

Emanation in Historical Context: Aquinas and the Dominican Response to the Cathars

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Recent work on Aquinas's use of Pseudo-Dionysius for his account of creation as an emanation from the divine helps to explicate the Neoplatonic character of his project.¹ For example, when Aquinas argues in the first book of his commentary on the *Sentences* of Peter the Lombard, his *Scriptum super libros Sententiarum* (*In Sent*), that all beings other than God *proceed* from one unique being, Aquinas attributes this view to Pseudo-Dionysius (*In Sent* I.2.1.1). He cites the thirteenth chapter of the *De divinis nominibus* in order to offer a picture of the origin of creation as occurring from a single first principle. In fact, there is reason to believe that he wrote his commentary on the *De divinis nominibus* in order to construct the emanational treatment of creation in the first part of his *Summa theologiae*.² I want to explain one important reason for why Aquinas turned to Neoplatonism in order to present a tight relation between the nature of God and creation: namely, that he was not simply following wisdom where she might lead, but studied the Neoplatonic tradition in order to refute Cathar theological opponents, and that this has implications for the structure of his *Summa theologiae*. In order to make this case, I first discuss the Cathar historical background and the

1. See Jan Aertsen, *Nature and Creature: Thomas Aquinas's Way of Thought* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1988) 40–45; Vivian Boland OP, *Ideas in God According to Saint Thomas Aquinas: Sources and Synthesis* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1996) 297–306; Edward Booth, *Aristotelian Aporetic Ontology in Islamic and Christian Thinkers* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983) 76–80; W.J. Hankey, *God In Himself: Aquinas' Doctrine of God as Expounded in the Summa Theologiae* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987) 9–10 and 136–42; idem, "Denys and Aquinas: Antimodern Cold and Postmodern Hot," in *Christian Origins: Theology, Rhetoric and Community*, ed. Lewis Ayres and Gareth Jones (London: Routledge, 1998) 139–84; Fran O'Rourke, *Pseudo-Dionysius and the Metaphysics of Aquinas* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1992) 234–41; and Rudi A. te Velde, *Participation and Substantiality in Thomas Aquinas* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1995) 261–65.

2. For a clear statement of the view that Aquinas wrote his commentary on *De divinis nominibus* when composing the first part of his *Summa*, see M. Michèle Mulchahey, "First the Bow is Bent in Study ...": *Dominican Education before 1350* (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1998) 290–97, 303. Mulchahey argues that Aquinas chose to lecture on Pseudo-Dionysius in order to construct the exitus-reditus structure of his *Summa*.

Dominican response to the Cathars before turning to Aquinas's treatment of creation as a procession from a single divine being in his *Scriptum super libros Sententiarum* and *Summa theologiae*.

1 CATHAR AND DOMINICAN BACKGROUND

By the early thirteenth century when the Dominicans were founded, the Cathars, known as Cathars in Germany and Italy, and as Albigenses in France, had become widespread in Europe. For example, they already possessed sufficient institutional strength in Languedoc by 1167 to hold a large representative church council at Saint-Félix de Caraman near Toulouse.³ By 1190, 14 Cathar bishops were active in France and Italy, and most of the nobles in the southwest of France were either sympathetic to, or at least tolerant of, these Christians. The number of Cathars in Italy was several hundred thousand by the year 1200, and the Cathars were one third of the population of the city of Florence by 1228. These numbers remained high until the middle of the century.

There were different groups of Cathars with different positions on theological, metaphysical, and moral topics, but in general they drew a Manichaean distinction between the God of the Hebrew Bible and that of the New Testament. The God of the old law was responsible for the material elements of creation, which were inherently evil. The God of the new covenant was responsible for the spiritual realm, which was good. The opposition between these two separate beings was the immediate cause of moral strife in the present life, a battle between light and darkness. Within this framework, the Cathars offered a dualist interpretation of creation. Creation was not the sole work of a single God, but the work of two beings. The God of the New Testament was the source of all that is good and the God of the Old Testament was the source of all that is evil.

Many popes, bishops, and nobles, the latter often with an eye on lands that could be gained in conquest, responded to the Cathars. For example, the bishops at the Third Lateran Council put out a call in 1179 for the organization of a crusade against the Cathars. They offered the same type of indulgence as was available for those engaged in the crusades for the Holy

3. For this brief presentation of the Cathars, I rely on F. Stegmüller, "Der Liber contra Manichaeos," in *Mélanges offerts à Étienne Gilson* (Toronto/Paris: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies/Vrin, 1959) 563; Hans Wolter, "The Threats to the Freedom of the Church, 1153–1198," in *History of the Church*, ed. Hubert Jedin and John Dolan, trans. Anselm Biggs et al, 10 vols. (New York: Seabury Press, 1980–1981) 4:98–104; A. Borst, *Die Katharer*, Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Deutsches Institut für Erforschung des Mittelalters, no. 12 (Stuttgart: Hierseann, 1953); and Ioan P. Couliano, *I miti dei dualismi occidentali* (Milan: Jaca, 1989). For a general account of the Dominican response, see D.A. Mortier, *Histoire des maîtres généraux de l'ordre des Frères Prêcheurs*, 8 vols. (Paris: Alphonse Picard et Fils, 1903–1920) 1:191–221.

Land. A penalty of death was devised for those convicted of heresy. In 1207 Raymond IV, the Count of Toulouse was excommunicated by Pope Innocent III for not taking a stronger stand against the Albigenses.⁴ This prepared the way for Innocent's crusade against the Cathars in 1209. This campaign, with Raymond's territory as the prize, was carried out by northern French nobles and knights under the leadership of Simon de Montfort, the Earl of Leicester.

Education became important both for the Cathars and their opponents. For example, by 1215 young Italian Cathars thought to have academic promise were sent to study at the University of Paris.⁵ Therefore, both Cathars and non-Cathars studied alongside each other at university. Education was also important in the effort against the Cathars. For instance, Dominic Guzmán and his companions took charge of the education of a group of women who were former Cathars in Prouille in 1207 and in doing so laid the foundation of the Dominican order. Careful study was thought to be necessary in order to strengthen the faithful against the Cathar heresy.

Foulques, the bishop of Toulouse, took the unusual step in 1215 of appointing Dominic and his followers as preachers for the entire diocese. The need for preachers who understood the differences between Cathar beliefs and orthodoxy led Foulques to extend the jurisdiction of their preaching. They were to teach the faith in such a way that they could respond to the Cathar threat in the area.⁶ Even the architecture of this emerging order was constructed with this purpose in mind. For example, the first new building included rooms designed for study to prepare for this type of preaching. The dimensions of this apostolate were extended across Europe and beyond in 1217 when Pope Honorius III removed Dominic's preachers from the bishop's jurisdiction and placed them under his own. Henceforth, the Dominicans were authorized to defend the faith for the entire church.

In order to engage the Cathars intellectually, the Dominicans established an important educational system that needs to be understood as the primary site of intellectual effort when interpreting Dominican texts from the thirteenth century. Within decades, they established hundreds of houses across Europe, each with its own school of higher education. Every house was to include one "Doctor," or educated lecturer, who was to offer lectures to the local community that were open to the public. These were no ordinary

4. For a general account of the crusade against the Cathars, see Hans Wolter, "The Papacy at the Height of its Power, 1198–1216," in *History of the Church* 4:162–70.

5. Stegmüller, "Der Liber contra Manichaeos" 563.

6. See Mulchahey, "First the Bow is Bent in Study" 6–7, 11, 22–23; and William A. Hinnebusch, *The History of the Dominican Order*, 2 vols. (Staten Island, New York: Alba House, 1966–1973) 1:39–42.

schools. M. Michèle Mulchahey has established that each local school was to include lectures on the two types of texts recognized as representing the highest level of education at the University of Paris: the *Sentences* of Peter the Lombard and the books of Scripture.⁷ Furthermore, by the middle of the century, lectures on the works of Aristotle would become standard at local houses in order to prepare the brothers to follow the more advanced lectures.⁸ Thus, in many cases, ordinary Dominicans and interested parties received a type of education often thought by scholars to be reserved only for those sent to the universities.

This view of the Dominican intellectual life as arising out of the activities and goals of local communities and not stemming from the universities represents a reversal of the standard view. This interpretation suggests that Dominican concerns shaped Dominican texts even at the University of Paris, where Dominicans studied with Dominicans and taught Dominicans within the walls of St-Jacques, the Dominican convent. Such a context suggests that historians need to read classic Dominican texts, like those of Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas, together with those of not so famous Dominicans in order to clarify the Dominican concerns.⁹

One such concern was over the danger presented to orthodoxy by the Cathars. This foil had provided much of the impetus for the formation and institutionalization of the Dominican order. It was also the subject of reference works written for the purpose of providing Dominicans with an arsenal for public and private debate. In fact, during the second quarter of the thirteenth century a cottage industry had arisen within the order of composing works for this purpose. These include the summa attributed to Peter Martyr of Verona, *Summa contra haereticos* (c. 1235), Moneta of Cremona's *Summa adversus Catharos et Valdenses* (1241), and Rainerius Sacconi's *Summa de Catharis et Pauperibus de Leonistis* (1250). My claim is that these works supply the background necessary for the reconstruction of the contemporary nature of many issues treated by Dominicans, including many issues on creation.

7. See Mulchahey, "First the Bow is Bent in Study" 6–7, 11, 132–36.

8. Albert the Great and Aquinas would each supplement these studies with lectures on the *De divinis nominibus* of Pseudo-Dionysius. While they did not do this at ordinary Dominican houses, they were not at university houses. Albert was at the new house of general studies at Cologne and Aquinas was at the new provincial house of studies at Rome. See Mulchahey, "First the Bow is Bent in Study" 290–93.

9. On the problematic nature of interpreting the medievals, including Aquinas, according to the modern branches of philosophy, see John Inglis, *Spheres of Philosophical Inquiry and the Historiography of Medieval Philosophy* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1998); and Hankey, "Denys and Aquinas."

