In the Service of Rome: Stoic Spirit in the *Aeneid*

Anitra Laycock
DALHOUSIE UNIVERSITY

Resurgence of interest in Vergil's *Aeneid* in the twentieth century, following some two hundred years of comparative neglect, can be dated to the landmark work of Heinze.[1] In a considered and thoughtful reflection upon preceding scholarship Heinze brings into perspective prevailing views on the cosmic and imperial purpose of the *Aeneid* and on the Stoic characterization of Aeneas. At the same time he opens the door to a more sympathetic consideration of the very human dilemmas in which its participants are caught. Heinze's great achievement, Otis argues, is to be able to show that Vergil develops in the *Aeneid* "a *psychological* and *dramatic* emphasis different from that of all Greek epic of which we know."[2] In the last fifty years, stimulated undoubtedly by reawakened concerns over autocratic government, scholarly interpretations of the *Aeneid* have burgeoned and the literature resonates with intense and contentious discussion polarizing around issues of imperialism and humanity as they are seen to be represented by Vergil in the epic.

Although cast in the form of traditional epic, the content of the *Aeneid* presents the human condition in a way which belongs to tragedy. Cold reason and the cheerless imperious dictates of *fatum* are seen to be pitted against the romantic, the side of feeling and of individual *fortuna,* in an opposition which appears irreconcilable. Adam Parry, particularly influential in promoting the conception of two quite distinct voices in the *Aeneid*, "a public

1. The immediate impact of Heinze's work may be evinced from the fact that it quickly ran to three editions. R. Heinze, *Vergil's Epische Technik* (Leipzig: 1903, 1908, 1915). That the thought expressed therein is considered important and thought-provoking in terms of current Vergil scholarship is attested by the appearance, ninety years later of the first English translation, *Virgil's Epic Technique*, trans. H. Harvey *et al.* (Berkeley: 1993). In his preface to this translation, Antonie Wlosok summarizes the general status of Vergilian studies at the time of Heinze's writing: "It was widely believed that Virgil was a writer who simply copied from his sources and had no artistic views of his own, but had merely cobbled together material from here, there, and everywhere, with no overall plan, so that the final product could not even be regarded as an integral whole," x.

2. B. Otis, *Virgil: A Study in Civilized Poetry* (Oxford: 1963) 414.

Dionysius, Vol. XVII, Dec. 1999, 27–56.

voice of triumph, and a private voice of regret,"[3] contends that there is in the epic "the continual opposition of a personal voice which comes to us as if it were Virgil's own to the public voice of Roman success."[4] Consequently there has emerged in the recent literature a sharp division between pro-Augustan and anti-Augustan readings of the poem; reductionist positions termed respectively 'optimistic' and 'pessimistic.'[5] Lost in this struggle has been any sense of an organic unity of the *Aeneid* within which this dichotomy can be reconciled. Nevertheless, it is increasingly recognized, as Hardie has pointed out, that Vergil's poems are to be seen "not as comments, whether of support or protest, from the sidelines of Roman history, but as themselves an important element in the various discourses and cultural practices that were central to the making of Augustan Rome."[6] With this in mind it is of use to revisit, in the light of current scholarship, those central issues raised by Heinze and to examine further the relation between divine necessity and human freedom as Vergil portrays it in the interactions between cosmopolis and individual in the *Aeneid.*

Central to Heinze's analysis of the overall purpose of the *Aeneid,* is his understanding of a coherent underlying structure which finds a focus in the awesome power of *fatum;* the inexorable guarantor of "the greatness of Rome, of the Roman people and of their ruler, of Roman history and of the Roman empire, the *maiestas populi Romani.*"[7] Within this context Vergil's purpose, Heinze argues, is primarily moral and recognizable as intimately associated with the ethos of the Augustan age and with the stated agenda of Augustus himself. The rule of Jupiter is to be equated with the Stoic conception of divine providence and the whole tenor of Vergil's thought, while it emerges directly only upon occasion: "be warned, learn righteousness; and do not neglect the gods," *discite iustitiam moniti et non temnere divos* (6.620), can, as Heinze understands it, be seen to express itself throughout the *Aeneid* in "the well-organized and deliberate progress of the story."[8]

The single overriding universal principle of the *Aeneid* can readily be equated with *fatum*, the 'word' of Jupiter. However, the interpretation of Jupiter's purpose is coloured according to the ultimate objective which Vergil is considered to have accorded priority. Hence if the *Aeneid* is seen as the

3. A. Parry, "The Two Voices of Virgil's *Aeneid,*" *Arion* (1963): 78. See also R.O.A.M. Lyne, *Further Voices in Vergil's* Aeneid (Oxford: 1987).

4. Parry 70.

5. Amongst advocates of the former position Hardie identifies Klingner, Pöschl, Buckheit, Cairns, Galinsky; of the latter, in addition to Adam Parry, Clausen, Putnam, R.F. Thomas, Boyle, Lyne. P. Hardie, *Virgil* (Oxford: 1998) 94–95, n. 171.

6. Hardie 2.

7. Heinze, *Virgil's Epic Technique* 382.

8. Heinze 374.

panegyric Vergil seems to promise in the *Georgics*,[9] the epic has been shaped to display to best advantage the character, achievements, and goals of Augustus. However, if Augustus himself is to be seen in the service of a broader and overriding good, whether the Roman state and way of life or Stoic principles, the text must reveal evidence consistent with this effect. It is relevant to ask, in this respect, whether it is Stoic conceptions that are the moving principle of the *Aeneid,* as Heinze would argue, or whether they are themselves adapted to a higher principle seen by Vergil to be present in a traditional and distinctly Roman ethos.

THE AUGUSTAN ETHOS

The traditional basis of Roman society and source of the greatness of the *res publica* was held to reside in an autocratic family structure in which the father as head exerted an authority which was almost absolute (*patria potestas*). Within this environment the young Roman underwent a strict moral grounding in which he was instilled with the *mos maiorum*; a reverence for custom and for those virtues of character which would make him a good citizen, the quintessentially Roman civic virtues of *virtus*, *pietas, iustitia,* and *clementia.* "Thus a dignified, patriotic and self-sacrificing character was formed, but often at the cost of a certain conservative narrowness and unadaptability."[10] The *res publica*, with its unwritten constitution and its system of checks and balances, was clearly recognized to be dependent on the moral character of its citizens acting in support of the common good. It was in the breakdown of these traditional values, therefore, that the root cause of the collapse of the republican system was naturally sought. Thus, Tacitus notes that the final decades of the *res publica* were characterized by discord, devoid of law and justice, *annos discordia, non mos, non ius*,[11] and Horace is forced to espostulate on the ineffectiveness of laws without morals, *quid leges sine moribus / vanae proficiunt?*[12]

The destabilization of Roman *mores* can be linked to the expansion of Rome from a small city-state to a far-flung empire. Livy, who like Vergil and Horace was a contemporary of Augustus, and the foremost historian of the age, complains that it is following this move to empire that the traditional discipline begins to lose its hold:

9. *Mox tamen ardentis accingar dicere pugnas Caesaris / et nomen fama tot ferre per annos. Georgics* III.46–47.

10. H.H. Scullard, *A History of the Roman World 753 to 146 BC,* 4th ed. (London: 1980) 361.

11. Tacitus, *Annals* 3.28.

12. Horace, *C.* 3.24, 35–36.

> with the gradual relaxation of discipline, morals first gave way, as it were, then sank lower and lower, and finally began the downward plunge which has brought us to the present time, when we can endure neither our vices nor their cure.[13]

The checks and balances of the republican constitution in which the monarchical (consular) element was contained by collegiality and annuality were gradually subverted by the necessities of maintaining empire. Army commanders, with an extended proconsular *imperium,* spent years away from Rome and became accustomed to absolute authority. In the Greek East in particular they were accorded the honours of kings. As a result, leading members of the Roman aristocracy became estranged from Roman authority and customs. On their eventual return to Rome, backed by what was essentially their own private army, they emerged as ambitious politicians in intense competition with others of their ilk. Private interest surely and inevitably replaced *res publica* as the *summum bonum* and civil strife became the norm.

The first simile of the *Aeneid,* in a conscious and conspicuous reversal of the usual order of comparison, likens Neptune's calming of a storm to the actions of a statesman who through his *auctoritas* averts an impending uprising (1.148–53). This striking affirmation of that fundamental desire for a return to the rule of law and order which underlies and stabilizes the Augustan age, makes explicit, as Horsfall notes, "the central place of politics and order in any sane reading of the poem."[14] Integral to the Augustan programme for the re-establishment of peace and order following a century of civil discord was the restoration of traditional *mores.* As Augustus himself states: "By the passage of new laws I restored many exemplary practices of our ancestors which were then falling into disuse."[15]

That Augustus was not alone in his desire to instigate a moral renewal is amply evidenced.[16] However, the family based value system of the *mos maiorum* had shown clearly that it was incapable of withstanding the forces of empire. There could be no return to the simple and idealized conception of an age in which public spirit ensured that the commonweal was elevated above private interest. Rather, the spirit of the times "invited intense reflection—which was by no means uncritical—on the special character of the Romans, their *Romanitas,* and the resultant obligations and responsibilities."[17]

13. *labente deinde paulatim disciplina velut desidentis primo mores sequator animo, deinde ut magis magisque lapsi sint, tum ire coeperint praecipites, donec ad haec tempora quibus nec vitia nostra nec remedia pati possumus perventum est.* Livy, *Ab Urbe Condita* 1.9.

14. N.M. Horsfall, "Virgil's Impact at Rome: The Non-Literary Evidence," in N.M. Hortstall, ed., *A Companion to the Study of Virgil* (Leiden: 1995) 103.

