

The Internal Dimensions of the Sensible Object in the Thought of Plotinus and Aristotle

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I

In several passages of the *Enneads* Plotinus is openly critical of Aristotle. In IV.7,8, he rejects the soul-entelechy theory; in II.4,14 he criticises the function of the three principles, form, privation and matter, and in III. 7 he rejects the *Physics* definition of time. But the locus classicus of this explicit criticism is the long work, VI,1-3, divided by Porphyry into three treatises, which constitutes a sustained attack upon the ten Aristotelian categories as genera of being. In the opening chapters of VI.1 it is argued that sensible and intelligible substance can not on Aristotelian principles¹ form one genus, and in the critique of substance in VI.3,1-8 Plotinus concludes that sensible substance can only be “an aggregate of qualities and matter”², not true substance, but an imitation (VI.3,8,20-32). This will also be Porphyry’s view. In the *Isagoge* (Busse 7, 22ff.) the particular is said to be a unique collection of properties.³ The notion of collection in both accounts, *athroisma*⁴ and *symphoresis*,⁵ stems from Plato’s use of the word *athroisma* in *Theaetetus* 157 b-c, where the fact that all sensible objects are constantly ‘becoming for someone’ precludes their ever truly being (157 A8 — B1). The term *athroisma* is also used by Albinus. In the *Didaskalikos* (p. 156, 2, 8-9, 10 Hermann) the collection of primary and secondary qualities constitutes the sensible object and the whole sensible universe is a collection.

This view of the sensible object, then, is characteristically

1. VI.1,1,25-28; cf. Aristot. *Metaph.* B3, 999 A 6-7. In the genus there can be no ‘earlier and later’.

2. συμφορησίς τις ποιότητων καὶ ὕλης.

3. ἄτομα οὖν λέγεται τὰ τοιαῦτα, ὅτι ἐξ ἰδιοτήτων συνέστηκεν ἕκαστον, ὧν τὸ ἀθροῖσμα οὐκ ἂν ἐπ’ ἄλλου ποτὲ τὸ αὐτὸ γένοιτο.

4. cf. *Timaeus* 44D5: συναθροίσαντες Sextus Empiricus, *Adv. Math.* VII. 277, man is τὸ ἐξ πάντων ἀθροισμα cp. also III. 8, 9, 47-48.

5. A. (1) Plotinus’ use of *symphoresis* is reminiscent of Plato’s description of the compound which lacks measure in *Philebus* 64E: οὐδὲ γὰρ κράσις, ἀλλὰ τις ἄκρατος συμπεφορημένη ἀληθῶς ἢ τοιαυτὴ κ.τ.ἔ.

(2) For related use of the term in the *Enneads* see e.g. IV.7,2,18, V. 8,4,48 and VI. 4,14,10.

B. συμπαγέντα (VI.3,8,21): familiar in the *Timaeus*; note also *Phaedrus* 246 C5, ψυχὴ καὶ σῶμα παγέν, and Empedocles, Fr.15,4: . . . πρὶν τε πάγεν τε βροτοὶ καὶ λύθεν. . . .

Platonic. In the judgement of Lloyd⁶, and Rist⁷, “despite the fact that the particular had somehow to be the logical subject, it could never for a Platonist be a substance”⁸; in that of Rutten, Plotinus reduces sensible substance, which “must be grasped by sensation rather than reason” (VI.3,8,2-3),⁹ to its “*fonction de sujet logique*.”¹⁰ For Rutten, this isolation of the sensible subject results in nominalism. From such a standpoint the contrast with Aristotle could hardly be greater: in the *Categories* substance is primarily the concrete particular, in the *Metaphysics* primarily the form of the object whose presence makes the thing what it is; even if the tension between the particular thing (τόδε τι) in the former sense and the form-species (εἶδος) in the latter may seem unresolved in the *corpus Aristotelicum*, it is nevertheless clear that the primary focus of Aristotelian thought is the non-abstract grasp of the reality of the composite sensible particular. For Plotinus, on the other hand, the particular is only an image, from which it is the philosopher’s task to separate himself.

In this paper I propose to argue from passages throughout the *Enneads* that Plotinus should not be understood so one-sidedly even within the narrow scope of the logical treatises and that views of the sensible object as in one or more senses a logical subject, although obviously correct in themselves, make little sense unless they are understood in a larger context.

