

Spinoza's Doctrine of the *Amor Dei Intellectualis I**

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Presenting Spinoza on the *amor dei intellectualis* (henceforth, the *amor*), Hegel writes: "For God can have only Himself as aim and cause; and the end of the subjective mind is to be directed on him. This is therefore the purest, but also a universal morality".¹ This paper can be seen to have, as its main purpose, a spinozist elaboration of Hegel's claim for the *amor*.

Reading his sublime distillation of Spinoza, we can discern three moments in the structure and realization of the *amor*, all crucial for our understanding here: (i) Hegel claims that God is both *causa sui* and His *own aim*. The ground for this claim lies in *Ethics*, Pt.V, Prop. XXXV: *God loves Himself with infinite intellectual love*,² although Hegel cites other germane propositions as well (5P14,6,27,32). In 5P35Dem, Spinoza proves that the maximal *amor* is God's infinite self-love, as he rejoices in his infinite perfection accompanied by his own idea. Thus, his rejoicing arises, as infinite self-love, with the expression of his perfection, as *causa sui*. In this way, God's rejoicing is his having himself as his *own aim*, and his self-expression is his being *causa sui*. Hence, God as *causa sui* grounds God as his *own aim*, with absolute rigour. (ii) Hegel also claims that the end of the subjective (human) mind is to be directed on God. This claim unites the practice of philosophical method with the intellectual love of the human mind toward God. For, Spinoza's sovereign aim in his Treatise on philosophical method, the *Tractatus de Intellectualis Emendatione* (henceforth, the

*The second part of this article will appear in a subsequent issue of *Dionysius*.

1. G.W.F. Hegel, *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, trans. E.S. Haldane and F.H. Simson, (Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1968, Humanities Press, 1974), Vol. 3, p. 278 (1974).

2. Henceforth, references to the *Ethics* will follow the now standard code: e.g., *Ethics*, Pt.V Prop. XXXV = 5P35; Definition = D; Axiom = A; Demonstration = Dem; Corollary = Cor; Scholium = Sch; Lemma = Lem; Definitions of the Emotions = DE; General Definition of the Emotions = GDE. The author translates Spinoza, using for consultation the translations of R.H.M. Elwes, *Benedict De Spinoza* (Dover, 1955) and S. Shirley, *The Ethics and Selected Letters*, (Hackett, 1982). Translations refer, by volume, page and line of text, to the Gebhardt edition, *Spinoza Opera* (Heidelberg/Carl Winters, 1925): e.g., Gebhardt, Vol. II, p. 232, line 30 = [G2, 232 (30)].

TdIE),³ is to find a method for purifying the mind, that it may understand things in the best possible way and without error (*TdIE* 16). And method perfects itself with the Knowledge of the mind's union with the whole of nature, or God (*TdIE* 13). Now, that very activity by which the mind perfects itself by conceiving with its own power adequate and true ideas (3D1,2; 3P1,3; 5P40), is identical with its passage in pleasure from a lesser to a greater perfection, accompanied by its own idea in God, this generating its intellectual love toward God (5 P15,35,36). Accordingly, the human *amor* fuses with the rigour of method. (iii) Hegel finally claims that the *amor* is the purest and a universal morality. This claim unites the *amor* and method [by (ii) above] with the overcoming and re-ordering of the passions (5P3,6,14,15). Spinoza affirms the power of the *amor* as he proves that blessedness is not the reward of virtue, but virtue itself, and hence that we do not rejoice in it because we control our lusts: Rather, *because* we rejoice in it, *therefore* we control our lusts (5P40Dem). In the *amor*, then, we have the purity of the ethic. Its universality is the creative grounding of the *amor* in God (1P16,5P35).

Within its main purpose, this paper seeks to treat the *amor* with a rigour found wanting in the body of writings on Spinoza, where that body considers the *amor* at all, and especially over the last fifty years. Scholars, whether they desiderate the *amor* or not, will grant that the *amor* is both the consummation and the most neglected aspect of Spinoza's thought. By taking a fresh approach, then, we hope to promote a change of venue in scholarship itself. Now, rigour certainly involves our uniting and elaborating claims (i) - (iii) above, in a demonstration. In short, it involves our taking seriously God or substance as *causa sui*; and this scholarship has virtually ceased to do. But rigour also involves our emending and even supplementing Spinoza's thought but strictly according to the spirit and the letter of the *TdIE*, and to the demands of the *amor* itself. These latter arise, of course, within the logic of the *Ethics*. The point here is that Spinoza would yield most on the *amor* were he forced beyond the explicit definitions, proofs and emphases involving it, to prove by proxy what the *amor* additionally requires and implies. This is especially true of 3DE6, where Spinoza defines love, though inadequately for the *amor*. But it also applies to other matters which, along with 3DE6, will get attention in due course. Again, the rigour needed here demands that we reconcile apparently conflicting elements in Spinoza's treatment of the *amor*.

3. References to the *TdIE* will follow the Bruder paragraphing of this treatise, translations following as well the Gebhardt edition of the latin text: e.g., *TdIE* 35 [G2, 15(5)].

Though reasonably self-contained, this paper is best read as the third item in a trilogy. The other two are "The Formalist Treatment of Spinoza"⁴ and "The Philosophical Method of Spinoza",⁵ published elsewhere. These papers offer a critical and methodological context presupposed in this paper, but developed here as well. To help the reader, the essay unfolds in sections, with sub-headings added; and auxiliary notes are provided throughout.

I

The amor in scholarship:

The body of scholarship on Spinoza is now, of course, vast, and it continues to grow. Currently, the high interest in Spinoza among philosophers has given birth to the new *Studia Spinozana*,⁶ a journal seeking to revive and develop the tradition started by the erstwhile *Chronicon Spinozanum* of the 'twenties. Now, certainly an article on Spinoza must set strict limits to its treatment of the literature. Especially is this so of an article on the *amor*. For, while we shall see the *amor* essentially neglected in the scholarship of the last century, philosophers and scholars have always, until quite recently, paid their respects to the *amor* as the consummation of Spinoza's thought. If writing books, they have allotted some portion of a chapter to presenting the *amor*. If writing articles, they have mentioned it. Hence, material of this kind abounds, and we cannot here begin to canvass it all.

In this section, then, we restrict ourselves to three objectives: First, granting the excellence of some works on Spinoza and the mediocrity of many, we shall generally characterize scholarship on the *amor*. Second, we shall refer specifically to a good number of authors, focussing on the gist of each's treatment of the *amor*. In each case, a brief rendering in the main text will be served by a documenting note, also compressed. Third, we shall draw from the foregoing a main reason for what has come to be an almost total neglecting of the intellectual love of God in Spinoza studies. This reason will lead into section II of the essay. Accordingly, the present section spans over a century of scholarship, beginning with Pollock (1880) and ending with recent work such as Scruton (1986) and Harley's version of Deleuze (1988). But we concentrate on the second half of that century, particularly on the last thirty years, during which the present situation of the *amor* has largely

4. C.P.A. Review, *Dialogue* XXV (1986), pp. 337-47.

5. C.P.A. Review, *Dialogue* XXVII (1988), pp. 89-110.

6. *Studia Spinozana*, (Walther & Walther Verlag, 1985), pp. 10-11. The *Studia* now publishes one large volume a year.

arisen.⁷ Hereafter, references to scholarship will be kept to what strictly serves the argument of this essay.

Generally characterized, then, scholarship on the *amor* is at best inadequate; and, at worst, it hardly exists. What there is of it we find mainly in books on Spinoza's philosophy as a whole. In these, while the *amor* appears as the completion of Spinoza's thought, it is also treated as one theme among many others. Blackwell's recent work (1985) seems the solitary exception, since it focusses on the *amor*. But it just uses the *amor* in an unsuccessful effort to exalt Lord Russell as a moralist.⁸ In presenting the *amor*, books tend to cite propositions from the two groups of propositions (5P15-20; 5P32-37) demonstrating the *amor*: They do not engage with the proofs themselves. Hence, what they yield is summary or paraphrase, the quality of which varies with the quality of the book itself. Often, their treatments are distressingly slight, hardly more than what an essay on a related topic might provide. Almost always, they lack both rigour and insight, the cost of which is sustained reflection in Spinoza's sense. With one exception (*Revue Internationale De Philosophie*, 1977), the journals and anthologies noted here are devoid of essays specifically on the *amor*. Individual papers, even those considering Spinoza's epistemology and theory of freedom, give the *amor* short shrift, if they mention it at all. Accordingly, a scholar might explore *ratio* and/or *scientia intuitiva*, both causes of the *amor* (5P28,31,32), and yet virtually ignore their effects, the *amor* itself. Or, he might consider Spinoza on adequate ideas and on the overcoming of the passions in freedom, ignoring the *amor* as the effect of the former (5P15) and the cause of the latter (5P42).

In short, scholarship generally fails to grasp and to deploy the *amor* as the strictest ethical expression of God or substance, the *causa sui*. This failure shows itself in two ways, one leading to the other: (i) Scholarship treating the *amor* fails to grasp Spinozan

7. Since the aim here is to trace a development to the present in scholarship on the *amor*, and not the entire course of scholarship, we start arbitrarily with Frederick Pollock, *Spinoza* (C. Kegan Paul & Co., 1880), omitting the eighteenth century continental beginnings of Spinoza scholarship and subsequent nineteenth century work. Cf. Pollock's overview of these, Ch. XII, and the Bibliography of F.M. Bernard's article on Spinozism in the *Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, P. Edwards ed., MacMillan, 1972), Vol. 7, pp. 543-44. Two recent works on Spinoza in Germany are: D. Bell, *Spinoza in Germany from 1670 to the Age of Goethe* (London, 1984); G. Vallée, *The Spinoza Conversations Between Lessing and Jacobi* (University Press of America, 1988). These works deal with Spinozism, i.e., with Spinoza's reception in Germany, and are not direct studies of his thought.