Within this polemical and institutional context, it is clear that study was intended within the Dominican order for the purpose of converting heretics as well as for understanding religious beliefs held on faith. For instance, the general chapter at Bologna ordered in 1242 that Dominicans were to exercise themselves studiously in those things that prepared one to argue against the heretics and for the defense of the faith. This directive was considered so important that it was confirmed at the general chapter of 1244.¹⁰ In his commentary on the rule of St. Augustine, Humbert of Romans, the master of the order during a critical period in the middle of the century, ranks defending the faith, or opposing heresy, as the chief goal of philosophical study.¹¹ Furthermore, arguing against the Cathars was a dangerous business, one that led to the assassination of Peter of Verona, the general Inquisitor of northern Italy, by the Cathar Carino in 1252. The crusade against the Cathars had become so important to the order, and to the bishop of Rome, that Peter was canonized as a martyr the following year and became the patron of the Inquisitors.¹²

Within this context, Aquinas would explain in his commentary on the *De Trinitate* of Boethius that philosophy should be studied to resist what is contrary to faith.¹³ Philosophy should not only be used to explain faith, but also to defend it against heresy. One way to clarify this use of philosophy, and of study in general, is to take a careful look at the objections that Aquinas includes in his works. Focusing on the objections, together with Aquinas's responses, can clarify his motivations and the way that they conform to a Dominican agenda. In the present case, Aquinas's motives in using Neoplatonism to construct a view of emanation as proceeding from a single

10. The general chapter at Bologna in 1242, *ordinamus* 6 and in 1244, *ordinamus* 4. For a selection of such texts, see Vincentio Fontana, *Constitutiones declarationes et ordinationes capitulorum generalium Sacri Ordinis Fratrum Praedicatorum*, ed. Alexandri Vincentii Jandel (Rome: Bernardi Morini, 1862) 218.

11. Other purposes include: the destruction of the errors of the philosophers, understanding Scripture, and the confirmation of faith. See Humbertus de Romanis, *Opera*, ed. J.J. Berthier, 2 vols. (Rome: A. Befani, 1888–1889) 1:435–37. Simon Tugwell concludes that this commentary was probably written while Humbert was master of the order in the 1250s and 60s. See Simon Tugwell, ed. and trans., *Early Dominicans: Selected Writings* (New York: Paulist Press, 1982) 32.

12. On Peter's death, see Antoine Dondaine, "Saint Pierre Martyr," *Archivum fratrum praedicatorum* 23 (1953):101–07. On the role that the memory of Peter's martyrdom played in Dominican moral reflection during the 1250s and 1260s, including the central emphasis given to infused fortitude, see John Inglis, "Aquinas's Replication of the Acquired Moral Virtues: Rethinking the Standard Philosophical Interpretation of Moral Virtue in Aquinas," *Journal of Religious Ethics* 27 (1999):16–19.

13. The other purposes are to demonstrate the preambles of faith and to shed light on the contents of faith. See *Expositio super librum Boethii De trinitate* 2.3.

first principle can be illuminated by those that he names as opponents to a single principle of creation. Specifically, my claim is that he is responding to the Cathars and Albigenses of Italy and Southern France.¹⁴ Reading his references to these adversaries within the historical context provides a rationale for his account of emanation as well as for structural differences between his *Scriptum super libros Sententiarum* and *Summa theologiae*. Therefore, I will consider objections and replies to there being a first principle as Aquinas discusses these first in the *Scriptum* and secondly in the *Summa*, in order to indicate the motivation for his emanationist account of creation.¹⁵ I shall argue that this account is shaped by Aquinas's rejection of the view that there are two first principles, one good and the other evil.¹⁶

2. SCRIPTUM SUPER LIBROS SENTENTIARUM

Significantly, Aquinas singles out objections of the Manichees when considering whether or not there is more than one principle of creation in the first article of the second book of his *Scriptum* (*In Sent* II.1.1). In his determination of the question, he discusses three incorrect views in regard to this issue. Peter the Lombard had discussed two such views in his *Sentences*, one attributed to Plato and the other to Aristotle.¹⁷ Aquinas includes two other opponents along with Plato: materialists beginning with the Greek pre-Socratics who posit only material principles; and dualists beginning with

14. In a general account of the polemics between the Cathars and their opponents, Gedaliahu Stroumsa concludes that Aquinas does not seem to offer a serious response to the position of the Cathars. While Aquinas did not write a specific treatise against the Cathars or the Albigenses, that is no reason to think that he did not respond. I argue below that he provides such a response in his treatment of creation in the *Summa theologiae*. See Gedaliahu G. Stroumsa, "Anti-Cathar Polemics and the *Liber De Duobus Principiis*," in *Religionsgespräche im Mittelalter*, ed. Bernard Lewis and Friedrich Niewöhner (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1992) 183.

15. See David B. Burrell, "The Challenge to Medieval Christian Philosophy: Relating Creator to Creatures," in *Medieval Philosophy and the Classical Tradition in Islam, Judaism, and Christianity*, ed. John Inglis (London: Curzon, forthcoming).

16. My claim is that by discussing Aquinas contextually, rather than by citing brief passages from disparate works and times, we are less likely to misrepresent his project. For example, Peter Burns's recent clarification of the context of Aquinas's arguments for the existence of God in the *Summa theologiae* sheds new light on how these arguments ought to be read. Burns argues convincingly that Aquinas was concerned with the simplicity of God, which is missed when these arguments are read in isolation. See Peter Burns, "The Status and Function of Divine Simplicity in *Summa Theologiae* 1a, 2-13," *Thomist* 57 (1993): 1-26.

17. On this account Plato believes that there are three principles of creation: God the artificer, pattern, and uncreated matter. For Aristotle there are likewise three principles: matter, species, and operation (*Sent* II.1. chs. 1 and 3). For an account of the context and content of this first article, see Thomas Aquinas, *Aquinas on Creation: Writings on the "Sentences" of Peter Lombard 2.2.1*, trans. Steven E. Baldner and William Carroll (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1997) 1-41.

Empedocles and Pythagoras who suggest two principles of creation (*In Sent* II.1.1).¹⁸ The Manichees are included among the dualists for positing two creator Gods: one of the New Testament, who is the creator of good things, and the other of the Old Testament, who created visible and corporal things. Of these three types of error, Aquinas pays most attention to that of the Manichees, offering more descriptive detail and granting more objections.¹⁹ They appear to have an urgency that the others lack.

The context of this discussion indicates that Aquinas is not offering an argument of only historical interest. In discussing the Manichees he is not primarily concerned with Augustine's opponents of the fourth and fifth centuries. For it had become common by his day to use the name 'Manichee' to refer to the contemporaries who argued for two principles of creation, one good and the other evil.²⁰ Included here would be the Cathars of Italy and Southern France, the groups which the Dominicans had been founded to return to orthodoxy. It is important to uncover this contemporary context in order to be clear about Aquinas's purposes. Keeping the Dominican *summas* written against the Cathars in mind can help to provide the type of background that Aquinas's Dominican audience would have possessed and supply the Dominican context for many of his discussions.

The Dominican Moneta of Cremona completed one of the most detailed responses to the Cathars, his *Summa adversus Catharos et Valdenses* (*SACV*) in 1241, eleven years before Aquinas began to lecture on the *Sentences* as a bachelor in theology.²¹ I will focus my remarks on this text in

18. For an evaluation of the influence of this discussion on Siger of Brabant, see Fernand Van Steenberghe, "Thomas d'Aquin et Siger de Brabant en quête d'arguments pour le monothéisme," in *Graceful Reason*, ed. Lloyd P. Gerson (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1983) 386–87 and 395.

19. Aquinas explains in his *Quodlibet questions* (*QQ*) that because the Neomanichees esteem the God of the New Testament over that of the Hebrew Bible, it is necessary when in discussions with them to use the former as an authority and not the latter (*QQ* 4.9.18).

20. See Steven Runciman, *Medieval Manichee: A Study of the Christian Dualist Heresy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1955) 4, 17–18; and Walter L. Wakefield and Austin P. Evans, trans. and eds., *Heresies of the High Middle Ages* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969) 665, no. 2, note 1. In referring to groups in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries as Manichees, medieval theologians often read the strong dualism of their contemporaries back into the opponents of Augustine. On this misinterpretation, see Christine Thouzellier, "Cathares et manichéens," in *Sapientiae Doctrina: Mélanges de théologie et de littérature médiévales offerts à Dom Hildebrand Bascour O.S.B.*, ed. Hildebrand Bascour (Louvain: Imprimerie Orientaliste, 1980) 312–26.

21. Two manuscripts say 1241, but the printed edition says 1244. See Moneta of Cremona, *Summa Adversus Catharos et Waldenses*, ed. T.A. Ricchini (Rome: Palladis, 1743). For a discussion of this point, see Wakefield and Evans, *Heresies of the High Middle Ages* 744, note 1; and Antoine Dondaine, "Le Manuel de l'inquisiteur (1230–1330)," *Archivum fratrum praedicatorum* 17 (1947): 179, note 26.

order to sketch the Dominican context of Aquinas's discussion. Moneta's work begins with an extended treatment of the objection that there are two principles of creation and 29 pages (in the printed edition of 1743) of replies constructed from Aristotle, Scripture, and the church fathers (*SACV* 6–35). For instance, Moneta devotes over a page to the Neomanichean objection based on Aristotle's principle that contrary things have contrary principles.²² This objection is that since evil is contrary to good, there must be two principles of creation in order to account for good and evil, a good God as the source of good and an evil God as the source of evil.

Against this background, Aquinas discusses five objections in his *Scriptum* to there being a single principle of creation (*In Sent* II.1.1).²³ In four of these an evil first principle is required in order to account for the contrary features of ordinary experience.²⁴ I will state each of these four arguments in order to indicate specific issues raised for Aquinas.

The first objection given to there being a single first principle relies on Aristotle's point in the *De caelo* (286a 20–25) that the existence of a contrary

22. *SACV* 23. Stroumsa argues that we ought not to assume that arguments based on philosophical premises were formulated by the Neomanichees themselves. He suggests that these arguments were supplied by theologians, including Dominicans, who had studied Aristotle. They refashioned Neomanichean views according to the language and conceptual traditions taught at the universities. See Stroumsa, "Anti-Cathar Polemics and the *Liber De Duobus Principiis*" 176–77 and Borst, *Die Katharer* 13–21, 225–26. For a defense of the contrasting view, namely, that the Italian Cathars themselves attained a high level of intellectual activity, see Lorenzo Paolini, "Italian Catharism and Written Culture," in *Heresy and Literacy, 1000–1530*, ed. Peter Biller and Anne Hudson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994) 83–103.

23. Aquinas was not alone among theologians at Paris in taking the Cathars seriously. Reminiscent of Alan of Lille's discussion in *Contra haereticos* (1:2–3), William of Auxerre refutes the view that two principles are required in order to account for creation in his *Summa aurea* (*SA* 2.8.1). He quotes Aristotle's point that contraries require contrary principles in order to present the Cathar position. Alexander of Hales also argued against the view that there are two principles of creation in the second book of his *Glossa in quatuor libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi* (*G*). One argument given is that there is one principle of light which is the principle of all souls and another of darkness which is the principle of all bodies (*G* II.1.6.d). A close reader of Alexander's gloss, Bonaventure will flag the Manichees as holding this view when introducing the issue of whether or not there is more than one principle in the second book of his commentary on the *Sentences* (*Sent* II.1.1.2.1). Alexander does not offer the argument that contraries require contrary principles while Bonaventure does, without citing the authority of Aristotle (*Sent* II.1.1.2.1.4). For a comparison between Aquinas and his contemporaries in regard to the Neomanichees, see Zachary Hayes, *The General Doctrine of Creation in the Thirteenth Century* (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 1964) 37–51.