15. Augustus, *Res Gestae* 8.5.

16. See in particular, K. Galinsky, *Augustan Culture* (Princeton: 1996).

17. Galinsky 76.

It was within this milieu, and in particular through the influence of the circle of intellectuals surrounding Augustus, that there formed, as Galinsky notes, "a new *consensus universorum* which finds a particular resonance in the literature of the period."[18] An important reflection of this is to be found in the immediate and far-reaching success of the *Aeneid*.[19] Its authority and influence as a foundational text for a renewed moral order in a society which had hitherto lacked a canonical source of reference to guide behaviour must by any standard be acknowledged as profound.

To the strong endorsement by Augustus of moral renewal and the adoption of the *Aeneid* as the foundational epic of Rome must be related the increasing influence of Stoicism in the Augustan era. The extensive and ongoing exposure to Greek culture, which began with the Punic wars, displayed to Romans a breadth of thought hitherto unknown to them. Although Stoicism was only one of many Greek philosophical schools to be found in Rome during the period of Greek enlightenment, and Epicureanism may have achieved an initial advantage in that it was earlier translated into Latin, the particular affinity of Stoic ethics to the traditional Roman conceptions of morality was instrumental in its widespread acceptance amongst the Roman nobility. With the added stimulus which Augustus provided to turn from viewing the human end as private interest and pleasure to reasoned discipline and the public good, Stoic moral philosophy was propelled into a position of dominance which would prevail for almost 200 years in the Roman Empire. Hence it is not surprising that the *mos maiorum*, originally family-based and separate from religious practice, finds under Vergil's hand a universal ground in the Stoic conception of a supreme divine principle which governs a rationally ordered cosmopolis. While this principle is in essence undoubtedly Stoic, its expression in the *Aeneid* remains fundamentally Roman.

Vergil certainly had a particular interest in philosophy, as is attested by his reported plan to devote his final years to its study.[20] However as Braund notes, in her assessment of the relation of Vergil's religious and philosophical ideas to the intellectual climate that informs them, there is "little external evidence" that Vergil owed an undivided allegiance to the ideology of any of the various philosophical schools for which he has been "claimed" so that "it is largely a matter of interpretation of the poems themselves."[21] As she con-

18. Galinsky 89. See also P. White, *Promised Verse: Poets in the Society of Augustan Rome* (Cambridge, MA: 1993).

19. N. Horsfall has collected the evidence of Vergil's impact in antiquity. See "Virgil's Impact at Rome" 249–55.

20. *Vita Donati* 35.

21. S.M. Braund, "Virgil and the Cosmos: Religious and Philosophical Ideas," in C. Martindale, ed. *Cambridge Companion to Virgil* (Cambridge: 1997) 205.

cludes, the attempt "[t]o assign crude labels to this most complex of authors is of limited usefulness."[22] Arnold in his seminal work on Roman Stoicism likewise concludes that although "Virgil's mind is penetrated by Stoic feeling, and his works are an interpretation of the universe in the Stoic sense ... [this] must be regarded rather as an adaptation than as an exposition of Stoicism."[23] The virtues which primarily characterize Aeneas are *pietas*, *virtus*, and *iustitia*, Roman virtues to be found inscribed on the *clupeus aureus*, the golden shield, which as Augustus relates in *Res Gestae,* the senate and the Roman people set up in the *Curia Julia* in his recognition.[24]

For those who have sought to establish the extent to which Stoic influence can be attested in the *Aeneid,* prime considerations have been the Stoic belief in a rational, providentially ordered, cosmos in which the individual, eschewing the irrationality of the passions, progresses in wisdom by ordering himself willingly to his fate.[25] Ruled by an all-pervasive and all-powerful god as constitutive principle and logos[26] the Stoic cosmos is characterized by a deterministic conception of destiny. As Cicero presents the Stoic position:

> By 'fate' I mean that which the Greeks call εἱμαρμένη, an ordering and sequence of causes, since it is the connexion of cause to cause which out of itself produces anything. It is everlasting truth, flowing from all eternity. Consequently nothing has happened which was not going to be and, likewise, nothing is going to be of which nature does not contain causes working to bring that very thing about.[27]

22. Braund 206.

23. E.V. Arnold, *Roman Stoicism* (London: 1911) 389–90.

24. *Res Gestae* 34.18–22.

25. In addition to Heinze, see in particular C.M. Bowra, "Aeneas and the Stoic Ideal," *Greece & Rome* 3 (1993): 8–21, and M.W. Edwards, "The Expression of Stoic Ideals in the *Aeneid*," *Phoenix* 14 (1960): 151–65.

26. The oft-cited Stoic fragment, Cleanthes' *Hymn to Zeus* provides a powerful sense of this Stoic universe and the integral relation between man and god which it entails. "Noblest of immortals, many-titled, ever omnipotent Zeus, director of nature, steering all with your law ... we are your offspring, and of all creatures that live and tread the earth we alone have been given likeness to god .... All this world, as it whirls around the earth, obeys you wherever you lead, and willingly submits to your power ... you administer the universal reason (logos) which passes through everything .... Nothing occurs on the earth apart from you, god, nor in the celestial realm nor on the sea, except what bad men do in their folly. But you know how to make things crooked straight and to harmonize what is dissonant .... For you have so wrought together into one all that is good and bad that they have a single everlasting reason. The bad among mortals shun and ignore it, wretches, who ever seek the possession of goods yet neither see nor hear god's universal law, by obeying which they could enjoy a good life in company with intelligence." Text quoted in Stobaeus, *Anthologium* 1.1.12.25–27 (*SVF* 1.537), trans. A.A. Long.

27. "fatum autem id appello, quod Graeci εἱμαρμένην, id est ordinem seriemque causarum, cum causae causa nexa rem ex se gignat. ea est ex omni aeternitate fluens veritas sempiterna. quod cum ita sit, nihil est factum quod non futurum fuerit, eodemque modo nihil

Within this determinate order, human freedom lies in understanding one's fate and conforming oneself to it willingly, for while "the fates lead the willing they drag the unwilling," *ducunt volentem fata, nolentem trahunt.*[28] Since the perfection of reason is the activity which is most suited to the nature of man, "that in which he surpasses the animals, and is surpassed only by the gods," it is in accordance with right reason that the moral life must be conducted and virtue is reason perfected.[29] To be in harmony with the logos of the cosmos, of which human reason is an integral component, is the greatest happiness for an individual. This is the life of the sage, the Stoic wise man.

From their adherence to the Socratic conception of the absolute identity of virtue with knowledge arose the Stoic maxim that the only good is virtue and the only evil vice. All else, including death, sickness, and poverty, is classed as indifferent in an absolute sense to human happiness.[30] That virtue may manifest itself in different forms, primary among which were the acknowledged Greek cardinal virtues of prudence, courage, justice, and temperance, the Stoics allowed. However, as knowledge, virtue must be complete and therefore, in the expression of any one of the virtues, all the others are presupposed.[31] All moral error for the Stoic is to be equated with mistaken judgement and is equally wrong.[32] The passions, which include not only anger and sexual desire but also pity, belong to the ruling part of the soul as perversions of reason and, according to Chrysippus, are said to be moral weaknesses not only from the fact that each of these passions is mistakenly judged to be a good, but also in that the impulse driving a person towards them exceeds what is natural, *κατὰ φύσιν*.[33] Nevertheless, although only the sage can be said to be virtuous, in that he has the proper inner disposition to perform perfect acts, *κατόρθωμα*, through combining right reason with appropriate action, ordinary individuals, the *φαῦλοι*, can through

est futurum cuius non causas id ipsum efficientes natura contineat." Cicero, *De divin.* 1.125 (*SVF* 2.921), trans. A.A Long and D.N. Sedley. Similarly, Chrysippus is quoted as saying in his book *Περὶ προνοίας*, *On Providence,* that *εἱμαρμένη*, fate, is "a certain natural ordering of the whole from eternity, *φυσικήν τινα σύνταξιν τῶν ὅλων ἐξ αἰδίου*, in which sets of events follow upon and succeed another such that they are an ineradicable network, *τῶν ἑτέρων τοῖς ἑτέροις ἐπακολουθούντων καὶ μεταπολουμένων ἀπαραβάτου οὔσης τῆς τοιαύτης ἐπιπλοκῆς*," Gellius 7.2.3 (*SVF* 2.1000).

28. Seneca, *Epist.* 113.15.

29. Seneca, *Epist.* 76.9 (*SVF* 3.200).

30. Stobaeus 2.96, 18–97, 5 (*SVF* 3.501).

31. Stobaeus 2.63, 6–24 (*SVF* 3.280).

32. Stobaeus 2.113, 18–23 (*SVF* 3.529).

33. "*οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῷ κρίνειν ἀγαθὰ ἕκαστα τούτων λέγεται ἁρρωστήματα ταῦτα, ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ τὸ ἐπὶ πλέον ἐκπεπτωκέναι πρὸς ταῦτα τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν.*" Galen, *Plac.* 4.5.21 (*SVF* 3.480).

the performance of appropriate activities, *καθήκοντα*, simulate virtue and indeed undergo moral progress increasing in wisdom as Stoic *proficientes*.[34]

DIVINE PROVIDENCE IN THE *AENEID*

The ultimate moving principle of the *Aeneid*, as befits its epic nature, is the plan of the supreme deity. Moreover, the identification of the Roman national god Jupiter with Zeus as supreme deity, which pre-dates Vergil and can be traced back at least as far as the third-century BC poet Naevius, is in itself of enormous significance. As Feeney points out, Jupiter, the supreme god, father of all men and gods, has at one and the same time a partisan interest as the guarantor of the supremacy of his own people, the Romans.[35] Fate, divine providence and the will of Jupiter are, to all intents and purposes, synonymous; the *fata*, the things spoken by Jupiter, must inevitably be brought to pass as the rational order of the cosmos. As a result, Jupiter can readily be associated with the divine providence of Stoicism in which "God, Mind, Fate and Zeus are all one."[36] Nevertheless, from the very beginning of the *Aeneid* it is evident that Vergil allows a much more substantial role to the contingent, to human individuality and choice, than would appear to be in accord with traditional Stoic doctrines.