8. Cf. Vance Maxwell, C.P.A. Review, *Dialogue* XXVI (1987), pp. 765-769, for a review of Blackwell bearing on this essay.

proof or reflection,⁹ and hence passes over the demonstrations of the crucial and related propositions. (ii) Hence, scholarship is found treating the intellectual love of God with piety not rigour, and as a sublime addendum to the *Ethics*, rather than as its intrinsic consummation. For this very reason, what is to be added is equally detachable: and scholarship would now fully detach the *amor* from the *Ethics*.

Let us turn now to specific cases, each briefly presented. Pollock (1880) claims, without argument and mistakenly, that "this intellectual love is not an emotion" and that "the divine love is nothing else than conscious acceptance of universal law, the 'welcoming every event' of the stoics".¹⁰ Martineau (1895) gives no account at all, simply quoting the ecstasies of Coleridge and Renan.¹¹ Joachim (1901), who misses the inconsistency seen by Pollock (n.10), and holds that "God is not liable to passion, nor to any form of emotion", restricts the *amor* as an affect to man's intellectual love for God, while formally placing it within "the complete love of God for himself."¹² In this he is unwittingly inconsistent. Hallett (1930), erroneously denies that the *amor* can arise from *ratio* or reason, restricting it to *scientia intuitiva* alone. Though he quotes 5P36 with the sensitivity and depth of a true Spinozist, he does not analyze the *amor*.¹³ Wolfson (1934), using his great learning, would reduce the *amor* to historical sources, namely Crescas, Aristotle, Psalm 16 and Ibn Ezra.¹⁴ Sérouga (1947) essentially summarizes Spinoza as "Le sage qui . . . arrive à cette vie heureuse de la contemplation, à cette joie qui caractérise foncièrement l'*amor Dei intellectualis*."¹⁵ Hampshire (1951) also summarizes Spinoza on the *amor*.¹⁶

9. Cf. Vance Maxwell (1988), pp. 96-105, where the identity of deductive proof and reflection is argued.

10. Pollock *ibid.*, p. 302. Pollock's denying that the *amor* is an emotion is his way of reconciling Spinoza's claims that (i) God neither loves nor hates anyone (5P17 Cor) and (ii) God loves men (5P36Cor).

11. James Martineau, *A Study of Spinoza* (1895, Books For Libraries Press, 1971), pp. 328-9 (1971).

12. H.H. Joachim, *A Study of The Ethics of Spinoza* (Oxford, 1901; Russell & Russell, 1964), pp. 289-921, 305-6 (1964).

13. H.F. Hallett, *Aeternitas* (Oxford, 1930), pp. 62, 145, 208, 314. Hallett misleads in identifying the finite, human *amor* as "an abstraction of" the infinite, divine *amor*. In this, he confuses the abstract or passive human love for God, which seeks God's love in return, with the active human *amor* which does not and need not seek this (5P17,19,36&Cor).

14. H.A. Wolfson, *The Philosophy of Spinoza* (Harvard, 1934), pp. 302-17. Restricting the transition from a lesser to a greater perfection to "ordinary [passive] pleasure", Wolfson errs in denying that the pleasure in the *amor* involves such a transition (3P53; 5P15, 27, 32).

15. Henri Sérouga, *Spinoza* (Editions Albin Michel, 1947), pp. 110-16.

16. Stuart Hampshire, *Spinoza* (Pelican, 1951), pp. 168-71. Hampshire

The century continues with Parkinson (1954), who mentions the *amor* when trying to illustrate the inferential nature of *scientia intuitiva* as, moving from an adequate idea of attributes (2P40 Sch 2), it "gives 'an adequate knowledge of the essence of things'." ¹⁷ Hallett (1957), writing another spinozist work, claims that "true, or 'intellectual', love, . . . springs from no *affectio*, but from the immanence of its 'object' in the very agency of the self."¹⁸ Wolff (1958) very briefly summarizes relevant propositions in pairs or groups.¹⁹ Zac (1959) notes briefly that Spinoza, in applying the scriptural term 'glory' to the *amor*, "ajoute une précision dans l'*Ethique*".²⁰

claims that it "was Spinoza's intention to *prove* that to be rational is necessarily to love God, and that to love God is to be rational . . . "Yet, ignoring 5P15-20 and 5P32-37 which involve rigorous proofs, he merely cites the *amor* as "simply and plainly explained" by 5P24, which does not even mention the *amor*.

17. G.H.R. Parkinson, *Spinoza's Theory of Knowledge* (Oxford, 1954), 9.3, pp. 185-6. Yet, while Parkinson rightly fuses the *amor* with *scientia* as showing "exactly how the modes follow from an attribute of God," he provides no analysis of how the *amor* thus arises in the overcoming and re-ordering of the passions (5P15,25,32&Cor). Though beyond the scope of his discussion, that analysis is needed to raise his illustration from suggestion to proof. We shall attempt that analysis in due course.

18. H.F. Hallett, *Benedict De Spinoza* (London: The Athlone Press, 1957), pp. 159-61. Hallett, as is Pollock (n.10 and Wolfson (n.14), is wrong to deny an "*affectio*" of the *amor* and hence to restrict "joy . . . to imaginative 'love' ", 'joy' being "the confused summary idea of . . . the passive transition to a greater perfection . . . "Indeed, the human *amor* generates the supreme affect, this being an internal and adequate transition from a lesser to a greater perfection (5P15,32&Cor).

19. Hans M. Wolff, *Spinozas Ethic: Eine Critische Einführung* (Fraacke Verlag, Bern, 1958), pp. 91-2. Thus: "In einigen der letzten Lehrsätzen (35,36) [E5] Stellt Spinoza der Liebe der Menschen zu Gott die liebe Gottes zu seiner Schöpfung und insbesondere zu den Menschen an die Seite, obwohl er im ersten teil dargetan hatte daB" denartige menschliche Empfindungen der allumfassenden Substanz Fremdsind, und Vollandet damit nach auBen hin die Verchnistlichung seines Gottes, obne daB der Gegensatz tatsächlich aufgehoben oder auch nur gemildert würde." A little later, there appeared another German work, S. Hessing's collection, *Spinoza Dreihundert Jahre Ewigkeit* (Nijhoff, 1962). But it contains only a scattered reference or two to the *amor*: e.g., in Hessing's *Die Glückseligkeit des freien Menschen*", p. 99, and in Myslicki's "Spinoza und das Ideal des Menschen," p. 146.

20. Sylvain Zac, *La Morale de Spinoza* (Paris: PUF, 1959), pp. 23-4. He writes: "Mais Spinoza ajoute une précision dans l'*Ethique*. L'amour intellectuel de Dieu peut être appelé 'gloire', en employant un terme des livres saints. Le mot se rapporte, chez les théologiens juifs, soit à la présence du pouvoir de Dieu par lequel celui-ci se manifeste dans le monde, soit à la joie suprême que l'homme ressent en appréhendant ce pouvoir. Chez Spinoza aussi l'amour par lequel l'homme se sauve coïncide avec l'amour dont Dieu a conscience lorsqu'il produit nécessairement les choses (1).

Hallett (1962), in his last spinozist work, makes the important claim of a continuity between passive and active or intellectual love, but, again, he provides no analysis or demonstration of the *amor*.²¹ Zac (1963) would distinguish "*l'amour envers Dieu*" (*ratio*) from *l'amour intellectuel de Dieu*" (*scientia intuitiva*), thereby seeing a progression and a structural difference of the *amor* in *ratio* compared with what he claims to be a fixed perfection of the *amor* in *scientia intuitiva*.²² De Deugd (1966), in exalting the first kind

Zac is indeed right to fuse in 'glory' man's intellectual love for God with God's intellectual love for man; and he aptly cites 5P36Sch here, though he declines to pursue that common "acquiescence of spirit" which raises the problem of God's "pleasure, if one may still use that term here" [G2, 303 (8), italics added], that problem involving an apparently inconsistent increase in God's perfection. We take up that problem in Part III of this paper. Zac concludes by comparing *ratio* and *scientia intuitiva* such that "tout en produisant des effets aussi et même plus salutaires que la connaissance du second genre, la connaissance du troisième genre nous met au-delà du bien et du mal" (p. 74). Now, *ratio* and *scientia* do put us above inadequate ideas of good and evil, reaching an emendation of these as adequately defined in 4D 1,2. But, in comparing *ratio* and *scientia*, Zac claims that *scientia* puts us above good and evil, whereas *ratio* apparently does not. He is mistaken, however: In proving that to understand things by the third kind of knowledge involves the highest endeavour and virtue of the mind (5P25Dem), Spinoza uses 4P28: *The Mind's highest good is the knowledge of God, and the Mind's highest virtue is to know God* [G2, 228 (8-9)]. Clearly, Spinoza identifies *scientia's* attainment of the highest virtue with its attainment of the highest good.

21. H.F. Hallett, *Creation Emanation and Salvation* (The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1962), pp. 48, 208, 217, 221. Hallett mistakenly identifies man's *amor* with "God's infinite intellectual love of himself insofar as he is actual in man as finite *creatum*". But Spinoza makes it clear in 5P36 (cited by Hallett) that, in the human *amor*, God loves himself, *not* insofar as he is infinite, but insofar as the human *amor* is a part of his infinite self-love.

