

Agreement and the Self-Evident in Philo of Larissa

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I

Introduction

Philo of Larissa, head of the Academy after Clitomachus, has attracted comparatively little philosophical attention. The reasons for this are not difficult to imagine. His two principal opponents, Antiochus of Ascalon on the dogmatist side and Aenesidemus on the sceptic side, both regarded his position as fundamentally inconsistent.¹ Moreover it is difficult to determine the exact features of his mitigated form of Carneadean scepticism. Some reconstruction is undoubtedly possible, but there is no extant exposition of his epistemological system as such. Cicero is actually suspected of having suppressed its novel features.² And Philo has also been thought to have had nothing new to offer — to have been ‘mediocre and colourless’.³

Before one accuses a thinker of mediocrity one should perhaps consider the problems which confronted him. Philo was a successor of Carneades, head of a school which had, since Arcesilaus, presented an image of relentless devotion to scepticism. But it was also a school which traced its ancestry back to Plato and Socrates; this fact was now less able to be ignored, for interest in the old masters was flourishing and even the rival Stoics were paying attention to Plato’s writings.⁴ If the Academy could present itself as the official teacher of the doctrines of Plato and Socrates, then it would win greater appeal. It might expect the patronage of

1. Cic. *Ac.* 2.18; Aenes. in Photius cod. 212 170a28-38.

2. J. Glucker, *Antiochus and the late Academy (Hypomnemata v. 56)*, Göttingen 1978, hereafter cited simply as ‘Glucker’, pp. 83-88; this involves interesting discussion of Aug. *c.Acad.* 3.41.

3. Glucker p.88.

4. Glucker 28-30 presents much of the evidence for Panaetius’ love of Plato. This may, however, have been outwardly presented as an interest in Socrates, since Panaetius has a great deal to say on the ἀλήθεια, i.e. the historically acceptable portrayal as opposed to authenticity, of the Socratic works of Plato, Xenophon, Antisthenes, Aeschines, Phaedo, and Euclides (D.L. 2.61). Posidonius’ interest in Plato is also well attested, having centred on *Tim.* and *Rep.* and extended to *Phr.* (see F85, F141-149, F290-1 Kidd). To judge from F85 and F151 much of the credit for apparently positive doctrine in Plato may have been attributed to Pythagoras by Posidonius (cf. F. Novotny, *The Posthumous Life of Plato*, The Hague 1977, p.55).

eminent Romans, who hoped to learn something of practical value. If it clung too persistently to its sceptical attacks on the rival Stoics, and on Epicureans, Peripatetics, and others,⁵ then there was no chance that it would have wide appeal in the Roman world, particularly while it lacked the other major source of appeal: — a powerful rhetorician like Carneades at its head.

The course which Philo had to take was obvious. He needed to minimize the apparent conflict between Platonic and Carneadean philosophy in such a way that his teaching might offer, legitimately, sound practical advice on matters of ethics and politics. In this fashion his philosophy might be seen as (a) useful and (b) preserving an ancient heritage. Our sources confirm that he took this course. Two books, which maintained the unity of the Academy from Plato's time (Cic. *Ac.* 1.13), were the cause of his final split with Antiochus. It is certain that the one-Academy theme was of importance to these books; they probably provided the inspiration for both Plutarch and anon. *In Theaetetum*, who later take up and defend such a case.⁶ It is scarcely surprising that the books annoyed Antiochus intensely, for he had already been claiming to go back to the authority of the 'Old' Academy, abandoning the 'New'.⁷ The legitimacy of Antiochus' 'Old Academic' studies was being called into question.

It is not, therefore, surprising that much of the debate between Philonian and Antiochian supporters in Cicero's *Academica* concerns the rival views of the history of philosophy. Philonians maintained that the majority of Presocratics and Socrates too acknowledged that nothing could be known for certain, because of the inadequacy of our senses and the folly of our minds, the brevity of life and the depths in which the truth is hidden (Cic. *Ac.*

5. The Stoa continued to be the chief enemy, but we learn from S.E. *Math.* 7.159 that Carneades extended the sceptical attack against the criteria of all schools. In the first century B.C. Aenes. still sees the Stoics as the principal enemy of the Academy (Photius 170a15-17) on epistemological issues at least. While Cic. shows that Academics quarrelled with other schools on most issues, the *Academica* fail to suggest any lively debate with Peripatetics or Epicureans on criteriology. The reason will appear in section V of this paper.

6. anon. *In Th.* (ed. H. Diels and W. Schubart, Berlin 1905) cols. 54.43-55.7; Plut. *Lamprias Catalogue* no. 63: Περὶ τοῦ μίαν εἶναι ἀπὸ Πλάτωνος Ἀκαδημία.

7. See Gucker 18-21 on the relatively early date of Antiochus' movement towards dogmatism and his acquisition of a band of 'hearers'; I should date both slightly later than Gucker, but feel certain that a splinter-group was already in existence before the notorious *Sosus*-episode: — probably as a private circle, not yet openly disowning the Academy, but claiming allegiance to the Old Academy *rather than* the New.

1.44). Plato investigated virtually everything, affirmed nothing with certainty, and often argued *in utramque partem* (ibid. 1.46). Although the subject of non-apprehensibility (ἀκαταληψία) had not yet become the subject of formal debate, the Old Academics had always pondered the matter, and sought to refrain from rash assent (Aug. *c. Acad.* 2.14).

Philo never tried to show that these ancients condemned assent altogether and abandoned doctrine. Even where he is emphasizing the 'sceptical' elements in early thinkers, Cicero *in propria persona* is quite ready to admit that they had doctrines.⁸ The Philonian view of the unity of the Academy was probably similar to that of anon. *In Theaetetus* (dated by myself less than a century after Philo)⁹

8. *Ac.* 1.44-46, 2.72-74 are the principal passages; the latter speaks of positive opinions held by Anaxagoras (snow is black), and Democritus (truth does not exist, the senses are full of darkness). All well-known Presocratics and even Plato are credited with doctrines at 2.118.

9. I sketch the principal arguments for an early date: (a) anon. writes when *Tht.* was usually held to be about the criterion (fr.4, cf. 2.11-26; he is at pains to establish that it is about simple (non-systematic) knowledge (cf. also 15.2-27, 17. 25-32); but Thrasyllus (early I A.D.) can subtitle the work *περί ἐπιστήμης* (D.L. 3.58), suggesting that anon.'s view is then accepted; the age of Philo and Antiochus, with its keen debate on the criterion, would have seen that as the subject of *Tht.* (b) To mistakenly write αἰτία λογισμοῦ for αἰτίας λογισμῶ (3.3 and 15.22) when referring to such a key passage as *Meno* 98a was not possible in the Platonic boom-period (II A.D.). (c) There is little interest in *Tht.* in II A.D., though it was important at the time of Philo Judaeus (e.g. *Quis Heres* 181, 249, long quotations in *Fug.* 63, 86, and *Mut.Nom.* 212-3). (d) The ὁμοίωσις-doctrine is still at an early stage of development (7.14-22, cf. 58.39-59.2). (e) The passage on Socratic midwifery is likely to have preceded Plutarch's discussion (*Mor.* 999c ff.). (f) There are no signs of Middle Platonist preoccupation with metaphysics-cum-theology. (g) The author is impressed by pure Aenesidemian Pyrrhonism. (h) Ἀκαδημαϊκός is used as an adjective to describe Plato, a unique case likely to have arisen from Aenesidemus' distinction between Academic and Pyrrhonian species of scepticism. (i) anon., believing in one Academy, would see himself as an Academic, but not at the exclusion of being 'Platonic', whereas Middle Platonists call themselves Platonics *as opposed to* Academics, the latter being once again a genuinely sceptic group (Gellius *N.A.* 11.5.6-8). (j) Eudorus of Alexandria, called 'Academic' in 3 distinct sources, is a suitable candidate for identification with anon., having positive beliefs but failing to adhere to any dogmatic system. He was, contrary to modern opinion, no follower of Antiochus, whose chief pupil in Alexandria (Aristo) he opposed. *Plut. Mor.* 1013b involves esoteric criticism of Eudorus for his failure to apply Academic principles (εἰκός, εἴλογον) correctly when commenting upon *Tim.* (as anon. had also done). Eudorus is a potent influence on Philo Judaeus and Plutarch, but both would have shown more respect for a mild Academic-Platonist than for an Antiochian. See further my 'Academics and Platonics', *Prudentia* xii (1980) 109-118.

where all Academics “with very few exceptions”¹⁰ are said to have *dogmata* — the same ones as Plato, as the rest of the commentary was intended to show.¹¹ Although Plato refrained from making categorical statements, it was claimed that his opinion shone through to those familiar with his style (col.59.12-21).

Philo saw in Plato useful teaching without claims to certainty. He tried to suggest that this was the case with the Academic sceptics too. Carneades was no problem; Metrodorus of Stratonicea had already maintained that Carneades had approved the Peripatetic position whereby the sage will have opinions (Cic. *Ac.* 2.78). Philo not only agreed with this (*ibid.*), but also viewed the creation of healthy opinions in the mind of the student as the proper work of philosophy.¹² He must have emphasized the positive contribution which could be made by the Carneadean degrees of probability towards a sound foundation for rational belief.¹³ Even Clitomachus could be cited to show that the Carneadean does not withhold his assent in every sense of the word, and that he inclines towards impressions which are both probable and undistracted (*ἀπερίσπαστος*), *Ac.* 2.103-5. Cicero’s ‘Catulus’, who takes a conservative Academic stance, could agree that the sage will opine “but in such a way that he will be aware that he is (only) opining,

10. anon. could not have used such language if he had regarded both Arcesilaus’ Academy and stricter Carneadeans as being free of Platonic doctrine. Since Arcesilaus was thought by some to have taught Platonic doctrine privately (S.E. *PH.* 1.234), it is likely that anon. accepted this view, seeing strict Carneadeans as devoid of Platonic doctrine. But the author’s view of ‘Platonic’ doctrine was different from ours, see next note.

11. A commentary on *Tht.* would be able to claim that Plato’s views were the same as Academic views with reference to (a) Platonic acceptance of flux-theory and the relativity of mundane observations; (b) doubts about all mechanical explanations of knowledge; (c) belief in the constructive importance of elenctic methods; (d) the τέλος of ὁμοίωσις θεῷ. This last may seem minimally Academic, but since the τέλος and the criterion were the two principal issues of the day (*Ac.* 2.29), some effort must have been made to forge a reconciliation here. Philo’s view of the Platonic τέλος, of which we get a hint at *Ac.* 2.129 (cf. Glucker 53-60), involved wisdom and perhaps also unity. In *Tht.* ὁμοίωσις θεῷ is seen as true wisdom (176c), bringing virtue in its perfected and unified form, and based upon justice. If that wisdom were realised via inquiry and maieutic methods then it could be seen as a New Academic goal. Note that anon. shows Socrates to be likening himself to God in two ways (58.31-59.2), his concern for men and his *refusal to assent to falsehood or do away with truth* (*Tht.* 151d1-3). This god-like aim was reconcilable with Philo’s view of New Academic practice and purpose.