It is, of course, axiomatic for Plotinus, as for any Platonist, that since the sensible world is created, it possesses something of the value of its creator. Hence, Wurm, for instance, emphasises that the collection of qualities, which constitutes sensible substance in VI.3,8, must also be understood as the manifestation of the immaterial form in matter.¹¹ But how precisely are we to link the reductive treatment of sensible substance in VI.1,1-3 and VI.3, 1-8

6. See “Neoplatonic logic and Aristotelian logic II”, *Phronesis* 1955, p. 158.

7. Plotinus, *The Road to Reality*, Cambridge 1967, Chapter 8, ‘the Sensible Object’, p. 103-111.

8. The view of sensible substance as a collection of qualities in matter, as an imitation of true reality, is of course not only that of VI.3, where the intelligible soul is expressly left out of account (1,21-28) with the progressive effect of calling the Aristotelian classification of categories into question (on which see K. Wurm, *Substanz und Qualität*, De Gruyter, Berlin, p.250 ff. 1973) but also a view of the *Enneads* in general (e.g. II, 7,3: II, 6,1, 48-52).

9. *Les Catégories du Monde Sensible dans les Ennéades de Plotin*, Paris, 1961, p. 57.

10. *op.cit.* p. 70.

11. K. Wurm, *Substanz und Qualität*, De Gruyter, Berlin, 1973, p. 256.

and following to the more positive views expressed elsewhere?¹² Here, it seems to me, Plotinus' treatment of the "internal dimensions" of the sensible object, as a profound and comprehensive development of Aristotelian thought, becomes of great importance. No one, of course, doubts the influence of Aristotelian, or Stoic thought upon Plotinus.¹³ While Stoic, or even Philonic, influence is thought to predominate in Plotinus' distinctive doctrine of Logos¹⁴, an influence which must itself anyway be traced back to Aristotle's forms in matter (*enula eide*),¹⁵ it is evident that for Plotinus, as for Aristotle, 'body is always a compound of form and matter',¹⁶ but it is rightly argued that the sense of this statement in Plotinus' thought is very different. Armstrong, Bréhier and Arnou¹⁷ emphasise that in the *Enneads* form and matter never really unite into an organic whole and that matter remains unchanged by the forms externally superimposed upon it. Again I shall argue here that this view, although impeccable in itself, does not do justice to the concentration and flexibility of Plotinus' approach. I shall propose that in the *Enneads* we can uncover a different approach to Aristotle which is indeed a criticism, but also — given Plotinus' vision and different preoccupations so many centuries later — a profound interpretation, an interpretation, moreover, perfectly compatible with the reductive treatment of Aristotelian thought in VI, 1-3.

Of course, one must also recognise that the theme of the reconciliation of Plato and Aristotle was a commonplace of the early centuries of our era.¹⁸ Bouillet, following Ravaisson, proclaims such a reconciliation for Plotinus' concept of matter in his notes to II,4, *On Matter*.¹⁹ But for our own day, I think, it is much more difficult to make such impressions philosophically meaningful. And whilst it is impossible in this paper to pursue the Platonic dimension, I hope nonetheless to provide a basis from

12. VI,2,14, for instance, expressly corrects the more positive view of 'quality' in II,6. On this see Wurm, *op. cit.* p. 255f.

13. cf. especially *Vita Plot.* 14, 4-5.

14. See, for example, Ravaisson, *Essai sur la Métaphysique d'Aristote*, t.2, p. 384.

15. See e.g. Heinze, *Die Lehre vom Logos*, Oldenburg, 1872, p. 124-5.

16. Bréhier, *The Philosophy of Plotinus*, Chicago, 1958, p. 174. C. Baeumker, *Das Problem der Materie*, Münster, 1890, p. 402.

17. A. H. Armstrong, *Architecture of the Intelligible Universe*, Cambridge, 1940, p. 95. Bréhier, *op. cit.*, pp. 172-175. Arnou, *Le Desir de Dieu*, Rome, 1967, p. 77, note 1.

18. See A. H. Armstrong, *The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Medieval Philosophy*, Cambridge 1967, pp. 9, 82-3, 197.

19. Bouillet, *Les Ennéades de Plotin*, t.1, p. 481.

which this connection might also be illuminated.