22. Sylvain Zac, *L'idée de vie dans la philosophie de Spinoza* (Paris: PUF, 1963), p. 214. He writes: "La fondement de la communion réalisée par la connaissance universelle du deuxième genre, c'est *l'amour envers Dieu*, principe de l'intelligibilité et de l'existence des choses. Le fondement de la communion par la 'science intuitive', c'est *l'amour intellectuel de Dieu*". Now, Spinoza does not distinguish the *amor* such that Zac's preposition "envers" ♦ "*l'amour*" under progression in *ratio* and his preposition 'de' ♦ "*l'amour intellectuel*" as a fixed and non-progression perfection within *scientia*. In 5P33 proving the eternity of the *amor* as arising within *scientia*, we have "*Amor Dei intellectualis*" and in 5P33Sch, we have, referring clearly to this same *amor*, "*hic erga Deum Amor*", i.e., "love of" and "love toward" God referring to "*l'amour intellectuel*." Again, we have in 5P36 "*Amor Intellectualis erga Deum*". Yet again, we have in 5P32Cor "*Amor Dei*" alone, and not "*Amor erga Deum*". Perhaps seeing this, but still maintaining his comparison of the *amor* as progressive within *ratio* yet fixed within *scientia*, Zac later writes: "Ce qui fonde la communion des hommes, au niveau de la connaissance du troisième genre, c'est *l'amour intellectuel de Dieu (amor intellectualis erga Deum)* qu'il convient de distinguer

of knowledge (*imaginatio*) as the source of the second (*ratio*), and at the cost of the third (*scientia intuitiva*), dismisses *scientia* and the *amor* as theoretical "encomiums" devoid of practical power for Spinoza.²³ Hubbeling (1967) mentions love as passion and as the *amor*, but does not pursue matters.²⁴ McShea (1969) claims that God "cannot be bribed, and he has no care for men."²⁵ While

de l'amour de Dieu (*amor erga Deum*). L'amour de Dieu est la joie qu'on éprouve lorsqu'en comprenant clairement et distinctement soi-même et ses sentiments, ou les rattache à la connaissance vrai des choses qui enveloppe nécessairement la connaissance de Dieu; il comporte lui-même des degrés, car plus nous connaissons les choses, plus nous connaissons Dieu (1). L'amour intellectuel de Dieu est là joie qui naît de la conscience de l'union de nôtre essence singulière avec l'essence éternelle et infine de Dieu, indépendamment des ses relations spatio-temporelles avec les autres essences . . . Il est éternel et indissoluble, car il est jouissance de la perfection même" (p. 217). But once again, Zac is mistaken in claiming a progression of the *amor* in *ratio* which he denies of the *amor* in *scientia*: In the proof of 5P25 (*The highest endeavour of the mind, and the highest virtue is to understand things by the third kind of knowledge* [G2, 296 (17-18)]), Spinoza writes: "and the more we understand things in this way, the more we understand God (by the preceding proposition [5P24]). Hence 5P24 (*The more we understand particular things, the more we understand God* [G2, 296 (17-18)]), which Zac restricts to *ratio* as showing a progression of the *amor* within *ratio*, applies also to *scientia* and to the *amor* arising from it. The same is proven in 5P26 (*The more apt is the mind to understand things by the third kind of Knowledge the more it desires to understand things by that same kind* [G2, 297(1-10)]). Moreover, Zac is mistaken to imply that *ratio*, but not *scientia*, moving by degrees depends "de ses relations spatio-temporelles au les autres essences . . ." For Spinoza, space and time are *entia imaginationis* (1P15Sch, Ep.12), and *ratio* as well as *scientia* grasps particular things *sub specie aeternitatis* (1D8, 2P41,44). It follows (i) that both *ratio* and *scientia*, and hence the *amor* in each, involve an eternal progression, (ii) that, although vastly different both (with the *amor*) arise within the same causal and epistemic structure. We shall pursue the matter in Pt. IV of this essay.

23. C. DeDeugd, *The Significance of Spinoza's First Kind of Knowledge* (Van Gorcum, 1966), Section 4. (1), esp. pp. 170-1. De Deugd's positivism blinds him to the inseparability of theory and practice in Spinoza.

24. H.G. Hubbeling, *Spinoza's Methodology* (Van Gorcum, 1967) pp. 54, 73f, 108, et al. Those, like Hubbeling, interested in Spinoza's method and epistemology, pay scant attention to the *amor*. This matter arises later in the section.

25. R.J. McShea, "Spinoza on Power", *Inquiry*, N1, Vol. 12, (Universitetsforlaget, 1969), pp. 139-40, McShea is right that God cannot be bribed (5P19), wrong that God cares not for men (5P36Cor). In characterizing the *amor* as just "a man's awareness that understanding is his aim and essence", McShea ironically saps the *amor* of its supreme power and pleasure (5P27,32&Cor).

the formalist reconstructions of Spinoza by Naess²⁶ and Wetleson²⁷ (1969) claim to be more dynamic or, as they say, "lambanalogical" than "epistemological" in their treatments of Spinoza's psychology, both exclude substance the *causa sui* as an impediment, and neither considers the *amor*. Forsyth (1972), denying that God acts for an end, quotes from 5P36&Cor to begin his summary paraphrase of the *amor*.²⁸

More recent studies continue with an important work by Misrahi (1972), who, taking 5P15 to be "absolument fondamentale" for the *amor*, restricts it accordingly to the human *amor* alone, and denies that it is "un amour véritable".²⁹ Taylor (1972) holds that the *amor* "does not exist in God 'as infinite', but only as constituting 'this or that finite mind' and would thus seem to mean no more than that content or delight which the human thinker derives from his passionless insight into truth . . ." ³⁰ Curley (1973) bows briefly to the intellectual love of God, calling it the "highest

26. Arne Naess, "Freedom, Emotion, and Self-Subsistence, *Inquiry* N1, Vol. 12, pp. 66-104. Naess, in a garbled note (10, p. 104), mistakenly distinguishes God and substance, affirms infinite power of substance, finally rejects substance while now identifying it with God: "Our interpretation of the *Ethics* does not recognize Spinoza's God as a kind of substance: whatever is predicted of God must be predicted of substance."

27. John Wetleson, "Basic Concepts in Spinoza's Social Psychology, *Inquiry*", N1, Vol. 12, pp. 105-32. Wetleson holds that Spinoza's "conceptualizations are relational throughout and they are basically anchored in social interaction" (p. 105). Now, relations, whether conceptual or physical etc., are always *causal* for Spinoza, hence inferential (*TdIE* 41, 1P16); and they are "anchored" in God alone (1P26, 27, 28; 2P45).

28. T.M. Forsyth, "Spinoza's Doctrine of God in Relation to His Conception of Causality", *Studies in Spinoza*, S. Paul Kashap ed., (California, 1972), pp. 11, 14-15. Emending Spinoza on teleology, we shall argue that, within his absolute perfection, God does act for his own ends, and hence loves himself with the absolutely infinite *amor*.

29. Robert Misrahi, *Le désir et la réflexion dans la philosophie de Spinoza*, (Gordon & Breach, 1972), pp. 256, 307-10. Misrahi writes: "On le voit, Spinoza déclare lui-même que 'l'amour de Dieu' pour lui-même ne prend signification que dans la mesure où nous considérons non pas la totalité de la nature, mais dans celle-ci l'humanité . . . La pensée de Spinoza est parfaitement clair: l'amour de Dieu pour lui-même, ou s'il on veut . . . la connaissance que Dieu a de lui-même . . . ce n'est rien d'autre que la conscience que l'homme a de lui-même et du monde." Against Misrahi, we shall argue that (i) not 5P15, but 5P35 is absolutely fundamental for the *amor*, including the human *amor*; and that (ii) the *amor* is not only "un amour véritable", but the supreme active affect.

30. A.E. Taylor, "some Inconsistencies in Spinozism (II)", *Studies in Spinoza*, S. Paul Kashap ed., (California, 1972) pp. 289-309. The inconsistencies that Taylor sees in the *amor* rest in his "one point of capital importance . . . on which I want to insist . . . that somehow the conception of God with which the [*Ethics*] opened, and to which it adhered faithfully enough down to the middle of Pt. V is wholly transformed when we

good" and chief among the "techniques for the purification and reorientation of that energy" whereby we preserve our being.³¹ Harris (1973), in an important book, appreciates the *amor* as "the most perfect and developed form of religion."³² Groen (1974) erroneously claims that, in the human *amor*, one "loves God, like God loves himself, with an infinite and eternal love".³³ Gueroult (1974), finding all souls to unite within *scientia intuitiva*, barely infers the *amor* as its product.³⁴ Allison (1975), noting Spinoza's "paradoxi-

come to V.35" (p. 309). He means that, whereas the *Ethics* begins mathematically with definitions of substance, God, etc. as 'high abstractions', God becomes in 5P35 concrete and infinitely self-loving. Taylor is wrong, and we shall relate the *amor* to method in Sections II and V.

