Riedel, *Theorie und Praxis*, p. 118.

79. Riedel, *Theorie und Praxis*, pp. 9-13.

While finding in Hegel a profound statement of modern alienation, he rejects in Heideggerian language the Hegelian unity of being and thought.

One sees, therefore, that the Hegelian onto-theology begins as a theory of being, but so that it from the beginning does not, as in its origin with Aristotle, orient itself to the "theoretical" character of objects (Mathematics, Physics) relative to the — to be sure still presupposed — divinity of being as that which always exists. On the contrary, it orients itself to the historical character of being in that epoch which has taken leave of onto-theological metaphysics. Because Hegel's theory in this way understands itself historically, that is, out of the practical and historical overturning of Europe, it is clear why it as a theory of being falls back into the existence of history.⁸⁰

The result is that Hegel remains implicated in modernity, which has overcome the ancient theoretical tradition and sustains to this day the practical spirit that is for Riedel so unthinking and destructive. Hegel's argument is ultimately only of historical interest, since he reverts in the end to the affirmation of unlimited human freedom in the world.

Thus Riedel sees in revolutionary historical freedom the completion of Hegel's philosophy and, indeed, of the modern period itself. A Marxist result somehow emerges from Hegel's strong attachment to modern subjectivity and his affirmation of a totally human world.

The possibility of a common interpretation, finally said, is grounded above all in this, that both Hegel and Marx experience what is alive, particularly what is alive in man, as subjectivity. And, to be sure, Marx experiences this in such a way that he transposes the subjectivity of man from the Hegelian sphere of spirit to the realm of what is living, so that from here on the over-all agreement, as indicated, could arise.⁸¹

80. "Man sieht also, daß die Hegelsche Onto-Theologie als Theorie des Seins beginnt, aber im vorhinein so, daß sie sich nicht, wie an ihrem Ursprung bei Aristoteles, am "theoretischen" Charakter der Gegenstände (Mathematik, Physik) bzw. an der — Obzwar noch immer vorausgesetzten — Göttlichkeit des immerseienden Seins orientiert, sondern am seinsgeschichtlichen Charakter derjenigen Epoche, die von der onto-theologischen Metaphysik Abschied genommen hat. Weil Hegels Theorie in dieser Weise geschichtlich sich versteht, d. i. aus dem praktisch-geschichtlichen Umbruch Europas heraus, wird klar, weshalb sie als Theorie des Seins auf das Seiende der Geschichte zurückgeht." Riedel, *Theorie und its Praxis*, p. 208.

81. "Die Gemeinsamkeit der Auslegungsmöglichkeit gründet, abschließend gesagt, vor allem darin, daß Hegel wie Marx das Lebendige

Riedel intends to distinguish Hegel from Marx, but in the end he succumbs to the contemporary assumptions as discussed above. Hegel's attempt to unite modern practical life with an older theoretical consciousness of divinity and natural life gives way to the revolutionary destruction of the latter.⁸²

What Riedel seeks over against the Hegelian synthesis of theoretical and practical consciousness is a post-modern return to the ancient Greek consciousness of nature. He turns away from the revolutionary freedom in nature to a profounder naturalism that "always already" transcends the human will.

In the classical Greek conception, theory is an attitude of man which is open to the being of beings as a whole and in which opening the divine itself stands in being. To be sure, this is never so that man "has" being or "disposes" over it, but so that he always already stands in it, insofar as something divine and immortal — "spirit" — is in him. The openness of this spirit towards beings is what opens man to being. The ground of man's openness to being, therefore, lies not in humanness, but transcends it in the presence of the divine in being. Man steps into relation to this presence through intuition, theory.⁸³

The emphasis here is on the possibilities of caring for the natural independently of the human reason that would subdue it. As against the willful subjectivity that determines the modern era, including Hegel's philosophy, Riedel looks to a new beginning in an existentially prior understanding of being.