24. Aquinas's worry about the Neomanichees in regard to there being more than one principle of creation was not only a youthful obsession. In his *Quaestiones disputatae de potentia Dei* (*De pot*), he continues to allot them the largest number of "objections" when considering whether there is only one principle of creation (*De pot* 3.6). Of the twenty-six objections, only two, numbers twenty-two and twenty-six, do not concern evil.

in nature implies the existence of its contrary. Granted that the highest good serves as the first principle of all that is good, then what about its contrary (*In Sent* II. 1.1.ob1)? Since evil exists contrary to good, the conclusion drawn is that a highest evil must exist as the first principle of evil.²⁵ If a highest evil exists as well as a highest good, there can be no unique principle of creation.

The second objection has to do with the point taken from Aristotle's *Physics* (203b 6–7) that everything is either its own first principle or from another principle. Since things which are evil do not serve as their own first principle, they must come from another principle (*In Sent* II.1.1.ob2). Yet as heat does not come from cold, because they are contraries, evil could not come from something good, because good is destructive of evil. Therefore, since causes cannot proceed to infinity and evil does not result from good, a first evil must exist which is the principle of all evil.

The third objection is that evil intentions require an evil principle (*In Sent* II.1.1.ob3). Implicit here is the view that since evil intentions are contrary to good intentions, they require a separate principle. And fourthly, the claim is made that if things are derived from one first principle, then all things must conform together (*In Sent* II.1.1.ob4). But since contrariety and diversity exist among created beings, clearly things do not conform together and there must be more than one principle of creation.

In each of these four objections contrariety appears as the basis for positing a second principle of creation. Like Moneta, Aquinas is concerned to consider the challenge that evil presents to there being a single first principle. His inclusion of these objections, along with the attention he gives to the incorrect view of the dualists in the determination of the question, indicate how seriously he took the Neomanichean position. If they were right, there would be no unique principle of creation and monotheism would lie in ruins.

In his replies Aquinas is quick to remove the basis for thinking that contrariety and diversity give grounds for positing a second principle.²⁶ He argues in each case that good is involved in bringing about evil, i.e. that evil is based in some way upon good or leads to good. For example, the argument is given that a highest evil is not able to exist, because there is nothing so evil in which there is not also some good, at least the good of existence (*In Sent* II.1.1.ad1). In regard to intentions, it is argued that because agents do not choose evil itself but only what appears good, actions classified as evil do not

25. For a careful account of different views held in the thirteenth century on the contrariety of good and evil, see L.-B. Gillon, *La théorie des oppositions et la théologie du péché au XIIIe siècle* (Paris: Vrin, 1937).

26. For an account of Aquinas's solution to the problem that evil presents to creation, see A.-G. Sertillanges, *Le problème du mal*, 2 vols. (Paris: Aubier, 1948–1951) 1:195–202.

require an evil principle (*In Sent* II.1.1.ad2). Furthermore, Aquinas states that if we isolate all the functions required for moral evil, then every immoral choice rests on many good human functions (*In Sent* II.1. 1.ad3). Since evil results from good, there is no need to posit an evil principle that stands contrary to the highest good. In fact, he argues that when considered in relation to the universe as a whole, what appears as contrary to good, contributes to the harmony of creation (*In Sent* II.1.1.ad4). Proximate to each other, individual things may seem contrary, but in the broader picture they have the same first cause and same final end.

Aquinas sketches the view that evil depends on good, but without a more detailed inquiry into the nature of evil and its origin, his replies are rather opaque. What does it mean to say that evil is contrary to good and yet is consistent with there being a single principle of creation? The difficulty in reconstructing Aquinas's response to the Neomanichees at this point is that he does not treat the relation of good to evil. Remaining faithful to the order of the *Sentences*, he refrains from doing this until distinction 34, where he treats sin in the context of the two first human beings. This text should be taken into account for a clearer understanding of Aquinas's response.

In distinction 34 Aquinas presents evil as dependent on good thus dispensing with the need for a second principle.²⁷ In order to make this case he inquires in the second article into whether evil is a certain kind of positive being. This issue is important because the Neomanichees have claimed that the positive nature of evil is a reason for a second principle of creation.²⁸ In his determination of the question, Aquinas states that evil is a privation and follows Augustine in placing a qualification on what it means to say that evil exists. His claim is that the subject of a privation is indeed something positive, but that the privation itself is not (*In Sent* II.34.1.2). The example given to illustrate this is that while an eye is something positive, blindness is not. Parasitical on being, the evil of blindness is nothing except the negation of sight. One can speak of the being of the subject of an evil, but not of the being of the evil itself.

In reply to the objection that evil has a nature because corruption occurs only through action and nothing acts unless it has a certain nature (*In Sent* II.34.1.2.ob4), Aquinas cites Pseudo-Dionysius in order to make the point that evil depends on good. Aquinas argues that evil in itself is a privation or a corruption and not an agent of privation. We are to distinguish evil under-

27. Peter the Lombard considered the nature and origin of evil in distinction 34 of the second book of his *Sentences*, but did not consider the arguments of the Neomanichees.

28. Aquinas offers five versions of the Neomanichean argument in the objections to the second article. Each objection depends on the distinction or contrariety between good and evil (*In Sent* II.34.1.2.obs 1–5).

stood as the corruption of something from the subject of the evil and the agent of evil, both of which are positive entities. He explains that this is why Pseudo-Dionysius claims that evil is not able to act unless by the virtue of good, and is not able to oppose good unless out of the power of good.²⁹ Evil is not a positive entity, but in some way depends on good, the topic of the next three articles.

The issue of whether good is a cause of evil is treated in the third article.³⁰ In the determination, Aquinas argues for the common structural features of both good and evil, concluding that good is an efficient cause of evil.³¹ Holding that each being acts according to its own form, he claims that action follows on a being in as much as it is perfect and good (*In Sent II.34.1.3*). For human beings, this means that they intend what is good.³² Yet, intending one good action can bring about a defect. For example, intending to eat what one likes can lead to an unhealthy physical condition. The intended action appears good, but if a defect occurs, an activity that is good in itself leads to evil. Because the activity desired is good, the defect is only brought about accidentally and good is the accidental efficient cause of evil.³³

These discussions provide a fuller response to the Neomanichees than that of the first distinction in the second book of the *Scriptum*. Now it is clear that because evil is the privation of something good, it is contrary to a particular good, yet consistent with a single first principle. While not an entity, the subject of evil is an entity, as is the agent that brings about the privation. The Neomanichees assumed that evil was itself an entity with its own being in need of a second principle. But, if evil is a privation, and not an entity, there is no need to posit a second cause. Moral evil occurs when

29. *In Sent II.34.1.2.ad4*. The text of Pseudo-Dionysius to which Aquinas refers is *De divinis nominibus* 4.31.

30. When Bonaventure considers whether evil arises out of good in his commentary on the *Sentences*, he states that the Manichees think that evil has a cause other than good (*Sent II.34.1.1*). Aquinas does not name his opponents as often as does Bonaventure, making it harder to reconstruct the thrust of his arguments.

31. The first two objections conclude that on account of the contrary nature of the two, good cannot be a cause of evil. In the third, the argument is given that God cannot be the first cause of good as well as of evil, since God must then be good and evil, which is absurd.

32. Moneta of Cremona had argued that since both good and evil intentions have something in common, i.e., that they are both intentions, the degree of diversity does not require two contrary first principles (*SACV* 26).

33. Aquinas wants to avoid the position that the highest good is the direct source of evil, which would lead to God being both good and evil. He distinguishes between a universal agent and particular agents in order to attribute privation to the latter and argues by analogy that just as the sun is a universal agent that causes the forms of all lower bodies and does not exclude particular goods, the highest good is the cause of every good, but not of the defect of any particular good.

intending one good that excludes another. Since this is a result of seeking something under the aspect of good, it is not completely contrary to good, only to the particular good excluded.³⁴ Therefore, good is not absolutely contrary to evil and there is no need for an evil principle of creation.

Moneta of Cremona had already made a similar case in his *Summa* where he argued both that evil is a privation of good and that there is no absolute contrariety between good and evil.³⁵ When we speak of good essentially, nothing is contrary to good (*SACV* 24). Both good and evil depend on the same good first principle. Yet, taken as a privation, evil is accidentally opposed to good, as ignorance is a privation of knowledge and injustice is a privation of justice. These evils are not contrary to knowledge or justice essentially, only accidentally, because nothing is essentially evil for it would then be deprived of its own being. Moneta concludes that evil is not contrary to good in a strong sense and that there is no need for a second principle.

Concern over serious objections raised by the Cathars led Dominicans to discuss the origin of creation together with the origin of evil, topics which traditionally would have been reserved for lectures on the first and the 34th distinctions of the second book of the Lombard's *Sentences*. These discussions represent more than the identification of a relation between topics treated in two different distinctions. In considering the origin of creation in relation to the origin of evil, Dominicans were offering a strikingly different account of creation. The origin of evil was no longer only a topic of moral inquiry having to do with Adam's sin, but a metaphysical issue central to the understanding of creation. My point is that when Moneta and Aquinas argue that the order of the universe requires a single principle of creation, they are not simply advancing arguments of intellectual interest for a single creator. Their concern with the metaphysical arguments of the Cathars drives them to change the order of presentation in theology, and to integrate a specific metaphysical component which establishes a connection between emanation in God and the emanation that is creation.

A similar interest appears to motivate Aquinas's consideration of creation as an emanation from God. For example, he explains in the prologue to the second book that in contrast to the philosophers who considered creation only according to nature, theologians consider creatures as they *issue forth*

34. This is the point that Aquinas made in reply to the fourth objection that things can be contrary in proximate effects, yet have the same first principle and end (*In Sent* II.1.1.ad 4). Yet in distinction 34 he offers more detail concerning the common role played by good in regard to both.

35. Bonaventure had also discussed the contrariety of good and evil in relation to the whether there is a first principle in his *Commentary on the Sentences*. Yet, the Dominican reference works are important sources for understanding Dominican concerns. See note 23 above.

from the first principle and are directed to the final end which is God.³⁶ Referring to Pseudo-Dionysius, he offers an analogy with the sun: just as the sun radiates its own rays to illuminate bodies, the divine radiates its good rays to pour out on creatures (*In Sent* II.prol.). It is important to recall that Bonaventure recognized in the proem to his commentary on the *Sentences*, a work which Aquinas used in preparing his *Scriptum*, that to view creation as an emanation goes against the position of the Cathars and the Albigenses.³⁷ Since Bonaventure is often more outspoken than Aquinas on the identity of his opponents, his commentary can often shed light on Aquinas's context.