31. E.M. Curley, "Spinoza's Moral Philosophy", *Spinoza*, M. Greene ed., (Doubleday/Anchor, 1973), pp. 354-76. Yet, Curley quotes Spinoza elliptically on the highest good for man: "'The highest good is that he should arrive, together with other individuals if possible at the enjoyment of such a nature . . . this is the end for which I strive, to acquire such a nature for myself and to endeavor that many should acquire it with me'" (p. 364). Hence he omits the essential ground of the *amor*, and what alone gives point to his claim: "What that nature is, we shall reveal in its place, namely that it is the knowledge of the union which the mind has with total nature" (TdIE13) [G2,8(25)]. Again, the *amor* is not one technique or means among others (even if the "most important" one) for purifying and changing *conatus*, although *because* we rejoice in the *amor* we hence control the passions (5P42). Rather, the *amor* is *conatus* itself treated as end *in itself* and not as means (5P25,27,28,32&Cor).

32. Errol E. Harris, *Salvation From Despair* (Nighoff, 1973), pp. 202-05. Harris's treatment is sensitive, yet brief. While he claims that God "therefore loves himself [in part] with the same intellectual love that man feels toward God" (p. 204), he does not try to explain how this same love in man involves a transition from a lesser to a greater perfection, yet in God it does not. The problem is essential for the *amor*. Since this transition is pleasure (3DE3) and, as Harris notes, Spinoza denies pleasure of God (5P17Cor), this same *amor* involves a rejoicing with pleasure in man, and a rejoicing without pleasure in God. How can this latter be? The answer lies somehow in Spinoza's problematically returning pleasure to God in 5P36Sch, and hence primally distinguishing divine and human pleasure within an (in part) identical *amor*. We return to this matter in due course.

33. J.J. Groen, "Spinoza: Philosopher and Prophet", *Spinoza on Knowing, Being and Freedom*, J.G. van der Bend ed., (Van Gorcum, 1974), pp. 69-81. Groen renders the human *amor* infinite in contrast with Misrahi (n.29) and others, who render the divine *amor* finite. Both renderings are mistaken: the divine *amor* is infinite, and the human *amor* finite (5P36&Cor).

34. Martial Gueroult, *Spinoza II: L'Âme*, (Paris: Georg Olms, 1974), pp. 464, 466. Gueroult writes: "Comment toutes les Ames parvenues à la connaissance intuitive, même si celle-ci n'est pas aussi étendu en chacune d'elle, ne serait-elles pas identiques à cet égard, puisque cette connaissance ne comporte que des idées adéquates en elle et en Dieu, que par ces idées elles connaissant les choses dans la même ordre et de la même manière que Dieu, jouissant de ce fait du même amour et de la même joie intellectuelle 36?" (p. 464). Doubtless, Gueroult restricts

cal" claims that while (i) God neither loves nor hates (5P17&Cor), yet (ii) he loves himself with infinite intellectual love (5P35) and loves man through man's intellectual love for him (5P36), denies a real contradiction without analysis and reduces the dual claim to "an elaborately expressed tautology".³⁵ Umphrey (1976), invoking the relation of God's self-love as expressed in individuals *qua* eternal, gives up at once: "Unhappily, Spinoza does not help us to be more precise about this relation."³⁶ Hessing's *Speculum Spinozanum* (1977) contains articles that mention the *amor* but they do not pursue it.³⁷

Neu (1977), in a notable work treating Spinoza and Hume as philosophical theorists of psychological therapy, claims that the adequation of ideas involved in the *amor* "transforms our pleasure from the love of a particular to the love of something else: ultimately, God or nature".³⁸ Rotenstreich (1977) has written what seems the only paper focussing on the *amor*. Assuming wrongly

himself here because his overriding objective in *Spinoza II* is a creative analysis of *Ethics II*, on the human mind. His death robs us of the three volumes remaining in his brilliant project, although a fragment of *Spinoza III* on the emotions is published in *Revue Philosophique de la France et de l'Etranger* (67(1967) pp. 285-302.

35. Henry E. Allison, *Benedict de Spinoza* (G.K. Hall & Co., 1975), pp. 151-3, 159-61. A revised edition of Allison, *Benedict de Spinoza: An Introduction*, (Yale, 1987), pp. 164-6, 173-5, takes the matter no further

36. S. Umphrey, "Spinoza's Defense of Human Freedom", *Spinoza's Metaphysics*, James B. Wilbur ed., (Van Gorcum, 1976), pp. 44-65. In the same volume, Wilbur ("Is Spinoza's God self-conscious?", pp. 66-84) concludes from 5P36Cor&Sch that "it is quite correct to say that Spinoza's God is self-conscious." But while he cites these texts, he does not grapple with them, or the others. In this volume, Rohatyn ("Spinoza's Emotivism", pp. 29-35), shows himself fully oblivious to the causality of the *amor*, in claiming that "only now we are soberly informed that, 'no one can hate God' (V, Prop. xviii), presumably because God is impersonal" (p. 32). Here, and in his n.9, he misses the dynamic of 5P18Dem: we cannot hate God because in contemplating God we are active, and hence pass from a lesser to a greater perfection, whereas hatred is the reverse transition accompanied by the idea of the external cause of the decrease in perfection.

37. Sigfried Hessing ed., *Speculum Spinozanum: 1677-1977*, (Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1977). E.g., Bernard's "Psychotherapeutic principles in Spinoza's *Ethics*", p. 79; Hammacher's "The cosmic creed and Spinoza's third mode of Knowledge", p. 185; Naess's fine "Spinoza and ecology", p. 422, sees in the *amor* ". . . acts of understanding performed with the maximum perspective possible . . ." Regrettably, Naess does not develop this claim in terms of ecological recovery.

38. Jerome Neu, *Emotion, Thought and Therapy* (California, 1977), pp. 79-81. Neu's claim seriously misunderstands the nature of *scientia intuitiva* and the *amor* arising from it. It is clear from 5P24 (*The more we understand particular things, the more we understand God* [G2, 296(17-18)]) and 5P25-7 elaborating it, that the *amor* involves intellectual love of particular things within God. By God or Nature, Neu seems to mean, not substance the

of it that "we cannot use the notion of emotions in the affective sense, but as denoting a total state of mind", he later asks: "why did Spinoza not leave the levels of cognition as modes of cognition only, and [instead] added or superimposed on these levels the aspect of love?"³⁹ Wetleson's (1978) edition of the 1977 Scandinavian Spinoza Symposium contains few papers that mention the *amor*, and none that pursue it.⁴⁰ Lewis (1978), writing on method in Spinoza, just verges on the *amor*: "Spinoza calls the peace of mind (*animae acquiescentia*) which springs from intuitive knowledge man's highest happiness."⁴¹ Shmueli (1978), in a novel paper, peripherally contrasts the "blessedness" of the *amor* with what he

causa sui, but a sum or "addition" of causes constituting an order understood "under the attribute of Thought" (p. 81). Hence this order of causes, by which Neu means "God or Nature", is grasped under Thought by *scientia*. Apart from this error, Neu has Spinoza mean, by "cause", "explanation" (p. 86), since he thinks with many others that Spinoza assimilates causality to logic as "logical ground". In fact, Spinoza does the opposite, assimilating logic to causality, "logical ground" to determine cause, as is clear, not just from 1AxB and 2P7,9 (quoted by Neu) but also from *TdIE* 41 and, indeed, from his entire philosophy.

39. N. Rotenstreich, "Conatus and Amor Dei: the total and partial Norm" (*Revue Internationale De Philosophie*, 1977, N. 119-120, Fasc. 1-2), pp. 117-34. He continues: "To indicate only that a summit is achieved in the third kind of Knowledge, Spinoza did not have to characterize that summit by additional qualities, including the quality of love" (p. 132). Because Rotenstreich mistakenly restricts emotions to *passive* affects arising from particular external causes, he misses Spinoza's doctrine of emotions as *active* affects (3D3, P58, 59), the *amor* being supreme among them as involving the highest pleasure (5P27, 32). Hence, the *amor* becomes for him a non-emotive "blessedness" added to *scientia intuitiva*; and he cannot understand that from *scientia* intellectual love necessarily arises (5P32Cor) as required by Spinoza's logic.

40. Jon Wetleson, ed., *Spinoza's Philosophy of Man*, (Universitats forlaget, 1978). For example: Naess ("Through Spinoza to Mahayana Buddhism or through Mahāyāna Buddhism to Spinoza", pp. 136-58) discusses freedom and Wetleson, but does not mention the *amor*; Parsons ("Spinoza's concept of human fulfillment . . . in thought and practice", pp. 158-78) mentions *scientia intuitiva* (p. 175) but not its effect, the *amor*; Savan ("Spinoza on death and the emotions", pp. 192-203) invokes the "love of God" as joyful transition (p. 201), but does not pursue the relation; Wetleson ("Freedom and contemplation or action? A reply to Arne Naess", pp. 204-10) discusses the "repose in oneself" of 5P42Sch (p. 207) but not the *amor*, or the *acquiescence* generating the *amor* (5P27) and that very "repose" itself; Wienpahl ("Spinoza and Mysticism", pp. 211-24), as does Savan, connects the *amor* with joy, but renders it as "God's understanding love" (p. 216) or "*Dei amor intellectualis* (n. 21). This latter ends his treatment of it.

41. D. Lewis, "On the Aims and Method of Spinoza's Philosophy", *Spinoza: New Perspectives*, R.W. Shahan and J.J. Biro eds., (Oklahoma, 1978) pp. 217-34. As do Taylor (n.30), and the host writing on Spinoza's method, Lewis separates the practice of method from intellectual love of

construes as inconsistent and "assaulting" argument in the scholia of the *Ethics*.⁴² Savan (1979), in a memorable address, notes the emotive power of the *amor* as it unites divine and human loves.⁴³ Wetleson (1979) takes the intellectual love of God seriously in an important book devoted to applying spinozan wisdom against "a disintegrating society".⁴⁴ Wienpahl (1979) claims of the *amor* that ". . . we can all have this experience . . . this experience is, in other words, what has led us to think confusedly of immortality. . ."⁴⁵

God, when in fact, as we shall argue in Section V, they necessarily occur together.