But, although Riedel opposes the Hegelian justification of modernity, he also learns from Hegel not to look nostalgically to nature in opposition to the encroachment of modern subjectivity.⁸⁴

bzw. die Lebendigkeit des Menschen als Subjektivität erfahren, und zwar Marx in der Weise, daß er die Subjektivität des Menschen aus der Hegelschen Geist-Sphäre zurückbeugt in den Umkreis des Lebendigen, so daß von hier aus die dargelegte Übereinstimmung ergeben konnte." Riedel, *Theorie und Praxis*, p. 136.

82. See *Theorie und Praxis*, pp. 85-9, for Riedel's discussion of Hegel's concept of the "end" of history and the "completion" of philosophy in practical human freedom.

83. "In der klassisch-griechischen Fassung ist Theorie eine Haltung des Menschen im Sein des Seienden, die diesem im ganzen geöffnet ist und in welcher Öffnung das Göttliche selber im Sein steht: zwar nie so, daß der Mensch es "hat" und über es "verfügt", sondern schon immer in ihr steht, sofern ein Göttliches und Unsterbliches — der "Geist" — in ihm ist, das die Offenheit dieses Wesens gegenüber dem Seienden eröffnet. Ihr Grund liegt daher nicht im Menschlichen, sondern weist über es hinaus auf die Gegenwart des Göttlichen im Sein, zu welcher Gegenwart der Mensch durch Anschauung, Theorie in den Bezug tritt." Riedel, *Theorie und Praxis*, p. 137.

84. Riedel, *Theorie und Praxis*, pp. 40-5.

The interest of his interpretation of Hegel is that he brings out the necessity to overcome this opposition and attain the true principle of human will. Riedel certainly links Hegelian philosophy to the modern domination and devastation of nature. But he also finds in it the recognition of an infinite being or becoming which is prior to the division of a merely human subjectivity from its finite and external interests.⁸⁵ The problem is that contrary to Hegel he dissolves subjectivity into a larger existence and leaves unexplained why it could arise and prove so destructive in the first place.

Riedel's response to Hegel is best judged in the light of its more explicit presentation in the writings of Martin Heidegger. One generally knows that Heidegger criticizes not only older modern thinkers but the whole of the western tradition from Plato to Nietzsche. Through his interpretation of Hegel, he wants both to reveal the primordial content of western thinking and to expose its fundamental error or perversity. As with the consideration of Riedel and other commentators above, the particular objections which Heidegger raises against Hegel cannot be taken up point by point within the confines of this article. The outline of Heidegger's argument here serves the limited purpose of highlighting the necessity for an approach to Hegel that is independent both of contemporary revolution and of the reaction against it.

Heidegger gives us a rich commentary on Hegel's phenomenological account of self-consciousness. He acknowledges that Hegel tried to ground modern subjectivity in divinity and justify its freedom in nature.⁸⁶ But he objects that Hegel does not allow the natural and historical simply to be in the face of a subjectivity that would dominate it.

If, in the era of subjectness that is the ground of the nature of technology, nature *qua* Being is placed in opposition to consciousness, then this nature is only the sum total of particular beings taken as the object of that modern technological objectification which lays hands indiscriminately on the estate of things and men.⁸⁷

85. *Ibid.*, p. 45.

86. Heidegger, "Hegels Begriff der Erfahrung", *Holzwege* (Frankfurt am Main, Klostermann, 1977), p. 129.

87. "Wenn innerhalb des Zeitalters der Subjektivität, in der das Wesen der Technik gründet, dem Bewußtsein die Natur als das Sein gegenübergestellt wird, dann ist diese Natur nur das Seiende als der Gegenstand der neuzeitlichen technischen Vergegenständlichung, die unterschiedslos den Bestand der Dinge und des Menschen angreift." Heidegger, "Hegels Begriff der Erfahrung", p. 192; Heidegger, *Hegel's Concept of Experience*, trans. Kenley R. Dove (New York, Harper and Row, 1970), p. 192.