Even within the basically negative treatment of substance and the other categories in VI.1-3, Plotinus does make one positive suggestion about the 'relationship' between intelligible and sensible substance, a suggestion he does not develop nor yet repudiate. He indicates in VI.1,3, that since one *genus* of substance is impossible, perhaps the elements of substance, that is, intelligible substance, then matter, form and compound, constitute a 'category' or 'way of speaking' in the sense that the Heracleidae make one family, οὐχ ὡς κοινὸν κατὰ πάντων, ἀλλ' ὡς ἀφ' ἐνός (3-4). The example is based upon *Metaphysics* X (1058 A 24) and V (1024 A 31-36), the thought upon such passages as IV, 1003 B 12ff, XII, 1075 A 16ff, E.N. I, 1096 B 27ff., and the suggestion intimates that an understanding of substance might well be constructed along the lines of a πρὸς ἓν equivocal; which is to say that the elements of "sensible" substance are neither to be identified with, nor simply distinguished in definition from, intelligible substance, but are rather to be derived from and referred to, the full reality of substance in its primary instance. Plotinus has only one objection: we still have no idea what substance is (8-9).²⁰ Whereas for Aristotle, of course, it should be impossible to define a *summum genus*, for Plotinus this deficiency is a reproach (Cf. VI.1,2, 15f.).

II

How can the significance of this positive note be developed? We must start with an examination of some key positions in Plotinus' complex approach to the problem of matter.²¹ In the *Enneads* the recognition of the sensible object as a purely logical subject is only *one moment*, however significant, in the analysis which reveals the internal dynamic of the presence of form to matter.

Generally speaking, the complexity, and subtlety, of Plotinus'

20. Plotinus uses the verb ἐπερείδομαι (VI.1,3,9), an echo of which appears in its use at VI.2,8,13, which means to rest or lean upon something. It possesses the connotation of force or strength. Above all, what is leant upon is sure to be as solid a foundation as one could find. Since Being is this foundation, the question of a "definition" of a *summum genus* can not be understood in any simple abstract sense. The notion of definition implies a discursive duality which can not be applied to the 'bulwark' itself. The question of soul's substance, its τί ἐστι, is treated in a similar way in IV, 7 and IV. 2. See for instance IV.2,1,1-18.

21. Here I can do little more than provide an outline of this approach. The theory is treated more fully in my, as yet unpublished, article, "Plotinus' Theory of Matter."

theory of matter is, I think, obscured by the fact that, although Plotinian matter does resemble Aristotle's 'prime' matter, it is an ultimate in a way which is generally considered unAristotelian; furthermore, it is identified with evil. This tends to make commentators stress the differences between Plotinus and Aristotle, rather than see those differences in the context either of a tractate's whole argument or in the terminological usage of the *Enneads* as a whole. Bréhier, for instance, believes that II.4, chapters 6 and 7, are the fruit of Plotinus' reading some commentary on Aristotle and that this "Aristotelianism" is subjected to critical revision in the following chapters.²² Whilst there is some truth in this assessment²³, it seems to me to lack a certain precision. Plotinus' own position develops in, through and from the views of his predecessors (Plato, Aristotle principally, but also undoubtedly the Stoics, among others) and is *comprehensive* of them. It is natural for him, therefore, to start with *the* traditional analysis of genesis, for in the following argument he is also an interpreter.

We may look at the argument in this way:

(1) For Plotinus, as for Aristotle, prime matter is that which the reason posits as a necessary constitutive moment of the analysis of all change²⁴ (II.4,6) and composition²⁵ (*ibid.*, chapters 6-13). There are two immediate consequences of this: a) matter precisely as matter does not "possess" form (II.4,8ff.; *Phys.* 207 A 26); yet b) since matter *receives* form and is never without form (cf. II.4,10, 31ff.), on the level of natural philosophy *prime matter* must play a *positive* role in the explanation of change and composition.²⁶ By "prime matter" here I mean matter in its relation to the making form as exhibited by the unity of form and matter in the composite. In other words, secondary matter *is* most fundamentally prime matter receiving determinate form. This is why Plotinus can claim (for Aristotle²⁷ and) for himself that matter is "a relative", when

22. Notice to II.4, p.49-50.

23. This is evident from II,4,14-16 alone.

24. Ravaisson rightly states, "*la matière première n'est que le dernier sujet qu'on est obligé de supposer permanent sous la variation des phénomènes*" (*op. cit.* p. 383ff.)