42. Efriam Shmueli, "The Geometrical Method, Personal Caution, and the Idea of Tolerance", *ibid.*, pp. 197-215. He writes: "Amidst the ecstatic descriptions of 'blessedness' in which the 'wise man' rejoices, the temper of this argumentation is unexpectedly assaulting" (p. 213). By treating the *amor* as "Spinoza's feeling of love for man's purest action" (p. 210) and hence as the passive emotion of wonder (3DE4), Shmueli also separates the *amor* from method, calling it "strictly contradictory . . . a loose metaphor for [Spinoza's] readers."

43. David Savan, "Spinoza on Man's Knowledge of God: Intuition, Reason, Revelation, and Love," *Spinoza: A Tercentenary Perspective*, Barry S. Kogan ed., (Hebrew Union College, 1979), pp. 80-103. He writes: "It is a profound and deeply felt emotion which we control actively because we see clearly and adequately that in loving a human being we love God, and in loving God we love-indeed, God loves-human beings" (p. 10). Savan's address, largely intended for a lay audience, elicits the basic structure of the *amor* in a non-technical way.

44. Jon Wetleson, *The Sage and The Way*, (Van Gorcum, 1979). Writing of the "active, joy which must necessarily accompany the third kind of cognition (5P32)", Wetleson writes that this joy "which Spinoza calls blessedness . . . is not contingent upon a transition in the conation to a higher level of perfection, or causal efficiency, as are the passive affects of joy, but is determined by the conation at the level of perfection itself, as Spinoza says in 5P33Sch. This can be explained by the fact that this feeling is dependent on no external causes" (p. 818). Now, while the feeling of joy or blessedness involved in the *amor* is supremely active (5P27,40), and hence involves no external cause, Wetleson errs in restricting a transition from lesser to greater perfection to external causes and passions alone. Because the *amor* involves the highest pleasure (5P27), and pleasure is defined in terms of transition alone (3DE2), the *amor* necessarily involves the highest transition. This point will arise again in an explicit analysis of the *amor*.

45. Paul Wienpahl, *The Radical Spinoza*, (New York, 1979) p. 150. While he denies with Spinoza that the experience of the intellectual love of God is common, Wienpahl again says that the *amor* "is down to earth and in the here and now" (p. 151). He thus tends to assimilate it to the temporal moment and hence to *imaginatio*, the lowest grade of knowledge, when in fact the *amor* arises from *ratio* or *scientia intuitiva*, being therefore eternal (5P28,31,33). Again, he is mistaken to conclude that the *amor* leads "us to think confusedly of immortality". This would mean that from adequate ideas (generating the *amor*) inadequate ideas can follow, that being impossible: From adequate ideas only adequate ideas can follow

Beginning the last decade, Kennington's (1980) anthology contains just two essays that briefly mention the *amor*; but, again, neither pursues it.⁴⁶ Alquié (1981), with others, separates the *amor* from the affects such that "Nous sommes maintenant dans l'éternité, ou l'amour intellectuel de Dieu paraît, en effet, indéterminable . . . précisément . . . dans la mesure où il est intellectuel, et non affectif et vécu, en sorte que nous ne croyons toujours pas comment il peut être béatitude."⁴⁷ Bertrand (1983), relating *scientia intuitiva* to imagination, barely mentions the *amor*.⁴⁸ Bennett (1984) dismisses Spinoza's doctrines of the mind's eternity, *scientia intuitiva*, and the *amor* as "pretty certainly worthless".⁴⁹ Collins (1984), in his sensitive "nature reading" of the *Ethics*, distinguishes the *amor* of *ratio*, which he claims involves a transition from lesser to greater perfection, from the *amor* of *scientia intuitiva*, which he

(2P40). Yet again, Wienpahl with others, reduces God's infinite love of himself to man's intellectual love of God, when the human *amor* is a part of the divine *amor*, not the whole of it (5P36). Here, in an account more idiosyncratic than insightful, Wienpahl cites the very proposition (5P36) that contradicts his reduction (p. 152).

46. Richard Kennington ed., *The Philosophy of Baruch Spinoza*, CUA, 1980). Weiss ("Some Pivotal Issues in Spinoza", pp. 3-13) identifies *conatus* with "God's love finitized" (p. 12) and writes summarily that "love of God is the same thing as understanding him — and this, of course, is exactly what Spinoza's philosophical account is to make possible" (p. 13). Gildin ("Notes on Spinoza's Critique of Religion", pp. 155-71), restricting himself to Spinoza's *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*, poses but cannot answer a question about the *amor*'s blessedness: "Whether the basic knowledge of God that flows from the simplest and most universal notions is sufficient to produce that blessedness, or whether the perfected knowledge must be present as well, is not apparent from the outline that Spinoza gives" (p. 161). To answer: the "'basic knowledge' . . .", being *imaginatio*, cannot yield that blessedness, which arises alone from adequate or perfected Knowledge in *ratio* or *scientia intuitiva* (5P28,32,33).

47. F Alquié, *Le rationalisme de Spinoza*, (P.U.F.: Paris, 1981), p. 337. He finds Spinoza inconsistent in ascribing love to intellect because he construes all affects as passions involving inadequate ideas and external causes, whereas intellect is active and involves adequate ideas eliminating all affects as "la subjectivité humaine". Citing (i) Spinoza's definition of love as an affect involving pleasure (or a transition from a lesser to a greater perfection) and the idea of its external cause (3D6) and (ii) 5P33Sch where Spinoza seems inconsistently to deny this transition in the *amor* and its blessedness, Alquié concludes that the highest intellectual insight, *scientia intuitiva* cannot involve love or blessedness, these being one. In emending 3D6, we shall address Alquié's difficulty.

48. M. Bertrand, *Spinoza et l'imaginaire*, (P.U.F.: Paris, 1983). She writes of *scientia* that: "Elle est intuition, mais en même temps Amour et en cela réside le salut" (p. 182).

49. Jonathan Bennett, *A Study of Spinoza's Ethics*, (Hackett, 1984), p. 372. Cf. V. Maxwell (1986), listed here in n. 4, that article being a critical notice of Bennett.

claims does not.⁵⁰ Singer (1984), treating Spinoza as one figure among many in a vast trilogy on love, writes that "the intellectual love of God enables us to escape the sorrows that attend ordinary love for individual things or persons".⁵¹ Delahunty (1985), identifying the *amor* with "science" or "scientific knowledge", charges Spinoza with reducing man thereby to mere intellect such that: "Spinoza's view of the human good is partial, because his view of the human self is partial."⁵² The important anthology edited by Grene and Nails (1986), on Spinoza and science, contains no paper on the *amor* and hardly a mention of it.⁵³ Hubbeling (1986), writing on *scientia intuitiva*, simply lists the *amor* as one product, among

50. James Collins, *Spinoza on Nature*, (S.I.U. Press, 1984). He writes: "In affective terms, then, the life of the virtuous mind is compounded out of joy and blessedness, regarded respectively as a transitional increase of power [*ratio*] and an eternal possession of perfect love [*scientia*]. That love toward God which reason based on the transitional *increase* is now emended as the way whereby our naturating mind gets to acknowledge its *possession* of an eternal knowledge and love for naturating nature or God" (p. 194). While Collins is right to affirm a transition of the *amor* in *ratio* or reason, he is wrong to deny it of the *amor* in *scientia*. Since *scientia* involves the highest acquiescence of mind, or pleasure accompanied by the idea of the self and God as its cause (5P27,30), the *amor* thus arising (5P32Dem&Cor) involves the highest transition (3DE2&Explanation).

51. Irving Singer, *The Nature of Love II: Courtly and Romantic*, (Chicago, 1984), p. 268. Restricting himself to a paraphrase in context, Singer first notes that while "God feels no pleasure and is subject to no emotion [5P35]" yet "God loves himself with an infinite intellectual love [5P35]. Spinoza does little to explain how this can be, but he claims that God 'rejoices' in the infinite perfection that he knows to be himself." Singer does not try to reconcile these apparently inconsistent propositions, and he is mistaken to characterize the acquiescence of the *amor* as very like "the Stoics had recommended". Stoic acquiescence in the rational order of nature is inward and detached, whereas the *amor's* acquiescence is outward and causally engaged in the order. This point will arise again.

52. R.J. Delahunty, *Spinoza*, (Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1985), pp. 274-5. Hence, like Alquié (n. 47) and others, he denies the affective power of the *amor*, assimilating intellectual love to objective scientific knowledge. Again, Spinoza does not reduce man to cold intellect in this sense: Rather, he greatly expands intellect and the *amor* to involve all cases of true action in all of human life (5P37,39,40). For a critical review of Delahunty, cf. V. Maxwell pp. 481-88, *Studia Spinozana*, Vol. 3 (1987).