Heidegger, like Riedel, at least partly interprets Hegel in the light of the aggressive subjectivity of contemporary revolutionary technology and its will to master human and nonhuman nature.

What Heidegger praises in Hegel is his attempt to show that the externality and givenness of nature must be overcome. He distinguishes Hegel from the naivety of a contemporary turn to nature that would expect to find it as a hardened and given existence. With regard to Hegel's overcoming of such a "natural consciousness", Heidegger writes:

One of the things that are not of the kind of the findings of natural consciousness which finds only beings — one of these things is Being. This is why the appearance of what appears, the reality of what is real, count for nothing within the field of vision of natural consciousness. In the judgment of natural consciousness, any step taken by the presentation of phenomenal knowledge will lead to nothing. In fact, that presentation never gets beyond its first step which has already led it to nothing.⁸⁸

Despite its revolutionary implications, therefore, Hegel's philosophy attains a standpoint from which to reduce the revolutionary consciousness of nature to nothing. But Heidegger looks to Hegel for more than this sceptical and nihilistic insight.

Heidegger draws from Hegel the conclusion that philosophy must return to the beginning of European thought and rediscover the original Eleatic vision of being. He sees in the post-Socratic departure from this starting-point relative to a separate principle the source of the traditional western "forgetting" of being and our excessive interest in its finite and external aspect.

If we think of the nature of metaphysics in terms of the emergence of the duality of what is present and its presence out of the self-concealing ambiguity of the *ö*v (and it will henceforth be necessary to think of it in this way), then the beginnings of metaphysics coincide with the beginnings of Western thought. But if we, on the contrary, conceive of the nature of metaphysics as the division between a suprasensible and a sensible world, and regard the first as a world that truly exists, while the second only seems to exist, then metaphysics begins with Socrates and Plato.⁸⁹

88. "Nicht von der Art der Funde des natürlichen Bewußtseins, das nur Seiendes findet, ist das Sein. Darum gelten das Erscheinen des Erscheinenden, die Realität des Realen im Gesichtskreis des natürlichen Bewußtseins als etwas Nichtiges. Nach dem Urteil des natürlichen Bewußtseins führt jeder Schritt, den die Darstellung des erscheinenden Wissens macht, zu nichts. Sie kommt sogar über ihren ersten Schritt, der sie schon zu nichts geführt hat, nie hinaus." Heidegger, "Hegels Begriff der Erfahrung", p. 157; *Concept of Experience*, pp. 73-4.

89. "Denken wir, was inskünftig notwendig wird, im Hervorkommen

The intense interest of western metaphysics in a rational world or in the being of beings appears excessive and impossible to Heidegger in view of its collapse into a destructive desire to control and enjoy sensuous nature. But Heidegger finds in Hegel's grounding of subjectivity the confirmation that western thought cannot grasp the being of beings and that it must turn to an ambiguous becoming-present and hidden completeness as its principle.

For Heidegger, Hegel's phenomenological rise to self-consciousness discloses the continuity of western metaphysical thought.

The theology of the Absolute is that knowledge of beings *qua* beings which among the Greek thinkers reveals and follows its onto-theological nature without ever pursuing it to its foundation. The language of absolute science shows that the Christian theology, in what it knows and in the way it knows its knowledge, is metaphysics.⁹⁰

The inner connection of Christian theology and Greek thought has, however, both a positive and a negative sense. Hegel gives us both the clearest statement of modern subjectivity and one of the last. In relation to Hegel, Heidegger thinks it possible to raise another question:

It is, to be sure, an altogether different question whether and in what way subjectness is a peculiar destiny in the nature of Being, whereby the unconcealedness of Being (not the truth of particular beings) *withdraws*, thus determining an epoch of its own. Within subjectness, every being becomes as such an object. All beings are beings by virtue and in virtue of this stabilization.⁹¹

des Zwiefachen von Anwesendem und Anwesen aus der sich verbergenden Zweideutigkeit des $\delta\upsilon$ das Wesen der Metaphysik, dann fällt der Beginn der Metaphysik mit dem Beginn des abendländischen Denkens zusammen. Nimmt man dagegen als das Wesen der Metaphysik die Trennung zwischen einer übersinnlichen und einer sinnlichen Welt und gilt jene als das wahrhaft Seiende gegenüber dieser als dem nur scheinbar Seienden, dann beginnt die Metaphysik mit Sokrates und Platon." Heidegger, "Hegels Begriff der Erfahrung", pp. 176-7; *Concept of Experience*, p. 107.

90. "Die Theologie des Absoluten ist das Wissen des Seienden als des Seienden, das bei den griechischen Denkern sein onto-theologisches Wesen zum Vorschein bringt und befolgt, ohne ihm jemals in seinen Grund zu folgen. In der Sprache der absoluten Wissenschaft kommt zum Vorschein, daß die christliche Theologie in dem was sie weiß und wie ihr Gewußtes weiß, Metaphysik ist." Heidegger, "Hegels Begriff der Erfahrung", p. 203; *Concept of Experience*, p. 147.

91. "Eine völlig andere Frage ist freilich, ob und inwiefern die Subjektivität

As Hegelian metaphysics is the summation of modern and indeed of western thought, so also does it anticipate the collapse of the western tradition.

The greatness of Hegel's phenomenological argument, for Heidegger, consists in the overcoming of its given natural beginning. He notes that Hegel begins with nature as it is directly experienced and moves to the discovery of self-consciousness.⁹² He finds in this move, however, an extreme conflict between the natural and the individual subject that can only be overcome in being. Heidegger carefully brings out that, for Hegel, the overcoming has its origin in the relation of external nature to the individual subjectivity that tries not to let anything escape its controlling will.

Rather, the exteriorization is the holding together of appearance in all its fullness, on the strength of that will whereby the *parousia* of the Absolute prevails. The exteriorization of the Absolute is its re-collection into the progression of the appearance of its absoluteness. The exteriorization is so far from being an estrangement into abstraction that, on the contrary, it is the very means by which appearance comes to be at home within the phenomena, as phenomena.⁹³

Heidegger is attracted to the Hegelian philosophy because it promises protection against an external, dissolving modern subjectivity. As with Hegel, Heidegger argues that it is necessary to go beyond the limits of a Christian and modern tradition and seek instruction from the ancient Greek philosophers. Of Hegel's high regard for the Greeks in relation to the whole of western philosophy, Heidegger writes:

The completion of philosophy is neither its end, nor does it consist in the distinct system of speculative idealism. The completion *is* only in the context of the whole course of the history of philosophy, in which the beginning remains as essential as the completion: Hegel and the Greeks.⁹⁴

ein eigenes Wesensgeschick des Seins ist, darin sich die Unverborgenheit des Seins, nicht die Wahrheit des Seienden, *entzieht* und damit eine eigene Epoche bestimmt. Innerhalb der Subjektivität wird jedes Seiende als solches zum Gegenstand. Alles Seiende ist Seiendes aus der und in der Beständigkeit." Heidegger, "Hegels Begriff der Erfahrung", p. 192; *Concept of Experience*, p. 132.

92. Heidegger, "Hegels Begriff der Erfahrung", p. 195.

93. "Die Entäußerung ist vielmehr das Ansiehalten der Fülle des Erscheinens aus der Kraft des Willens, als welcher die Parusie des Absoluten waltet. Die Entäußerung des Absoluten ist seine Er-innerung in den Gang des Erscheinens seiner Absolutheit. Die Entäußerung ist so wenig die Entfremdung in die Abstraktion, daß durch sie das Erscheinen gerade heimisch wird im Erscheinenden als einem solchen." Heidegger, "Hegels Begriff der Erfahrung", p. 192; *Concept of Experience*, p. 131.