It is from Homer and from traditional Greek thought on human destiny that Vergil draws strength and the words of Zeus in the *Odyssey* find their echo in the *Aeneid* in the fates of such unfortunates as Dido and Turnus: "Oh for shame, how much mortals blame the gods, for they say evils are from us, but indeed they themselves, by their own recklessness have sufferings beyond their appointed lot."[37] What Vergil brings from Stoicism to this Homeric picture is the notion of the quintessential providential nature of the cosmos and of a relationship between men and gods which portrays the particular vicissitudes of fate which the individual must endure not as arbitrary blows but as an integral part of the rational providential order. Edwards has demonstrated convincingly the consistent adoption by Vergil in the *Aeneid*

34. As Cicero puts the Stoic position: "But although we say moral worth, *honestum*, to be the sole good, it is nevertheless consistent to perform an appropriate act, *officium*, in spite of the fact that we count appropriate action neither a good nor an evil." *De finibus* 3.17.58. Seneca, discussing the importance of moral precepts in perfecting virtue, elaborates the point thus: "But the approach to these qualities is slow, and in the meantime, in practical matters, the path should be pointed out for the benefit of one who is still short of perfection, but is making progress, *proficiens*. Seneca, *Epistulae morales* 94, 50 (Loeb ed., trans. R.M. Gummere).

35. D.C. Feeney, *The Gods in Epic* (Oxford: 1991) 113.

36. Diogenes Laertes, *SVF* 2.580.

37. "*ὦ πόποι, οἷον δή νυ θεοὺς βροτοὶ αἰτιόωνται.· ἐξ ἡμέων γάρ φασι κάκ' ἔμμεναι· οἱ δὲ καὶ αὐτοὶ σφῇσιν ἀτασθαλίῃσιν ὑπὲρ μόρον ἄλγε' ἔχουσιν.*" Homer, *Odyssey* I.32–34.

of the Stoic conception of life as "following fate" or "following the god."[38] Nevertheless, this is not to be equated with the strict determinism of the ancient Stoa. Indeed, quite apart from the eclecticism already noted to be constitutive to Vergil's own philosophical thought, sustained criticism from their philosophical opponents combined with their immersion in the practical Roman milieu had effected a softening of the rigour of many of the strictures of the Old Stoa. As a consequence, the period of the second and first century BC, dominated by Panaetius (*ca.* 189–109 BC), the founder of Roman Stoicism as "the school which will train the scholar, the gentleman, and the statesman"[39] and by his successor Posidonius (*ca.* 140–51 BC), has come to be described as the Middle Stoa. While direct evidence that these philosophers modified the standard Stoic conception of strict determinism is limited, it can be noted that Cicero, drawing upon their thought, has his Stoic spokesman, Balbus, remark, that "the gods attend to important issues and neglect the small," *magna di curant, parva neglegunt.*[40]

The question of the relation between the universal order of reason and the individual particularity and arbitrariness of natural desire which will dominate the action of the *Aeneid* at every level begins to make its presence felt in Book 1 as an overriding opposition in the sphere of the divine. The issue takes form concretely in the conflict between Juno and Jupiter over whether it is to be Carthage or Rome that will rule the world. The two cities stand from the start opposed physically to one another, *Karthago, Italiam* contra *Tiberinaque longe / ostia* (1.11–12). *Saeva Iuno* rails in support of her city, Carthage, *hoc regnum dea gentibus esse* (1.17), calling into play the forces of natural disorder against the dictates of *fatum,* which have decreed the supremacy of Rome (I.22). Juno, as Feeney notes, by her presence as the representative of Rome's most feared opponent "at once establishes the fact that the gods of this poem are going to be indispensable elements of whatever historical statement it has to make."[41] Somehow, if there is to be an effective resolution at the human level, the establishment of a *pax Romana,* there must be first a solution at the level of the divine. The answer, as Vergil will make quite clear, however, is not a simple conquest of one side by the other, the routing of the vagaries of choice by rigid and inflexible order. The question becomes rather that of determining in what manner and to what extent the side of *fortuna*, a world in which there is space for human free-

38. Amongst the relevant citations provided are *Aeneid* 1.382; 5.709; 12.677; 3.114; 10.49, Edwards 151–2.

39. Arnold 102.

40. Cicero, *De natura deorum* 2.66.167. It is known that Cicero requested a copy of Panaetius' book, *On Providence* from Atticus in June 45 and that much of the technical detail of *ND* 2 is consonant with the thought of Posidonius.

41. Feeney 131.

dom, is to be allowed a part in shaping the way that the providential order of destiny will unfold. Once it is allowed that humans are in a full sense responsible for the choices they make, the paths they follow in fulfilling their accorded destiny, then the divine order in its turn must be seen to possess the means of actively containing the resulting diversity within the causal nexus of *fatum.*

At the level of the divine the problem is seen to unfold in the interactions between Jupiter, Juno, and Venus. Juno's position in the *Aeneid* is pivotal, poised between that of Jupiter who is firmly identified with the authority of universal rational order and that of Venus, characterized in accord with her traditional role as the divine champion of the appetitive; of individual desire. As both the sister and wife of Jupiter, *soror et coniunx*, Juno wields a power among the gods second only to that of Jupiter himself. As the epic action commences, Juno is in angry and open revolt against the edicts of Jupiter. How, Vergil asks, can there be so much anger in the minds of gods, *tantaene animis caelestibus irae* (1.11)? The question of anger will, in fact, loom large in the argument of the *Aeneid* and be significant in the shaping of its resolution at both the divine and human level. As Vergil portrays her, there is an inherent duality to the nature of Juno in her double role as both consort and sister; a conflict between her divine mandate to uphold the objective standards of an ethical order and the exercise of her natural will to gratify her own desire in the promotion of her particular ends. This inner tension, the source of her anger and frustration, becomes particularly evident in Juno's abuse of her divine responsibility for the ethical institution of marriage to further at all cost her desire that Carthage should be the city to rule the world. The conflict within Juno is central to the problem that Vergil presents, mirroring in the divine the divided nature, the rational animality, of humankind. Wielding a power over the course of natural events which challenges the authority of the whole rational order, Juno's bitterness fills with fear and torment, sea and earth and sky, *aspera Juno / quae mare nunc terrasque metu caelumque fatigat* (1.279–80). By contrast, Venus, the goddess of desire, accepting that there are limits to her powers, acknowledges unquestioningly the supremacy of Jupiter, not opposing his edicts but using her wiles to plead her cause with him. Venus' concern throughout the epic remains unchanged, the furthering, as she sees it, of the particular interest and well-being of her own family, Aeneas, and Ascanius. Acting wholly within character, she plans her cruel self-interested entrapment of Dido by Cupid.

That Juno can and does actively oppose and obstruct what she knows to be the will of Jupiter is quite clear from the outset (1.19–20). However, that there are limits to her powers must soon emerge. Venus, also privy to Jupiter's will, beseeches Jupiter, on behalf of her son Aeneas, to remember his promise that from the blood of the Trojans the Romans will rise to rule over

land and sea (1.234–7). With the firm assurance to Venus that his will is in no way changed (1.257–8), Jupiter is led by Vergil quite naturally to the divulgence of details of his master plan for a human realm in which the Romans as lords over all things will establish law and order world-wide in a lasting peace. This is of course immediately identifiable with the imperial objectives of Augustus. However, in the wake of the long period of civil disorder in which the Roman Republic has been embroiled, it can reasonably be held also to embody the hopes of the poet and indeed the Roman people as a whole.

As Jupiter unrolls the secret scrolls of fate for Venus, *longius et volvens fatorum arcana movebo* (1.262), the link through the progeny of Aeneas to Romulus the traditional founder of Rome is quickly established. Significantly only two lines are devoted to the coming action in the epic itself (1.263–4). They establish however that, albeit at a heavy cost, the essential basis for civilized life, a defined community and a set of common ideals, *moenia et mores*, are to be put in place by Aeneas and his companions. Only much later will Rome itself, the city of Mars, be founded by Romulus and, with the linking of the two foundational legends, the people known as Romans first come on stage (1.276–7). The rule of Rome, the Eternal City,[42] is destined to be the earthly expression of the divine rule of Jupiter, an empire without end, knowing no limits with respect to fortunes or time, *his ego nec metas rerum nec tempora pono / imperium sine fine dedi* (1.278–9).

The earthly harmony is to be a reflection of the divine and as a necessary prerequisite for the establishment of the Roman race as *rerum dominos*, the appeasement of Juno herself must be an integral part of the divine plan. Juno too will come to prefer the people of the toga, Jupiter pronounces, *sic placitum* (1.282–3). The whole tenor of Jupiter's speech is a resounding endorsement of Roman imperialism culminating in the rule of Augustus Caesar. Yet, behind the patriotic trumpeting, the longing for peace and the restoration of ancient mores (1.291–3) is evident. After two hundred years of almost continuous warfare, the gates of war will close, *claudentur Belli portae* (1.294), this time permanently, confining within them the forces of chaos, the *furor* of civil disorder (1.294–6).[43] While Vergil in the *Aeneid* undoubt-

42. The connotation of Rome as the Eternal City is reported by Austin to appear first, as such, "in Tibullus 2.5.23f. 'Romulus aeternae nondum formaverat urbis / moenia' (so Ovid of Romulus, *F.* 3.72 'aeternae ... pater urbis'); cf. Livy 4.4.4 'in aeternum urbe condita'." R.G. Austin, *Commentary, Aeneid Book 1*, n. 278 f.