53. M. Grene and D. Nails eds., *Spinoza and The Sciences*, (D. Reidel, 1986). Notwithstanding the theme of his essay, Cook ("Self-knowledge as Self-Preservation?", pp. 191-210) ignores the *amor*, which involves, as the product of *scientia intuitiva*, the highest self-knowledge and self-preservation (3P6, 7,9; 5P25,26,27,32). Now, since effort, purpose and desire are supreme in *scientia* and the *amor*, and these involve the highest activity or virtue (4P24, 5P25), they involve the highest perfection (5P40): Hence, Cook is indeed mistaken to hold that, for Spinoza "effort, purpose and desire were sure signs of imperfection" (p. 208). These involve imperfection only as unemended passions producing inadequate ideas.

others, of *scientia*.⁵⁴ Scruton (1986) presents the *amor* impressionistically through the ecstasies of Herder and Goethe over 5P19.⁵⁵ Deleuze (1988), writing insightfully of the active affects arising from *scientia intuitiva*, pluralizes the *amor* into "joys or loves".⁵⁶

Before advancing a main reason for the now almost total neglect of the *amor* in Spinoza studies, we shall draw from the above what we judge as basic errors in the interpretation of the *amor*.

Lloyd ("Spinoza's Version of the Eternity of the Mind", pp. 211-33) refers to the "eternal intellect of God" (p. 230) but not to the *amor*, its infinite and eternal product (5P33,35). Paty ('Einstein and Spinoza', pp. 267-302) relates Einstein to the *amor*, but does not pursue it as such in that relation: "And for Einstein, Joy in looking and comprehending is nature's most beautiful gift' [Einstein, *Ideas and Opinions*, (Crown, N.Y., 1954), p. 28]. The intellectual love of God, which sums up their conducts, is a spiritual adventure to be sure; but it is, out of their contingent being, which is founded in the universal nature of things, a search for the Knowledge of Being" (p. 278). To be noted here is the fact that, whereas Einstein affirms the universe as contingent in its existence and rationality, Spinoza denies contingency except in the sense of intellectual privation (1P29,4D3).

54. Hubbeling, "The Third Way of Knowledge (Intuition) in Spinoza," *Studia Spinozana*, Vol. 2 (1986) pp. 219-31. Among others, he treats *scientia* without considering the *amor* as its supreme affect. Hubbeling mentions the *amor* once in connection with Spinoza's *Korte Verhandeling* (Short Treatise) (p. 221) and twice in connection with *The Ethics* (pp. 222, 228). We shall return briefly to Hubbeling on the relation of *ratio* to *scientia intuitiva*, this matter arising in Section IV.

55. Roger Scruton, *Spinoza*, (Oxford, 1986). 5P19: *He who loves God cannot endeavour that God should love him in return* [G2, 292 (7-8)]. Scruton does not consider, as others do not, the apparent inconsistency between 5P19 and 5P36Cor inferring that God, loving himself through the human *amor*, thus loves man. Nor does he treat philosophically Goethe's gloss on 5P19: "if I love you [God], what is that to you?" (p. 112).

56. Gilles Deleuze, *Spinoza: Practical Philosophy*, trans. R. Hurley, (City Light Books, 1988). He writes: "Not only must these affects or feelings be joys or loves . . . They must be quite special joys or loves since they are no longer defined by an increase of our perfection or power or acting but by the full, formal possession of that power or perfection. The word *blessedness* should be reserved for these active joys: they . . . are eternal and are no longer explained by duration; they no longer imply transitions and passages, but express themselves and one another in an eternal mode, together with the adequate ideas from which they issue (V, 31-33)" (p. 51). Deleuze, by referring to 5P31-33, clearly means by these "joys or loves", the *amor* itself, which he therefore erroneously pluralizes: These human "joys or loves" are a part of God's infinite self-love (5P36). Also, as does Collins (n.50), Deleuze mistakenly denies a transition from lesser to greater perfection within *scientia*. As does Collins, he restricts *scientia*, the *amor* and *blessedness* to the *possession* alone of the highest perfection. And he restricts transition to duration, i.e., to passive joys involving inadequate ideas within *imaginatio*. This difficult relation of transition to *blessedness* involves 5P31Cor,33Cor specifically, and will be considered later, in Section IV.

The reader might consult the notes on authors cited here: (i) Several scholars deny a transition from a lesser to a greater perfection in the *amor*. Among them are Wolfson (n.14), Wetleson (n.44), Collins (n.50) and Deleuze (n.56). (ii) Closely related to (i), several writers deny that the *amor* is an affect or emotion at all. They include Hallett (n.18), Misrahi (n.29), Rotenstreich (n.39), Alquié (n.47) and Delahunty (n.52). (iii) Some, identifying the infinite *amor* as a whole with its human part, thereby reduce infinite whole to finite part. They include Hallett (n.21), Misrahi (n.29), Wienpahl (n.45) and Weiss (n.46). (iv) Closely related to (iii), is the "radical humanism"⁵⁷ of some, whereby: Wetleson (n.27) anchors Spinoza's conceptualizations in "social interaction", not substance; Groen (n.33) renders the human *amor* infinite; Shmueli (n.42) reduces the *amor* to Spinoza's feeling of awe or wonder for "man's purest action"; Wienpahl (n.45) psychologizes the *amor* as a temporal and confused thought of immortality, hence placing it within *imaginatio*. (v) Scholars commonly separate the practice of philosophical method in Spinoza from the *amor*. Among others, Taylor (n.30), Neu (n.38), Lewis (n.41), Shmueli (n.42) and Alquié (n.47) variously do this. (vi) Closely related to (v) is the separation of *scientia intuitiva* (at, or partly at, which level some think method in The *Ethics* to work) from its supreme (a) effect, the *amor* itself. Involved here, for example, are Rotenstreich (n.39), Wetleson (n.40), Lloyd (n.53) and Hubbeling (n.54). These points, (v) and (vi) in particular, bring us now to our main point concerning the current neglect of the *amor*, and leading into Section II.

Our point concerns the formalism that now dominates Spinoza studies. While this is a complex matter,⁵⁸ the version of formalism applying here is "hypothetico-deductivism", the view that the *Ethics* derives from initial hypotheses or stipulative definitions, and is hence an arbitrary construction to be tested against experience. This formalism yields the major "incoherency" that Taylor (n.30) sees in Spinoza, namely "that somehow the conception of God with which The [*Ethics*] opened, and to which it adhered faithfully enough down to the middle of Pt.V is wholly transformed when we come to V 35". 5P35 proves that *God loves himself with infinite intellectual love* [G2, 302(4)]. We can see now the "incoherency"

57. On "radical humanism" as largely true of contemporary philosophy and scholarship, cf. F.L. Jackson, "The Revolutionary Origins of Contemporary Philosophy", *Dionysius*, Vol. IX (1985) pp. 127-71. This important theme continues in his later essay, "The New Faith: Strauss, Kierkegaard and the Theological Revolution", *Dionysius*, Vol. XII (1988), pp. 111-42.

58. Cf. V. Maxwell (1988), n.1 & *passim* for a discussion of this regarding Spinoza's method. Here, this now prevailing formalism is shown to be rejected by Spinoza. Cf. also V. Maxwell (1986), pp. 340-2.

with which Taylor charges Spinoza: if God or substance is by definition⁵⁹ a 'high abstraction', and indeed, a fiction, it is absurd to attempt a proof that a fiction loves itself with infinite intellectual love. For, on this view, fictions as hypotheses are not agents, but just the assumptions of finite minds, and have significance only in what is abstractly derived from them. And the absurdity that Taylor and others see in the divine *amor* (5P35) applies also to the human *amor*, a part thereof (5P36). But these are absurd only on the mistaken assumption of hypothetico-deductivism and related aspects of formalism. Hence it is small wonder that formalism has moved from the view that reason and hence the *amor* in Spinoza are non-affective, and thus non-transitional, to Bennett's culminating dismissal of the mind's eternity and the *amor* as "rubbish which causes others to write rubbish".⁶⁰

But another absurdity concerns us here: when Spinoza discusses hypotheses, he uses the latin word *fingere* (*TdIE* 52-64), such that to hypothesize is to *feign*. Moreover, he absolutely denies (i) that God can hypothesize or feign anything, since feigning concerns only what we think possible (not what is necessary or impossible) and both God's existence and that of his modes are necessary (*TdIE* 53;1P11,16): and, (ii) that we can hypothesize or feign the existence of God (*TdIE* 53, 97 II). Feigning the existence of God or substance is thinking that a false idea becomes true (P8 Sch 2). In short, it is absurd.

Now both Spinoza and his formalist interpreters hold that hypotheses are perishable. Spinoza claims that hypotheses are so often inadequate ideas,⁶¹ and that the hypothesis of God or substance is *always* an inadequate idea. The formalists, ever more Popperian, claim that all hypotheses are subject to the contingencies of empirical testing, and, indeed, that now we can seek only disconfirmation of hypotheses, confirmation being both scientifically illogical and out of the question.⁶² We can then do no better than to conclude this section by quoting Spinoza (*TdIE* 9-10):

59. For an argument concerning the true definition of substance, cf. V. Maxwell (1988), pp. 98-105.

60. Bennett, *op. cit.* (n.49), p. 374.

61. Fictions or hypotheses, excluding that of God or substance, and infinite modes, can be adequate and hence eternal as the products of "the free, imaginative faculty of mind" (*mentis imaginandi facultas libera* [G2,106(20)] (2P17 Cor). But for Spinoza, the imagination is characteristically passive, its hypotheses being hence inadequate ideas and perishable within *imaginatio*.

62. Serving Bennett and Hubbeling, W.N.A. Klever does his best to render Spinoza a contemporary scientist and philosopher of science in this sense. Cf. his "Axioms in Spinoza's Science and Philosophy of Science", *Studia Spinozana*, Vol. 2 (1986), pp. 171-95.