25. See, for example, Baeumker, *Das Problem der Materie*, pp. 402-3.

26. Cf. II.4,11,40-12,1. Re matter's pliability see also Seneca *Ep.* 65,2 (*res ad omnia parata*) and SVF II, 322,11 (*materia rerum, ex qua et in qua omnia sint, tota flexibilis et commutabilis*). Undoubtedly, there is much stoic influence, but here we confine ourselves to the most distinctive features of the theory in II.4.

27. *Physics* B, 194 B 8; A, 191 A, 8-12.

arguing against what he considers the spurious unity of the Stoic *substratum*.²⁸

(2) This is developed further in Chapters 14-15 where Plotinus confronts the negative conception of matter and the problem of what one can mean by 'non-being' in this sense.

In arguing against Aristotle's conception of the principles form, matter and privation (II.4.14), Plotinus is arguing against the relativity of those principles. How can matter and privation be one in *substratum* and two in definition? (1-17; cf. *Physics*, 190 B 29-191 A 1). If privation means the denial of being in the sense that this does not qualify being (17-23), then matter and privation can be taken each in two ways: either form and privation are contrasted with their substrate (23-24); or, if matter is a relative, privation must characterise its indefiniteness. "But if privation is the same as matter by being indefinite, how do the definitions remain two?" (28-30)²⁹ The sense of this hypothetical conclusion is clear. If one can accept the previous flexibility in the usage of the two terms, a flexibility which can only stem from the real identity of the "things"³⁰, then it is only reasonable to accept Plotinus' conclusion as most fundamental. For Plotinus the Aristotelian sense of privation, where form and privation are contrasted with their substrate, is a disguised description of the second sense in which form is contrasted with privation-matter.

In Chapter 15 Plotinus argues that matter-*apeiron* is neither an accident nor a composite or formal subject. It does not have existence in the way that Aristotle understood the 'infinite' of the Platonists and the Pythagoreans (*Phys.* 203 A 4; 204 A 20-21). In being nothing but itself, then, it can have a sort of existence in this way (II.4,16,3). And since in this sense, it does not 'have' the good,

28. VI.1,27, espec. lines 14-281. Cp. II,4,13,26-32 which indicates another 'sense' of relative. For the fundamentum is necessarily included in the formed subject, but each in different ways. (Cf. also III.6,19,23-25.

29. II,4,14,28-30: ἐι μέντοι τῷ ἀορίστῳ εἶναι καὶ ἀπειρῶ εἶναι . . . τῆ ὅλη ταῦτόν κ.τ.ε. cp. *Phys.* 208 A 1: τὸ εἶναι τῷ ἀπειρῶ στερησις, and 207 B35: ὡς ὅλη τὸ ἄπειρον αἴτιον.

30. The use of the verbs, ἀποτόμενος 23, ἐφάπτοιο, 27, suggests that Plotinus sees his arguments as denoting an objective reference, that of real, unfolding participation. In this sense we must also understand that they do not destroy the positions left behind, but rather assimilate them. This is also the sense of the series of hypotheticals (22-30) and the persuasiveness of the "τάχα ἄν . . . ἐφάπτοιο" (27) The final position is then shown to be the *basis* of Aristotle's view in *Physics* A. In other words, for Plotinus the principles are in one way two and in another three, but they are most fundamentally *two*.

it must be evil (16,16ff.), in fact the 'Platonic' principle of recalcitrance (19-23).

Two points need to be emphasised: at the end of II,4, Plotinus' theory of matter-evil is comprehensive of the argument's whole development. His Platonic theory is developed directly out of Aristotle's. This is equally true of II.5 and III.6 in entirely different ways. Yet all three tractates develop the conception of an entirely dimensionless matter which has, on the one hand, a positive function in the analysis of change and composition and, on the other, a negative polarity in its own nature.