43. As Austin reads the closing lines of Jupiter's speech: "In this ornate and richly-constructed passage Virgil expresses the full meaning of the *pax Augusta* to come: law and order shall be established on ancient, honoured institutional concepts; civil war shall be ended, and the madness that inspired it shall be imprisoned and impotent. It is a noble manifestation of Virgilian idealism" n. 292ff.

edly presents here in Jupiter's great speech a rational providentially ordered cosmos, he does not do so at the expense of denying the side of passion and feeling. Within the overarching and identifiably Stoic rational framework it is amidst the interplay of natural forces, of passions, and disaster, and in their transformation and subordination to *fatum* that the end is actualized. The word of Jupiter, the *fatum* of his people, will be inexorably unrolled but in the context of strife and setback fuelled by the opposition of Juno.

That there is a deeper significance for Vergil to the underlying and unifying theme of divinely ordained Roman domination than can be contained within a simple exposition of traditional Stoic doctrine further manifests itself in Book 6. Prefacing a second great exposition of the will of Jupiter is a description by Anchises of a cosmology that is inherently Stoic in conception. The cosmos is seen to be formed from fiery energy, *igneus vigor* (6.730), sustained by a spirit, *spiritus* (6.726),[44] and activated by mind, *mens* (6.727). From the seeds, *seminina* (6.731),[45] which originate in the heavens, arise the forms of living things. To this quintessentially Stoic foundation, however, is wedded a Pythagorean-Platonic eschatology in which the soul, contaminated in the body by the taints of passion and desire, on release from its earthly prison must undergo purification and rebirth.[46] As Williams points out, Vergil paints a picture of "hope after death, one in which virtue is rewarded, one in which the unexplained suffering of this life may find its explanation."[47] This may be contrasted with the bleakness of the traditional Stoic belief that soul after death simply reverts immediately to the *igneus vigor*.

While Vergil retains the underlying rational order of Stoicism, the modifications of the strict Stoic doctrine of providential determinism which have emerged in Books 1 and 6 allow the introduction of a meaningful conception of human freedom and its attendant notion of moral responsibility. Divine providence still prevails, the fates will indeed find a way, but the choices of both gods and humans will have an influence on the path of fate to its appointed end. Within this relation of freedom and necessity, *fortuna* and *fatum*, Vergil explores with great sensitivity the nature of the human condition. At the same time he gives form and meaning to the Augustan program of moral renewal, and the rule of universal order and peace. It is against this backdrop that the prophesy of Jupiter is brought into sharper

44. The Stoic πνεῦμα.

45. The Stoic λόγοι σπερματικοί.

46. Evidence that such doctrines had by this period become assimilated into Roman Stoic thought is cited by Arnold, 266–68. As he notes, Seneca, *Dial.* vi 23, 1; 25, 1, clearly expresses this position.

47. R.D. Williams, "The Sixth Book of the *Aeneid*," in S.J. Harrison, ed., *Oxford Readings in Vergil's* Aeneid (Oxford: 1990) 202.

focus as future heroes of Rome parade before the eyes of Aeneas (6.756–886). As the progeny of Aeneas are successively identified by Anchises, the link to the Augustan era is firmly forged. Particularly noticeable is the break in the chronological order which occurs at that high point in patriotic fervour reached with the founding of Rome itself by Romulus: "Behold, son, under his [Romulus'] auspices famed Rome will make her imperium equal to the earth and her spirit equal to Olympus."[48]

All the potential for glory and the imperium without end that Jupiter has promised is seen to be there for Romulus but it is only with Augustus that this promise is to be fulfilled and, significantly, he it is who now comes into view, standing next to the founder of Rome. With the emperor Augustus will come a new Golden Age, *Augustus Caesar, divi genus, aurea condet / saecula qui rursus Latio* (6. 792–93) and the establishment of universal Roman rule. Confronted by such a prospect of future glory there can be no doubt or hesitation on the part of Aeneas (6. 806–7), he must subject himself to fate and fulfil his appointed role.

There is, however, another side to empire which must not be allowed to fall from sight; all this splendour and power comes at a heavy cost in human toil and suffering. The force of the closing words of the proem, the magnitude of the task to be undertaken to found the Roman race, *tantae molis erat Romanam condere gentem* (1.33), resounds through the bloody catalogue that marks the history of Rome unfolding before the eyes of Aeneas and his father. As the yet unborn shades of Pompey and Julius Caesar confront each other, Anchises, unable to restrain his anguish at the prospect of the bitter civil strife to come, vainly interjects: "My sons, do not let such great wars become habitual in your thoughts, nor turn your mighty force against your homeland's vitals."[49]

The cry for forbearance in the face of conflict is a call to *pietas*, the subjection of the individual interest to the *summum bonum*, the good of the state. It is significant that the great exposition of Roman glory in Book 6 culminates, as Austin has well noted, "not with the individual, Augustus, but with an ideal, the expression of Roman ethos and Roman mission."[50] Others, and here the Greeks are intended, will excel in artistic and scientific endeavour, but it is the Roman vision that will both encompass and sustain these cultural achievements within the political sphere. The highest and most complete form of the practical life is politics and the Roman art will be the

48. *En hujus, nate, auspiciis illa incluta Roma / imperium terris, animos aequabit Olympo. Aen.* 6.781–2.

49. *Ne pueri, ne tanta animis adsuescite bella / neu patriae validas in viscera vertite viris. Aen.* 6.832–3.

50. Austin 233.

supreme art of government: "but yours will be the rulership of nations, remember, Roman, these will be your arts: to teach the ways of peace to spare defeated people, tame the proud."[51]

Rome will be the earthly cosmopolis. The hardship of war will be succeeded by the establishment of world peace under Roman rule, *pax Romana*, and the inculcation of Roman moral values, a new Golden Age.[52] The *imperium sine fine* promised by Jupiter in Book 1 will assume a substantial form in which the dividedness of human nature is overcome through the ordering of sensuous desire to the rule of objective reason and the common good. Before this can be brought about however the sources of division, those forces which inherently threaten the universal order, must be identified and understood; it is to this end that Vergil explores the agency of the *Aeneid*'s participants, both human and divine.

Stoic Strands in the Characterization of Aeneas

Within the bounds of an overtly Stoic framework, human moral agency in the *Aeneid* has commonly been seen to be vested by Vergil in a Stoic conception of the nature of Aeneas himself.[53] Heinze, in what has emerged as perhaps most controversial of his views, would further argue that Aeneas has been cast by Vergil in the role of a Stoic probationer, a *proficiens*, undergoing an ordered and systematic development in wisdom and virtue as the *Aeneid* progresses.[54] Among those who have subsequently considered Aeneas in this light Bowra and Edwards are prominent, and their arguments must be addressed as important to effecting an understanding of the extent to which the characterization of Aeneas can be considered to be that of a Stoic 'wise man.' The presence of elements of Stoic philosophy within the *Aeneid*, as has already emerged, is not evidence of a commitment on the part of Vergil to all of its tenets.

The succession of events that lead to the fall of Troy and the beginning of the epic journey of Aeneas are recounted in Book 2. The long Trojan war has apparently ended with the withdrawal of the Greeks, and Aeneas as he sleeps

51. *Tu regere imperio populos, Romane, memento / [hae tibi erunt artes], pacique imponere morem / parcere subiectis et debellare superbos. Aen.* 6.851–3.

52. As Braund suggests, "It is tempting to identify the authority of Anchises with that of Virgil speaking as the national poet and producing his patriotic vision for Augustus and the Romans, the ultimate *paterfamilias* and his 'sons.' If this is right, politics trumps the labelling of philosophical ideas in interpretation of Virgil: whatever his inspiration, Virgil weaves his ideas into a fabric laden with significance for his Roman readership," 210.

53. Heinze argues that "Aeneas the fully developed hero is a model of the Stoic 'wise man'," 227; Arnold states that "Virgil's conception of ethics is displayed in the character of Aeneas" and that this is a fundamentally Stoic concept, 391.

54. Heinze 227.

peacefully in his father's home in a secluded part of the city has no conception that Troy is burning all about him. The appearance in a dream of the ghost of Hector, the greatest of the Trojan heroes, and his instructions to Aeneas to flee, taking with him the Trojan gods to establish a new city for them across the sea (2.293–5), is the first intimation that there is a divinely ordained and fated duty to which Aeneas must submit himself. However, alerted finally to the situation which now prevails in Troy, Aeneas has no thought for the duty newly placed on him by Hector. It is immediately and abundantly clear that there is here exhibited by Aeneas no abstract Stoic rationality untouched by passion. Although reason tells him there is no sense in fighting, *nec sat rationis in armis*, Aeneas is, *demens*, suffused with a furious anger, *furor iraque mentem praecipitat.* As he battles through the night, his intent is fixed upon dying the death of the traditional Homeric hero, *mori succurrrit in armis* (2.314–6). The appearance of Panthus carrying the Trojan gods has no capacity to recall the words of Hector to Aeneas. Indeed, only after he has witnessed the final atrocities which surround the death of Priam himself does Aeneas remember his own family, left unprotected; his father, of an age with Priam, his wife Creusa and son Iulus. Yet even now he is diverted as the sight of Helen incites him to renewed fury, *furiata mente ferebar* (2.588). It is the appearance on the scene of his mother, Venus, that at last restrains him and she it is who reveals to Aeneas the utter futility of his *furor.* In a chilling revelation he sees with his own eyes that in fighting the destruction of Troy he is pitting himself against the very gods themselves (2.588–623).

Prepared now at last to flee the city, Achilles returns home to assemble his family for the journey only to discover his father, Anchises, adamant in his refusal to live a life of exile. Aeneas, the Trojan prince and hero of *θυμός*, is now shown to be characterized by the very Roman virtue of *pietas.*[55] The submission of Aeneas to the will of his father as *pater familias* in the extreme circumstance of Anchises' refusal to leave the doomed city of Troy is incontrovertible evidence of Aeneas' understanding that his actions, his will as individual, must be ordered to a will that is more authoritative. "My father had you thought I could go off and leave you here? Could such unholiness fall from a father's lips?"[56]

A parallel between the traditional Roman conception of the role in the family of the dutiful son and that of the relation of the individual to divine

55. The epithet *pius* has formally characterized Aeneas to this point in the *Aeneid.* See, for example, I.10; 220; 253; 305; 378, where Aeneas is spoken of as *pius* or *insignem pietate virum.* Here for the first time this epithet is given narrative concretion.