12. *Stob. Ecl.* 2.40.18-20 (Wachsmuth).

13. The clearest exposition of these is seen at S.E.7.166-189; their positive aspect is stressed at *Ac.* 2.105.

and know that there is nothing which can be apprehended (for certain). . . ." (Ac. 2.148). Thus it was easy to maintain that Carneades approved of opinions when accompanied by the doctrine of non-apprehensibility. Certain officially adopted opinions could achieve the status of a *dogma* as we see from Ac. 2.29 and 133 ('*quod mihi tecum est dogma commune*'), the word as yet meaning no more than 'doctrine'.¹⁴

It was rather more difficult to claim that Arcesilaus approved of opinions, but, whether or not he was their source, Philo certainly made use of rumours of esoteric teaching within Arcesilaus' Academy, known to us principally from Sextus (*PH.* 1.234); claims of similar activity are replied to with mocking disbelief by 'Lucullus' (Ac. 2.60). Here it is the Academic *sententia* which is allegedly kept secret; in Sextus it was τὰ Πλάτωνος; in anon. *In Th.* it is once again Platonic doctrine, but probably not Platonism as we should conceive of it;¹⁵ in Augustine (*c. Acad.* 3.43) it is thought to have been Platonic doctrine, but he is going beyond what he had read in Cicero. There the claim had simply been that the Academics only revealed their views to those who had remained loyal to them until old age. The advantage of these rumours to Philo's one-Academy thesis was clear: he could claim to be the direct inheritant of true Platonic doctrine, doctrine from which Antiochus, because of his age, was still excluded: — or had until recently been excluded. In either case Philo could appeal to the philosophical digression of the seventh Platonic *Epistle*, where Dionysius is castigated for attempting to reveal secret Platonic doctrine before he had had time to understand it adequately. One is even forced to consider the possibility that the digression was forged to suit Philo's purposes!¹⁶

Thus the view of the Academy presented by Philo was such that its principal characteristic was not lack of doctrine so much as

14. SVF fails to provide evidence of a sense of *dogma* which necessarily implies certainty, apart from 2.37.10-11, where Clement (*Strom.* 8.15) follows a post-Aenesidemian source. A good example of the weak sense of *dogma* may be seen at Strabo 15.1.59, where it is used of the teachings of the Brahmins and Sramans.

15. see above, n.11.

16. Because (a) it was an age when forgeries flourished, a direct result of the desire to establish ancient authorities for one's views; (b) the passage is sceptical in significant ways, even ἐπιστήμη, including νοῦς (342c4-5), being among things which are ἀσαφής (343b6-7) and fill men with ἀπορία and ἀσάφεια (c4-5); (c) the setting sees Dionysius as too ambitious (cf. Antiochus at Ac. 2.70, Plut. *Cic.* 4) and as a revealer of secret doctrine which he cannot yet have understood (cf. Aug. *c. Acad.* 3.43 = Cic. *Ac.* fr. 21 Müller). But the issue is complex.

caution: — the constant admission that its own views could not be established with certainty. Even in Varro, following Antiochus, the New Academic characteristic is a lack of certainty in what it proposes rather than any fixed set of proposals.¹⁷

Having sanctioned cautious assent, Philo was able to divide up the tasks of moral philosophy in such a way that the practices of the sceptical Academy were regarded as early steps in an education-process: a process which would lead in time to the transmission of a wide range of ethical and political doctrine, including material on the goal of life (τέλος). Stobaeus has preserved for us Philo's division of moral philosophy, and, like other authors, shows him to have been a respected Academic.¹⁸ Beyond the unhelpful description of the goal as εὐδαιμονία, Stobaeus does not elaborate on how Philo conceived of it, but Cicero offers clues as to the goal which he, and presumably Philo, thought to be Platonic.¹⁹ That goal was epistemological: knowledge or wisdom of some kind.

II

Epistemological outlook

Philo had probably announced himself as a teacher of Platonic ethics, but in theory of knowledge it is more doubtful whether he claimed to be Platonic. He acknowledged that the epistemological issues of his own day were not formally debated in Plato's time (Aug. *c.Acad.* 2.14). His insistence that elenchus is required for cathartic purposes, expelling unhealthy opinions before healthy ones were implanted,²⁰ may remind one of *Meno* 84a-c or *Tht.* 150b ff; but there the healthy opinions are solicited *from within*. At first sight they would appear to be implanted from outside in Philo;²¹ but this may be due to comparison with physical healing which runs throughout the passage, since health-giving opinions must fulfil the role of medicines consumed. Only from *Ac.* 2.60 does it become plain that Philo realised that philosophical progress came from within: the Academics had been concealing their view in order that the hearer should use *ratio* rather than *auctoritas*.²² Even

17. Aug. *CD.* 19.1-3.

18. 2.39.20ff Wachsmuth; for respect for Philo see also Cic. *Ac.* 1.13, *Brut.* 306, Aug. *c.Acad.* 3.41; contrast Numenius fr.28 des Places = 8 Lang.

19. See n.11 section (d).

20. Stob. *Ecl.* 2.40.18-20 Wachsmuth.

21. note the expression τῶν ὑγιῶς ἔχουσῶν (sc. δοξῶν) ἐνθαιτικόν.

22. Here we meet Philo's chief complaint against dogmatism: it encourages one to depend upon one's teacher rather than on informed evaluation of both sides of a case. *Ac.* 2.60, 2.7-9, and Aug. *c.Acad.* 1.3.7

here no connexion with Plato is obvious, and Hermann's theory that Philo was reviving true Platonic epistemology²³ (as distinct from claiming Plato's authority for his own version of Academic theory) is probably doomed to oblivion.

One concept commonly thought to play a significant role, if not the primary role, in Philo's retreat from a sceptic position, is that of the self-evident (ἐνάργεια).²⁴ In the *Academica* we hear of a group of Academics, the less conservative members of Philo's school, who distinguished between *perspicua* (ἐναργῆ) and *percepta* (καταληπτά), 2.34. Philo was certainly among them, though we have no guarantee that it was primarily his theory. Anon. *In Tht.* (col. 70) shows that the admission of ἐνάργεια was the orthodox position of the later New Academy, and Aenesidemus offers further confirmation; this latter, who is clearly attacking a Philonian position in Photius cod. 212, 170a17-35,²⁵ introduces a dilemma which only works against his Philonian opponents if they were tempted to approve the proposition that things are "self-evidently grasped (in a general sense) through sensation or thought" (ἐναργῶς κατ' αἰσθησιν ἢ κατὰ νόησιν καταλαμβάνεται). Later evidence suggests that the terminology, verb excepted, is accurate.²⁶ Anon. *In Tht.* reports that the Academics²⁷ agree that

(*placuit Ciceroni nostro beatum esse qui veritatem investigat, etiam si ad eius inventionem non valet pervenire*) show an Academic ideal of free inquiry. Here lie the origins of the term σκεπτικός, which by Philo Judaeus' time had yet to acquire its later established sense of "searching without ever coming to conclusions". *Ebr.* 202 still assumes that the goal of the σκέψεις of the σκεπτικός is discovery. Traces of a new meaning (under-emphasized by K. Janacek in *Listy Filologicke cii* [1979] 65-68) appear at *Fug.* 209 and *Congr.* 52, but are still in their infancy. See also *QG.* 3.33.

23. In *Disputatio de Philone Larissaeo* and *De Philone Larissaeo Disputatio Altera* (Göttingen 1851/55).

24. Glucker 71-83 provides good discussion of the literature. Emphasis on the self-evident was to begin with Hermann's Göttingen Disputations (see n. 23), and continued with Zeller (*Die Philosophie der Griechen* vol.3, 616-7 or Eng. trans. by S.F. Alleyne 83-85), Hirzel (*Untersuchungen zu Ciceros Philosophischen Schriften*, hereafter cited as 'Hirzel' + vol.no., Leipzig 1882, 3.205-214), and Brochard (*Les Sceptiques Grecs*, Paris 1887, 197-201). Glucker notes that Cicero does not present the doctrine as being peculiar to Philo at *Ac.* 2.34.

25. K. Janacek in *Eirene* xiv (1976) 93-100 shows that Photius has preserved Aenesidemus terminology faithfully; Aenesidemus in turn must have given a plausible account of official Academic views and practices, since the work was addressed to the Academic L. Aelius Tubero.

26. τὰ πρὸς αἰσθησίν τε καὶ νόησιν ἐναργῶς φαινόμενα is technical terminology in both Galen (e.g. *Opt. Doctr.* p. 89.23-90.10 Marquardt, *Plac.* 2.256, 9.725 *et al.*) and Clement *Strom.* 8.7.3, 8.7.8, 8.8.1. Galen has much to say on ἐνάργεια; both use the principle of ὁμολογία (Clement *Strom.*

certain things are self-evident, but, because contrary arguments can always be found, no proof should be sought in such cases.²⁸ Evidence for the use of the self-evident is not often found in Cicero's reply to 'Lucullus', but much of the material of 72-109 either is Clitomachian or has a distinct Clitomachian character. At 105 there seems to be approval of the notion of *perspicuitas*, but not of the term itself. At 107 there may be an Academic appeal to the *perspicuum*, but Reid's conjecture would bring it about that the appeal comes from the dogmatist side. At 132 there certainly is an appeal to the *perspicuum*: where Cicero's source (if source he must have) can only be post-Clitomachian.

If we look for the origins of Academic interest in the self-evident, then we are led to Carneades himself, as Sextus (*Math.* 7.160-1) uses such terminology in reporting Carneades' general attack on criteria of knowledge.²⁹ Antiochus (see 7.162) is probably Sextus' source, and the arguments may have been adulterated with later Academic language (especially as the source understands all post-Socratic systems in terms of the self-evident (see 7.143-4, 200, 203, 211-6, 218-9, 221, 257). In any case the passage does not suggest that Carneades acknowledged the existence of anything self-evident. More interesting is *Ac.* 2.99, where Carneades is said by Clitomachus to have related all argument against *perspicuitas* and the senses to an attack on 'cataleptic' rather than probable presentations. This might be thought, and may have been thought by some Academics, to imply Carneades' approval of the notion of the self-evident as applied to certain very persuasive presentations, even though it was not possible to approve of the self-evident as a guarantee of truth.