Secondly, quite apart from considerations 'peculiar' to himself, Plotinus is compelled to develop the negative conception of matter by the logic of Aristotle's own position. For if matter is to be the principle of the accidental, if it is to be identified with indefiniteness and credited with a certain recalcitrance; above all, if we are to keep matter as matter (II.5,5,33-34), not only must it 'contribute' to the composite object (II.4,12,1) but it must also be pure negativity in itself.³¹

The analysis of the composite object, therefore, leads in two directions: τὸ εἶδος κατὰ τὸ ποιὸν καὶ τὴν μορφήν, ἢ δὲ κατὰ τὸ ὑποκείμενον ἀόριστον, ὅτι μὴ εἶδος (II.4,6,17-18; cf. *Physics* 193 A 29-31; 107 A 26). And since privation is ultimately identical with matter, the analytic description of all genesis either on the side of matter or in relation to form *must be fundamentally vertical*.

Furthermore, since matter, as matter, is purely negative, it must be a nature opposed to form, a field of contradictory influence. Thus, in I.8 Plotinus argues that whilst individual substance can not be contrary to individual substance, there is nothing — on Aristotelian terms³² — to prevent substance in the sense of form

31. It would seem legitimate to interpret *Metaph. z,3*, 1028 B, 36-1029 A 33 as exhibiting in undeveloped form this tension between the negative and positive moments of prime matter. On the one hand, it is the last subject of predication; on the other, it is utterly "other" than the categories.

32. When Plotinus speaks of 'substance in general' here (ἡ καθόλου οὐσία, I,8,6,81), he certainly includes Aristotle's "form". My reasons for thinking this will emerge in the course of this paper. Here we might only indicate that the character of the opposition between substance and anti-substance, and the terminology in several cases (e.g. συμπληροῦν), is developed with the Aristotelian-Peripatetic position in mind. a) Alexander, for instance, points out at *De Anima* 119,25-29 (Bruns) that Aristotle himself made form the contrary of privation, thereby appearing to contradict the doctrine of the *Categories* (also stated in the *Metaphysics*), that individual substance has no contrary. (b) Apart from the *language* of opposition (I,8,6,40-59; for which compare *Laws* X, 906 A and *Metaph.* IX, 4), the implicit understanding behind Plotinus' theory is that neither form

from being contrary to privation, as non-substance, and the complements of one being utterly opposed to those of the other.³³ The notion of a complement of substance or non-substance reflects the principle that the form or matter of any part is identical to the form or matter which is common and one.³⁴ Such a view comprises both the Platonic and Aristotelian positions: from the standpoint of form, matter is *δυνάμει*; from that of matter it is a nature utterly opposed to form. And between the two poles of substance and non-substance there is coming to be. Thus, the inner vertical analysis of the composite object is for Plotinus the real basis on which any purely 'physical' analysis depends. Whilst the horizontal, material³⁵ analysis remains a distinct moment in his thought (cf. III.1,6,1-3; VI.4,13,11-14; V.9,2,14-15; etc.), it does not stand at the forefront of Plotinus' attention. For him the dynamic of real genesis is the internal distance between two poles: *καὶ εἰς ἃ μὲν λήγει, ἕλη καὶ λόγος, ὅθεν δὲ ἄρχεται, ἐφεστῶσα τῷ μεμιγμένῳ* (III.2,2,39-42). The meaning of this we shall discuss later. But it should be evident now from this account of matter why sensible and intelligible can not form a unified series of genera. As one thing in another (*ἄλλο ἐν ἄλλῳ*), Plotinus argues at VI.1,10,53-58, the quality or image in the substrate also contributes to *non-being*.³⁶ If qualities and acts are to be related at all, therefore, it can only be in so far as the former find their explanation in the latter; and this will not be a genus, but a "way of speaking", a focal meaning dependent upon a real source.

It must also be emphasised that the vertical analysis of the whole object is implicitly based upon a notion central to the argument of *Metaphysics* Book Z, namely that form, composite and matter are not only elements of substance, but constitute a natural analytic hierarchy. For Aristotle, the form and composite are 'more substance than the matter' and the form is prior to the composite (*Metaph.* 23 1029 A 29f.).³⁷ For Plotinus too in VI.3,7 the form clearly *is* to a higher degree than the compound and the matter.

nor matter is a genus. Hence, their 'secondary' instances can in opposed ways be referred to their respective "essences" in a manner analogous to the *πρὸς ἓν* equivocal (e.g. *συμπληροῦν* I,8,6,38-39; 52; *συντελεῖν*, 15,11 etc. EN.I.6,1096 B, 27-28 . . . τῷ ἀφ' ἐνὸς εἶναι ἢ πρὸς ἓν ἅπαντα συντελεῖν).