56. *Mene effere pedem, genitor, te posse relicto / sperasti tantumque nefas patrio excidit ore. Aen.* 2.657–8.

providence in Stoicism can clearly be drawn. The Stoic as a citizen of a rational cosmopolis dutifully directs his actions towards the good of the whole, his virtue is life in accord with the universal rational order. In whatever form this is expressed, "whether we think of destiny, of providence, of the gods, or of the state, success for the individual is to agree and to cooperate; to struggle and to rebel is to fail."[57] Aeneas must come to understand that his true duty and his destiny lie in freely subordinating his own individual ends to the will of Jupiter, *pater hominum atque deorum.* This is the fundamental underlying movement which propels Aeneas in the *Aeneid*, an ordering of ends that while it is identifiable as Stoic is also at the same time quintessentially Roman.[58]

For Bowra there is no doubt at all that Vergil is fully committed to the portrayal of Aeneas as a Stoic probationer. "Aeneas is a Stoic, but like all Stoics he has to go through a period of probation, and during this his temptations and difficulties are often too much for him, and he fails."[59] Vergil from the perspective of Bowra is here "adapting himself to the current Stoicism of his age."[60] However, the alternative and equally admissible hypothesis that Vergil is adapting Stoicism to traditional Roman values and the Augustan ethos must also be considered. The difference between these two viewpoints will emerge primarily in consideration of whether all aspects of Aeneas' conduct are to be measured against strict Stoic criteria emphasizing in particular the requirement for ἀπάθεια, freedom from the perturbations

57. Arnold 281.

58. This accords closely with Roman conceptions of the proper ordering of *pietas.* In the encounters between Aeneas and Venus, and Aeneas and Anchises, and in the final resolution by divine omens, Vergil establishes that *pietas* is due first and foremost to the will of the gods, secondarily to the state, and finally and most immediately to the family. Otis brings out well the significance of the impasse reached by Aeneas and Anchises. "*Pietas*, indeed, is the duty of sons to parents and parents to sons but, as Cicero observed, it was pre-eminently the duty of citizens to their city: *pietas quae cum magna in parentibus et propinquis, tum in patria maxima est* (*De Republica* VI. 16). We know too well what Romans thought of the desertion of a *patria* from the famous speech of Camillus in Livy (5.52). To the Roman mind neither family nor local gods (in short familial *pietas*) could exist without a *patria,*" 245.

59. Bowra 11. In introducing his account of a Stoic Aeneas, Bowra turns to Augustine for support. However, examination of the cited text, *Civ. Dei* 9.4, does not lend credence to Bowra's claim either that "Augustine condemns Aeneas as a Stoic" (11) or that "Augustine takes him [i.e., Aeneas] as typical of Stoic hardness of heart in his treatment of Dido" (10). Augustine's point in the cited passage is merely that in the man of virtue the mind exercises dominion over the passions. The purpose of 9.4 is in point of fact to argue that differences between Stoic, Peripatetic, and Platonic accounts of virtue are linguistic quibbles. As he says, "In my opinion, the Stoic view of the matter is identical with that of the Platonists and Peripatetics, in respect of the objective reference of their statements as opposed to the sound of their words."

60. Ibid.

of the passions. Also to be taken into account is the requirement that any purported moral development in Aeneas be correlated with the display of development of characteristic virtues. Recognizing this to be the case, Bowra centres his argument around the presence or absence in Aeneas of the accepted Stoic virtues of justice, moderation, courage, and wisdom.[61] To these may be compared the established Roman virtues of *virtus, clementia iustitia* and *pietas,* the significance of which in the context of the Augustan culture, including the *Aeneid* itself, has been noted by Galinsky.[62]

With respect to the Stoic virtues of moderation, courage, and wisdom, Bowra and Edwards concur in finding Aeneas to fail conspicuously through the first five books of the *Aeneid.*[63] Only in consideration of the virtue of justice is Aeneas seen to succeed, justice being equated by Bowra with the Roman virtue, *pietas.* Amongst evidence of Aeneas' lack of wisdom and moderation the Dido episode, not surprisingly, is accorded first place. On the other hand to ascribe the loss of Troy and the loss of Creusa to a lack of prudence on Aeneas' part, as Bowra does, hardly seems reasonable, since both events were divinely fated.[64] Most difficult to substantiate, however, as indeed Bowra recognizes, is his charge that Aeneas lacks courage.[65] As Vergil himself presents Aeneas in these early books, he is quite clearly characterized as not only renowned for his *pietas* but for his *virtus* and *iustitia.* Hence Ilioneus describing to Dido, Aeneas, whom he believes to have perished at sea, speaks of him as a king who exceeded all in his justice, his *pietas*, and his achievements under arms, his *virtus*, *quo iustior alter / nec pietate fuit, nec bello maior et armis* (1.544–5). *Virtus*, 'manliness,' has the particular connotation for the Romans of military valour; of glorious and arduous service on behalf of the state.[66] Yet it is admittedly true that whereas Aeneas is brave in

61. These are of course the traditional 'cardinal' virtues of the Greek πόλις and so are not limited to Stoicism, as Augustine points out. The nature of virtue in Roman Stoicism has been summarized by Arnold, 302–29. A much fuller account, based primarily on the *Περὶ Καθήκοντος* of Panaetius is given by Cicero, *De Off.* Book I and II.

62. Galinsky 83–89.

63. Bowra 15; Edwards 155.

64. Thus Bowra argues that "despite his [Aeneas'] long experience of Greek wiliness he allowed the Wooden Horse to be taken into Troy. To the same weakness must be ascribed his loss of Creusa. He knew that he wanted her to escape, but he failed to take the right precautions to see that she did, 12. Vergil makes quite clear, however, that these outcomes were inevitable. The terrible demise of Laocoön; the awesome display of the gods' might revealed to Aeneas by Venus, *divum inclementia, divum / has evertit opes sternitque a culmine Troiam. Aen.* 2.602–3; and the words of the phantom of Creusa herself to her distraught spouse, *non haec sine numine divum / eveniunt; nec te comitem hinc portare Creusam / fas, aut ille sinit superi regnator Olympi. Aen.* 2.777–79 all reinforce the fated necessity of these events.

65. Bowra 13.

66. Galinsky 84.

battle he does not in the Stoic sense exhibit courage through an indifference to the exigencies he must endure. However, there is no evidence that Vergil intends Aeneas to be measured in relation to a strict Stoic criterion of courage and thereby to be judged inadequate. While it is certainly the case, as Bowra points out, that the "circle of Maecenas and Augustus was busy with thoughts for the regeneration of the Roman character, and found the solution in a popularization of the Stoic type,"[67] this is not to say that they identified completely with traditional Stoic precepts and that it is therefore on the basis of such moral perfection that Aeneas must ultimately be judged.

As Aeneas yields, *cessi* (2.804), to fate and leaves Troy he embarks on an extended period of wanderings punctuated by a succession of abortive attempts to found the new city, all of which serve to expose the inadequacies of the old world order to the task ahead. During this time his ultimate goal is only gradually revealed as he is driven onward by a series of prophesies towards his fated destiny in Italy. In his journeying, the spirit of Aeneas can be seen to be tested in much the same way as that of πολύτλας Odysseus and in so far as each of them knows his will as enduring in the face of adversity each may be characterized as 'stoic.' For *pius* Aeneas, however, there is a duty that is not there for Odysseus, a duty to subjugate his own ends to an overriding and universal end and establish a foundation not for a πόλις order which he himself will rule, but for the κοσμόπολις he will never know.

The dispute between Jupiter and Juno on the form that this universal city is to take, whether it will be founded on the objective rule of universal reason or the particular demands of feeling, unknown to Aeneas, gives shape to his destiny. "She [Juno] kept [them] far from Latium, and for many years they wandered, driven by the fates over all the waters. So hard it was to found the Roman race."[68] Throughout this long trial of endurance for the Trojans it is Juno who inexorably opposes their progress with her wrath. Nevertheless, dragged herself against her will by fate, she knows from the start, as does Poseidon in the *Odyssey*, that ultimately her resistance must be futile. "[Juno] asked herself: 'Am I defeated, simply to stop trying unable to turn back the Trojan king from Italy!' Doubtless I am forbidden by the fates."[69]

Meanwhile, the extent of this divine opposition remains hidden from her victims, only obliquely alluded to in the prophesy of Helenus who acknowl-

67. Bowra 14.

68. *Arcebat longe Latio, multosque per annos / errabant acti fatis maria omnia circum / tantae molis erat Romanam condere gentem. Aen.* 1.31–3.

69. *Haec secum: 'mene incepto desistere victam / ne posse Italia Teucrorum avertere regem! / quippe vetor fatis.' Aen.* 1.37–39.

edges that he is hindered by the fates from knowing all that is to come and forbidden by Juno to speak on these matters, *prohibent nam cetera Parcae / scire Helenum farique vetat Saturnia Iuno* (3.379–80). Juno must be appeased, Helenus further adjures the Trojans, but if he knows the full extent of her opposition he says nothing (3.433–40). When at last it seems that Aeneas must attain his goal and land in Italy, Juno's rage reaches a crescendo; expressed in all its force[70] in the storm she unleashes to drive Aeneas and his comrades away from Italy and onto the shores of North Africa, where lies her own great city of Carthage and Queen Dido.