Glucker believes that the distinction between *perspicua* and *percepta*, with recognition of the former but not of the latter, could go back to Metrodorus of Stratonicea.³⁰ This theory is superficially attractive (a) because Philo is linked with Metrodorus in his

8.3.3, 4.1, 4.3, 5.1, 6.2; for Galen see n.74). The verb is unlikely to have been standard Philonian expression, since elsewhere φαίνεσθαι is used in preference to καταλαμβάνεσθαι. The latter is found in Aenes. because the dispute with Philo was particularly concerned with the terms καταληπτός and ἀκατάληπτος, cf. 169b42-170a3 and the importance of ἀκατάληψία as a theme of the work as a whole 169b19-21, 25-26, 28-29. Philo allowed the possibility that assent to an impression which was true/self-evident was an act of κατάληψις in a non-Stoic sense, see below pp. 84-88.

27. 70.12-26; the work takes a particularly Philonian view of the Academy, cf. the one-Academy thesis at 54.43ff.

28. cf. Cic. *ND.* 3.9 (Cotta): "*perspicuitas ratione elevatur*".

29. Glucker p.78.

30. pp. 77-78, after Brochard *Les Sceptiques Grecs*, hereafter SG., 197-8.

interpretation of Carneades,³¹ (b) because Metrodorus was formerly an Epicurean and may have been tempted to translate Carneadean thought into Epicurean terminology,³² and (c) because Philo may well have inherited from Metrodorus his interest, however hostile, in Epicurean thought.³³

That the concept was of particular interest to Philo is most clearly attested by Numenius' report (fr. 28 des Places = fr. 8 Lang): ἡ δὲ τῶν παθημάτων αὐτοῦ ἀνέστρεφεν ἐνάργειά τε καὶ ὁμολογία. Here παθήματα are not the πάθη (for this would make Philo an adherent of Cyrenaic theory of knowledge),³⁴ but rather our conscious experiences as a whole, particularly those which we should classify as cognitive experiences.³⁵

III

Agreement

More troublesome than this is the term ὁμολογία. Does it mean internal consistency or general agreement? Did Philo recognize a large class of matters over which mankind could arrive at a general, if not universal, consensus? Such a meaning would not exclude matters of consistency from consideration, but it is important to establish whether the narrower or the wider sense of ὁμολογία should here be understood.

The obvious method of determining which sense is more likely here is to examine other relevant authors in search of some link between ἐνάργεια and ὁμολογία. One is not disappointed; such links are particularly noticeable in Galen, where both senses of ὁμολογία are relevant (see below p. 94 and n. 74). Clement of Alexandria, following in *Strom.* 8 an earlier handbook of logic (see n.26 and below p.92), insists that demonstration must begin from principles which are *generally agreed*, going on to recommend as

31. *Ac.* 2.78, showing *at least* that Metrodorus did not see suspension of judgement as a Carneadean ideal.

32. *Ep. ad Her.* 48, 52, 71, 82, also 72 (ἐνάργημα); *Ep. ad Pyth.* 91, 93, 96 (all ἐνάργημα); *Sent.* 22; *Nat.* 28, fr. 21.6 Arrighetti, etc.

33. He encouraged pupils to hear Zeno of Sidon, *Cic. ND.* 1.59, and had a tremendous memory for the *Sententiae* of Epicurus, *ibid.* 113.

34. There was, however, great Academic interest in the Cyrenaic doctrine that the πάθη alone are καταληπτά (*Ac.* 2.20, 142, anon. *In Th.* 65.29-39, *S.E.Math.* 7.190-200). [Plut.] *Lib.* 4 (p.42 Sandbach) is particularly interesting: ἔδει μὲν τοὺς δογματικούς καὶ καταληπτικούς εἶναι φιλοσόφους φάσκοντας, εἰ μὴ περὶ ἄλλο τι, τὴν γε τῶν πάθων ἐνάργειαν ὁμολογεῖν ἀλλήλοις καὶ συμφέρεσθαι. Note the link between agreement and self-evident.

35. πάθημα is used frequently by Plato in such a sense, e.g. *Tim.* 61c5, 65c2, 67b1, e3, *Th.* 186c2, d2.

such whatever appears self-evident to the senses or intellect. But what of Cicero, in whom we might expect to find traces of Philo's doctrine? Very occasionally, following the Stoics (*ND.* 2.4) or Antiochus (*Fin.* 5.55) one finds him claiming that *perspicua* OUGHT NOT to be doubted. But in *ND.* 3.9-11 'Cotta', the Academic speaker, produces the connexion for which we seek: '*evidens de quo inter omnis conveniat*' and '*hoc perspicuum sit constetque inter omnis*'. Here at least the *perspicuum* IS NOT doubted. This may be a case of the application to philosophical problems of an orator's view of *perspicuitas* (cf. *De Or.* 2.132, *Inv.* 1.92), but it is important that such a view should have been introduced into philosophy by Cicero's day.

It is the same concept of the self-evident which is used by Plutarch, who probably follows a conventional form of anti-Stoic attack in the *De Communibus Notitiis*. Here he attempts to turn the Stoic accusations that the Academics contravene the common notions and accepted usage (κοινὰ ἔννοιαι, συνήθεια) against the Stoics' own excesses. In a number of places he appeals to ἐνάργεια as if it were considered to be of the same kind of universally recognizable quality as accepted usage and the common notions.³⁶ I quote three passages:

- (a) καὶ μὴν οὕτως οὐδὲν ἐναργές ἐστι καὶ τῶν κοινῶν ἐχόμενον
 ἔννοιῶν ὡς τὸ εἶ τι μὴ ἔμψυχόν ἐστιν, ἐκεῖνο ἄψυχον εἶναι,
 (1074b)
- (b) καίτοι πῶς οὐκ ἐναργές ἐστι. . . ; ταῦτα γὰρ ἐπίστανται καὶ
 διανοοῦνται πάντες, ἂν μὴ Στωικοὶ γένωνται. (1079a)
- (c) ὑπερβολὴ τίς ἐστιν ὀλιγωρίας καὶ παρανομίας εἰς τὴν ἐνάργειαν
 καὶ τὴν συνήθειαν. (1084b)

Together the three passages clearly show the interrelation between the three concepts: self-evident, common notion, and accustomed usage.

Plutarch is also liable to charge the Stoics with having deserted ὁμολογία in this essay. At 1062e we read ἢ πού σοι δοκοῦσι θαυμασιῶς ἐν τοῖς δόγμασι τὴν ὁμολογίαν βεβαιοῦν; This may seem at first to be an accusation of internal inconsistency, particularly when the sentence had begun ὅταν μὲν οὖν μηδενὸς ἐκστήναι τῶν μαχομένων . . . θέλωσι. But no inconsistency is brought out, and the

36. All three concepts seem to be used in a non-technical manner by Plutarch, who gives the impression of not distinguishing rigidly between them. Note the connexion between συνήθεια and γνήσια ἔννοιαι at 1070bc which may remind one of the true offspring which Socratic midwifery was supposed to solicit from within the mind of the individual.

continuation (beginning $\xi\tau\iota\ \delta\acute{\epsilon}\ \mu\acute{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\omicron\nu\ \acute{\epsilon}\nu\ \tau\omicron\iota\varsigma\ \pi\rho\acute{\alpha}\gamma\mu\alpha\sigma\iota\nu$), though it does seem to point out a positive contradiction in Stoic behaviour, nevertheless constitutes a charge of contravention of the common notions (1062f). One strongly suspects that the concept of $\delta\mu\omicron\lambda\omicron\gamma\iota\alpha$ being applied does not stop short at internal consistency. Again at 1069f we read that the ethics of the Old Academy and early Peripatetics conceded $\tau\eta\nu\ \acute{\alpha}\lambda\eta\theta\acute{\omega}\varsigma\ \tau\eta\ \phi\acute{\upsilon}\sigma\epsilon\iota\ \pi\rho\acute{\omicron}\sigma\phi\omicron\rho\omicron\nu\ \kappa\alpha\iota\ \sigma\upsilon\nu\varphi\delta\omicron\nu\ \delta\mu\omicron\lambda\omicron\gamma\iota\alpha\nu$. Here the meaning of $\delta\mu\omicron\lambda\omicron\gamma\iota\alpha$ is naturally somewhat confused by the attempt to bring to mind the Stoic doctrine of $\tau\omicron\ \delta\mu\omicron\lambda\omicron\gamma\omicron\mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu\omega\varsigma\ \tau\eta\ \phi\acute{\upsilon}\sigma\epsilon\iota\ \zeta\eta\nu$, but Plutarch clearly implies that true $\delta\mu\omicron\lambda\omicron\gamma\iota\alpha$ concerns naturalness, general agreement, and consistency in one's doctrine. It is very difficult to separate these three elements of the term in such contexts. At times Plutarch sees a close connexion between $\tau\omicron\ \delta\mu\omicron\lambda\omicron\gamma\omicron\epsilon\iota\nu\ \tau\eta\ \phi\acute{\upsilon}\sigma\epsilon\iota$ and acceptance of common notions (1060a, b), even going so far as to use the expression $\tau\alpha\iota\varsigma\ \kappa\omicron\iota\nu\alpha\iota\varsigma\ \pi\rho\omicron\lambda\acute{\eta}\nu\epsilon\sigma\iota\ \dots\ \delta\mu\omicron\lambda\omicron\gamma\omicron\mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu\omega\varsigma$ (1074f).

From Plutarch we see (a) that the self-evident is linked with man's natural/common notions, and (b) that agreement with nature is thought to be a strange concept if divorced from such natural notions. The way the terms are used in this essay is important because Plutarch's Academic leanings seem Philonian rather than Clitomachian, and he probably has some post-Clitomachian model for this line of attack. The essay shows no firm commitment to common notions, accustomed usage, the self-evident, or agreement (at times such commitment appears elsewhere in the *Moralia*) but it is easy to see how attacks on the Stoics, based on their contravention of their own principles (interpreted in a non-Stoic way), might very soon lead to the acceptance of the validity of (their version of) these principles by less conservative Academics. It is a small step from the claim that the Stoics are convicted by the criteria of agreement and the self-evident to the realisation that Academic objections to their excesses are supported by such criteria.

The evidence of Sextus is also important, this time because much of his thought stems from that of Aenesidemus, who appears to have been associated with Philo's Academy.³⁷ I offer three passages from Sextus which link the self-evident with general agreement:

37. Photius 169b32-35 indicates that Aenesidemus had belonged to the same $\alpha\acute{\iota}\rho\epsilon\sigma\iota\varsigma$ (sect rather than school) as L. <Aelius> Tubero, presumably the Academic friend of Cicero (*Lig.* 21), and certainly an Academic (see 169b33).