Bonaventure has reasons for viewing the production of the visible realm as a river flowing from a single first principle. He does not offer a purely speculative account of the origin of the world when discussing creation as an emanation.³⁸ The logic of the Neomanichees provides Bonaventure and apparently Aquinas with a rationale for considering creation in this fashion. In responding to the threat of the Cathars and the Albigenses, Aquinas offers a view of creation which accentuates the role played by a single God and leaves out the possibility of a second principle. This is important for the structure of the first half of the *Scriptum*, which is taken up with two emanations, the internal emanation of the divine persons in the first book and the external emanation of creation in the second. Aquinas seems to offer a picture of the internal and external emanations of God that refutes heresy and clarifies the faith.³⁹

36. Aquinas's view of emanation so frames his approach to creation that he can begin the determination of an article on the formation of women by drawing an analogy between a craftsperson making an object and the emanation of creatures from God. Citing Pseudo-Dionysius, he notes that just as form emanates into matter from the art of the craftsperson, all forms and natural powers flow into creation from the ideas in the mind of God (*In Sent* II.18.1.2). This analogy should not be taken too far, for, as I shall argue, Aquinas thinks that making differs from emanation in that emanation begins with nothing while making begins with matter. See David B. Burrell, "Creation or Emanation," in *God and Creation: An Ecumenical Symposium*, ed. David B. Burrell and Bernard McGinn (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1990) 34–35.

37. On Aquinas's use of Bonaventure's commentary on the *Sentences*, see M.-D. Chenu, *Introduction à l'étude de saint Thomas d'Aquin*, 2nd ed. (Paris: Vrin, 1954) 235.

38. *Sent* I.proem. On Bonaventure's view of emanation, see Zachary Hayes, "Bonaventure: Mystery of the Triune God," in *The History of Franciscan Theology*, ed. Kenan B. Osborne (St. Bonaventure, New York: Franciscan Institute, 1994) 51–72.

39. In contrast to the Lombard's view of the *Sentences* as concerned with God and signs, Aquinas follows the scheme of Pseudo-Dionysius, interpreting this work according to the procession of creatures from, and the return of creatures to, God (*In Sent* I.2.div text). The return is accounted for in the third and fourth books. For a clear account of these two emanations in the *Scriptum*, see Hankey, *God in Himself* 22; Paul Rorem, "'Procession and Return' in Thomas Aquinas and His Predecessors," *Princeton Seminary Bulletin* 13 (1992): 158–59; and Paul Rorem, *Pseudo-Dionysius: A Commentary on the Texts and Introduction to Their Influence* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993) 170–72.

In summary, Aquinas includes four objections to the problem that evil presents to there being a single creator and focuses on the Neomanichees as the serious threat to this view. A concept of emanation fits in with this goal, for it allows him to present creation as an issuing forth from a single creator. Aquinas's reasons for going to Pseudo-Dionysius and the Neoplatonic tradition in order to find a framework for considering creation appear to be bound up with a serious theological controversy of his day. Yet, because he lectured and wrote in a different theological world from that of the Lombard, he was not able to obtain the order of treatment he needed from the *Sentences*. Remaining faithful to this structure in the second book of his *Scriptum*, he treated the objections of the Neomanichees to there being a single first principle separately from the origin of evil. Furthermore, there was no logical place to offer a sustained treatment of creation as an emanation from God.⁴⁰ Writing the *Summa theologiae* would give Aquinas the opportunity to construct his own structure for treating creation, one that was more suitable for his Dominican theological project.⁴¹

3 SUMMA THEOLOGIAE

What I propose is that by treating creation in the *Summa theologiae* (*ST*) according to the Dionysian concept of emanation, Aquinas tightens the relation between the first principle and creation, a relation that is reflected in the overarching logic of the first part of the work; and in doing so he responds to the dualism of the Neomanichees.⁴² As we have seen, Aquinas offers a metaphysical account of evil in relation to creation in his *Scriptum*, clearly remaining faithful to Dominican worries over the Cathars. He offers a brief account of emanation which appears to serve this same purpose. Keeping the structure of his *Scriptum* in mind allows us to see better what Aquinas accomplishes in his *Summa*.

In the *Scriptum*, Aquinas devotes the first book to God and the second book to creation. The inquiry into creation is divided into two sections.⁴³ The

40. When considering whether anything can be created by God Aquinas argues in the second article that all that is imperfect arises from the first and perfect being (*In Sent* II.1.2). He also examines whether creation presupposed matter and occurred out of nothing. I will argue that the Neomanichees placed both issues on the table and that Aquinas addresses each one when treating emanation in the *Summa theologiae*.

41. In an apparent reference to the limitations imposed on commentators on the *Sentences*, Aquinas states in his *Summa theologiae* that in order to improve instruction he will follow the order of teaching and not the order of exposition (*ST* I.prol). No longer bound by the text of the Lombard, he is free to construct his own order.

42. This does not mean that the processions in the Trinity are understood in a Augustinian way.

43. *In Sent* 2.1.div. text. The first section consists of distinction 1, the second section, of distinctions 2 through 44.

first treats general issues that include questions about the number of first principles, the eternity of the world, whether it is fit for God to act for an end, and whether creatures were made on account of God's goodness. By placing the objections of the Neomanichees and his responses here, Aquinas introduces the problem of evil into his account of creation in general, something that the Lombard had not done and Aquinas could not do in the *Scriptum*. The second section of his discussion of creation is given over to consideration of different types of creatures, including angels and human beings. Here Aquinas considers the origin of evil and its relation to good within a discussion of the first human sin.

In the *Summa* Aquinas treats creation in questions 44 through 119 of the first part. He structures this section into three according to a Neoplatonic pattern: the production of creatures in questions 44–46, the distinctions between creatures in questions 47–102, and the conservation and governance of creation in 103–19.⁴⁴ As in the *Scriptum*, this treatment begins in the first question with an argument for the uniqueness of the creator. There is no discussion at this point of the Neomanichean view of the two creator Gods. As we saw, Aquinas had discussed the views of the Cathars in his *Scriptum* when considering whether there is more than one first principle of creation and again when treating the origin of evil within the context of the first two human beings.⁴⁵ In the *Summa* he no longer offers an account of the origin of evil at either point in his text.⁴⁶ Instead he discusses it in questions 47 through 49, after his treatment of the production of creatures in general and before considering the different types of creatures. He treats the origin of evil in these three questions and refrains from treating the Neomanichean objections to there being an evil creator God until the last article of 49 (*ST* 1.49.3). This is an important juncture in the structure of this treatment of creation, for it is after this point that he begins to treat specific types of creatures starting with the angels. In effect, he discusses the

44. Aquinas notes this structure in *ST* 1.44. On the Neoplatonic pattern see my notes 39 and 78. For an accurate schema of the structure of Aquinas's discussion of creation, as well as of the work as a whole, see Clemens S. Suermondt, *Tabulae Schematicae, cum introductione de principiis et compositione comparatis Summae Theologiae et Summae Contra Gentiles S. Thomae Aquinatis* (Rome: Marietti, 1943) 24.

45. Choosing to examine human functions and not the first sin when considering Adam and Eve represents a remarkable shift from the *Sentences*: Aquinas thus responds to the Neomanichees by placing the accent on the positive character of human beings. This stands in contrast to Bonaventure, who continues the Lombard's focus on sin in the third part of his *Breviloquium*.

46. That Aquinas wanted to be clear about the origin of evil when writing this part of the *Summa* is another reason why he might have chosen to comment on the *De divinis nominibus* of Pseudo-Dionysius at this time. See Mulchahey, "First the Bow is Bent in Study" 296–97.

origin of evil at the end of his considerations of issues having to do with creation in general, including emanation. By structuring the text in this way he is now better able to do justice to the Cathar objections and, by extension, to respond to them more adequately than he had done in the *Scriptum*. I claim that the discussion of Cathar objections at the end of the account of creation in general illuminates the motivation behind specific elements of the Neoplatonic structure and its emanationist metaphysics. To establish this, I will first discuss his view of the causal role that good plays in regard to evil in questions 47, 48, and 49, and secondly his account of the first cause, including his view of emanation, in questions 44 and 45.

3.1 *Opposing the highest evil: The goal of ST 1.44–49*

In order to indicate the central purpose for Aquinas's discussion of the origin of evil in his *Summa*, it is necessary to begin with the last article of question 49 where six Neomanichean arguments are given in support of the view that there is a highest evil that is the cause of all evil. The familiar argument based on contraries is given first, that since there are contrary causes of contrary effects, and since contraries are found in things, there need to be contrary principles, one good and the other evil. Aquinas's response is brief but noteworthy: the Neomanichees have considered only particular effects in this world and not the single common first cause (*ST* 1.49.3.ad1). This establishes that the prior account of emanation paved the way for a specific response to the Neomanichees. He states that those who judge that contrariety implies two first principles fail to reduce contrary particular causes to a common universal cause (*ST* 1.49.3). The point that I wish to highlight is that this claim rests on the analysis of the first cause, emanation, and the distinction between good and evil, which appear in the first six questions of his treatment of creation.⁴⁷

Aquinas alludes to the preceding discussion when he states that there is no single first principle of evil which can compare with the single first prin-

47. Aquinas also makes this point in his commentary on First Colossians, where he claims that the Manichees have erred in distinguishing between corruptible earthly bodies caused by an evil God and incorruptible heavenly bodies caused by a good God (*Ad Colossenses* 1.4, Cai ed. 1953, 38–42, 2:133–34). He explains that a correct understanding of the distinctions between things and their derivation from a single principle will clear up this error (as well as those of the Platonists). In order to clarify the unique relation between God and creation he discusses creation, enumerates the going forth of creatures from God, and comments on divine providence. This tripartite structure that also appears in the *Liber de causis*, serves as the framework for treating creation in the *Summa*, and has been useful for dating this commentary. See Ghislain Lafont, *Structures et méthode dans la Somme Théologique de saint Thomas d'Aquin* (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1961) 102–06 and Simon Tugwell, ed. and trans. *Albert & Aquinas: Selected Writings* (New York: Paulist Press, 1988) 247–48.

ciple of good (*ST* 1.49.3). In fact, twelve references to the preceding text appear in the *sed contra*, determination, and replies of this article, more than is usual for Aquinas.⁴⁸ Through a careful choice of questions and cross-references in questions 44 through 49, he has constructed a complex argument against the Neomanichees that takes into account related issues. I will trace parts of this argument in order to indicate the significance of the Neomanichees for the structure of Aquinas's treatment of creation including his consideration of emanation. First I consider the immediate background to this discussion in questions 47 through 49 in order to indicate the complex structure of these questions.