Dido and the Epicurean Principle

The superiority of Rome is to be vested not simply in military might but in moral authority and with the arrival of Aeneas in Carthage the battle between Jupiter and Juno over the basis of moral order in the world reaches a new climax. Juno, acknowledging the true nature of her struggle changes her tactics. If Rome is to be the city of the world then it must be assimilated to Carthage and assume Carthaginian values, Juno's values. Removed from the stark abstraction of the divine conflict, the dispute finds a focus in the division that is there within the human self, the rational animality of man. Philosophically, this division of reason and nature is polarized in the opposition of Stoicism and Epicureanism, the identification of the self with either the rational and universal or with the natural and particular.

The Epicurean undercurrents which persist through the Dido episode have long been noted and recently analyzed in some detail.[71] It is perhaps of note also in this respect that as Aeneas, newly landed on the unknown shores of Dido's kingdom, comforts his men he does so in words that invoke a characteristically Epicurean stance. "It is sweet to see the misfortunes from which you yourself are free," says Lucretius.[72] "Perhaps someday it will be pleasant to remember even these adversities," *forsan et haec olim meminisse iuvabit*, agrees Aeneas (1.203).[73] The 'stoic' endurance of Aeneas has been

70. That Juno in this incident subverts her divine power as goddess of marriage to achieve her ends "when she bribes Aeolus to unleash the winds with the sexual lure of a nymph in marriage," has been noted by Hardie, 84.

71. J.T. Dyson, "Dido the Epicurean," *Classical Antiquity* 15 (1996): 203–21. See also D.C. Feeney, *The Gods in Epic* (Oxford: 1991) 172–73. A.G. McKay, in his recent article "Vergil and the Garden," *Ancient Philosophy* 19 (1999): 37–53, argues the necessity for "a fresh assessment of Aeneas' character" and for exploring "the polarities and contacts between Stoic and Epicurean determinism, between the Garden and the Porch" (50), in an atttempt to "prompt a reconciliation of opposites in the epic" (37).

72. Lucretius, *De Rerum Natura* ii, 4.

73. While expressing the same sentiment, Vergil's version it must be said is not coloured by the callousness of indifference to the sufferings of others which marks the true Epicurean position.

tested to the breaking point, as Vergil portrays very clearly in the contrast between the public confidence with which Aeneas proclaims to his comrades their destiny and the doubts that assail him privately. The fates promise a peaceful settlement in Latium, Aeneas reassures the Trojans. "It is the divine will that there Troy will rise again," *illic fas regna resurgere Troiae* (1.205–6). Although he himself is sick with care, he simulates hope in his features repressing his suffering deep within his heart, *curisque ingentibus aeger / spem vultu simulat, premit altum corde dolorem* (1.208–9). It is not an assured and confident leader of a new rational order that Juno brings within her own particular orbit, but a man borne down by adversity, one who seeks the *sedes quietas* (1.205) of Epicurus; a ready convert to the life of pleasure about to enfold him.

As he looks for the first time upon the city of Carthage Aeneas is immediately captivated, marvelling at the enormity of the project, the eagerness of the workers, and the tangible evidence of civilized order which presents itself. (1.421–9). "How fortunate are those whose walls already rise," *O fortunati, quorum iam moenia surgent!*, he exclaims. In the centre of the city is the huge shrine that Dido is building to *regia Iuno.* It is here, ironically, in Juno's city, that for the first time Aeneas' fear is stilled and he dares to hope that at last he has found shelter, *hic primum Aeneas sperare salutem / ausus et adflictus melius confidere rebus* (1.451–2). On the walls of the temple he sees the events of the Trojan War now frozen in stone and there are tears shed, *sunt lacrimae rerum* (1.462), for a past to which there can be no return. It is at this critical juncture in the affairs of Aeneas, carefully choreographed it would seem by Juno, that Dido enters the picture.

It has been well noted that, just as Carthage is an *altera* Rome, so in Dido Vergil presents an *alter* Aeneas.[74] Herself an exile of fate, a survivor of hardship, *me quoque per multos similis fortuna labores* (1.628), Dido appears every inch the ruler as she moves among her people directing and urging on their work. Seated on her high throne she allots the workload and applies the laws, dispensing justice fairly, *iura dabat legesque viris, operum laborem / partibus aequabat iustis aut sorte trahebat* (1.507–8). When a group of Aeneas' lost comrades appear and address the Queen they are received with exemplary hospitality. Parallels with the universal city of Rome appear both in the address of Ilioneus to the Queen and in her response. Hence Ilioneus begins with sentiments that will find their echo in the elaboration of the mission of Rome by Anchises (6.853): "O Queen, whom Jupiter granted to found a new city / and to restrain the proud nations with justice," *O regina, novam cui condere Iuppiter urbem / iustitiaque dedit gentis frenare superbas* (1.522–3). In her reply Dido makes manifest the universal nature of her own city as

74. See, for example, Otis 265.

she offers the Trojans citizenship on an equal basis with the Tyrians. Like Rome, Carthage takes in the world admitting no distinction between peoples in terms of race or origin.

> Should you wish to settle in this kingdom on equal terms with me, the city I am building is yours; draw up your ships, Trojans and Tyrians will be treated by me with no discrimination.[75]

What must emerge if Aeneas is to survive this trial, the honey trap of Juno, is a recognition of the flawed nature of the principle upon which Carthage is based. The Carthaginians are a trading nation their business is to cater to the desires of the senses. The city, Vergil tells us, originated in a commercial transaction and enjoys a tenuous existence under the terms of a contractual arrangement with the neighbouring king, Iarbas (4.211–13). The principle that sustains Carthage is at root Epicurean, the peace and stability that comes through the removal of want. But this is a principle that shifts with the perceptions of the individual, one that devoid of rational limit may readily sink into self-indulgence. For the citizen of Carthage, appetite and passion are the foundations of happiness. As Dyson notes, Epicureanism, "the philosophy of temperance and tranquillity often degenerated in practice into sensualism."[76] The opulence of Carthage, proudly displayed by Dido to Aeneas (4.74–6), everywhere gives substance to this. Here the natural will is primary and as desire meets headlong with desire a social contract must be enacted to prevent strife. The overt order the city presents is an expression of a natural justice, an expediency that deters one man from harming another in a society where all have equal rights to pleasure. There is no absolute justice, no objective rational order such as is to characterize Rome, but only reciprocal contractual agreements ever prey to dissolution.

It is in Queen Dido that the inherent instability which renders Juno's city inadequate to the task of the cosmopolis is delineated most clearly. The whole focus of Book 4 is on Dido and the fatal infatuation that consumes her whole being to the neglect of her people and her city. "No more her towers rise; the young do not exercise at arms, nor ready the harbours or battlements safe for war."[77] There is no objective good that can, for Dido, outweigh the satisfaction of immediate desire. Dido's *culpa* is that her desire knows no limit and this is evident before ever she is struck by the darts of

75. *Vultis et his mecum considere regnis? / urbem quam statuo, vestra est; subducite navis; / Tros Tyriusque mihi nullo discrimine agitur. Aen.* 1.572–4.

76. Dyson 204.

77. *Non coeptae adsurgent turres, non arma iuventus / exercet portusve aut propugnacula bello / tuta parant. Aen.* 4.86–7.

Cupid. The tragedy of Dido has tellingly been linked to the *Bacchae* as well as to Euripides' Phaedra and Medea.[78] In the absoluteness of her vow, *fixum immotumque sederet*, to eschew love and marriage following the death of her husband, Sychaeus (4.15–17), Dido embraces a negation of passion every bit as extreme and unreasoned as the love for Aeneas which will cause her now to renounce this same vow. The only place for rational objectivity for Dido is as the servant of passion; in the justification of a change in the object of subjective desire. Thus, her original vow is discounted in face of her passion for Aeneas; her previously disregarded neglect of her duty to provide security and continuity for her city through husband and children becomes now the rationalization which supports her new desire (4.31–53). Her sister Anna, quite rightly identifying this new fortune with the hand of Juno, feeds the flames: 'What a city you will see, sister, what a kingdom will rise with such a husband," *Quam tu urbem, soror, hanc cernes, quae surgere regna / coniugio tali!* (4.47–8).

The full extent of Juno's involvement becomes clear in the discussion that now takes place between Juno and Venus. The success of Venus' ploy to fill Dido with passion for Aeneas can be exploited to advantage by Juno. What better way to resolve her dilemma and prevent the founding of Rome than to make the Trojans rulers of a Carthaginian cosmopolis. Thus Juno proposes to Venus an end to hatred and strife, an everlasting peace, *pacem aeternam* (4.99), but only on her terms. Tyrians and Trojans will join in one city, this union to be crowned by the marriage of Dido to Aeneas. Together, Juno and Venus will be the divine guardians of this city. Venus, however, is not blind to the hidden motives of Juno, her plan to move the cosmopolis from Italy to Libya, *sensit enim simulata locutam / quo regnum Italiae Libycas averteret oras* (105–6). She recognizes at once that objective reason, in the form of the will of Jupiter, plays no part in Juno's plans, a conclusion Juno emphatically affirms: "*Mecum erit iste labor*" (4.115). Allying herself with Venus, the champion of the natural and appetitive, Juno contrives a travesty of a 'marriage' for Dido and Aeneas (4.126), a further abuse of the divine authority in accord with which, as presiding goddess of the family, it is her responsibility to uphold the ethical order and the formal institution of marriage.[79] Her rejection of the ethical in favour of the natural order reveals unequivocally Juno's commitment on a divine scale to that same subjection of a rational universal end to the primacy of individual will that is found to characterize Dido.

78. Williams 333.

79. The previous occasion was her usurpation of Neptune's power over the sea by the offer of marriage, with a beautiful nymph as a bribe, to Aeolus if he would abandon his duty to keep the winds enclosed.

The seeming 'passivity' of Aeneas throughout the affair with Dido has brought charges of moral weakness[80] and it is well noted that his regular epithet *pius* is conspicuously absent during this period, to return only as he acknowledges once more the will of Jupiter (4.393). Whereas Aeneas, if he is to understand the true nature of the city he is to found, must be exposed to Dido's world, the world of the primacy of natural desire in which reason is a slave to the passions, he cannot remain a part of it. The prevailing principle of Carthage, under the sway of Juno, is the appetitive nature which is common to all mankind. What Aeneas must come to recognize, however, is that although the appetitive principle necessarily characterizes man it does not do so sufficiently; man is not simply animal, but rational animal.