- (a) πᾶν γάρ τὸ δι' ἐναργείας προσπίπτον κοινῶς τε καὶ συμφώνως λαμβάνεσθαι πέφυκεν ὑπὸ τῶν ἀπαραποδίστους ἔχόντων τὰς ἀντιλήψεις, (Math. 11.76)
- (b) τῶν δεικνυμένων ἐστὶν ἡ ἐνάργεια, τὸ δὲ δεικτόν ἐστι φαινόμενον. τὸ δὲ φαινόμενον, ἢ φαίνεται, κοινῶς πᾶσι ληπτὸν ἐστὶ, (Math. 11.240)
- (c) ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ περιπτωτικῶς κατ' ἐνάργειαν λέγεται ὑποπεσεῖν αὐτῷ καὶ κατειληφέναι τὸ ἄδηλον, οὕτως ἂν οὐδὲ ἄδηλον εἶη ἀλλὰ πᾶσιν ἐπ' ἴσης φαινόμενον καὶ ὁμολογοῦμενον καὶ μὴ διαπεφωνημένον. (PH. 2.8)

Passages (a) and (b) serve to support the connexion between the self-evident and the universally apprehended; passages (a) and (c) emphasize the connexion with συμφωνία and ὁμολογία. Passages (b) and (c) also operate with the concept of the φαινόμενον. It is significant that τὸ κοινῶς πᾶσι ληπτὸν (Math. 8.8), συμφωνία /διαφωνία (ibid. 53),³⁸ ὁμολογία (PH. 1.181, 183, and τὸ φαινόμενον (D.L. 9.106 etc.),³⁹ had all been of relevance to Aenesidemian Pyrrhonism, and it is possible that their connexion with the self-evident also goes back to Aenesidemus and to his Academic training.

Questions of individual and communal cognition clearly became important in Aenesidemus' day, but it is not obvious why. Aenesidemian arguments against truth (Math, 8.40-54) use the dichotomy between πᾶσι κοινῶς νοητόν and τισὶν ἰδίως νοητόν to prove that truth cannot be any νοητόν (44-45). More important is Aenesidemus' reply to the notion that truth might be the 'probable' (πιθανόν), since the obvious place for such a notion to originate was the probabilist Academy when, under Philo, it was ready to accept the existence of truth: since all are not persuaded (πειθεσθαι) by the same things, the theory would bring it about that opposite impressions were true, making the same thing existent and non-existent, true and false (52). Consideration follows of the idea that what persuades the majority is true: the majority, being healthy, regard honey as sweet (truly), while the individual with jaundice perceives it as bitter (falsely). Like the relativity of true/false to whatever persuades the individual, the issue of the

38. cf. the Pyrrhonism opposed by Clement's source at *Strom.* 8.22.1ff, and that espoused by Philo's source at *Ebr.* 180, 198.

39. A concept of fundamental importance to Aenes., cf. anon. In *Th.* col.61. Note his assumption (S.E. *Math.* 8.215) that τὰ φαινόμενα appear in approximately the same way to people who are in approximately the same condition, which guarantees the Aenesidemian nature of the passages quoted.

perception of sweet/bitter by healthy/sick people had been raised by Plato's *Theaetetus* (159b ff), which was probably the principal Platonic text for the Academic sceptics. There 'Protagoras' had taken up the question (166e), and tried to distinguish between *healthy* and *true* opinions: the sick man's perceptions will be less healthy but no less true (167bc). But Philo, preserving Protagoras' comparison between the intellectual condition and physical health (Stob. *Ecl.* 2.39.20ff), makes *healthy* opinions the opposite of those that have arisen *falsely* (ibid. 2.40.18-20), suggesting an equation of true opinions with healthy ones. If Philo also believed that health was the natural and normal condition, he ought also to believe that truth is both natural and normal; and, just as the majority are healthy enough to perceive sweetness truly, they are also liable to be correct on other issues which are open to them to judge. Thus Philo had good reason to give serious consideration to the equation of truth with τὸ τῷ πλῆθει πιθανόν, firstly because the possibility arises from consideration of a principal Platonic text, and secondly because his own thought tended in that direction (if only with regard to matters of common knowledge). And Aenesidemus' harsh criticism of the view in question (53-54), which he actually calls ληρῶδες, suggests that *somebody* held *some* view of which this is a simplification.

Aenesidemus shows similar interest in questions of individual opinion and communal agreement in his eight 'tropes' against cause-theory (*PH.* 1.180-5). There is the expected suspicion of 'private hypotheses' (183-4), and we find appeals to lack of ὁμολογουμένη ἐπιμαρτύρησις (181), and κοινὰ καὶ ὁμολογούμενα ἔφοδοι (183). The passage confirms that general agreement had become an issue for the epistemology of the early 1st century B.C.

IV

Aenesidemus and 'Heraclitus'

Further important evidence, though difficult to use, is to be found in the 'Heraclitian' theory of truth associated with οἱ περὶ τὸν Αἰνησίδημον at *Math.* 8.8 They say that some φαινόμενα appear to all κοινῶς, and others to τινὶ ἰδίως the former being true and the latter false. Truth (ἀληθές) is thus τὸ μὴ λήθον τὴν κοινὴν γνώμην. Though it has strong affinities with the view that truth is what is persuasive for the majority at *Math.* 8.53, the doctrine is generally agreed to be related to the view of Heraclitus' epistemology given at *Math.* 7.126-134.⁴⁰ Some regard the source

40. J.M. Rist, 'The Heraclitism of Aenesidemus', *Phoenix* xxiv (1970) p.316; U.Burkhard, *Die angebliche Heraklit-Nachfolge des Skeptikers Aenesidem*, Bonn

of the doxography as Posidonius,⁴¹ but there is no evidence to link Posidonius with any sections beyond 92-109 (on the Pythagoreans) and 115-121 (the first account of Empedocles).⁴² These sections concern like-by-like cognition, and both introduce thinkers other than those being immediately tackled in a way that seems out of place in a doxography; when one reflects that Posidonius had been discussing Pythagorean theory while interpreting Plato's *Timaeus*⁴³ this is not surprising. The material cannot come from a doxography; it would have been a strange doxography which included a Rhodian anecdote (107-8). If it did not come from a doxography, then there is no reason why it should have come from a work which discussed details of epistemologies not relevant to like-by-like cognition or to Plato's *Timaeus*. Evidence of Posidonius' interest in epistemology is extremely thin, and it is likely that he wrote only one book *On the Criterion*.⁴⁴

The doxography of *Math.* 7.89-260 is of unparalleled length and detail. Though we might have expected Sextus to offer a comparatively detailed doxography on the criterion, the detail of

1973, hereafter cited simply as 'Burkhard', pp. 75ff.

41. This possibility is allowed by Hirzel 3.495 in his pioneering discussion of this source-problem at 3.493-524; it has been more influential than it ought, and Burkhard follows to the limited extent of requiring Posidonius as source of the basic Heraclitian doctrine as well as the passages where I admit Posidonian influence. It is damaging to his case that he cannot see Posidonius as a single source for 89-140, for there is no reason then to suppose that the source of 93ff is the same as that of 126ff.

42. Note that this first (Posidonian) account of Empedocles is much less in accord with the rest of the picture of Presocratic epistemology than the second (122-5), which suggests a kind of λόγος to which Empedocles looks for his criterion. The former view says much about Democritus' use of like-by-like cognition, *even though* nothing is said of it in the section on Democritus; much too is said of Plato's use of the principle, even though nothing is said in the section on Plato (141-4). The very fact that the former view of Empedocles contains so much comparative material serves to divorce it from the rest of the doxography:- apart from the earlier Posidonian passage at 93-109, where Empedocles has just been quoted (anonymously) and Plato's *Tim.* is again mentioned.

43. This is stated at 7.93 (=F85 Kidd); clearly the quotation of Empedocles B109 and much of what follows proceeds from the interpretation of *Tim.* Though Posidonius would probably have had no motive for a commentary on all of the work, I see evidence of systematic interpretation of its theory of soul. All three fragments of Posidonius which involve *Tim.* (F85, 141, 291 Kidd) could have come from such a limited exposition.

44. Note that D.L. 7.54, probably still following Diocles of Magnesia, does not specify the volume no. in referring to the work *On the Criterion*, though he had done so in respect of works by Chrysippus at 7.50 and 7.54 (*bis*). The nature of the information given by D.L. suggests that the work did not contain a weighty doxography.

7.89-260 goes far beyond his needs. This is only explicable on the assumption that he had a convenient extended doxography to draw on. In that case why should he select a different doxographical source for 89-140 from that used at 141ff? Were the latter thinkers not tackled in the source of 89-140? Or the earlier thinkers not tackled in the source for 141ff? I find the theory that Posidonius was the source of the earlier chapters and Antiochus of the later chapters⁴⁵ quite unpalatable. There is a theme which underlies the whole: the early physicists, while criticizing the senses, introduced some kind of reason (λόγος) as criterion.⁴⁶ Plato retained λόγος but made an advance by adding the ἐνάργεια which comes via the senses (141-4), and the Old Academy also took due note of the senses (145-9). After very full consideration of the New Academy, during which Antiochus is allowed space to explain Carneades' lessons for the dogmatists (162-3), we go on to the Cyrenaics (another *Socratic* school, 190), and learn that they adhere to ἐνάργεια without λόγος (200). After an Antiochian interlude (201-2) we proceed to consider Epicurus (203-216), the foundation of whose theory is ἐνάργεια (216).⁴⁷ The Peripatetic school is found to apply ἐνάργεια to both sensibles and intelligibles (218). The final section on the Stoics centres chiefly on their difficulties (227-260), but ends on a note which reveals strikingly the source's liking for ἐνάργεια (257) as embodied in the later Stoic theory of the καταληπτική φαντασία: to the point where he ridicules those who admit the existence of objects while slandering sense-presentations (260).

It seems to me entirely plausible that the overall source is Antiochus or Aenesidemus writing from an Antiochian point of view, possibly through one character in a dialogue (for he is unlikely to have agreed with it).⁴⁸ It would have suited Antiochus

45. Hirzel (3.495) did not commit himself to this view. See n.41.

46. Thales etc. (89) and Anaxagoras (91) adopted λόγος in a general sense, Pythagoras (92) mathematical λόγος, Xenophanes (110) the doxastic variety, Parmenides (111-4) the epistemonic kind, Empedocles (view 2) adhered to ὀρθός λόγος (122), Heraclitus to a divine kind (126ff), and Democritus to the λόγος which he called a γνησίη γνώσις (138-9).

47. Rather than suggesting that *Math.* 7.203-216 misreports the Epicurean use of ἐνάργεια (we may look forward to a paper by D.N. Sedley on such a topic), I shall merely point out that the details of Epicurean theory, as set out here, do not seem to warrant such great emphasis being placed on ἐνάργεια, particularly from 211 to 216.

48. Though we have no evidence for Aenesidemus dialogues, it would have been as natural for him as for Antiochus or Cicero to have written one. As D.N. Sedley points out to me, the ascription of the 'Heraclitian' doctrines of Aenesidemus now to Heraclitus and now to Aenesidemus (and now to the one 'according to' the other) might best be explained on

well to see the Presocratics as adherents of λόγος, despising the senses yet unable to do without them.⁴⁹ The Socratic schools can then claim credit for the defence of ἐνάργεια, with the Peripatetics going on to show how the ἐνάργεια of the senses can give rise to the same quality in conceptual thought (cf. the Antiochian view at *Ac.* 2.21-22); the Stoics may then work out in greater detail what the criterion has to be.