33. cf. especially I.8,6,35 ad fin.; 15,9-12.

34. cf. I.8,3,17ff.; 5,14ff. Which in a different way is no more than to say *ἕλη ἔστι καὶ τούτου καὶ οὐ τούτι* (III.6,17,35).

35. By 'material I mean that the focus of the analysis is the material object which comes to be.

36. cp. VI. 4,2,21-22.

37. cf. also *Physics* B,1,193B,6-8.

Therefore, one can not accept the postulate of the Stoics,³⁸ or indeed of Alexander of Aphrodisias (*Quaest.* 79.14-16), that things in this universe of reference hold their *being* from matter (VI.3,7,1-3).³⁹ And Plotinus concludes that whether form and matter come from the same source or not (*ibid.* 5-35), the substantial priority of the one over the other makes it impossible to create one genus of substance from its different elements (VI.3,8,1ff).

More importantly, however, Plotinus' definition of sensible substance as an aggregate of qualities and matter is in fact reached by what is obviously intentional use of Aristotle's analysis of the substrate in *Metaphysics* Z3. In VI.3,8 Plotinus asks what is common to all sensibles, *qua sensible*, and answers that they are all subject — *substrata*, not qualities or predicates (3-12)⁴⁰. Here he clearly intends a comprehensive, non-abstract (. . . οὐ γὰρ παραλελειψεται ἡ ὅλη οὐδὲ τὸ εἶδος) grasp of the significance of the sensible object in itself. In this light the injunction that sensible substance is to be grasped 'by perception rather than *logos*' is, contrary to the view of Rutten,⁴¹ I think, typically Aristotelian.⁴² But if sensible substance possesses magnitude and quality, Plotinus proceeds to argue, and if we separate these accidents, then the 'substance' in this case can only be the ultimate subject — *substratum* upon which the qualities are founded (*ibid.* 12-19), and the sensible substance will be a whole composed of the qualities and the matter. Thus, the notion, and reality, of the sensible

38. cf. SVF. I. 85 and 87, II. 316.

39. On the other hand, it is evident that sensibles could not have *sensible* existence if they did not rest upon matter (VI.3,7,3-5)

40. cf. VI. 3,4, 26-27 and *Metaphysics* 1029 A 1-3.

41. *Op. cit.* p. 57.

42. This is not simply a case of reducing the *Metaphysics*' analysis (see note 40 above) to the primary substance of the *Categories* (cp. VI.3,8,3-12,5,14 and *Categ.* 5,2 A 12-13); the complexity of Plotinus' argument in VI.3,8 speaks against this. Plotinus is criticising the view that substance, the ultimate object of the enquiry, can be *sensible simpliciter*; and it is surely the main thrust of Aristotle's argument in *Metaph.* Book H especially to arrive at a "sensible" grasp of the one object. To this end, for instance, Aristotle can say that the logical analysis related to the definition of man is one of no use to the inquiry into *sensible* substance (*Metaph.* H3, 1043 A 37-B1). Since 'there is no definition' of sensibles, 'but they are known either by thought or perception' (*ibid.* Z 10, 1036 A 5-6), I am inclined to think that Plotinus is here 'quoting' a well-known Aristotelian-Peripatetic formula.

Ps. Alexander, for instance, uses just these words (*In Metaph.* p. 509, 24 Hayduck). If his commentary is Post-Plotinian, it remains likely that much of Alexander's original commentary is included.

object, when viewed purely in terms of the *outer nature*, is firstly that of the whole subject compound and secondly, on analysis the quality in matter or qualified thing (VI.3,8,22-23) which leads inevitably to the notion of the *substratum* as bare matter, sterile in itself (*ibid.* 34-35), yet the base of all appearance (*ibid.* 35-37). This *outer nature*, therefore, although an image in the Platonic sense, is also very simply Aristotle's *basic* compound of form and matter.⁴³