The lesson of Book 4 is that appetite cannot be the primary ruling principle. Yet if it is allowed that reason in the form of the will of Jupiter is to rule it in turn, as Vergil makes clear, cannot be completely abstracted from the appetitive; there must be room in the cosmopolis for those individual desires and preferences which are integral to human nature. Jupiter is no Stoic abstraction, he admits the opposition of Juno within his universe and once Juno has come to understand for herself the true nature of her powers he will recognize her legitimate demands. Aeneas too never exhibits that ἀπάθεια which is the hallmark of the rigorous Stoic but he does learn the destructive power of a passion that lacks the limit and order of objective reason. As yet, however, the relationship between these two forces remains undetermined and before the eternal city of Rome can come to be there must be a reconciliation of passion with reason at the level of the divine and the human.

When Mercury arrives to recall him to his duty, Aeneas cloaked in Tyrian purple, is hard at work on the fortifications for Dido's city (4.261–4). His underlying nature, however, is unchanged: he is still *pius* Aeneas and, the superficial covering of desire cast aside, he is reconciled to the will of Jupiter as the true good. That this is not simply a coldly rational assent to duty devoid of any emotional content but that indeed Aeneas loves Dido, Vergil leaves no doubt:

> But dutiful Aeneas, although he longed to soothe her suffering with consolation, and to turn away her cares with his words; groaning long and shaken in his mind by his great love, nevertheless carried out the gods' commands and returned to the fleet.[81]

Here is no cold-hearted unfeeling Stoic, although he exhibits a fixity of purpose which is 'stoic,' he shed tears of regret at his loss, *mens immota*

80. See, for example, Otis 265–66.

81. *At pius Aeneas, quamquam lenire dolentem / solando cupit et dictis avertere curas, / multa gemens magnoque animum labefactus amore / iussa tamen divum exsequitor classemque revisit. Aen.* 4.393–6.

manet, lacrimae volvuntur inanes (4.449).[82] Aeneas is a *pius* Roman and passion, however great, must submit to the higher call of duty, the demands of the state as the *summum bonum*. Dido, by contrast, has no universal end upon which to fall back once the love of Aeneas is removed.[83] The fundamental instability of Dido's position exposes the ultimate inadequacy of the principle that predominates at Carthage where everything is reduced to the arbitrary determination of natural will. With no object of desire, the will of Dido is no longer able to determine itself either positively or negatively in relation to the world of external particulars and, retreating into the void of a contentless abstraction, it self-destructs. Opposed by the persistent moral will of Aeneas, his relation to the universal λόγος which is the providential will of Jupiter, the purely natural will of Dido, devoid of rational limit, is overcome and with it Dido herself, the flames from her funeral pyre presaging the eventual destruction of Carthage by Rome.

The Anger of Aeneas

Thwarted once again in her attempt to subvert fate, the hostility of Juno assumes a new form. Resigned to the inevitability of Rome, her tactics are now to delay the inevitable and to ensure that the cost in human suffering will be as high as possible: *bella horrida bella* will mark every step of the way. As the Trojans arrive in Latium, the great wife of Jupiter, *magna Iovis coniunx* (7.308) assesses her options:

> I cannot keep him from the Latin kingdoms: so be it, let Lavinia be his wife, as fates have fixed. But I can still hold off that moment and delay these great events.[84]

Against the will of Jupiter and the hegemony of providential order, Juno will bring all the forces of irrational disorder. The laws of nature will be overturned (12.785); the powers of hell itself, in the form of the fury Allecto, will be unleashed on earth (*Acheronta movebo*, 7.312), to foment an unholy war.[85]

82. See the comment on Augustine's treatment of this line at n. 59 above.

83. On the death of her first husband Sychaeus Dido was able to maintain her relationship to him in a negative way through her vow of celibacy. For Aeneas she has sacrificed everything, her vow to Sychaeus, her honour, the welfare of her city.

84. *Non dabitur regnis, esto, prohibere Latinis, / atque immota manet fatis Lavinia coniunx: / at trahere moras tantis licet addere rebus. Aen.* 7.312–5.

85. As Otis points out, "Virgil's intention here seems quite clear: Allecto symbolizes the fury within the human heart that is ever ready, given the proper motivation, to burst into flame and overwhelm the more rational part of the soul. But there is no madness in the strict sense and no diminution of moral responsibility," 325.

As Vergil moves to his *maius opus* (7.44), the focus will no longer be the tribulations of Aeneas but the struggle of Rome to establish a new order, one that will be characterized by the elimination of disorder and an end to all war. On the divine level Juno has yet to come to a rational understanding of her relation to Jupiter and the nature and limit of her powers. Only once this has been accomplished can the human community move towards a peace that is everlasting. At the human level, the establishment of the *pax Romana* will require first that the causes of war be extirpated and this cannot be simply legislated; the instabilities that disturb the peaceful order of society must be identified and rooted out at their source. Peace as King Latinus knows it, a Saturnian Golden Age, is already there in Latium, long established, *in pace longa* (7.46), when Aeneas arrives:

> Then do not shun our welcome; do not forget the Latins are a race of Saturn, needing no laws nor restraint for righteousness; by their own will and by the customs of their ancient god they hold themselves in check.[86]

However, the peace that this simple homogeneous community enjoys reveals itself as natural and unthought. The peace that prevails is one that has no rational basis in universal laws but is based in custom and goodwill. Just as the Epicurean city of Carthage enjoyed a precarious stability so too the city of Latinus will prove unable to withstand the forces of change that are about to sweep in from without. A new order, a stable objective rational order, is needed for a new world, but it must be such that it can encompass within it the spectrum of human diversity; the sister of Jupiter, Saturn's other child, Saturnian Juno, must yet have her due.

The onus of establishing the new order falls to Aeneas, now *imperator*, as it were, in the service of the future Rome. Indeed, if there is any one point upon which commentators on the *Aeneid* are in general agreement, it is that his visit to the underworld in Book 6 marks a turning point in the character of Aeneas. Although his departure by the gate of false dreams, his evident surprise when viewing the scenes of Roman history on the shield his mother presents to him, and his ignorance of their significance, *rerumque ignarus imagine gaudet* (8.730), all argue that he has no conscious recall of the events he witnesses in Elysium, he is nevertheless characterized throughout the Italian wars by a self-confidence and decisiveness which previously were markedly lacking. As he places the divinely wrought shield over his shoulder, literally and metaphorically he takes upon himself the burden of Roman destiny, *attollens umero famaque et fata nepotum* (8.731).

86. *Ne fugite hospitum, neve ignorate Latinos / Saturni gentem haud vinclo nec legibus aequam, / sponte sua veterisque dei se more tenetnem. Aen.* 7.202–4.

The problem that has continually frustrated attempts to interpret the latter half of the *Aeneid* is how to reconcile Aeneas the *pius* founder of the Roman race, or rationally ordered Stoic exemplar as he is so commonly portrayed, with the seemingly irrational *furor* he displays in battle. In particular, attention has focussed on the savage slaughter spree he indulges in after the death of Pallas and on the final act of the *Aeneid*, the angry killing of a suppliant Turnus. In a sense, perhaps what Vergil shows most clearly through a comparison of Turnus and Aeneas, both in their similarity and their difference, is what is necessary to move from the competitive individualism, which is at the basis of civil strife whether in the ancient world or the world of the late Republic,[87] to an ordered relation to a common universal end, the *summum bonum* as the common weal. Aeneas and Turnus share a common 'Homeric' origin and this is nowhere more evident than in the *furor* of their ἀριστεῖαι, the bloody rampages which punctuate the action in the later Books. It is Turnus, however, and not Aeneas who is specifically linked by name to the greatest of the Homeric warriors, Achilles (6.89; 9.742). Yet Aeneas is destined to defeat Turnus, a feat he could never accomplish when faced with the real Achilles at Troy. The point of the comparison centres not so much on Achilles the warrior but on the fact that Turnus, like Achilles, will not allow the good of his comrades, his community, to outweigh his concern for his personal honour. In this he can be directly contrasted with Aeneas, or with heroes such as Hector and Odysseus, who are willing to order their own ends to the good of the community.

Vergil's concern in Books 9–12 is to draw out the distinctions that delineate the Roman warrior and citizen from his Homeric precursor. The absence of Aeneas from the action in Book 9 allows attention to be focussed on Turnus at a time when he is given full rein to exercise his own abilities. Almost immediately the blind arrogance of Turnus becomes apparent. The divine intervention, *mirabile monstrum* (9.120) which prevents him from destroying the Trojan fleet, fills all who witness it with terror, all except Turnus that is. Turnus, it is immediately apparent, is by contrast with Aeneas, *impius*; dismissive of the gods and their oracles he proclaims, *nil me fatalia terrent* (9.133). As the battle develops around the Trojan encampment, Turnus raging in full force, finds himself shut alone inside the Trojan walls. Totally unconcerned with his situation his recklessness is apparent and his arrogance portrayed in his likening of himself to Achilles (9.742). Driven by his rage and his insane desire for slaughter, *furor ardentem caedisque insana cupido* (9.760), Turnus has no thought for his comrades and the enormous strategic implications of the Trojan error upon which he might capitalize.

87. *Gener atque socer* (7.317) may be an allusion to Pompey and Julius Caesar, who were related in this manner, and hence to civil war in the Roman Republic.

> The Trojans turn and run in fear and trembling; and if the victor had then taken care to smash the bolts, to let his comrades pour inside the gates, that day would have been the last day of the war and of the Trojan nation.[88]

Like Dido, Turnus, the Latin hero, is governed by passion and the gratification of his subjective desires is paramount for him. Reason plays little or no part in the actions of Turnus, he recognizes no objective order whether human or divine.