The organization of the material suggests strongly that the Antiochian source dates from before any open break with the Philonian Academy.⁵⁰ There is no division of Academy into Old and New; no harsh criticism of the New Academics, rather an attempt to learn from their arguments. There is much superficial criticism of the Stoics, the traditional Academic enemy, and the obvious agreement with Stoic theory at 257-260 could be interpreted as a defence of ἐνάργεια rather than of the καταληπτικὴ

the hypothesis that Heraclitus was a character in an Aenesidemian dialogue, perhaps conversing with Zeno or Cleanthes, and no doubt winning the argument. But in any case we cannot assume that Aenesidemus devoted great efforts to thinking out for himself an essentially *coherent* view of the development of criteriology. A sceptic makes capital out of contrasting the *opposing* views of the dogmatists (cf. *Math.* 7.261), but this doxography is set out with the positive purpose of enabling us to draw certain lessons from each successive school. Another sceptic approach is to exaggerate the importance of sceptical elements in the most unlikely of poets and philosophers (D.L. 9.71-73), and nothing could be further from the thrust of *Math* 7.89ff. The view of Plato, moreover, is alien to that of Aenes. whether one agrees with the emendation of Heintz or that of Natorp at *PH.* 1.222 (see Burkhard 21-28). In the former (likelier) case Aenes. would be a proponent of the view that Plato was truly σκεπτικός (though *not* of course Pyrrhonian); in the latter case he would have argued *as Sextus does* against seeing Plato as purely sceptical: and Sextus does not argue as if he has any positive view of a Platonic criterion.

49. Claiming allegiance to Plato, and wishing to see Plato making a significant step towards his own theory, Antiochus could not argue that the Presocratics had advanced far towards grasping the notion of ἐνάργεια, but he did want to be able to appeal to them on occasions (*Aug. c. Acad.* 2.15).

50. That Antiochus had been expressing pro-Stoic views before 87 B.C. appears from *Ac.* 2.69 (see n.7). A strong, if esoteric, argument for an early date for Sextus' Antiochian source is that Plato is given a doctrine which makes ἐνάργεια *per se* no indication of truth (7.143). This would involve him in making a distinction between *perspicua* and *percepta*, a distinction adopted by Philo's Academy but totally opposed by Antiochus at *Ac.* 2.34. After the *Sosus*-affair Antiochus would never have agreed to see Plato in this manner. The assertion that Plato's περιληπτικός λόγος is ἴσος τῷ καταληπτικῷ shows his adoption of κατάληψις by this stage, but does not openly involve his acceptance of the Stoic καταληπτικὴ φαντασία.

φαντασία as defined by the Stoic.⁵¹ There is no open attempt to judge the principal issue over which Stoics and Academics diverge when it is raised at 252. Antiochus could still *claim* to be working in the Academic tradition, and to be setting forth theories (as they appeared to him) impartially.⁵² But he would certainly be *suspected* of Stoicism.

A point in favour of seeing a single main source for the whole doxography is the appearance of the concepts of doxastic reason and epistemonic reason in relation to Xenophanes and Parmenides (110-114). Much the same terminology occurs in relation to Speusippus (epistemonic reason and epistemonic sensation, 145-6) and Xenocrates (epistemonic reason and doxastic substance, 147-8). The concepts of epistemonic and doxastic (now δοξαστικός rather than δοξαστός) reason come to be found in Platonism alongside a more exalted divine reason ([Alcinous] *Didasc.* 4, p.154.18-28 Hermann),⁵³ and a divine reason is found in the accounts of Empedocles and Heraclitus at *Math.* 7.122 and 127-133 respectively. Sextus' source is working with a division of reason into doxastic, epistemonic, and divine which is later regarded as Platonic, a slight indication that his source was nominally a Platonist.

The presence of Posidonian elements at 92-109 and 115-9 is due *either* to Antiochus' having admired Posidonian (early) work on like-by-like cognition, *or* to Aenesidemus' having worked these Posidonian elements into an account otherwise written from an Antiochian point of view. It is not due to Sextus' introduction of the material, as everything in 7.89-260 belongs to the intellectual climate of the first century B.C.

If my overall view of *Math.* 7.89-260 is correct, then the source for the Heraclitian section (126-134) will be Antiochus of Ascalon, still nominally an Academic but with strong Stoic sympathies (cf. Cic. *Ac.* 2.69). With such a view I am not forced to distinguish between the physical theory of the basic source (126-131a) and the additional epistemology contributed by Aenesidemus (131b-134),

51. Note that 258 shows how a man strives for a τρανή και πληκτική φαντασία, i.e. for compelling clarity; note also the light-metaphor applied to our senses at 259-260 (cf. *Ac.* 2.46).

52. Though interpretation of pre-Aristotelian thinkers is highly coloured by fanciful and biased interpretation, the treatment of later systems is fairly sound.

53. R.E. Witt, *Albinus and the History of Middle Platonism*, Cambridge 1937, hereafter cited as *Albinus*, p. 15, regards the terminology of *Didasc.* as Old Academic, arguing from the similarity with *Math.* 7.145-9. But since 7.110-4 uses the same terms in relation to Presocratics it is sounder to see the terminology as that of Sextus' source.

as Burkhard is compelled to do.⁵⁴ It seems to me that the Academy was quite capable of having produced the whole theory, particularly if a new emphasis on near-universal agreement on certain issues had led them to consider the idea that τὰ κοινῆ φαινόμενα are reliable while τὰ κατ' ἰδίαν ἐκάστω φαινόμενα are false (134). If I were then forced to consider the rest of Aenesidemus' 'Heraclitian' doctrines as Academic in origin, that would not be damning; Rist tried to place them in an Academic context, and an Academic origin would in no way conflict with Burkhard's thesis that they were an anti-Stoic device.

One cannot simply identify the theory of knowledge attributed to Heraclitus at *Math.* 7.126-134 with *the* theory adopted for *themselves* by the fourth Academy. It was only one theory which they found to be illuminating. It involved doctrines which could never have been adopted by the Academy directly, such as the use of air (not fire) as the first-principle and source of animation (*Math.* 10.233; Cicero probably knew this account⁵⁵). It involved an odd view of the mind whereby it actually emerges through the sense-organs so as to establish contact with the animate/rational air outside;⁵⁶ this may be related to Antiochus' view that the mind ought to be completely involved in the act of sensation.⁵⁷ The overall consistency of these elements of the alleged Heraclitian views of Aenesidemus (other points may be unrelated) suggests that somebody had worked out a very biased Heraclitian system; it took more than a little ability to twist the facts for an interpreter to see Heraclitus, whose condemnation of the opinions of the majority is quoted⁵⁸ and whose rejection of the senses is noted (126), as the champion of τὰ κοινῆ φαινόμενα as apprehended by the mind through the organs of sensation (134, 129-130). The interpretation is as outrageously biased as those of Xenophanes, Parmenides, Empedocles (non-Posidonian account), Plato, and

54. Burkhard 92-96; e.g. 94: "Der folgende Satz (133 Ende) geht nicht mehr auf Posidonius zurück."

55. At *ND.* 3.35 he is aware of an interpretation of Heraclitus which does not make fire the first element; such a view may have been mentioned or propounded by his Academic source.

56. *Math.* 7.350, 364, Tert. *De An.* 14.5. Theories of vision in Plato (*Tim.* 45b-d) and the Stoics (SVF 2,863, 866, 871) postulate some cognitive power emerging beyond the eye; it is more adventurous to extend the principle to other senses.

57. *Math.* 7.126; the source understands Heraclitus to say that one should not trust the *irrational* senses; the lesson may be that the mind's power must always operate within the senses, cf. *Ac.* 2.30 and the omission of ἀλόγου δοξαστόν in the quotation of *Tim.* 28a at *Math.* 7.142.

58. *Math.* 7.132 = B1DK and especially 7.133 = B2DK.

(presumably) the Old Academics. Such bias is explained only on the assumption that the interpretation had a dogmatic lesson to teach, and the systematic nature of the interpretation tends to confirm that it did so. Aenesidemus himself did not have the motive for *devising* such a system, nor for gross mis-representation; he drew on those who did have such a motive.

It is quite natural that Antiochus, like Philo, should have been interested in any areas of general agreement among us and in various ways of accounting for such agreement, the 'Heraclitian' account among them. After all it was Antiochus who saw a consensus of opinion among Old Academics, Peripatetics, and Stoics;⁵⁹ it was he who saw all the chief post-Socratic schools *agreeing* on the importance of the self-evident (*Math.* 7.143-4, 160-3, 200, 216, 218-9, 257). But in some ways Antiochus was atypical. Orthodox Academics seem to have confined the operation of the self-evident, as source of general agreement, to matters not usually debated by the philosophers.⁶⁰ After all, disagreement was a primary sceptic weapon (*Ac.* 2.116-146). Such disagreement might be regarded as a significant sign that the self-evident was absent in philosophical matters. This Antiochus could not accept; therefore he had to explain lack of agreement among philosophers as a failure to apply themselves to *perspicua* (e.g. *Ac.* 2.46), or to resist the connexion between the self-evident and general agreement. There is certainly no evidence that he accepted the connexion; what he recognizes as self-evident seems always (except at *Math.* 7.218) to be the irresistible clarity observable in many of our sensations. It is something with which one *ought to agree* (*Fin.* 5.55), but not an automatic source of agreement.

The evidence that the Academy of Philo's day was concerned with matters of general agreement seems more than adequate, and the view of Heraclitus' epistemology at *Math.* 7.126-134 probably reflects aspects of Philonian thought as well as Antiochian. But the view of the self-evident which Antiochus later employs is probably Stoic rather than Academic, and it offers us few clues as to what Philo's concept may have been. For this we must look elsewhere.

V

Photius, Cicero, and Philo's 'Roman heresy'

Photius has preserved for us Aenesidemus' criticism of the

59. *Ac.* 1.17-18 etc., 2.15, establish the link between Old Academy and Lyceum. Much of Zeno's innovation is held to be a matter of terminology (2.15, cf. *Fin.* 4 et 5 *saepe*); other 'corrections' feature at *Ac.* 1.35-42.