In his distinction between good and evil in questions 47 through 49 Aquinas prepares an explanation for why there is no need to resort to an evil principle of creation. For instance, after having argued that God is the source of the inequality of things in question 47 (*ST* 1.47.2), he places qualifications on what it means to say that something is evil in the first three articles of question 48. In the first article, the conclusion is drawn that evil refers to the absence of good, a point that is assumed in the third article in order to demonstrate that evil depends on good as on a subject. Since the form through which anything that is in act is good, every being is good, and evil is an absence or a privation in something good (*ST* 1.48.3). The reader is thus prepared for the argument in question 49 that because evil is dependent on good as its subject, there is nothing which is evil in its essence and the Neomanichees are wrong to posit a highest evil as the cause of all evil (*ST* 1.49.3).

A second instance is the argument given in the fourth article of question 48 that evil cannot corrupt the entire good. Here, Aquinas prepares to eliminate the possibility that the highest evil can be conceived as the complete corruption of good. He argues that evil always diminishes the good of its subject, yet because it remains in the subject, it never totally consumes the subject (*ST* 1.48.4). This allows him to argue in question 49 that since the good of a subject always survives evil, there can be no highest evil, another reason why it is wrong to posit a highest evil as a first principle (*ST* 1.49.3).

An account of the roles that particular goods and the highest good play in causing evil is given in the first two articles of question 49. In the first article, Aquinas uses Aristotle's four causes to specify the causal character of particular goods in regard to evil. Relying on the point established in the third article of question 48, that evil is in good as in a subject, he argues that since good provides the material for evil, it is the material cause of evil (*ST* 1.49.1). Furthermore, he claims that since evil occurs through the privation of one

48. I count the general reference and the eleven references to specific discussions.

form by another, good is the efficient cause of evil, if only accidentally.⁴⁹ For example, since fire is intent on its own form, and not on the privation of air, when the form of fire causes a privation in air, the privation occurs accidentally. Because the action is in itself good and brings about evil only accidentally, evil is said to depend accidentally on good. This point will be used to argue that evil cannot be reduced to an evil cause, but only to a good cause upon which evil occurs accidentally (*ST* 1.49.3.ad 6).

The causal role of the highest good in regard to evil is considered in the second article of question 49. If the highest good causes both involuntary and voluntary evil, then there is no reason to resort to an evil first principle. For example, in regard to involuntary evil, Aquinas states that God intends the good of the order of the universe as a whole (*ST* 1.49.2). Since, as was argued in the second articles of questions 47 and 48, the perfection of this order requires inequality, corruption is an accidental requirement of perfection and the highest good is an accidental cause of involuntary evil. Secondly, the distinction between evil as penalty and evil as fault which appears in the last two articles of question 48 (*ST* 1.48.5–6) prepares for an explanation of God's causal role in regard to voluntary evil. Since the order of the universe requires justice, the highest good brings about evil conceived as a penalty given to those who sin (*ST* 1.49.2). Arguing in some detail that both particular goods and the highest good play causal roles in the origin of evil, Aquinas provides an alternative to positing a highest evil as a first principle of creation.

In short, Aquinas structures questions 47–49 in order to refute the Neomanichees. The problem of evil plays a central role in this discussion of creation. Previously, it had not been a common theological practice to inquire into the origin of evil when treating general issues of creation, that being reserved for discussion of the Fall. For example, the first twenty distinctions of the second book of the Lombard's *Sentences* are given over to consideration of creation, for the most part to different types of creatures. The Lombard discusses the creation of human beings before considering the origin and effects of human evil. Commentaries on the *Sentences*, as would be expected, and theological works in the thirteenth century were ordinarily governed by the order of this treatment. Another example, closer to Aquinas, is the first eighteen questions of Albert the Great's *Summae de creaturis*, which discuss creation with no mention of the origin of evil. Evil also continues to be treated in the context of the fall in the second part of the second book of

49. Moreover, because for Aquinas evil is the privation of both form and of proper end, it has no formal or final cause. For an account of Aquinas's use of Aristotle's notion of accidental cause in presenting good as a cause of evil, see Carlos Steel, "Does Evil Have a Cause: Augustine's Perplexity and Thomas's Answer," *Review of Metaphysics* 48 (1994): 259–62.

the *Summa fratris Alexandri* (SFA 2–2.1). At the time Aquinas was writing his *Summa theologiae* in the 1260s, there was no common practice of treating the origin of evil within an account of creation in general.⁵⁰ He breaks this pattern when he considers the nature and origin of evil before treating types of creatures. Yet, while this was not common in academic theological works, it had been done in Dominican reference works written against the Neomanichees.⁵¹ Within this institutional context, it made sense that Aquinas should consider questions of evil within his treatment of creation in general.

Clearly, Aquinas has carefully structured questions 47 through 49 in order to respond to the Cathars. Yet, he also indicates in the last article of question 49 that questions 44 and 45 serve this same purpose.⁵² In these questions he provides the general picture of creation that allows him to refute the Cathars. Aquinas makes this point when he accuses the Cathars of lacking an account of the universal cause of all being, which lies beyond the contrariety of particular goods and evils (ST 1.49.3). A detailed presentation of the first cause is needed in order to make the case against the Cathars. According to Aquinas, one needs to treat creation as a single principle, before treating particular goods and evils. The Cathars extended comments about particular goods and evils to the universal cause as if these should apply. But, according to Aquinas, particular goods and evils do not lie on the same playing field as the first cause. In order to make this clear, he provides a general account of creation. Significantly, Aquinas states that he has already provided such an account—a direct reference to his initial treatment of creation (ST 1.49.3). This is no light aside, but the weighty thrust of an important determination that brings to a head what he has accomplished in this section of the *Summa*. According to Aquinas, he treats emanation in

50. Conceiving divine science according to the concept of good, Philip the Chancellor also treats the dependence of evil on good and the origin of evil before treating types of creatures in his *Summa de bono* (SB), written around 1228. He is motivated as well by the Neomanichees. Discussions in the prologue and first section of the work indicate the degree to which this work as a whole is aimed at the Cathars (SB prol. 6 and 1.1–2). Yet the Dominican reference works written against the Cathars offer a clearer picture of the Dominican interest in these matters.

51. My discussion of Moneta supports this point. Another example is the *Summa contra hereticos* attributed to the Dominican Peter of Verona, which begins with discussions of good, evil, and creation. See Thomas Käppeli, “Une Somme contre les hérétiques de S. Pierre Martyr(?),” *Archivum fratrum praedicatorum* 17 (1947): 298 and 320.

52. Question 46 is concerned with the beginning of creation. Yet, even here Aquinas has not forgotten the Neomanichees. In the last article on whether things were created at the beginning of time, the bulk of the determination is devoted to those who argue for two first principles, one good and the other evil (ST 1.46.3). Concern for the Cathars when discussing the beginning of the world was not accidental to this discussion, it was also an important topic in the *summa*’s written against the Cathars. For example, see Moneta’s discussion in SACV 477–501.

order to provide a Cathar-tight picture of the relation between the first cause and creation.

Aquinas's consideration of the origin of evil in his treatment of creation in general is not his only departure from the traditional structure of these discussions. His treatment of the universal cause of creation in questions 44–45 also represents a change. In claiming that this discussion is needed in order to respond more fully to the objections of the Manichean dualists, Aquinas supplies an important reason for why he offers elaborate accounts of the single first cause and emanation.⁵³ The detail that he devotes to these concerns, and especially his decision to treat emanation, amounts to a reconceptualization of the standard approach to creation as represented in the Lombard's *Sentences* and its commentaries. Traditionally, little attention was devoted to creation in general.⁵⁴ Therefore, through providing the account of the universal cause that the Cathars lack, Aquinas supplies a treatment that was not present in the standard academic literature of his discipline. He constructed an emanational account of creation guided by a polemical purpose.

3.2 *The universal cause of all being*

Having discussed the reason that Aquinas gives for treating the universal cause of all being in detail and the support that this lends to there not being an evil first principle of creation, I now turn to this treatment in questions 44 and 45 where he treats, respectively, the first cause of creation and the mode of emanation. As in the *Scriptum*, Aquinas opens the discussion of creation in his *Summa* in question 44 with an argument for a single principle of creation. What is philosophically interesting about this argument is that its structure is based on Aristotle's four causes.⁵⁵ Devoting one article to each cause, Aquinas argues that God is the efficient, exemplar, and final cause of creation as well as the principle of the material cause (*ST* 1.44.1–4). The implication is, as he states, that since God is responsible for all four causes, there is only one principle of creation (*ST* 1.44.ad4). Aquinas uses Aristotle in order to provide a more rigorous defense of a single first cause than he did in his *Scriptum*. This defense supplies a more precise statement that serves to answer the Cathars.

53. I explain above Aquinas's point that the Cathars stopped at the level of particular causes and failed to provide an account of a common universal cause. A detailed argument for a first principle had appeared recently in the Franciscan *Summa fratris Alexandri* (*SFA* 1–2.1.1.1.2.1). This argument appears shortly after considering the two-creator objection of the Cathars.

54. Three short chapters are devoted to this topic in the Lombard's *Sentences* (*Sent* 2.1.1–3).

55. The *Summa fratris Alexandri* includes a treatment of God's role as creator interpreted according to the four causes of creation (*SFA* 1–2.1.1.1.2.1).

The issue that Aquinas treats in question 45 is the emanation of creation from God. He uses a concept of emanation as the procession of all being from the first principle in order to draw a sketch of a tight relation between the first principle and creation. I argued above that the structure of Aquinas's treatment of creation in general indicates that his discussion of emanation works against the Cathars. It was not unheard of to discuss emanation in relation to the Neomanichees. I noted that Bonaventure viewed emanation as a response to the Neomanichees in his commentary on the *Sentences*. One other work which is worthy of note in this regard is the *Summa de bono* (*SB* 1225–28) of Philip the Chancellor. Not bound by the structure of the Lombard's text, Philip was at liberty to construct a different order of theological treatment. He indicates in the prologue the role that the Cathars played in relation to this work. For example, he offers arguments against there being a highest evil, and immediately presents an emanationalist metaphor, i.e., all creation flows (*SB* prol. 7). This emanationalist account of the procession of all being from the highest good provides the framework for this text as a whole. Philip constructed theology according to a concept of the good in order to respond more directly to the Cathars. Yet while both Bonaventure and Philip treated emanation in response to the Cathars, their texts do not serve to clarify many of the specific issues that Aquinas treats in his discussion of emanation. The Dominican reference works written against the Cathars supply much of this context.

Having established that Aquinas constructed his account of emanation with an eye on the Cathars and their arguments for a highest evil, I will now argue for three additional claims: first, that many of the specific concerns that he raises when treating emanation have to do with Dominican worries over the Cathars; second, that the Cathars helped to motivate Aquinas's use of Pseudo-Dionysius in constructing his view of emanation; and third, that it is not a coincidence that he brings the first principle and creation together in a close relation in this account of emanation, that in fact, this view counters the Neomanichees in a striking fashion and provides the keystone for the structure of the first part of the *Summa theologiae*. Each of these points suggests that Aquinas discusses emanation in this text in order to respond more fully to the Cathars.