This is equally evident in the argument of II.6, where the peculiarly limiting focus of Plotinus' argument against genera of *sensible* being does not apply. There in Chapter 1, 44-49, using the *Seventh Letter's* distinction between essence and quality (cf. 343 c), Plotinus argues that fire's being is substance, but that when we actually *look* at fire, we are led away from its essence to a grasp, rather of the qualitative. In the case of sensible objects, Plotinus adds, this is quite reasonable, for none of them are substance, but merely affections of substance. Following up this negative line of thought in Chapter 2, Plotinus uses the same Aristotelian *reductio* as he does in VI.3,8. If the substance prior to qualified substance is body, then, if fire is a hot body, the whole will not be substance; with the result that if we take away all the qualities, matter will have to be the substance (II.6,2,7-13). When Aristotle reaches this impasse in *Metaphysics* Z 3, his natural recourse is to turn back to the primacy of form (*Metaph.* 1029 A 27-30). This Plotinus also does in II. 6,2, unlike VI. 3,8. But we do not think that matter is substance, he adds; for it is the form which is substance rather; and this is not quality, but *logos* (13-15). In both II. 6,2, and VI. 3,8 Plotinus' example is fire. In VI. 2, 4, 1-12 his example is a stone. In all of these passages it is the outer nature, that of *body* which is in question.⁴⁴

The outer nature of the sensible object, therefore, comprises two real points of focus: it is, as a whole, a logical subject in the more positive, and Platonic, way in which Lloyd and Rist see it; but also, in the *internal momentum* of the analysis which leads to matter it is a logical subject in the more isolated and pessimistic sense which Rutten generally seems to give it. Whereas on the lowest level "matter" is 'ready to stand apart' from "form" (VI.7,11, 65-67) and whilst its "anti-substantiality" is cause of physical and moral evil, and 'source' of nominalism if the intelligible is 'absent', in a

43. Wurm (*Substanz and Qualität*, p. 255-6) takes VI.3,8,30-31 to contradict the Aristotelian-Peripatetic rule οὐσία ἐξ οὐσιῶν. But this is not so, if we follow Plotinus' developed analysis of form and matter as outlined in this paper.

44. cf. VI. 2,4,2.

concrete sense the object is a subject — *substratum* (III.6,12,38-57; II.4, 12,13-22), substance to affections (e.g. III. 6,12,43-47; II.4,12,13-22) and *substratum* to the form (e.g. II.4,6,16-17⁴⁵); it is also a proper grammatical subject, a subject of predication (VI.6,13,29-36; VI.3,6, 28ff.). In this ambience, I propose, the subject is not stripped of real substantiality, for here the notions of matter and the composite objects are enriched in the light of form.

III

We can examine 'form' in two ways — either from the point of view of the *logos* which is in nature or from that of soul in its own right.⁴⁶ Let me take the more important case of soul first.

A

For Plotinus soul gives something of herself (an illumination merely) to body, but remains distinct and impassive. For Aristotle, on the other hand, soul is the essence or form of body, the form of life at whatever level a living thing has life. The formulation of the Aristotelian position which Plotinus is to attack in IV.7,8(5), 2-5 is curious:

they say that the soul in the compound has the rank of form in relation to the matter which is body ensouled, form not of every body or of body as such, but of a natural organic body potentially having life.

Not only is there no mention here of the Aristotelian first and second entelechies, but the loosely appended *ἔμψυχον* in line 3 is difficult.⁴⁷ Furthermore, the alternative reading, preserved in Eusebius, of *ψυχικῶν* for *φυσικῶν*, that is 'psychic organic body' for 'physical, organic body', scarcely seems to augur well for an impartial understanding of the Aristotelian position. All these considerations have led Blumenthal, for instance, to ask if Plotinus really understood the spirit of Aristotle's thought at all.⁴⁸ Worse still, Plotinus goes on to criticise the soul-entelechy as if it were the shape of a statue in relation to the bronze and could be cut up into little pieces just like a qualified thing. If this is what Aristotle means, he argues, many absurdities result not least among them

45. 'the fire is destroyed, we say, not the matter'.

46. cf. V.9,2,16-18; III.8,3,7-10.