60. Aug. *c.Acad.* 2.11, 3.22, is based on reports that Carneades argued

Academy, cast in the form of a comparison between Academics and Pyrrhonians. The reference is not to a school which openly claimed to be dogmatic, for the close comparison would then have been purposeless. Moreover these Academics rejected the Stoic criterion which Antiochus espoused openly after 87 B.C. Thus the Academics in question are the fourth Academy of Philo and Charmadas.⁶¹ For it can hardly have been an unofficial Academic position which was compared with the new official Pyrrhonism; nor could it have been earlier Academicism, since the Stoic criterion was *all* that these opponents of Aenesidemus claimed to reject (170a21-22). This would appear to imply that rejecting the Stoic criterion was *the full extent of their 'scepticism'*. The position is well-known from Cicero:

“Nam cum dicunt hoc se unum tollere, ut quicquam possit ita verum videri ut non eodem modo falsum etiam possit videri, cetera autem concedere, faciunt pueriliter.” (Ac. 2.33)

In this passage we are probably confronted with an attitude which Antiochus had associated with Philo's Academy for some time. A slightly more radical means of expressing the same idea is encountered at *Fin.* 5.76, where Cicero *in propria persona* disclaims any quarrel with Peripatetic epistemology:

“Nihil est aliud, quamobrem mihi percipi nihil posse videatur, nisi quod percipiendi vis ita definitur a Stoicis ut negent quidquam posse percipi nisi tale verum quale falsum esse non possit.”

Here the blame for non-apprehensibility is conveniently placed upon the shoulders of the Stoics, on the grounds that their definition of the act of comprehension expected more than was

against knowledge of philosophical matters only, i.e. that he was prepared to consider it for matters of simple fact.

61. Gucker p.117 with n.67, Rist in *Phoenix* xxiv (see n.40), Burnyeat in *Doubt and Dogmatism* (Oxford 1980) p.31 n.22. Whether Charmadas held the chair is uncertain; he may have succeeded Philo briefly, for Sextus refers at *PH.* 1.220 to τὴν περὶ Φίλωνος καὶ Χαρμίδων (sc. Ἀκαδημία) and similar expressions concerning school-doctrine at a given moment of the school's history do not mention figures other than those who held the chair and always observe chronological order, e.g. Carneades and Clitomachus (*PH.* 1.3, 220, 230) or Zeno, Cleanthes, and Chrysippus (*PH.* 3.200, *Math.* 11.30). What we know of Charmadas' 'scepticism' suggests that it was as mild as Philo's. He is fond of Plato (*Gor.* at *De. Or.* 1.47, 90; *Phr. ibid.* 1.87); he believes that truth lies deep (*ibid.* 1.87, 92); he argues on the assumption that knowledge, as opposed to mere opinion, is a reality (*ibid.* 92); he may have supported the theory of planned esotericism within the Academy (*quibus non scientia esset tradenda, ibid.*).

possible. Cicero in a more conservative mood at *Ac.* 2.112 says that he would not quarrel to any extent with the Peripatetic who defined "apprehensible" as "*quod impressum esset a vero*" without adding the Stoic "*quo modo imprimi non posset a falso*". In a school which traditionally argued for both sides of the question, it was something of a sign of approval if one did not argue strongly against a position. Admittedly Cicero would not thereby be abandoning his view that "*nihil posse comprehendī*", but that view would imply a Stoic, not a Peripatetic, understanding of the term. For there is ample evidence that the Philonian Academic ought to accept the possibility of apprehension (i.e. κατάληψις) if all that is demanded by the concept is for something to be *impressum e vero*. *Ac.* 2.34 speaks of those who are convinced of the existence of truth, and try to claim that there are *perspicua*: "*verum illud quidem et impressum in animo atque mente*". The Peripatetic conditions of apprehension are clearly being met by such Academic doctrine as this. Such conditions will not result in infallibility, for which reason the Peripatetic sage will sometimes opine (assent weakly or falsely?); Cicero cannot agree with such a picture of the sage (*Ac.* 2.113), though he does not dispute the matter in earnest (2.112); but Philo, influenced by Metrodorus' view of Carneades, seems to accept the Peripatetic position here too.

This enables us to explain Sextus' report that Philo held things to be non-apprehensible so far as the terms of the Stoic definition are concerned, but apprehensible as far as the nature of the things themselves was concerned (*PH.* 1.235).⁶² Here I side with Hirzel (*Untersuchungen* 3.198) against Brochard (*SG.* p.198 n.2) in assuming that Philo did go so far as to call things *καταληπτά* in a general, non-Stoic sense at some stage of his career, possibly only in his 'Roman Books' which so annoyed Antiochus. For *Ac.* 2.18 makes it clear that he had there very much wished to avoid the conclusion *nihil posse comprehendī*; the same chapter also suggests that Philo maintained the validity of this conclusion "*si illud esset, sicut Zeno definiret, tale visum. . . impressum effictumque ex eo unde esset quale esse non posset ex eo unde non esset*". Clearly Philo was insisting that things were non-apprehensible *on the terms which Stoics demanded for apprehension*. Antiochus' indignant insistence that this definition is correct, put into the mouth of 'Lucullus' here and agreed on by Cicero personally (2.113), strongly suggests that Philo was not so sure. What he had to retain, in order to maintain a semblance of loyalty to Carneades, was the impossibility of certainty,⁶³ not the Stoic sense of κατάληψις.

62. For my interpretation of this sentence see below, p.88.

63. Brochard *SG.* p.192 sees the issue of certainty as supreme.

A point in favour of seeing the admission of a general sense of apprehension as the innovation of the Roman Books is the fact that they were said to contain an open lie (*Ac.* 2.12, 18). The lie was to deny that Academics ever said "*ista quae sunt heri defensa*". The views defended yesterday had been the traditional Academic teachings, in this case as explained by 'Catulus' (see 2.11); his view is summed up by Cicero at 2.148, and the two main points are that the sage will opine in such a way that he knows that he opines, and that *percipi nihil. . . posse*. Philo had no great quarrel with the first of these doctrines (see 2.78), and so he must have denied that the Academics had altogether (*omnino*) maintained the second. What other established doctrine of the Academy was there to subvert? Why else is it that Antiochus put so much emphasis in the *Sosus* on the claim that Academics should not waver in their *dogma* that *nihil posse percipi*? (*Ac.* 2.29).

It is important to offer an explanation of why the alleged heretical doctrine of the 'Roman Books' should have seemed heretical. The notion that the doctrine of non-apprehensibility was an anti-Stoic ploy was not new, and the *ad hominem* nature of Arcesilaus' attacks on the Stoics was acknowledged (*Acad.* 2.76-77, *Math.* 7.150-8); and although one could present it as official Academic *dogma* (*Ac.* 2.29), it was nevertheless not thought to be certain by either Arcesilaus (*Acad.* 1.45) or Carneades (*Acad.* 2.28). Academic practices of arguing both sides of the case ought always to have allowed the possibility that things are in some sense apprehensible. I think the 'heresy' lies rather in Philo's willingness to tolerate the Peripatetic definition of apprehension when Arcesilaus (*Ac.* 2.77) and Carneades (*Math.* 7.160-4) had been thought to accept the *necessity* of the Stoic definition. Admittedly they had seen the definition as being necessary *for certainty* while Philo did not believe in certainty, but the term *κατάληψις* was so closely associated with the Stoic criterion that *any* admission of the term appeared to be opening the gates to certainty.

Why was it that Philo was willing to open these gates? Why did he choose to suggest that some kind of apprehension was possible? How did it fit into his thesis of the unity of the Academy (*Ac.* 1.13)? There is an obvious answer. Antiochus had recently claimed that the *περίληψις* which Plato introduced in the *Timaeus* (28a etc.) was just as forceful a notion as that of *κατάληψις* (*Math.* 7.144, on the date of which see above p. 79-82; Plato had thus disagreed with the Academic *dogma* of *ἀκαταληψία*. Philo could deny the equation of *περίληψις* with *κατάληψις* altogether, or limit it to a weak sense of *κατάληψις*. He chose the latter course, and, having admitted that Plato acknowledged a weak kind of *κατάληψις*, he had to show

that the Academics of a later period would not have rejected this weak version of apprehension. It may be that Philo took the trouble to refute Antiochus' erroneous interpretation of *Tim.* 28a as presented at *Math.* 7.143-4, thus causing him to adopt the more moderate stance of *Ac.* 1.30-31.⁶⁴

Attempts to deny that Philo admitted *κατάληψις* in some sense do not convince me. Brochard (p.196) interprets Sextus (*PH.* 1.235) to mean that Philo thought things were apprehensible in their own nature *qua* true; he denies that Philo thought things to be apprehensible for us *at all*. But where is the heresy here? And why should Philo make confident statements that the nature of things is apprehensible when he was happy to admit that he could not apprehend it? How was this ever ascertained? Can things be apprehensible when nobody can apprehend them? It does not help greatly to assume that God can apprehend them:⁶⁵ no Academic loyal to Carneades could claim to know such details about the divine, and one might be forced to admit that God received the Stoic criterion. This kind of interpretation seems to me to neglect the details of Sextus' text. He does not say that things are apprehensible for Philo *according to* (*κατά*) their own nature, but up to a given point, *ὅσον* indicating the *extent* to which they are apprehensible; the *ἐπι* + dat. construction which follows *either* indicates the 'end or purpose' (LSJ III 2) — "for the attainment of the nature of the things themselves" — *or possibly* the condition (LSJ III 3) — "on the conditions imposed by the nature of the things themselves". Things are not apprehensible up to the point (*ὅσον*) at which *either* the Stoic criterion is attained *or* its conditions are met (which amounts to the same thing). Philo's view is that things are as apprehensible as nature requires, but not apprehensible enough for a Stoic.

64. D.N. Sedley attempts to read into Philo a Pyrrhonist argument for seeing Plato as a sceptic: D.L. 9.73 relies on Plato's acceptance of the likely story while the truth was left to Gods and heroes (cf. *Tim.* 29c). See his review-article of Glucker, *Phronesis* xxvi (1981), 67-75.

65. Sedley (see n.64) follows Brochard *SG.* 196 and Glucker 82 in assuming that Philo saw nothing wrong with the nature of the universe, merely inadequacies in our own powers. Note that my reading of *PH.* 1.235 will not absolve nature from all the responsibility for our knowledge-difficulties, and in this respect it accords better with the Academic position of *Ac.* 1.44, 2.32, and 2.73. These passages imply limited approval of Democritus' theory that nature is in itself obscure. *Ac.* 2.116ff shows that the Academy was very far from admitting that the objects of physics were not obscure. Though the idea that the subject is beyond mere men is present at 2.117 and 127, this does not entail that it is known to Gods.

VI

Aenesidemus on Philo's theory

We have now seen what was meant by Aenesidemus' claim at Photius cod. 212 170a21-22 that the Stoic criterion was all that the Academics rejected. Philo's position accepted that the truth could be reached, that it could appear self-evident, and that it could be impressed upon the mind (*Ac.* 2.34): but he rejected the Stoic criterion and its accompanying certainty. The rest of Aenesidemus' complaints support my conclusion:

εἰ δ' ἐναργῶς χατ' αἴσθησιν ἢ κατὰ νόησιν καταλαμβάνεται,
καταληπτὸν ἕκαστον φατέον.

Whatever Aenesidemus is trying to do here (for his exact intentions are obscured by a textual error at a30), he could achieve nothing unless Philo was inclined to accept the protasis; in acceptance of the protasis the acceptance of a weak sense of apprehension, based on the concept of the self-evident, would be implied.