3.2.1 Emanation and Dominican concerns

First, let us note that many of the central issues that Aquinas treats in his consideration of emanation have a recent polemical history within his order. For example, Aquinas devotes the first two articles on the mode of emanation to whether God produces things out of nothing, citing the gloss on the opening verse of Genesis that to create is to make something *ex nihilo* (*ST* 1.45.1). The Neomanichees were understood by the Dominicans explicitly

to deny creation *ex nihilo*.⁵⁶ For example, the Dominican Rainerius Sacconi in his *Summa de Catharis et Pauperibus de Lugduno* presents John of Lugio, a Cathar, as arguing that creation was the making of things out of pre-existing matter and not from nothing.⁵⁷ Moneta of Cremona considers the same interpretation in his *Summa*, to which he responds in some detail that to create is to make something out of nothing (*SACV* 70).

Reading Aquinas on creation *ex nihilo* against this background provides clarification of his project. I will mention one example in order to support this point. Moneta notes that we are not to think as the Cathars do that the word ‘*ex*,’ or ‘out of,’ in creation *ex nihilo*, indicates either matter or some relation to matter. Just because we often use the words ‘out of’ in reference to the material used in making something is no reason to think that saying God creates ‘out of’ nothing implies that creation presupposes a preexisting material (*SACV* 70). In order to avoid this Manichean position, Moneta argues that ‘*ex*’ is to be taken here as referring to an order in time, that is, to something happening after something else and not to a material. His point is that to speak of creation out of nothing is to say that first there was non-being and then there was being. A version of this argument appears as an objection in Aquinas’s first article on emanation.⁵⁸ The objection considered is that the preposition ‘*ex*’ is said to import a causal relation, that of a material cause.⁵⁹ For example, it is explained that when we say a statue is made ‘out of’ brass, we indicate the material out of which the statue is made. Yet, since the material out of which something is made must itself be something, and since ‘nothing’ is not something, it cannot be the material of a being, nor in some manner its cause. Therefore to create is not to make something out of nothing. Aquinas counters this argument with Moneta’s point that the preposition ‘*ex*’ does not designate a material cause but a temporal order. It signifies ‘after,’ meaning that creation occurs after previously not

56. For a discussion of the difficulties in distinguishing between what different groups of Cathars and their opponents meant by the term *nihil*, or nothing, see Dennis J. Billy, “Cathar Polemic and the Meaning of ‘Nihil,’” in Réal Tremblay and Dennis J. Billy, eds. *Historia: Memoria Futuri: Mélanges Louis Vereecke (70e anniversaire de naissance)* (Rome: Editiones Academiae Alphonsonianae, 1991) 121–42.

57. Rainerius Sacconi, “Summa de Catharis et Pauperibus de Lugduno,” in Antoine Dondaine, *Un Traité néo-manichéen du XIIIe siècle: Le Liber de duobus principiis, suivi d’un fragment de rituel cathare* (Rome: Istituto storico domenicano, 1939) 73.

58. Aquinas offers further versions of this argument in his *Scriptum* and *Quaestiones disputatae de potentia Dei* (*In Sent* II.1.1.2, *DPD* 3.1.ob7).

59. *ST* 1.45.1.ob3. The first objection to creation occurring out of nothing also focuses on there being a material cause. For a clear account of the distinction that Aquinas makes in relation to the word “*ex*,” see Velde, *Participation and Substantiality* 155–56. I hope to have supplied the polemical context.

existing.⁶⁰ Aquinas's Dominican audience would have understood such discussions in light of the Cathar objections to creation *ex nihilo*.

Aquinas discusses a related issue that had arisen in the controversy with the Cathars in the second article when posing the question whether God is able to create anything. In order to settle this issue he makes a distinction between creation and making that becomes central to his approach to emanation in question 45. This is no minor distinction for Aquinas. He uses it in order to clarify the external emanation of creation in articles two, three, four, five, six, and eight. Through consideration of the analogy between creation and human craft, he explains that creation is both like and unlike human making. Viewing this analogy within the recent Dominican historical context brings out its polemical nature.

Aquinas distinguishes human craft from the creation of God and notes that when humans make something, this presupposes the natural things upon which they work.⁶¹ To suppose that God made things in this manner, and did not create them, would mean that there is something presupposed upon which he worked. If this were true then God would not be the cause of everything, contradicting the conclusion drawn in the first article of question 44, that God is the universal cause of all being. Aquinas uses this potential contradiction in order to arrive at the desired conclusion, namely, that God brought everything into being out of nothing in the sense that creation required no preexisting matter.

My point is that in highlighting the difference between creating and making, Aquinas discusses an issue given new life by the Neomanichees.⁶² For instance, the *Liber de duobus principiis* (*LDP*), written around 1250, one of the few works of the Cathars to have survived, includes the claim that those who argue for a single principle of creation misunderstand how 'to

60. Aquinas adds another possibility, that if the negation 'nothing' applies to the preposition 'ex,' then it denies the material cause, that is, creation is not made out of something (*ST* 1.45.1.ad3).

61. Aquinas does not use this analogy only in order to distinguish creation from human making. He also uses it in order to explain the divine role in creation (*ST* 1.45.6).

62. Peter the Lombard had discussed the difference between creating and making in his *Sentences* in order to distinguish divine creation from human and angelic craft, but he gives no indication of dealing with issues raised by the Cathars. He claims that to create, properly speaking, is to make something out of nothing, while to make is to make something out of matter (*Sent* II.1.2). God creates out of nothing, while human beings and angels make out of matter. He also notes without comment that there is no significant distinction in Scripture between saying that God makes or creates, a statement that would become controversial. For instance, note the careful way that Aquinas explains what it means to say that to create is to make something from nothing (*ST* 1.45.2.ad2).

create' and 'to make' are used in Scripture.⁶³ Because matter is thought to preexist creation, the word 'creation' is said not to mean that something is brought out of nothing, but that the true lord God, in contrast to the principle of evil, adds something upon (*super*) the essences of the beings that are already exceedingly good (*LD 23*). To explain this point, three different senses are noted of the use of the words 'create' and 'make' in Scripture. In each case, the two terms are treated as identical in meaning.

For instance, the first sense is to create or make from something as if out of some preexisting material (*LD 25*).⁶⁴ The examples given are that human beings, angels, and Jesus Christ were not produced out of nothing. With the help of Scripture the claim is made that the essences of each of these are prior to what has been added by God. For example, Jesus was conceived of the Holy Spirit and human beings were made of the earth according to the image of God. Neither arose, strictly speaking, out of nothing, but eternally preexisted creation with God.⁶⁵

This view of the good true God as both creator and maker stands in marked contrast to that of the Garatenses, a Neomanichean group refuted in the *Liber de duobus principiis*.⁶⁶ They are presented as holding that 'creation' refers to the activity of the good creator God in bringing forth immaterial beings and that 'making' refers to the activity of a less powerful being, a creature turned evil, who has produced all visible bodies (*LD 58*). According to this view the evil lord makes the visible world out of the preexisting matter created by the good God. 'Creation' here has a different point of reference than 'making.'

Dominican polemicists recognized that groups of Cathars held various views on 'creation' and 'making.' For example, Peter of Verona discusses one group of Neomanichees which describes the devil as a creator and maker

63. The numbers given in my citations to the *LD* refer to the section numbers that appear in *Livre des deux principes* ed. and trans. Christine Thouzellier, Sources chrétiennes, no. 198 (Paris: Cerf, 1973). On dating the *LDP*, see *ibid.* 27–31. This work represents absolute dualism in arguing for two opposed principles, one good, and the other evil, neither above or below the other.

64. The qualification "as if" (*tanquam*) is significant for it introduces a nuance in speaking of what existed before creation (*LD 25*). The claim made is that something like matter existed before creation, not that matter itself existed. The Dominicans attributed the latter view to the Cathars. For example, Rainerius Sacconi presents John of Lugio as holding that in creation, the good God makes something out of preexisting material. See Sacconi, "Summa de Catharis et Pauperibus de Lugduno" 73.

65. The second sense of 'to create' and 'to make' is to add to the essence of those who are evil and the third is to keep the evil lord or his ministers in existence and allow them to function (*LD 27–29, 30, respectively*).

66. The Garatenses were an Italian group of mitigated dualists who ranked the principle of good over the principle of evil. See Wakefield and Evans, *Heresies of the High Middle Ages* 42.

and another which views him only as a maker.⁶⁷ The former are absolute dualists who view the devil as a principle of creation equal in power to the good God and the latter are mitigated dualists, who argue that since the principle of evil is a creature of God, it is weaker than God. Moneta of Cremona provides further detail in regard to the mitigated dualists, claiming that according to them a single God created heavenly things and produced matter out of nothing (*SACV*109). Since the devil used this matter to make material things, he is a maker, in contrast to God the creator.

Moneta speaks of creation as making something out of nothing. He argues that the Neomanichees use 'to create' in an improper sense when they claim that to create is to make something out of something preexisting (*SACV* 70). On this account, if God did create all things, then the Cathars are wrong to say that creation occurred out of preexisting matter. The reason for this is that God must be the cause of preexisting, as well as of existing things (*SACV*70). Furthermore, Moneta's philosophical training is evident when he argues against the view that the divine essence is the preexisting material of creation. His argument *ad absurdum* is that if God created all things out of his own essence, then since he is the highest simple and unable to be divided into parts, all creatures would receive the same divine substance and be of the same substance as God, contradicting the distinction between God and creatures (*SACV*70).

This is the contemporary background against which Aquinas considers the difference between 'to create' and 'to make' in his discussion of emanation. In fact, the logic of his discussion often responds directly to the Cathars. Let three examples suffice to make this point. The distinction between creating and making that I discussed above allows him to claim that creation occurs out of nothing, an assertion that the Cathars had denied, and the Dominicans had defended.⁶⁸

Second, Aquinas clarifies the difference between creation and making when he distinguishes the production of things which involve motion from the production of creatures without motion.⁶⁹ Production with motion, which occurs in ordinary making, presupposes something that is moved, which according to the Dominicans is how the Cathars understood creation. 'To make' in this sense introduces change into what already exists. For Aquinas, the relation between maker and product is not as strong as that between

67. Dondaine, "Saint Pierre Martyr" 320.

68. (*ST* 1.45.2) The inquiry into whether creation occurred out of nothing in the *Summa contra Gentiles* (*SCG*) is aimed even more pointedly at those who held that matter preexisted creation. Aquinas offers fourteen arguments against this view (*SCG* 2.16).

69. (*ST* 1.45.3) For a clear account of Aquinas's distinction between production with motion and production without motion, see Velde, *Participation and Substantiality* 156–58.

creator and creation. The latter is more direct because creation viewed as an emanation presupposes neither motion nor pre-existing matter, but relates directly to the first principle alone.