94. "Die Vollendung der Philosophie ist weder deren Ende, noch besteht

There is much that moderns still attached to Christian Europe may learn from the ancient beginnings of their tradition. But, for Heidegger, the chief lesson is that the metaphysical thought which underlies Christian belief and still secretly sustains modern freedom must be forgotten.

Thus, through his commentary on Hegel, Heidegger brings out the possibility of overcoming modern arrogance in a return to the origins of the European tradition. He warns us, however, not to treat such a return as merely a flight from subjectivity to the nature that stands in opposition to it. The "disclosure" of being in Greek philosophical thought puts into question the subjectivity that even Hegel, according to Heidegger, presupposed as absolutely prior. Heidegger intends to move beyond the limits of Hegelian metaphysics when he writes:

And there immediately arises before us the further question, whether the disclosure has its place in the spirit as the absolute subject, or whether the disclosure itself is the place and indicates the place in which the spirit as a representing subject can first "be" what it is.⁹⁵

Heidegger learns from Hegel that modern willfulness is strong enough to reduce to nothing everything natural and finite that is present to it. But he argues against Hegel that there can be no overcoming of this destructiveness unless we give up the willful relation to the finite from which it arises.

Heidegger's great distance from Hegel appears when he considers the origin of the destructiveness of modern subjectivity. He thinks, contrary to Hegel, that the extreme conflict between nature and subjectivity arises from the excessive limitation of "being" to finite categories of reason and mediation of it through "man" and his willfulness.

We stubbornly misunderstand this prevailing *belonging* together of man and Being as long as we represent everything only in categories and mediations, be it with or without dialectic. Then we always find only connections that are established either in terms of Being or in terms of man, and

sie in dem abgesonderten System des spekulativen Idealismus. Die Vollendung *ist* nur als der ganze Gang der Geschichte der Philosophie, in welchem Gang der Beginn so wesentlich bleibt wie die Vollendung: Hegel und die Griechen." Heidegger, "Hegel und die Griechen", *Wegmarken* (Frankfurt am Main, Klostermann, 1976), p. 433.

95. "Und sogleich steht die weitere Frage vor uns auf, ob die Entbergung ihrem Ort im Geist hat als dem absoluten Subjekt, oder ob die Entbergung selber der Ort ist und in den Ort weist, worin dergleichen wie ein vorstellendes Subjekt erst "sein" kann, was es ist." Heidegger, "Hegel und die Griechen", p. 440.

that present the belonging together of man and Being as an intertwinning.⁹⁶

The modern demand is that the human individual relate finite nature to a separate principle or being through his own activity. This attains its supreme expression in Hegel only to collapse into a mindless domination of nature.

Let us at long last stop conceiving technology as something purely technical, that is, in terms of man and his machines. Let us listen to the claim placed in our age not only upon man, but also upon all beings, nature and history, with regard to their Being.⁹⁷

Heidegger wants to set a limit to the endless modern interest in nature which comes out of the western and Christian tradition, especially as this is summarized by Hegel. This is why he does not identify nature with the principle, in the manner of Hegel, but rather respects the difference of natural and finite beings from their principle or being.

For Hegel, the matter of thinking is: Being with respect to beings having been thought in absolute thinking, and as absolute thinking. For us, the matter of thinking is the Same, and thus is Being — but Being with respect to its difference from beings. Put more precisely: for Hegel, the matter of thinking is the idea as the absolute concept. For us, formulated in a preliminary fashion, the matter of thinking is the difference *as* difference.⁹⁸

96. "Dieses vorwaltende Zusammengehören von Mensch und Sein verkennen wir hartnäckig, solange wir alles nur in Ordnungen und Vermittlungen, sei es mit oder ohne Dialektik, vorstellen. Wir finden dann immer nur Verknüpfungen, die entweder vom Sein oder vom Menschen her geknüpft sind das Zusammengehören von Mensch und Sein als Verflechtung darstellen." Heidegger, *Identität und Differenz* and the translation of it by Joan Stambaugh, both in *Identity and Difference* (New York, Harper and Row, 1969), p. 95; *ibid.*, p. 32.