One must try to construct the whole argument so far as is possible without consideration of the lines affected by the textual difficulty at a30. Aenesidemus is accusing the Philonians of failing to notice a contradiction (a28). After the troublesome lines in which the contradiction was detailed, we meet with an explanation of it, the outline of which is as follows:

- (A) If we recognize (γινώσκειν) P and -Q, then no further hesitation is possible.
- (B) If P and -Q are not recognized, then each thing should be admitted to be completely (πάντως) non-apprehensible.
- (C) If <P and -Q> are self-evidently grasped through sensation or thought, then each thing should be said to be apprehensible.

Philo will resist the conclusion of (A) since certainty cannot be admitted, and thus he should (it is claimed) resist the protasis too; thus he must accept the protasis of (B), and, allegedly, its conclusion. But by accepting the protasis of (C) he is forced to accept that the conclusion of (C) is in some sense valid. But the conclusion of (C), in whatever sense, is at odds with the conclusion of (B) which applies to all senses. So the contradiction is one of denying a proposition in every sense, while asserting it in some sense.

Now we may look at a28-29: τὸ γὰρ ἄμα τιθεῖν τι καὶ αἶρειν ἀναμφιβόλως. . . . Taken on its own, without the words that follow, one would translate: "for to postulate something and at the

same time deny it unequivocally. . . ." This would give a *precise description* of the type of inconsistency which we suppose to be explained at a31-38: the postulation of apprehension in some sense and the denial of it in every sense. Next we move on to the troublesome words of a30-31: ἅμα τέ φάναι κοινῶς ὑπάρχειν καταληπτά. Grave problems have arisen out of the natural supposition that ἅμα τε looks back to the previous ἅμα and presents an idea which conflicts with asserting and denying things, thus resulting in the allegation that Academic practice is not in accord with Academic theory. But as we have seen the previous ἅμα is naturally understood as part of a ἅμα. . . καί. . . construction; it cannot then be answered by a second ἅμα. The second ἅμα must point forward to another καί (now missing), while the connective τε serves only as a link-word; it does not indicate a contrast with the preceding notion, for a single τε with the second ἅμα is far too weak to signal such a contrast on its own.

Restoration of the missing ἅμα. . . καί. . . contrast is not likely to achieve the exact words of Aenesidemus, but we may, I think, be confident that he wrote something of the following kind: ἅμα τε φάναι κοινῶς ὑπάρχειν καταληπτά <τὰ πράγματα καὶ πάντως ἀκατάληπτα> "and to say that things are in a general sense apprehensible and at the same time completely non-apprehensible. . . ." To explain the lacuna one must place ἀκατάληπτα last, one requires the καί to answer ἅμα, and some adverb is needed to answer the enigmatic κοινῶς. If the latter means "in a general sense", then, to achieve any genuine inconsistency, we must have some adverb equivalent to the ἀναμφιβόλως of a29 or the πάντως of a36 to signify "in every sense". The addition of τὰ πράγματα seems desirable so as to give ὑπάρχειν a subject, though the latter could perhaps mean "there exist. . .".

On this reading of the argument it cannot work without Philo's assent to the protasis of (c): including the verb "apprehend". Now let us take a brief look at the principal alternative interpretation, following Hirzel's emendation of καταληπτά in a30 to ἀκατάληπτα.⁶⁶ The inconsistency would apparently be the willingness to assert or deny things unambiguously while saying that things were non-apprehensible. Then:

66. Hirzel 3.233 emended καταληπτά to ἀκατάληπτα. F.H. Sandbach has privately sponsored an improvement, namely that we should read κοινῶς <μη> ὑπάρχειν καταληπτά: "that apprehensibles in general do not exist". It was not enough to create an inconsistency that Philo should have acknowledged the existence of non-apprehensibles.

- (A) if we recognize P and -Q <well enough to be able to affirm them> then no further hesitation is possible <on the question of their apprehensibility>.
- (B) if P and -Q are not recognized, then each thing should be admitted to be completely non-apprehensible.
- (C) if <P and -Q> are self-evidently apprehended through sensation or thought <sufficiently for us to be able to affirm them>, then each thing should be said to be apprehensible.

The argument lacks the clarity and cohesion which one would expect from Aenesidemus. (A) includes too much that must be supplied; (B) is redundant if Philo admits that things are non-apprehensible (unless perhaps "if" stands for *only if*); (C) is pointless, for there would be no way in which Philo could accept the protasis if he had made things non-apprehensible, and Aenesidemus puts no pressure on him which might force him to accept it. There is no reason why he should admit, just because he affirms P and denies Q, that things are self-evidently apprehended through sensation or thought; the Academics of *Ac.* 2.35 ridicule similar suggestions from their listeners. And so I conclude that here too there will be no inconsistency unless Philo assented to the protasis of (C) and affirmed that things are self-evidently apprehended via sensation or thought: but in that case Hirzel's emendation is most unlikely to be correct.

It is safe to assume that Philo did think of certain things as being self-evidently *apprehended* by sensation or thought in some weak sense of that verb. Both the needs of Aenesidemus' argument and the evidence of Cicero force us to that conclusion. Philo's theory of the self-evident at *Ac.* 2.34 is sufficient for apprehension in the Peripatetic sense of 2.112; the denial at 2.34 that *perspicua* can be apprehended must be based on the Stoic sense of the verb; the denial of certainty must persist, but there was doubt as to whether *κατάληψις* must involve certainty. Even Stoic *κατάληψις* was not, like Stoic knowledge, *ἀμετάπτωτος ὑπὸ λόγου*.⁶⁷ It was grasped only with one hand, not two (*Ac.* 2.145).

Aenesidemus has no difficulty in securing from Philo an assent to the proposition that things are self-evidently apprehended; his efforts are concentrated on securing the admission that things are entirely non-apprehensible on the Philonian theory. Antiochus too worked hard to show that the preservation of uncertainty (by

67. The Academics were well aware that Stoics often defined knowledge as *κατάληψις ἀμετάπτωτος ὑπὸ λόγου*, *Math.* 7.151. If apprehension were not always to be knowledge, then it could not always have this property.

denial of Stoic apprehension) made things *entirely* non-apprehensible (Ac. 2.32-36); that there was no real difference between Philo and those who made everything as uncertain as the number of stars (2.32). Aenesidemus had to use (A) in order to force Philo into the protasis of (B), and so hopefully to the conclusion of (B). The reason why both opponents labour the point is surely that Philo *resisted* the imputation that he made everything uncertain and entirely non-apprehensible. He denied that the Academics had ever done such a thing: "*ista quae sunt heri defensa negat Academicos omnino dicere*" (Ac. 2.12). Gucker correctly argues that that *omnino* here means "not entirely" rather than "not at all". He suggests (p.80, n.227) that it is the equivalent of the Greek παντελῶς. It is Aenesidemus' πάντως. According to Philo the Academics did not claim that things were πάντως ἀκατάληπτα. He had to be shown that they approved premisses which entailed it.

VII

The second type of self-evident

Sensation is usually thought of as the chief, if not the only source of the self-evident. Antiochus clearly thought of self-evident-ness as a property attaching to the evidence of the senses, and he appears to show at *Math.* 7.218ff that the intelligible self-evident recognized by Theophrastus is entirely derived from the sensible self-evident. But Aenesidemus would not have spelt out κατ' αἴσθησιν ἢ κατὰ νόησιν if Philo's own theory of ἐνάργεια had not had these two separate aspects.

The two aspects are well-known to Clement of Alexandria and Galen;⁶⁸ either type of self-evident could for them supply the premisses of demonstrated knowledge. Clement is generally held to be following a source which is in some sense Antiochian,⁶⁹ and it could be that Philo's dual theory received recognition in Antiochus' earlier work. After all the *Canonica* mentioned Theophrastus' dual theory (*Math.* 7.218) even if its dual nature did not receive emphasis. This passage and that of Aenesidemus at least confirm that a dual theory, such as is found in Galen, can be traced back to the first century B.C., and the obvious place to search for the nature of the intelligible self-evident is in Galen himself: for Galen is also the author in whom the connexion between the self-evident and general agreement is most consistently found (see n. 74).

68. For references see n.28 above.

69. Witt *Albinus* 31-41; S. Lilla, *Clement of Alexandria*, Oxford 1971, 125ff.

The obvious candidate for identification with the intelligible self-evident would be the natural/common notions which were appropriated by the Academics of the first century B.C. from the Stoics.⁷⁰ Mutilated passages in Antipater and Philodemus suggest that ἐνάργεια was thought by other schools to belong to our πρόληψεις or ἔννοιαι of the Gods.⁷¹ Moreover common/natural notions appear to have become undemonstrated principles of knowledge in Middle Platonist times,⁷² and would thus conform with the principal requirement of τὰ ἐναργῶς φαινόμενα in Galen and Clement: that they should be ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ πιστά.⁷³

Galen certainly regarded the common notions as self-evident to the intellect, and being trustworthy in their own right they are also an appropriate starting point for an epistemonical argument (*Plac.* 7.593, cf. 601; 8.648). And at *Plac.* 9.778 we read (incredibly) that the Carneadean presentation which is probable, researched, and unimpeded and the Chrysippean presentation which is apprehensive, serve similarly as criteria of truth; but that self-evident sensation and intellection (αἰσθησίς τε καὶ νόησις ἐναργῆς) are accepted universally as such a criterion. Though the expressions differ

τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχουσι δύναμιν, ὥσπερ γε καὶ ἐπειδὴν φηί τις ἀπὸ τῶν κοινῶν ἐννοιῶν ἄρχεσθαι καὶ ταύτας τίθεσθαι πρῶτον ἀπάντων κριτήριον ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ πιστόν.

Here we have the connexion between the self-evident and the common notions made quite explicitly, though the thought of the passage is not beyond reproach. The common notions are not exact equivalents of the Carneadean and Chrysippean criteria (as conceived by Galen), for they are concerned chiefly with sense-presentations; they might cast their net wide enough to embrace common notions, but are more concerned with self-evident sensation. The common notions are equivalent only to

70. In Academic texts the doctrine makes its first appearance at *Cic. TD.* 1.57, and is used to explain Platonic 'recollection'.

71. *Plut. Mor.* 1051ef, if the emendation of ἐνέργειαν to ἐνάργειαν (following Meziriac) is correct, shows Antipater to have used the term to refer to a clear πρόληψις of the Gods. Philodemus *Sign.* fr.8 de Lacy may possibly have used κατενάργημα for such a πρόληψις.

72. e.g. *Didasc.* 4 p.155.28H and anon. *In Thet.* 15.2ff.