Moreover, these evils seemed to have arisen from the fact that all felicity or infelicity is placed solely in the quality of the object to which we adhere with love. For no strife will arise concerning what is not loved, nor will sadness be felt if it perishes, nor envy if it is possessed by another, nor fear, nor hatred, in a word, no commotions of the mind. For all of these arise in the love of things which can perish, which all of the things spoken of here can do. But love toward a thing eternal and infinite feeds the mind solely with joy, from which all sadness is excluded; wherefore it is greatly to be desired, and to be sought with all our strength. [G2, 7, (16-26)]

II

The ground of the amor:

In view of the basic misconceptions of the intellectual love of God culled above from scholarship, we must enquire first into the ground of the *amor*. Although it occurs in the second group of propositions demonstrating the *amor* (5P32-37), 5P35 unquestionably proves its ground, and thus underwrites the first group of propositions on the *amor* (5P15-20) also, by making their ground explicit. This is so because the propositions and their proofs, being necessary, are eternal (1D8), and hence, so to speak, coeval. They do not really come in a numerical and temporal sequence, but rather in reflective order. The propositions articulate, as their proofs elaborate by reflection, what is already contained in the definitions and axioms of E1. In particular, they involve 1D6 defining the *causa sui*, 1D3 defining substance, and 1D1 defining God, these latter two being themselves elaborations of 1D1. Accordingly, while 5P15 with its group "precedes" 5P35 with its group (and is thus taken by Misrahi to ground the *amor*), it is 5P35Dem which reflectively invokes 1D1&6. Therefore, 5P35&Dem truly ground the *amor* and both sets of propositions deploying it.

Let us then look closely at our grounding proposition:

Proposition XXXV

God loves himself with infinite intellectual love

Demonstration

God is absolutely infinite (*by Defin.6.p.1*), that is (*by Defin.6.p.2*), the nature of God rejoices in infinite perfection, and this (*by Prop.3.p.2*), concomitantly with the idea of himself, that is (*by Prop.11 Defin.1.p.1*) with the idea of his own cause and that is what in Coroll. Prop.32 we said to be intellectual love [G2,302 (3-10)]

The proof starts by invoking 1D6, which conceives God as being absolutely infinite, i.e., as substance consisting in the infinitude of attributes, each of which expresses its eternal and infinite essence. Next, the proof, by 2D6 equating reality and perfection, identifies the absolute infinitude of substance with God's nature rejoicing in infinite perfection.⁶³ From this identity, we see that God's *rejoicing* and his *expressing* his essence through each attribute of the absolute infinitude of attributes are themselves identified. This identity of divine rejoicing and divine expressing is pivotal for our grasp of the divine *amor* both in itself and in its relation to its finite forms or parts, especially the human *amor*. Having established the identity, the proof, by 2P3, renders God's rejoicing concomitant with his having the idea of himself. And this divine idea is itself identified (2P3) with God's thinking all things which necessarily follow from his absolutely infinite essence or power. Once again, and through his absolutely infinite idea, God's rejoicing and his expressing his absolutely infinite power in full modal existence, are identified. Next, by identifying God's idea of himself with his idea of his own cause (1D1,P11), the proof identifies divine rejoicing and divine expressing within the divine substance as *causa sui*.

Before engaging the *amor* directly here, we shall draw from the above two important emendations, one to the proposition itself, and one to its proof. First, it is clear from Spinoza's use of 1D6, conceiving the absolute infinitude of substance, that the expressive totality of the attributes is involved in the divine *amor*. Hence, 5P35 must emend as: *God loves himself with [absolutely] infinite intellectual love*. Accordingly, the divine *amor* cannot be restricted to the expression of the attributes Thought and Extension alone: the divine rejoicing is absolutely infinite. To this emendation, Spinoza would necessarily agree; he often writes "infinite" when he means "absolutely infinite". Second, Spinoza's use of 1D6 in 5P35 Dem requires it to emend as: "the nature of God rejoices in [absolutely] infinite perfection". These emendations apply also to 5P36, and to its proof using 5P35. 5P36 emends as: *The intellectual love of the mind toward God is that love of God whereby God loves himself, not insofar as he is infinite [or absolutely infinite], but insofar as he can be explicated through the essence of the human mind considered under the form of eternity; that is, the intellectual love of the mind toward God is part of the infinite [and absolutely infinite] love whereby God loves him-*

63. Now, while 2D6, identifying perfection with reality, does not mention "rejoicing" it strictly implies this: For by reality Spinoza means substance and modes, which exhaust reality (1D3,5; P4Dem). The relation between substance and modes is precisely that of *natura naturans* to *natura naturata*, which relation is exhaustively expressive (1P29Sch), and is hence the divine "rejoicing".

self [G2, 302(12-15)]. The conclusion of 5P36 Dem also emends as: "and therefore (*by the preceding proposition*) this love of the mind is part of the infinite [and absolutely infinite] love whereby God loves himself" [G2, 302(24-25)]. Note that, in these emendations and especially in those of 5P36 Dem, we distinguish God or substance as *infinite* (attribute) and as *absolutely infinite* (totality of attributes), following the distinction in 1D6 *Explanation*. Hence God loves himself with absolutely infinite intellectual love in thinking the idea of himself as *causa sui* under the totality of attributes; and God loves himself with infinite intellectual love in thinking the idea of himself as *causa sui* under any specific attribute. Also, it follows that, since the human *amor* is a part of God's infinite intellectual love (5P36), and not the whole of it, absolutely more so is the human *amor* a part of God's absolutely infinite intellectual love, and not the whole of it. And clearly, Hallett (n.21), Misrali (n.29) and others are mistaken: The divine *amor*, being absolutely infinite whole, cannot be reduced to that part of itself (subsumed under Thought and Extension), the human *amor*.

Now, our creative troubles begin with the conclusion of 5P35 Dem: " . . . and that [the nature of God rejoicing in infinite and absolutely infinite perfection concomitantly with the idea of his own cause] is what in Coroll. Prop. 32 we said to be intellectual love". With the above emendations necessary and in place, difficulties arise at once with Spinoza's use of 5P32Cor to conclude 5P35Dem, which latter would prove that the divine rejoicing is the infinite and absolutely infinite intellectual self-love of God. For 5P32Dem&Cor prove the *human amor* to arise from *scientia intuitiva*, and, as we have just seen, the human *amor* is part (and *not* the whole) of God's infinite intellectual self-love, to say nothing of his absolutely infinite *amor*. Hence, 5P32Dem&Cor cannot be used by commentators to reduce the divine to the human *amor*. Moreover, Spinoza's use of 5P35 to conclude his proof (P36) that the human is indeed a part of the divine *amor* again confirms that the divine *amor* demonstrated in 5P35 cannot be so reduced. It confirms also that the human cannot be raised up to the divine *amor*, infinite or absolutely infinite, scholars having tried this too.

Yet the proof of 5P35, our grounding proposition, does lead back to 5P32Cor which itself leads back to earlier resources, and particularly to the definition of love (3DE6). A close look at 5P32Dem&Cor will therefore admit us to the problematic structure of the *amor* through its human form:

Proposition XXXII

Whatever we understand by the third kind of knowledge, we delight in, and this is concomitant with the idea of God as cause.

Demonstration

From this kind of knowledge arises the highest acquiescence of mind that can be given (*by Prop. 27 above*), that is, (*by Defin. Affects 25*) pleasure, and this is concomitant with the idea of the self, and consequently (*by Prop. 30 above*) concomitant also with the idea of God as cause. Q.E.D.

Corollary

From the third kind of knowledge arises necessarily the intellectual love of God. For from this kind of knowledge arises (*by preceding prop.*) pleasure concomitant with the idea of God as cause, that is (*by Defin. Affects 6*) the love of God, not insofar as we imagine him as present (*by Prop. 29 above*), but insofar as we understand God to be eternal, and this is what I call the intellectual love of God. [G2, 300(12-27)]

With 5P32Dem&Cor now before us, we note that, indeed, they do concern "what in Cor. Prop. 32 we said to be intellectual love", as 5P35Dem so concludes. And certainly they concern the intellectual love of God, all intellectual love being this for Spinoza. But they do not directly concern the infinite and absolutely infinite intellectual love characteristic of the divine *amor* alone. They do, however, imply the divine *amor* as part implies whole, infinite and absolutely infinite, and as whole dwells in part.

Here, the point is this: the relation between human and divine *amor* cannot involve either (i) the reduction of divine to human *amor* or (ii) the exalting of human to divine *amor*. The relation between the two is isomorphic within substance, *causa sui*. Therefore, when Spinoza used 5P32Cor to prove 5P35, he draws reflectively or deductively (cf.n.9) on this isomorphism to move from part to indwelling whole, from human to divine *amor*. This preliminary point will develop in our analysis.

Returning to 5P32Dem&Cor, we shall elicit the structure of the human *amor*, moving from this to a necessary emendation of the definition of love (3DE6), and from that to an interpretation of the divine *amor* and their relation. 5P32Dem starts with the supreme mental acquiescence arising from *scientia intuitiva*, the highest form of knowledge. The proof cites 3DE25 defining self-approval (*acquiescentia in se*), 5P27 showing this self-acquiescence to be accompanied by the idea of the mind itself, and 5P30 showing it to be accompanied also by the idea of God as cause. The isomorphism in human and divine *amor* noted above occurs with the unity of the ideas of the mind itself and of God as cause(s) of this acquiescence. Now, this supreme acquiescence is also supreme pleasure arising from the contemplation of our own power (3DE25). 3DE2 defines pleasure as "the transition of a man from a lesser to a

greater perfection" [G2, 191(1-2)].⁶⁴ We note here that in 3DE3 *Explanation*, Spinoza emphasizes the *transition* to a greater perfection as the proximate cause of pleasure, just as the reverse transition is the proximate cause of pain. Neither can be defined in terms of the sheer state of greater or lesser perfection respectively. Hence, it follows from this emphasis on transition, and from 5P27 cited, that supreme self-acquiescence involves a supreme transition from a lesser to a greater perfection. And hence commentators are in error to deny a transition in this self-acquiescence and thus in the *amor* itself (5P32Cor).