97. "Setzen wir uns endlich davon ab, das Technische nur technisch, d. h. vom Menschen und seinen Maschinen her vorzustellen. Achten wir auf den Anspruch, unter dem in unserem Zeitalter nicht nur der Mensch, sondern alles Seiende, Natur und Geschichte, hinsichtlich ihres Seins stehen." Heidegger, *Identity and Difference*, p. 98; *ibid.*, p. 34.

98. "Für Hegel ist die Sache des Denkens das Sein hinsichtlich der Gedachtheit des Seienden im absoluten Denken und als dieses. Für uns ist die Sache des Denkens das Selbe, somit das Sein, aber das Sein hinsichtlich seiner Differenz zum Seienden. Noch schärfer gefaßt: Für Hegel ist die Sache des Denkens der Gedanke als der absolute Begriff. Für uns ist die Sache des Denkens, vorläufig benannt, die Differenz *als* Differenz." Heidegger, *Identity and Difference*, pp. 112-3; *ibid.*, p. 47.

This "ontological difference" separates the individual's theoretical and practical relations to nature, on one side, from his thinking of their principle or being, on the other. It seems to Heidegger that the opaqueness of the principle, or the living individual's distance from the source and origin of nature, sets a limit to his interest in it and allows him to stand in harmony with the whole.

But then between Heidegger's limitation of modern free subjectivity and Hegel's interest in rising to a knowledge of the principle and being of nature there is a world of difference. Heidegger's principle is being only and not to be understood as self-conscious thought or ground as follows:

Metaphysics thinks of beings as such, that is, in general. Metaphysics thinks of beings as such, as a whole. Metaphysics thinks of the Being of beings both in the ground-giving unity of what is most general, what is indifferently valid everywhere, and also in the unity of the all that accounts for the ground, that is, of the All-Highest. The Being of beings is thus thought of in advance as the grounding ground.⁹⁹

Heidegger wants to avoid the traditional "error" of grounding natural and finite beings in a separate rational principle and instead allow being to stand prior to any such distinction. So too all the traditional distinctions between nature and divinity, nature and self-consciousness, nature and history, and so on, are obstacles to speaking of nature *qua* being and must be overcome.

Thus we think of Being rigorously only when we think of it in its difference with beings, and of beings in their difference with Being. The difference thus comes specifically into view. If we try to form a representational idea of it, we will at once be misled into conceiving of difference as a relation which our representing has added to Being and to beings. Thus the difference is reduced to a distinction, something made up by our understanding (*Verstand*).¹⁰⁰

99. "Die Metaphysik denkt das Seiende als solches, d. h. im Allgemeinen. Die Metaphysik denkt das Seiende als soches, d. h. im Ganzen. Die Metaphysik denkt das Sein des Seienden sowohl in der ergründenden Einheit des Allgemeinsten, d. h. des überall Gleich-Gültigen, als auch in der begründenden Einheit der Allheit, d. h. des Höchsten über allem. So wird das Sein des Seienden als der gründende Grund vorausgedacht." Heidegger, *Identity and Difference*, p. 125; *ibid.*, p. 58.

100. "Sein denken wir demnach nur dann sachlich, wenn wir es in der Differenz mit dem Seienden denken und dieses in der Differenz mit dem Sein. So kommt die Differenz eigens in den Blick. Versuchen wir sie vorzustellen, dann finden wir uns sogleich dazu verleitet, die Differenz als eine Relation aufzufassen, die unser Vorstellen zum Sein und zum Seienden hinzugetan hat. Dadurch wird die Differenz zu einer Distinktion, zu einem Gemächte unseres Verstandes herabgesetzt." Heidegger, *Identity and Difference*, pp. 129-30; *ibid.*, p. 62.