The third example is taken from an argument for the claim that only God can create. Noting Augustine's view that neither good nor bad angels can create, Aquinas uses the same distinction to argue why this is so in article five and, in so doing, explains why those who think that the physical world was produced by an evil creature are wrong (*ST* 1.45.5). In clarifying these differences between creating and making, Aquinas refutes both the absolute and the mitigated dualists.⁷⁰

3.2.2 The Cathars and Aquinas's use of Pseudo-Dionysius

I have argued that while Aquinas raised issues in regard to emanation which had been treated by Dominican inquisitors in response to the Neomanichees, the latter also gave him grounds for developing a concept of emanation in his account of creation. I will extend this argument by claiming that the Cathars helped to motivate Aquinas's use of Pseudo-Dionysius in constructing his view of emanation and that this motivation appears to be reflected in the structure of the first part of the *Summa*.

The Cathars offer an account of creation that sets up an opposition between the good God and creation as it stands. For example, the argument that in order to preserve divine goodness, there must be an evil principle of creation, occurs in the *Liber de duobus principiis* (*LD* 7). On account of the unbridgeable gap between the evil of creation and the goodness of God and granted that there is evil in the world, attributing its origin to a single first principle violates the supreme goodness of the divine nature.

Aquinas draws on Neoplatonism in order to construct an account of creation as an emanation from the first principle that counters this view by lessening the distance between the first principle and creatures and thereby removing the need for a second principle. For example, he states, both in his introductory statement and in the first article of question 45, that by creation he means the emanation of all being from the first principle (*ST* 1.45.1). This is an important component of his account of the universal cause that he claims is necessary in order to respond to the Cathars.

In regard to Neoplatonism, Aquinas's use of Pseudo-Dionysius's *De divinis nominibus* (*DN*) stands out for a couple of reasons. What he found in Pseudo-Dionysius was a view of emanation that offered a framework that allowed

70. I do not mean to deny that Aquinas is concerned with a host of problems brought on by Avicenna and the Lombard, two names mentioned in the text, but only to point out that his distinction between making and creating ought to be read as part of the Dominican agenda against the Cathars.

him to answer the Cathars. For example, Aquinas found a general framework in Pseudo-Dionysius for treating emanation in relation to the source of evil.⁷¹ Pseudo-Dionysius treats the goodness of God as the source of the emanation of all things. He constructed this view in order to offer a sound response to the argument that since evil is contrary to good, it requires an evil cause (*DN* 716A, 732B). This view does not follow because the good is the source of good and of evil. According to Dionysius, those who argue that the evil apparent in the world implies an evil first cause fail to recognize that evil actually depends on and serves the good.

While this argument sounds similar to that of Aquinas, there is a difference. Pseudo-Dionysius argues that matter is good and plays a positive role in relation to the universe as a whole in order to oppose a Neoplatonic perspective from which matter appears as evil.⁷² He is not refuting the existence of a highest evil in these passages. Yet while he does not share the same concern as the Dominicans, he does provide a framework for treating the issue of emanation in relation to the origin of evil. This is why Aquinas can quote him in the *sed contra* to the first article of question 48 saying that evil is not a being, and refer to him in the reply to the fourth objection in order to claim that evil is dependent on good.⁷³ Aquinas uses Pseudo-Dionysius's reasoning in order to offer an emanationalist account of creation and refute the Cathar's claim that the existence of evil implies the existence of a highest evil being.

A second reason for why Aquinas turned to Pseudo-Dionysius in constructing his account of emanation is the latter's monotheistic view that one God is the source of the emanation of the substance of all that exists. In placing stress on the uniqueness of the single source of emanation, Pseudo-Dionysius counters the Neoplatonist view that demiurges are required for creation.⁷⁴ He does this by arguing that the single "Cause" of all things is the source of all things because he is all things (*DN* 824B). God is the single source because all created things that exist precede creation in the sense that

71. Another important conceptual source for Aquinas's view of emanation is the discussion accompanying the first proposition of the *Liber de causis*. He commented on this work in 1272 after completing the first part of his *Summa*. See the introduction by Vincent A. Guagliardo to Thomas Aquinas, *Commentary on the Book of Causes*, trans. Charles R. Hess and Richard C. Taylor (Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 1996) ix–xxiv.

72. On Proclus as the foil of Pseudo-Dionysius's argument that matter is not evil, see Booth, *Aristotelian Aporetic Ontology* 78–79.

73. (*ST* 1.48.1.*sed contra*, ad4). William of Auxerre had turned to Pseudo-Dionysius in his *Summa aurea* (*SA*, 1215–29) in order to make the point that evil cannot exist without good (*SA* 2.8.1).

74. (*DN* 953D). On Proclus as Pseudo-Dionysius's foil in regard to the monotheistic source for emanation, see Booth, *Aristotelian Aporetic Ontology* 77–78, especially note 117; Velde, *Participation and Substantiality* 255, 262–63.

they are in the single source. In response to the Cathars, Aquinas provides a more precise account of the view that God is all things in his treatment of the exemplar cause of creation.⁷⁵ He mines Pseudo-Dionysius's *De divinis nominibus* in order to argue that all created perfections flow from a single first principle and reflect their source.⁷⁶ Creation is thus related directly to the first principle as the expression of that principle. An emanationalist relation is established between the two which runs counter to the position of the Cathars.

Aquinas builds a much stronger case against the Cathars from Pseudo-Dionysius than is found in the Dominican reference books written for this purpose. For example, Moneta of Cremona devotes the second book of his *Summa* to the issue of creation. He is careful to argue for a single holy creator who is the source of the matter and form of creation. He presents the objection that material objects require a separate creator from the creator of spiritual beings. Moneta counters this position by claiming that things differ from each other according to species and can be classified according to distinctions (*SACV* 85, 109, 117). His point is that God is the unique source of the species of individual things, even of the order and structure of material objects. Moneta offers pages of scriptural support for this point, the type of evidence a Dominican would need when disputing with Cathars (*SACV* 117–38).⁷⁷

What is missing in Moneta is a focused inquiry into how God is the single source of creation. The Cathars have motivated him to consider the importance of the distinctions of creation and the relation between creation and the single creator. He also presents a trinitarian account of creation in which the visible distinctions between species are produced through the invisible second person of the Trinity, but he does not close the gap between the creator and the created with a single coherent picture of this relation (*SACV* 118). Aquinas does just this with the help of Pseudo-Dionysius. He offers a clear picture of a tight relation between the two that prepares his readers for his account of the origin of evil.

75. Aquinas discusses the exemplar cause of all creatures in his discussion of the universal cause (*ST* 1.44.3). On the formal cause, see Velde, *Participation and Substantiality* 112–14. On the role of Aquinas's view of the divine ideas in relation to his account of emanation, see Boland, *Ideas in God According to Saint Thomas Aquinas: Sources and Synthesis* 248–61.

76. For example, Aquinas quotes Pseudo-Dionysius in order to establish that the Trinity is active in emanation as an entire divinity (*ST* 1.45.6.*sed contra*). On Aquinas's use of Pseudo-Dionysius in presenting the view that God is the source of all things, see Booth, *Aristotelian Aporetic Ontology* 223–24; Velde, *Participation and Substantiality* 255–61. This does not mean that Aquinas's view is non-Augustinian.

77. This polemical context indicates a contemporary reason for Aquinas's treatment of the distinction of creatures in question 47 (*ST* 1.47).

This understanding of emanation produces a tighter fit between a first principle and creation than that admitted by the Neomanichees. Of course, this is an unacceptable position for the Cathars because the existence of evil requires that creation stand apart from a single first principle. In arguing for a close relation between creator and creation, closer even than the relation between that of craftsman and product, Aquinas closes this gap and refutes their position. While Moneta of Cremona had argued for similar views on related issues, Aquinas turned to the Neoplatonic tradition in order to offer a more conceptually-precise account. Reading this discussion of emanation within the Dominican historical context indicates its polemical edge.

3.2.3 The structure of the first part of the *Summa*

Interestingly enough, the relation between creator and creation reflected in the structure of the first part of the *Summa theologiae*, is in sharp contrast to the common practice in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries of devoting separate books of such works to God and to creation. For example, the first book of the *Sentences* of Peter the Lombard is devoted to God, and the second to creation, a division that establishes the framework for commentaries on the *Sentences* including that of Aquinas. Also, even though he did not slavishly follow the order of the *Sentences*, William of Auxerre devoted the first book of his *Summa Aurea* to God and the second to creation. The *Summa fratris Alexandri* would follow this pattern, as would Aquinas in his *Summa contra Gentiles*. But by treating God in questions 2 through 43 and creation in questions 44 through 119, Aquinas alters this framework in the *Summa theologiae*.⁷⁸ In fact, by treating God and creation in the same part, he does not simply join together the two first books of the *Scriptum*; he presents an account of creation within a treatment of God that reflects a view of sacred

78. In contrast to the Lombard's order of discussing the Trinity before the unity of God, Aquinas has reason to begin with unity. For example, he considers the divine unity in questions 3 through 26 of the first part before considering the Trinity in questions 27 through 43. Wayne Hankey argues that it was Aquinas under the influence of the Neoplatonists and not Augustine or Peter the Lombard who initiated the western practice of treating the unity before the Trinity. My point is that the Neomanichees gave Aquinas a further reason to treat the unity first in order to refute the view that there are two creator Gods and then to discuss the Trinity as the internal emanation of God. Paul Rorem agrees with this view. See Wayne Hankey, "De Trinitate of St. Boethius and the Structure of St. Thomas' *Summa Theologiae*," in *Atti del Congresso Internazionale di Studi Boeziani*, ed L. Obertello (Rome: Herder, 1981) 367–75; Hankey, *God in Himself* 56–80, 139–61; Rorem, "'Procession and Return' in Thomas Aquinas and His Predecessors" 161; and Rorem, *Pseudo-Dionysius* 173–74. On how this represents a reversal of the logic of Augustine's *De Trinitate*, see Hankey, "The Place of the Psychological Image of the Trinity in the Arguments of Augustine's *de Trinitate*, Anselm's *Monologion*, and Aquinas' *Summa Theologiae*," *Dionysius* 3 (1979): 99–110.

teaching as encompassing creation to the degree that it relates to God. This is why Aquinas refers to the principal purpose of sacred teaching at the beginning of the second question as "... the understanding of God, not only according to what he is in himself, but also in as much as he is the principle and end of things ..." (*ST* 1.2). He is concerned with God, treating creation out of an interest in the divine.⁷⁹

Aquinas provides structural unity to these two discussions in the first part of his *Summa* by treating first the internal emanation of the divine persons and then the emanation of creatures from God.⁸⁰ The importance of this structure is made evident when he explains how the second emanation depends on the first (*ST* 1.45.6). There is a causal relation between the two which occurs as follows: based on the emanation of the Son from the Father as the ideas of God, and the Spirit from both as the love for each other, the Father is to creation as a craftsperson is to the object of the craft, the Son is the word through which the Father creates, and the Spirit is the love the Father has for what is created (*ST* 1.45.7). Therefore, the emanation of creatures represents the emanation of the divine persons and indicates the relative proximity of creator to creation.