5P32Cor simply moves from *scientia's* highest mental acquiescence, accompanied by the idea of the mind itself and God as cause, to the human *amor* by way of the definition of love. (3DE6): "Love is pleasure concomitant with the idea of an external cause" [G2, 102(19-20)]. Accordingly, the *amor* is intellectual and we love God, not as we imagine him present in time, but as we grasp his eternity.

Now, the supreme transition from a lesser to a greater perfection which we have shown the human *amor* to involve somehow applies to God's infinite and absolutely infinite *amor*. This is so because of Spinoza's use of 5P32Cor in 5P35Dem proving the divine *amor*. And yet in 5P17Cor, Spinoza denies that, "properly speaking" (*proprie loquendo*), God loves or hates anyone, because God cannot pass to either a greater or a lesser perfection and hence cannot be affected by pleasure or pain. From this it follows that God cannot love himself, contrary to 5P35, and cannot love man, contrary to 5P36Cor. Indeed, Spinoza explicitly denies the latter, it seems, in the noble 5P19: *He who loves God cannot endeavour that God love him in return* [G2, 292 (7-8)]. As we have seen, scholars noting this inconsistency tend either to reduce the divine to the human *amor* or to deny that the divine *amor* is an affect. Both the moves contravene *both* divine *amor* and human *amor* (5P35,36). More directly for these scholars, either move destroys the human *amor* which they would somehow preserve.

Spinoza himself is aware of the apparent inconsistency and difficulty in his applying this transition involved in pleasure to God. He writes (5P36Sch): "Insofar as it [love or blessedness] is referred to God it is (*by Prop. 35 above*) pleasure, if one may use that term here, concomitant with the idea of itself, and it is this also insofar as it is referred to the mind (*by Prop. 27 above*)" [G2, 303 (8-11)]. But Spinoza does not resolve the matter, and the great company of scholars ignores it altogether. Here, we shall take Spinoza's "if one may use that term here" as a speculative gift to be exploited

64. For Spinoza, perfection = power = essence = virtue.

in due course. At this point, we shall let the foundational notion of acquiescence secure matters (5P36Sch): "For whether this love refers to God or to the mind, it can rightly be called acquiescence of spirit, which (*by 25. & 30 Defin. Aff.*) in reality is not distinguished from glory" [G2, 303 (6-9)]. Accordingly, acquiescence and hence transition (5P27, 32, 35) pertain to both divine and human *amors*, though differently to each. As we shall see, the difference refers to differentiation itself as this pertains to the divine self-expression on the one hand and to the human overcoming of the passions on the other.

In concluding this foundational section on the *amor*, we come at last to Spinoza's definition of love, 3DE6. It is cited directly in 5P32Cor proving the human *amor* and indirectly in 5P35 proving the divine *amor* by way of 5P32Cor. Hence it is crucial. In defining love, Spinoza follows strictly his theory of definition through the proximate or efficient cause: To define *anything*, whether substance or mode, is to conceive its existence through its proximate cause (*TdIE* 96-97).⁶⁵ Proximate causes are either internal or external. Substance as *causa sui* is internal proximate cause of itself. Infinite modes as eternal arise either immediately (1P21) or mediately (1P22) within the attributes of substance and express its internal proximate causality. Finite modes, including man, arise through other finite modes which are their external proximate causes to infinity (1P28). But the modifications, states or affects of finite modes, including man, can arise through either internal or external proximate causes. This distinction between the internal and external cause is pivotal for Spinoza's entire philosophy culminating in the intellectual love of God. We shall turn to it now as it bears on the definition of love (3DE6) and on its applications.

For Spinoza, the distinction between the internal and the external cause is essentially the distinction between action and passion. We act when something occurs either within or outside us of which we are the sole and hence adequate cause (3D1, D2; P1, P3). Contrariwise, we are passive when something affects us of which we are only the partial and hence inadequate cause. Here the cause is mainly external and the affect or modification of mind and body is essentially a passion (2P7, 3P3). In the case of actions of mind and body, our causing them is God's causing them insofar as he constitutes our mind and body alone. Here, the mind in God's infinite intellect thinks adequate ideas, and the body in God's infinite body (under Extension, the make of the entire universe) generates adequate modifications or images (2P7; 5P1,4). Spinoza's

65. Spinoza's theory of definition is discussed in V. Maxwell (1988), pp. 98-102.

entire ethic, his doctrine of the overcoming and re-ordering of the passions, grounds itself in this distinction and in our endeavouring to separate a passion from its external proximate causes and to unite it to an internal one (5P2,3). This is a difficult matter, not well understood by scholars, and we shall pursue it in the next section. But here we shall note this: The intellectual love of God, whether sought as the highest good of reason (5P20) or of *scientia intuitiva* (5P25, 32, 33) is the internal proximate cause (and not the effect) of our overcoming the passions (5P42Dem).

We return to 3DE6: "Love is pleasure concomitant with the idea of an external cause." Clearly, in a section of the *Ethics* devoted to defining the passions, Spinoza here defines love as a passion involving an external proximate cause. Hence both the idea and the bodily modification constituting this emotion are inadequate. As such, love belongs clearly within *imaginatio*, the lowest level of knowledge (2P40Cor2) within which alone arise inadequate ideas and bodily modifications (2P41). The ideas and bodily modifications of reason or *ratio*, and *scientia intuitiva* are necessarily adequate. And yet, Spinoza uses 3DE6 (defining love as a passion through its eternal proximate cause) to define intellectual love and to prove the propositions (5P15-20, 32-37) deploying it. He cites 3DE6 directly in 5P15Dem, 5P17Cor and 5P32Cor and, of course, indirectly in other proofs using these. Now, since *ratio* and *scientia intuitiva* generating the *amor* involve only adequate ideas (2P41) and adequate ideas arise only from adequate ideas (2P41,42), it is clear that 3DE6 defining love as a passion cannot define the intellectual love of God, human or divine. For the human *amor* involves the highest activity and virtue attainable by man (4P28, 5P40) whether sought for by reason (5P20Dem) or attained in *scientia intuitiva* (5P32Cor). Moreover, 3DE6 absolutely cannot define the divine *amor*, though so used indirectly in 5P35 using 5P32Cor which cites 3DE6 directly. For, as emended above, the divine *amor* arises with God's rejoicing in his absolutely infinite expressive perfection (5P35Dem) or power to exist (1P11Dem&Sch,20); and hence God is absolutely active (5P40) and thus without passions (5P17).

From all of this it follows that we must, for Spinoza, distinguish passive from active or intellectual love, hence defining the latter through an internal proximate cause. Accordingly, 3DE6 emends (for proofs of the *amor*) as: "Love is pleasure concomitant with the idea of an internal [proximate] cause." To this emendation, Spinoza would necessarily agree at once.⁶⁶

66. After all, and apart from the explicit doctrine concerning the distinction and relation of activity, which is rational, to passivity, which is irrational (3D1,2; P1,3), we have 4App 1-6 culminating in this (4App6):

But why does not Spinoza himself emend 3DE6 or supplement it with a definition of active or intellectual love? If we marvel that he does not, we marvel less that generations of scholars have missed his oversight with its crucial speculative implications. That they have, would certainly explain at least in part why writers noted have either denied that the *amor* is an affect or emotion, or reduced the divine to the human *amor*, or rendered the *amor* as itself a passion in accordance with 3DE6 as it stands. Perhaps the answer to our question involves this. While Spinoza is careful to distinguish active from passive emotions in 3D3 and 3P58, his great concern in E3 is to define the main passive emotions, each through its external cause(s). Of forty-eight emotions defined in E3, forty-four are clearly passions, with 3DE1 (desire), 3DE2 (pleasure) and 3DE30 (honour) being either actions or passions, and 3DE25 (self-acquiescence) being clearly an active emotion. Moreover, the General Definition of the Emotions (3GDE) preëmits the term *affectus* (emotion) to mean *passive* affect or emotion,⁶⁷ as accordingly the title of E3 itself (*De Affectionibus*) tends to do. With this overriding concern for the passions in E3, Spinoza understandably concentrates on definition by external cause. Hence the oversight concerning 3DE6 comes from this emphasis, it seems, and not from deficiency in thought: our emendation of 3DE6 is fully Spinozist. With that and our emendations of the grounding propositions 5P35 and 5P36 in place, we turn next to the first group of propositions (5P15-20) demonstrating the *amor*.

[to be continued]

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"But since all things of which man is the efficient cause are necessarily good, therefore no evil can befall man except from external causes; namely insofar as man is part of total nature, which laws human nature is compelled to obey, and to which it must accommodate itself, in almost infinite ways" [G2, 267(15-20)]. In short, Spinoza's entire philosophy demands this emendation of 3DE6 for the *amor*, divine and human.

67. 3GDE: "Emotion, which is called passivity of mind is a confused idea whereby the mind affirms of its body, or some part thereof a greater or lesser force of existence than before, and by which occurrence the mind is determined to think of one thing over another" [G2, 203(29-33)].