Hegel, on the other hand, not only reduces the difference between being and finite beings to a distinction but deepens the distinction to the point where an infinitely rational and providential spirit may be envisaged.

The problem is that through his general criticism of western thought Heidegger is so far removed from Hegel that the force of his interpretation of the texts is questionable. Heidegger thinks that the revolutionary interpretation of Hegel which takes the modern subjective relation to nature and history as given and self-evident is one-sided. But, with this revolutionary interpretation in view, he also considers that Hegel's rise in thought to the divine principle of nature is one-sided. Since this rise in modern times occurs absolutely within subjectivity, it easily inspires a secular freedom that acknowledges no limits, natural or divine. Heidegger has such a strong dislike of this unlimited secular freedom that it determines his entire judgment of Hegel.¹⁰¹ When Hegel subordinates natural and historical beings under human and divine thought, he makes explicit, according to Heidegger, the western, and especially modern, tendency to level the difference between divinity and humanity and destroy both.

Heidegger's interpretations of Hegel's phenomenological texts are most questionable of all, for here he considers the overcoming of the modern secular self-consciousness. What is at issue is the strength of the distinction and opposition between natural and historical life and self-consciousness. While exploring many of the difficulties involved in Hegel's discussion of nature and time, especially those concerning the concretion of universal reason and nature, he nevertheless ignores the most important aspect of the argument. His discussion mainly concerns the quelling of the extreme conflict between external existence and the finite practical spirit: the way in which moderation and limit may prevail over the aggression of modern will. There is much of independent interest in his commentaries, but they underestimate Hegel's argument that the order and limit to modern will must be inwardly established. He follows Hegel to the point where the natural and historical appears to be nothing only to depart from the text and make being first and prior to any self-conscious and willful determination of it.¹⁰²

One readily admits that Heidegger's notion of the difference between beings and the being of beings is appallingly difficult. But it seems that he overlooks the point of Hegel's distinction and opposition between natural and historical beings and the finite

101. *Ibid.*, pp. 117-8.

102. Heidegger, *Hegels Phänomenologie des Geistes*, in *Gesamtausgabe* (Frankfurt am Main, Vittorio Klostermann, 1980), xxxii. 201-3.

self-consciousness. Heidegger would follow Hegel in separating being from the finite and in limiting the strong modern will to dominate nature and history. The difference is that Hegel does not separate being or the principle from the finite in such a way that the modern opposition between the subjective individual and historical life is simply transcended. Heidegger abandons a western and Christian metaphysical tradition to expand the being of nature and history and dissolve the self-conscious opposition to it. But the result is a separation of being and self-consciousness according to which the distinction and opposition between nature and self-consciousness, between nature and history, and so on, should never have occurred.¹⁰³

It seems that, for Heidegger, the moments of the Hegelian argument are of interest, but not their distinction and opposition to each other. But there is a difficulty. One of the principal questions to be considered in an analysis of Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*, for example, concerns the extreme conflict between modern rational freedom and natural and historical interests in chapters IV and V of that work. Is it necessary to an understanding of Hegel's account of spirit in chapter VI? Such a connection is not considered in Heidegger's commentaries on Hegel's phenomenological texts.¹⁰⁴ His need to experience the being that is somehow present in nature and history prevents him from considering, with Hegel, where the modern self-consciousness comes from and why it proves to be so destructive.¹⁰⁵

Like Riedel and others who try to distinguish Hegel from the revolutionary interpretation of his argument, Heidegger rightly indicates what is absolute in the texts. But in his transcendence of the context of modern subjectivity, he does not follow a path which, like Hegel's, remains with subjectivity. As against the commentators inspired by revolutionary subjectivity, Heidegger is clear that, with Hegel, we must not simply assume that the merely

103. See Heidegger's discussion of Hegel's concept of time and life (*ibid.*, pp. 208-13). Heidegger denies Hegel's philosophical science but simply opposes himself to the human willfulness that Hegel's philosophy seeks to account for (pp. 215-6).