73. Galen *Plac.* 9.725, 778, *Inst. Log. saepe*: in particular compare the requirements of an axiom at 1.5 (p.4.16-18 Kalbfleisch) and 3.2 (7.21ff): see also *Opt. Doctr.* 4.50 (p.90.8-10 Marquardt) and 5.51 (p.91.16-17). Clement *Strom.* 8.6.7, 7.1-2, 8.1, 8.6, might appear to separate the self-evident from the "trustworthy in itself", but close inspection will reveal that the former must be a species of the latter: a species from which one must begin in order to achieve an epistemonical demonstration.

self-evident intellection — and then only because (a) what is evident to one individual is assumed to be so for any mature human being in command of his mental faculties, and (b) what is evident for all is assumed to be sufficiently evident to act as a criterion for the individual.

Turning to Galen's *Institutio Logica* (3.2 p. 7.21ff Kalbfleisch) we discover that *ἔννοια*, insofar as it differs from *νόησις* at all, designates concepts which need not be the object of any actual thinking-process, and may thus remain latent in many minds. The term *νόησις* refers rather to the actual thinking of the concept. Since a concept must actually be the object of our thought in order to be an *ἐναργῶς φαινόμενον* at any given moment, the expression *τὸ πρὸς νόησιν ἐναργῶς φαινόμενον* is accurate: the *ἔννοια* must give rise to actual *νόησις*. Similarly a universal concept will not be pondered by everybody, even though all are able to do so in theory, and so *qua* universal it is an *ἔννοια* only.

If *νόησις* is the activation of an *ἔννοια*, then it is clear that self-evident apprehension through *νόησις* will involve study of an *ἔννοια*; and if what is self-evidently apprehensible is potentially universally apprehensible, then self-evident apprehension via *νόησις* will involve study of a common/natural notion. Galen's evidence is not to be dismissed lightly; it is in his work that we can see the criterion of sensible or intelligible self-evident in constant operation. Not only does he reveal to us the link between intelligible self-evident and common notions, he also gives repeated evidence of the link between the self-evident and *ὁμολογία*: both as internal consistency and as near-universal agreement.⁷⁴

In view of Galen's importance it would be well to notice that he recognizes (again at *Inst. Log.* p. 7.21ff) two species of *ἔννοιαι*, one derived from the memory of sensations, the other innate and thus universal (though the former kind could presumably be universal when derived from evident sensations familiar to us all). Existence of the latter type may not have been recognized by the older Stoics,⁷⁵ but Cicero takes them for granted.⁷⁶ Once where he follows Antiochus there is recognition of *parvae notitiae* of the virtues naturally established within us (*Fin.* 5.59), but in a context where he emphasizes how perfunctory nature's original moral/intellectual gifts to man had been. Elsewhere Antiochus

74. e.g. *Plac.* 3.339: οὐδὲν ὁμολογούμενον οὔτε τοῖς ἐνάργεσιν οὔτε ἀλλήλοις λέγουσιν οὔθ' ἕκαστος αὐτῷ, cf. 4.414-5, 5.456.

75. I tend to take the side of Sandbach (A.A. Long ed., *Problems in Stoicism* 22-37, repr. from CQ. xxiv (1930) 44-51).

76. See particularly *TD.* 1.57, 4.53, *Off.* 3.76, *Top.* 31.

appears to take it for granted that accurate concepts are impossible without their being grounded in accurate sensation (*Acad.* 2.21-22, cf. 1.42, *Math.* 7.217ff). One gathers from this that Cicero's interest in innate concepts, often remaining hidden in the depths of the soul and requiring *enodatio* (=διάρθρωσις),⁷⁷ comes rather from the mildly sceptical brand of Platonism so prevalent in the *Tusculans*, i.e. from Philonian Platonism.⁷⁸ There the innate notions are linked with Platonic 'recollection', which could have been introduced by Philo as a theory with some degree of probability: but if Antiochus had introduced it he would have had to do so *as a dogma*. To defend such a dogma was not in his interests. He could admit no more than that man had a primitive awareness of virtue and the divine thanks to our innate divine spark.

It makes good sense that Philo should have brought confidence in universal/natural notions into the school of Plato. There may be no direct evidence that he did so, but it would help to explain why Cicero considers them the legitimate tools of an Academic. They were able to be related to Platonic thought (especially *Phd.* 74b6 etc. ἐννοεῖν) sufficiently easily to accord with Philo's one-Academy thesis. They were common to all mankind, and thus operated chiefly at the level of universals. Plato's ideas could easily be treated, like Stoic προλήψεις (D.L. 7.54 = SVF 2.105), as natural notions of things universal. Plato's division of reality into sensible particular and intelligible idea might be seen as justification for the distinction between sensible self-evident and intelligible self-evident (= innate/common notion).⁷⁹ To claim Plato's support

77. Found in the technical expression *enodationis indigens* at *Top.* 31, that being equivalent to διαρθρώσεως δεόμενος (cf. anon. *In Thet.* 46.44, 47.45, 53.46, 56.36). The origin of the διάρθρωσις-terminology would appear to have been Academic-Platonist rather than Stoic. Plutarch fr. 215f (Sandbach — Loeb) asks whether Epicurean προλήψεις are διηρθρωμένοι or not, suggesting that they had not used the concept themselves; it follows the application of the notion of actuality and potency to Stoic natural notions in a manner which suggested that they had applied *neither* this concept *nor* that of διάρθρωσις. Note that at fr. 217j there is mention of ἀδιάρθρωτος μνήμη, which ought to lead us in the direction of Platonism. In other authors note ἀδιάρθρωτος ἔννοια in Galen (*Opt. Doctr.* p.33.18 Marquardt), διάρθρωσις in Eudorus (Stob. *Ecl.* 2.49.9), and διηρθρωμένη ἐπίνοια in Philodemus D3 fr.69 (Diels).

78. I claim that Philo is *inspiration* for the *Tusculans* rather than their source. For Academic sentiments in the work see 1.60 (if Cic. could make an affirmation about anything unclear. . . .), 4.47 (Academic *verecundia*), and especially 5.11 (the claim to follow Socrates and Carneades in removing error and searching for the *veri simile*).

79. The ontological-epistemological division at *Tim.* 28a, and the application of the term περιληπτός not only to intelligibles but also to

Philo did not have to embrace Platonic Ideas and Platonic 'recollection': that gave one account of the origin of natural notions, but not the only account. Their origin was ἄδηλον, and required no conviction. What mattered to Philo was that these notions should be *natural*, and thus (potentially) universal.

If knowledge were natural, based on the natural use of our senses and on natural notions, dogmatic teaching became an irrelevance, capable only of obscuring the truth that lies within our grasp. The teacher's duty would be to train us to make use of our natural faculties, drawing out⁸⁰ our inner notions and helping us to clarify them.⁸¹ As in Plutarch⁸² or anon. *In Tht.* (48.34) *private* notions and *private* opinions would be frowned upon as falsehoods which impeded the emergence of innate truths; the powerful elenctic of the Socratic midwife would be required to expel such idiosyncracies. Private school doctrine⁸³ would be as insidious as individual invention. A great constructive purpose was therefore attributed to elenctic by Philo (Stob. *Ecl.* 2.39.20ff); it was directed towards the eventual discovery of the truth or of the closest approximation to it (*Ac.* 2.7, cf. 60). Dogmatic teaching was avoided so that pupils might think for themselves (*Ac.* 2.60); the judgement of the Academic was thus freed from obligation to defend school doctrine (*Ac.* 2.8); he gave a willing ear to all points of view, seeking out '*sine pertinacia quid constantissime* (=μάλιστα δόμολογουμένως?) *dicatur*' (*Ac.* 2.9).

The educational ideal of the fourth Academy thus assumed that the truth would emerge in the expulsion of whatever was false. In such a theory common/natural notions had a place; that which appeared natural and self-evident to the vast majority of men could not be ignored.

Conclusion

Philo cannot be criticized for his failure to produce a new criterion of knowledge. He never desired to propose one. He assumed that we knew much without ever being able to be sure of our knowledge. The self-evident was good enough for knowledge, but much that *appeared* self-evident to persons of unsound mind

sensibles (28c1), give far more support to a dual theory of the self-evident than to Antiochian theory.

80. Plut. *Mor.* 1000e: ἐπεγείρειν, ἀνακινεῖν, συνεξάγειν; Cic. *Off.* 3.76.

81. i.e. διαρθροῦν, see n.77.

82. *Mor.* 999f-1000c, 1062a, 1070bc, 1084d; see also Galen *Plac.* 2.212, 5.461, 7.778-9.

83. passages listed in n.82 show that school doctrine can also be private; cf. also *Mor.* 1079a.

might in fact be false, and so uncertainty always lingered. General agreement that P is self-evident might offer some confirmation, but mistakes can be made about whether such agreement exists. We can only trust in our natural criteria — senses and intellect — to lead us towards the truth. We must ensure that these criteria are in good health (Stob. *Ecl.* 2.40.18-20) as Plato's *Timaeus* had poetically suggested (90a-d). This is all that we can do, for we have no criterion καθ' ὅ, only the criteria δι' οὗ, upon whose capacity for accurate judgement we are totally dependent.⁸⁴

Such an attitude cannot be called 'sceptic'; but to call it σκεπτικός in the more natural sense of the first century was appropriate (see n. 22). As Cicero makes abundantly clear, it was a primary ideal of Philo's Academy to *quaerere* (*Ac.* 1.46), *conquirere* (*Ac.* 2.7), or *exquirere* (*Ac.* 2.7, 9).

This new attitude towards knowledge opened the way for new exploration of Platonism and new attention to man's inner self in the quest for the knowledge within him. Philo was no founder of Middle Platonism; Charmadas appeared the more dedicated Platonist of the fourth Academy.⁸⁵ But Philo did provide the approach to knowledge which enabled early Middle Platonism to become established. Though his school did not endure, his brand of Academicism was still to be found in Cicero, in anon. *In Tht.*, probably in Eudorus (see n.9), often in Philo of Alexandria, often in Ammonius and Plutarch. In the second century A.D. a more dogmatic style of Platonism seems to have become established, and the fourth Academy was left behind, but there was still no return to the Stoic criterion which Antiochus had defended. If Antiochus was influential then, it was through his early works; it may have been these which brought Philonian epistemology to Galen.⁸⁶

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84. For the division of types of criterion see S.E. *Math.* 7.35-37 and *PH.* 2.15-16. Anon. *In Tht.* is careful to point out that he only acknowledges that there is discussion of the criterion δι' οὗ in *Tht.* This apparently is meant to exclude the καθ' ὅ (col. 2). *Tht.* 184c-5e is the obvious passage to detect Plato's use of twin criteria δι' ὅ; he even uses the expression φ (184c) into which anon. lapses.

85. I judge from *De Or.* 1.87-93; see above, n.61.

86. I should like to thank Dr. D.N. Sedley of Christ's College, Cambridge, for his criticism of an early draft of what finally became this paper; his help was greatly appreciated, though the errors are mine alone. I owe a great debt to a vast body of literature which has made this small study possible. Only very specific debts have been acknowledged; some omissions may be due to oversight, and for these I make my early apology.