W.J. Hankey presents these two emanations as the Neoplatonic framework of the first part of the *Summa theologiae*, noting similarities between the presentation of the emanation of the Trinity and that of creation.⁸¹ The former concerns a relation in God and the second concerns a relation in creatures. Furthermore, both discussions begin with an account of the four causes, a rhetorical device rarely put to such a structural use by Aquinas.⁸² Hankey concludes that the order of this part of the *Summa* introduces the *exitus-reditus* contour of the whole work through an imitation of the motionless-divine motion of these two emanations.⁸³ I think Hankey is right and that polemical considerations led Aquinas to follow Pseudo-Dionysius in his inquiry into creation.

Significantly, Aquinas presents the emanation of creation as representative of the first emanation, that is, as patterned after the interior life of the divine first principle, a representation that occurs as both trace and imita-

79. Aquinas makes a similar point in the first question when stating that sacred teaching concerns God principally and treats creatures in as much as they are traceable to God as principle and end (*ST* 1.1.3.ad1).

80. Questions 28 through 43 and 44 through 119, respectively. Aquinas remains close to Bonaventure's discussion of the personal and external emanations (*Sent* I.proem). On Bonaventure's view, see Hayes, "Bonaventure: Mystery of the Triune God," 56–59 and 62–63.

81. See Hankey, *God in Himself* 136–37.

82. *Ibid.* 141. The two discussions are in *ST* 1.2.3 and 1.44.

83. *Ibid.* 142.

tion (*ST* 1.45.7).⁸⁴ He explains that the Trinity is represented as a trace in all creatures: in possessing being, creatures represent the Father as cause and principle, through having form they represent the Son as word, and by having order they represent the Holy Spirit as the will of the creator. Yet certain types of creatures have a closer intimacy still: since the Son proceeds as the word of the intellect and the Holy Spirit proceeds as the love of the will, those creatures that possess intellect and will bear an actual imitation of the internal emanations of God. As both trace and image, the emanation of creatures is a continuation of the internal emanation of the three divine persons of the Trinity.

Creation is the corporal, temporal, and spiritual expression of God.⁸⁵ In speaking of creation as an emanation—and considering both creator and creation within the first part of his *Summa*—Aquinas strengthens his case against the Neomanichees. A creation that flows from a single first principle does not depend on two principles. The relation between creation and its principle here is so close that there is no room for a highest evil. In fact, given the standard procedure of devoting one book to God and another to creation, the Dominican texts written against the Cathars were among the few Latin works to serve as a model for treating both together.⁸⁶

4 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

My hypothesis is that the Cathars motivated Aquinas's account of emanation, an account that binds together the two halves of the first part of his *Summa theologiae*. Three arguments lead to this conclusion. First, Aquinas clearly responds to the Cathars at the beginning of the second book of his *Scriptum super libros Sententiarum* when considering whether there is a single principle of creation. He describes an emanationalist account of creation in the prologue to this book. Theological works from the first half of the thirteenth century had treated the emanation of creation from a single first principle versus Cathar arguments for two first principles, one good and the other evil. While this was an unusual move in a commentary on the *Sentences* of Peter the Lombard due to the structure of the Lombard's work, it occurs

84. On the background in Pseudo-Dionysius concerning the unity and multiplicity of the Trinity that is carried over into creation, see Werner Beierwaltes, "Unity and Trinity in Dionysius and Eriugena," *Hermathena* 157 (1994): 6–9.

85. For a careful sketch of the expression of the divine essence in creation as a similitude, see Velde, *Participation and Substantiality* 92–116.

86. Both Moneta and Peter Martyr begin their works against the Neomanichees with discussions of the oneness of God, the Trinity of persons, and divine creation, the topics of the first part of Aquinas's *Summa theologiae*. See *SACV* 7–36 and Käppeli, "Une Somme contre les hérétiques de S. Pierre Martyr(?)" 298–99 and 320–22.

in Philip the Chancellor's *Summa de bono* and Bonaventure's *Commentary on the Sentences*. Reading Aquinas's *Scriptum super libros Sententiarum* from within this context suggests that his discussion of emanation responds to the Cathars.

Second, Aquinas improves the logic of his consideration of the first principle of creation and emanation in his *Summa* by including clear statements of both discussions within his treatment of creation in general. By reading his *Summa* against both his *Scriptum* and the Dominican reference works written to refute the Cathars, we can see why Aquinas structured his treatment of creation as he did, including his discussion of emanation. In this general treatment, consisting of questions 44 through question 49, he bridges the gap between the internal emanation of God and the emanation of creation, the two topics that constitute the first part of the *Summa*. The last topic discussed before the inquiry shifts to specific types of creatures is the Neomanichian thesis that there is an evil highest principle and that this presents a threat to there being a single first principle. This issue serves as the capstone of his treatment of creation in general, the goal as it were of the questions and articles that precede it. As he acknowledges, his resolution of this issue with the Cathars depends on his treatment of the universal cause, which includes his discussion of emanation in question 45. Aquinas's discussion of emanation fits into this structure by providing an account of the origin of creation that stands above the contrariety of particular goods and evils. He provides the necessary background for arguing that evil depends on good and does not depend on an evil first principle. From this perspective, Aquinas's account of emanation is one section of a tightly organized argument against the Cathars.

Third, many of the key issues that Aquinas raises when treating emanation have a contemporary polemical history within the Dominican order. While earlier authors discussed similar issues, Dominicans reworked these discussions in order to respond to the Cathars. For example, while Aquinas located helpful discussions of emanation and the problem that evil presents to there being a single source of creation in Pseudo-Dionysius, he put the latter's conceptual distinctions to a different use. Aquinas constructed a response to the Cathar's objection concerning the highest evil and in doing so focused on one of the key concerns of the Dominican order. Reading him in this Dominican context lends support to the view that he constructed an account of emanation in order to answer the Cathars. This was a key aim of the Dominican mission.

This has implications for how we ought to read Aquinas on both God and those things that proceed from God. In the Dominican tradition of Moneta of Cremona, Peter Martyr of Verona, and Rainerius Sacconi, Aquinas

defends the faith against living options of the thirteenth century. He does not offer an account of creation as an emanation for its own sake, that is, a merely theoretical account of the origin of creatures. Neomanichean objections to there being a single first principle introduce considerations of evil into his discussion of creation in general and provide an impetus for his account of emanation.

I do not mean to imply that the Neomanichees supplied Aquinas with his sole inducement for offering an account of emanation. Many factors are in play here: the attempt to understand what has been revealed in Scripture; bridging the chasm between the absolute simplicity of God and the distinctness of creation; as well as responding to Avicenna's view of the necessity of emanation.⁸⁷ Furthermore, there is something intellectually intriguing about borrowing concepts and accounts from Pseudo-Dionysius in order to describe a Neoplatonic procession from God.⁸⁸ Yet the issues that Aquinas raises when discussing the emanation of creation had their own history within his religious order, a history with which members would have been familiar. Discussing these issues within a treatment of emanation would have supplied Dominicans with an understanding of the origin of creation that ena-

87. Recently scholars have argued that Aquinas used the two emanation framework in his disputed questions *De potentia Dei* (*QDP*) in order to respond to Avicenna's view that creation is a necessary emanation. For instance, Gregory Reichberg claims that Aquinas distinguishes between a necessary internal and voluntary external emanation in order to avoid Avicenna's slippery slope into creation out of necessity. Since Aquinas clearly structures the first part of his *Summa theologiae* according to these two emanations, one might think that this interpretation would apply here as well. But the location of his arguments against viewing divine action as necessary does not support this interpretation. In question 19 of the *Summa*, Aquinas considers whether the will of God is the cause of things within his account of divine volition and not in his presentation of the emanation of creation as he had done in his *QD* (*ST* 1.19.4). His argument that divine action is voluntary on the part of God prepares for his discussion of the two emanations, but without any explicit mention of Avicenna. Such limited concern with Avicenna's view within his treatment of emanation suggests that this was not a central reason for structuring the first part as he did. See Gregory Reichberg, "The Communication of the Divine Nature: Thomas's Response to Neoplatonism," *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* 66 (1992): 218 and 227, note 14; Maurice Bouyges, "L'idée génératrice du De Potentia de Saint Thomas," *Revue de Philosophie* 2 (1931): 250–51, 256–67; and Beatrice H. Zedler, "Saint Thomas and Avicenna in the 'De Potentia Dei,'" *Traditio* 6 (1948): 107. For a clear account of Aquinas's argument that creation is not a necessary emanation from God see John Wippel, "The Latin Avicenna as a Source for Thomas Aquinas's Metaphysics," *Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie* 37 (1990): 79–81.

88. Hankey argues convincingly that by reading Aquinas in the context of the Neoplatonists we can begin to clarify the Neoplatonic, as well as, the Aristotelian character of his project. See Hankey, *God In Himself* 147; idem, "Denyand Aquinas" 172–73.

bled them to engage rationally with Cathars and Albigenses in France and Italy.⁸⁹ This context suggests why it was important for Aquinas to introduce an emanationalist account of creation into his *Summa*. Furthermore, by taking into consideration Aquinas's theological opponents we can contextualize motivations for the structure of the first part of his *Summa theologiae*. Reading this work within its textual and historical context brings to light the contemporary urgency of issues that might otherwise appear as mere speculation in Aquinas's modulated Latin prose.⁹⁰

89. The Neomanichees are never far from Aquinas's mind throughout his consideration of creation. For example, at the beginning of his treatment of bodily creatures he asks whether they are from God (*ST* 1.65.1). He is concerned to establish the uniqueness of the first principle before considering corporal creatures. Referring to the Neomanichees, he notes that some heretics claim that visible things were created by an evil principle and not by the good God. Against this position, he argues that since being is common to all things, both visible and invisible, there must be a single principle of being. In the second article he argues that all creatures were created for God's goodness, further distancing himself from the Neomanichean view that bodily creatures were created by an evil being (*ST* 1.65.2). Other examples of concern for the Neomanichees within his account of creation include Aquinas's stand against the dualism of the Neomanichees when he explains the positive role that matter plays in human understanding (*ST* 1.84.1–3), his account of how the human body represents divine perfection when he explains what it means to say that the first humans were made of the slime of the earth (*ST* 1.91.1), and his argument for a single governor of the world (*ST* 1.103.3).

90. I would like to thank David Barry, Daniel Fouke, and the anonymous readers at *Dionysius* for comments on earlier versions of this article.