104. Heidegger's view of the whole of Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* divides the work into two great parts with the division falling between chapter V on reason and chapter VI on spirit (*ibid.*, pp. 50-1). Heidegger, however, does not consider whether the beginning and the end of the work might be connected by an enquiry into the source of a destructive modern freedom (pp. 52-7).

105. Thus it is easy for Heidegger to confirm Marx's reading of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* and see in it the "contemporary metaphysical essence of work". "Brief über den 'Humanismus'", *Platons Lehre von der Wahrheit: Mit einem Brief über den "Humanismus"* (3rd ed., Bern, Francke Verlag, 1975), p. 88.

human individual can reduce the whole of natural and historical life to his subjective will. But Heidegger himself raises a problem when he assumes, in what is still a contemporary response, that modern subjectivity either should or can be dissolved.¹⁰⁶ It may be that Hegel's rise to a knowledge of the absolute principle can remain with modern freedom in a way that lies beyond both the revolutionary reduction of nature and history and the existentialist response to it.

Hans-Georg Gadamer uncovers such a connection in his treatment of the Hegelian arguments. He has given us a number of interesting commentaries on Hegel, including some on the phenomenological texts. He steers between the conflicting approaches as described above by emphasizing the religious and institutional aspects of modern freedom in Hegel's thought and the resulting completeness and stability of it. Since, for Gadamer, the subject matter of the Hegelian philosophy is more important than its apparent revolutionary consequences, he is able to make the Marxist interpretation secondary when approaching the texts.¹⁰⁷ Similarly, he forcefully distinguishes Heidegger's interest in being from Hegel's attempt to limit modern subjectivity relative to a larger nature and history. He seems to side with Heidegger against the tendency of Hegel's revolutionary pupils, including Marx, to collapse the difference between natural and historical life and the subjective individual. But he also allows that Heidegger does not appreciate how, for Hegel, the independence of nature and history must be established and limited through the inner logic of modern subjectivity. Gadamer's grasp of Hegelian freedom as both divine and human, both absolute and historically mediated, leads him to a critique of Heidegger to which the one above closely conforms.¹⁰⁸

Gadamer's writings on Hegel have emerged as perhaps the most useful of contemporary attempts to explicate the Hegelian texts. The difficulty with his interpretations, however, may lie not so much in his general response to Hegel as in the way he explains the parts of the texts. He rightly tries to bring out the connections in the argument and thus to explain Hegel's difficult concept

106. See Heidegger, *Nietzsche*, ii. 342-3, for his reduction of modern subjectivity to Nietzsche's will to power. From this standpoint, the whole of the western metaphysical tradition appears to be nihilistic. Heidegger in this context mentions Hegel amongst others, but leaves still unasked why, for Hegel, modern subjectivity arose and how metaphysics may be established or from within it.

107. Gadamer, *Wahrheit und Methode: Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik* (3rd. rev. ed., Tübingen, J.C.B. Mohr, Paul Siebeck, 1972), pp. 325-9.

108. See Gadamer, *Hegels Dialektik*, pp. 90-1.

of a substantial modern freedom. But he does not pursue the connections to the point where Hegel's intention to demonstrate the necessity in them can be made explicit. Gadamer's view of the openness of the texts, of a hermeneutical encounter with them, discloses connections and possibilities which are easily overlooked by readers more concerned with Marx or Heidegger than Hegel. But this very openness paradoxically seems to hide from him the unity of the texts that the author intended. What Hegel emphasized was the inescapable and compelling aspect of his rise "in thought" from a destructive freedom to the divine or absolute. My argument is only that we have yet to make this deeper connection more explicit and in so doing to show whether and how Hegel's arguments can provoke us to thought even today.

University of King's College
Halifax, N.S.

Note:

The English translations of Manfred Riedel (notes 76, 77, 78, 80, 81, 83) and Martin Heidegger (notes 94, 95) in the text are the responsibility of the author.