In Book 10 the contrast between the opposing heroes is made more explicit in the comparison of the treatment of their young opponents, Pallas and Lausus. Turnus actively seeks out Pallas, an inexperienced warrior, impiously boasting his regret that Evander, Pallas' father was not present to see his son fall before his eyes, *cuperem ipse parens spectator adesset* (10.443). As the youthful Pallas, *iuvenis* (10.445), marvels at Turnus' imposing frame, *ingens corpus* (10.446), the extent of the mismatch serves only to enhance the obscene nature of Turnus' blind and overweening pride. When Pallas falls mortally wounded, Turnus, triumphant, rips off the dying boy's belt, revelling and rejoicing in the plunder, *quo nunc Turnus ovat spolio gaudetque potitus* (10.500); the poet himself cannot contain his revulsion at the scene: "Oh mind of men ignorant of fate and approaching destiny or how to keep the measure, sustained by prospering fortunes."[89] By contrast, Aeneas, is forced into fighting Lausus when the youth, attempting to help his father, Mezentius, refuses to withdraw from the uneven contest (10.811). As he looks upon the dying boy, Aeneas is moved by pity, *miserans* (10.824), and his behaviour is a striking instance of his *pietas*. He takes no spoils from his victim and himself lifts the body and hands it to Lausus' companions.

The scene is now set for the final showdown, the direct confrontation of Turnus and Aeneas. Before any lasting solution on the human battlefield can be achieved, however, a resolution of the conflict between Jupiter and Juno over the governing principles of the cosmos must finally be effected. The rule of Jupiter, as he makes clear in his speech in the divine council that opens Book 10, is not one of absolute necessity. Under the overall governance of *fatum*, room is left for a subjective realm of human freedom. The fates will find a way, *fata viam inveniunt* (10.113), Jupiter announces, but each individual is free through his own will to shape his relationship to the ordained end, *sua cuique exorsa laborem / fortunamque ferent* (10.110–11). The particular and contingent is thus formally accorded by Jupiter a part in the unravelling of the fates albeit only as subsidiary to the unwavering law of

88. *Diffugient versi trepida formidine Troes, / et si continuo victorem ea cura subisset, / rumpere claustra manu sociosque inmittere portis, / ultimus ille dies bello gentique fuisset. Aen.* 9.756–9.

89. *Nescia mens hominum fati sortisque futurae / et servare modum rebus sublata secundis! Aen.* 10.501–2.

destiny. It is this that Juno, whose fight throughout has been to overturn the universal order and allow a complete primacy to the accidental and to the free subjectivity of the individual human will, must yet of her own volition come to accept.

Little by little, while permitting Juno to give full rein to her opposition, Jupiter has been drawing her towards an understanding of its full implications. When Turnus' sword, left behind in his haste, is 'miraculously' restored to him by Juturna (12.783–5), who is helping her brother at Juno's behest, it at last becomes apparent to Juno that ultimately the position she has been driven to adopt as a result of her sustained opposition to the will of Jupiter is incompatible with any order at all, whether supernatural or natural, universal or particular. To overturn the consequences of Turnus' freely arrived at choice is to strike at the base of her own power over the subjective order. Hence even before Jupiter summons her and calls her to task, ordering her to desist and give heed to his entreaty, *desine iam tandem precibusque inflectere nostris* (12.800), Juno knows her opposition to *fatum* is at an end. She yields at last and in the self-conscious freedom of ordering her will to the rational dictates of *fatum*, voluntarily gives up all incitement to war, *et nunc cedo equidem pugnasque exosa relinquo* (12.818).

From her initial position of outright rejection of *fatum*, Juno has been dragged, through successive attempts first to countermand then to circumvent and finally to retard the inexorable progress of fate, to a position in which she finally understands not only the necessity for a universal order but also her own place in it. Jupiter in response confirms Juno's relationship to him in both the ethical and the natural realm; as both *coniunx* and *soror*. As *coniunx*, Juno must accept the authority of the divine will of Jupiter and uphold the universal rational ethical order she has recently flouted. As *soror*, she is granted her request that within that order she may sustain the natural and particular in all its manifold difference. That which the fates do not expressly forbid, *nulla fati quod lege tenetur* (12.819), Jupiter grants, may be freely embraced.

Although held within a rational providential framework that is identifiably Stoic in conception, the cosmos of Vergilian Jupiter, is a far remove from the rigid determinate asceticism of traditional Stoicism, reflecting no doubt, as has been considered, the Augustan ethos in which it was conceived. The principles now firmly established at the level of the divine highlight the pivotal role of Juno as mediator between the particular and contingent and the objective universal rule of law as the will of Jupiter within which it is contained. No other race will come to worship Juno so faithfully as the Romans (12.840). Jupiter himself does not stand apart from his cosmos in Stoic indifference. The rational order is maintained by force where

necessary, the anger of Jupiter visiting upon cities which merit it, war, death, and disease (12.851–2). The divine mandate by which the Romans as Jupiter's chosen people will impose the universal rule of law while at the same time exhibiting a tolerance for the natural diversity of custom and language which distinguish peoples has been brought into being.

While still retaining his conception of a Stoic Aeneas, Bowra is in the final analysis forced to admit that Aeneas departs substantially from the Stoic ideal in his display of strong emotions, in particular anger and pity; this he concludes must be attributed to "the martial traditions of Rome."[90] Edwards too allows that, for Vergil, the human feelings that Aeneas so often exhibits are not to be regarded in the Stoic manner as weaknesses "but as pathetic and often admirable traits of human nature."[91] The *furor* of Aeneas over which so much ink has been spilt is perhaps not after all therefore the main point.[92] It is apparent that the human solution in the *Aeneid* has none of the immediacy that appears to characterize the divine. Many centuries of war will intervene before Augustus, ruthless himself in hunting down and punishing those who killed his father, Julius Caesar, will purportedly bring a closure to strife and establish an 'everlasting' peace in the wake of his own *furor*. For the practical and militaristic Romans, indeed, anger retains its power as an important weapon both to restrain and to punish those who would seek to overthrow the order of peace.

That the abstract and external imposition of laws is not of itself sufficient to ensure the stable persistence of the cosmopolis, Vergil and the Augustan circle certainly realized. Hence the emphasis on moral renewal and the importance of the exemplar. It is clear that it is in the promotion of virtuous behaviour in the citizen and in the family that the link must be forged between individual and state. Augustus saw the moral order of the empire focussed in himself as *exemplum* and was assiduous in promotion of his image as the upholder of *mores*.[93] However, dependent as it ultimately was on the cult of the emperor, that link could be tenuous at best. Inevitably in time the two sides moved apart, the emperor far removed from the life of the

90. Bowra 19.

91. Edwards 160.

92. For recent controversy on Aeneas' *furor*, see in particular, K. Galinsky, "The Anger of Aeneas," *American Journal of Philology* 109 (1988): 321–49, and "How to be Philosophical about the End of the *Aeneid*," *Illinois Journal of Classical Studies* 19 (1994): 191–201. For an opposing perspective see M.C.J. Putnam, *Virgil's Aeneid: Interpretation and Influence* (Chapel Hill: 1995).

93. The role of the *princeps* as a model for the *mores maiorum* is well described by Paul Zanker, *The Power of Images in the Age of Augustus* (Ann Arbor: 1988) 159–66. That in private Augustus fell somewhat short of his own propaganda image, even seducing the wife of his most trusted ally, Maecenas, is asserted, scurrilously perhaps, by Suetonius.

individual citizen who was free to follow his own pursuits within the remote abstractness of a universal law. It was in the vacuum thus created that Christianity rose and flourished, completing in a sense the work that Vergil had undertaken to show how the individual, though the actualization of his own nature as a rational moral agent, can be united with the universal will of divine providence.[94]

There is a place for emotion in the Roman order, the innate dividedness of human nature is both accepted and exploited in the service of Rome. When Aeneas stops to consider the plea of Turnus for *clementia* he is exhibiting his virtue as a Roman exemplar in whom reason is the guide for action. The sight of the baldric of Pallas which triggers the renewal of his *furor* while it is personal to Aeneas is also at the same time symbolic of the cumulation of actions by which Turnus has repeatedly demonstrated that his ruling principle is always the subjective dictate of feeling. Turnus cannot be saved from himself any more than could Dido; his θυμός-dominated appetite finds no occasion to look to reason. A powerful and unpredictable source of strife, Turnus has no place in the new rational order. As Vergil brings his Roman epic to its conclusion, Turnus' limbs fall slack with chill, *solvuntur frigore membra,* and his life with a groan flees *indignata* to the shades below (12.951–2). The will of Turnus to the very last rejects Jupiter and the rational order of *fatum.* At the same time, with these final words, Vergil brings back clearly to mind the vision of Aeneas as he is first encountered in the *Aeneid.* On the point of perishing at sea, *solvuntur frigore membra*, Aeneas too groans in despair but stretches both his hands to the heavens (1.92–3), entrusting his fate to the will of Jupiter. In these contrasting images Vergil encapsulates a sense of the fragility of the human soul, a *humanitas* that permeates the whole of the *Aeneid* and is integral to a full understanding of *pietas* in the service of Rome.[95]

94. Coining a phrase used by Tertullian of Philo, T.S. Eliot speaks of Vergil as almost an *anima naturaliter Christiana*, "Vergil and the Christian World," *The Sewanee Review* (1953): 13.

95. The stimulating insights into the *Aeneid* provided in seminar discussions by Dr. R. Friedrich and Dr. C. Starnes generated the impetus for this paper. A debt of gratitude is owed also to Dr. W.J. Hankey and Dr. J.P. Atherton for their helpful criticism and comments. This work was supported by Fellowships from the Social Sciences Research Council of Canada and the Killam Trusts whose assistance is gratefully acknowledged.