47. On this see H. J. Blumenthal's *Plotinus' Psychology*, The Hague, 1971, pp. 12-13.

48. *op.cit. ibidem*.

the impossibilities of accounting for sleep and for the development of reason and perhaps even perception (IV.7,8,5,5-15)⁴⁹. For this reason, he continues, Aristotelians introduce a second soul or *nous*, an entelechy of a different sort. Unlike the earlier objections, there is some force in this last remark.⁵⁰ If the end of the particular is not simply to reproduce the specific form, but to participate, in some way, in the divine life, then, whilst the higher faculties will in one sense depend for their *embodiment* upon the lower, the lower will, nonetheless, depend for their *intelligibility* upon the higher. However this may be, Plotinus proceeds to argue that if the reasoning soul or intellect is to be immortal, then why not also the sensitive, the desiring and the vegetative, since experience seems to show that they are separable (17-32). The vegetative soul can, for instance, withdraw into the root of a plant that has withered. And if the power of increase can extend from seed to full grown plant, why should it not be completely separable? How could a reality which is without parts become the entelechy of a divisible body? Plotinus next introduces the argument of *metensomatosis* and concludes on the basis of the whole cumulative argument that soul has being not by being the form of something, but rather as a substance which does not take its being from its location in body (cf. VI.2,8,3-5), a substance which exists before it comes to be the soul of this object.

Is it possible to make philosophical sense of this criticism? It seems to me that we can.

Firstly, as the terminology of line 40 makes clear, the object of the argument has been to abolish the narrow Peripatetic definition of soul as a physical form (cf. *De Anima Liber cum Mant.*, p. 120, 10), an *enulon eidos* (*Quaest.* II. 10, p. 55, 13), which is taken to be τὸ τινοῦς εἶδος (*ibid.*, 9-10). Plotinus is, therefore, arguing against the materialism of Alexander of Aphrodisias. However, his indirect reference to the axe analogy from the *De Anima* at lines 5-6 shows that it is Aristotle's thought which is primarily at issue.

I suggest, then, that the two natural sections into which the criticism falls indicate what lies behind Plotinus' expressed thought: the outer nature, the schema or sensible shape, on the one hand; on the other, the internal, ultimate substantial nature, Intellect. If the soul is form of the body in any of the different senses of inseparable entelechy, then the natural, analytic direction

49. On this see G. Verbeke, "Les critiques de Plotin contre l'entéléchisme d'Aristote: Essai d'interprétation de l'Enn.4,7,8⁵", in *Philomathes*, The Hague, 1971; especially pp.194-210.

50. cf. Verbeke, *op. cit.* pp. 211ff.

is towards the *locus* of sensible substance; for the expression or manifestation of soul is, therefore, viewed only *κατὰ τὸ γενομένον* (cf. VI. 2,1,32-33; VI. 2,4 *passim*). This is more evident still when one recognises that historical existence, *to the degree* that it focusses upon the sensible, rests ultimately, for Plotinus, upon the life of body *qua* body as its subject — *substratum*. In fact, it is this distinction between the ‘corporeal’ and the properly ‘psychic’ which is developed explicitly in VI.3,17, 1-2. The reduction of the immanent, immaterial form, therefore, in IV. 7,8 [5], 5ff. to its manifestation as a quality or form in matter is *not* so much an absurd identification as a real, and logically necessary, *alignment*, a reference point to which the immaterial is traced, and the resultant absurdity constitutes a rejection of the thesis that soul can be fully interpreted within the analysis of *sensible* substance. This is why Plotinus can treat the theories of Aristotle and Alexander together. On the other hand, if soul, as an *energeia* in itself and an *energeia* in body,⁵¹ is *not* to be simply aligned with its qualitative manifestation in a *substrate*, then the interpretation of its own nature belongs within that of Intellect. In other words, its proper subject — *substratum* is *Nous*.⁵² This is exactly what Plotinus means when he says that soul is complete or perfect in its possession of *nous* (V.1,10,12).

This interpretation is, I think, confirmed by the fact that such an analysis is fundamental to almost all the treatises of the *Enneads*: whether ascent to Being or the One is by means of an hierarchical analysis of unities (to Being, cf. VI.2,4ff.; to the One: VI.9), self-dependence (VI.8: τὸ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν), contemplation (III.8) or Sophia (V.8: see especially V.8,5), the question of reference and meaning is always of the utmost importance. The analysis into form and matter, shaper and shaped, at all levels of reality is fundamental (cf. V.9,3).

Particular confirmation is to be found in a passage from Plotinus’ last work. In I. 1, 4 Plotinus discusses different views of the presence of soul to body. What does Plato mean at *Timaeus* 36 E 2 when he describes the soul of the universe as “woven throughout” its body? Is soul in body as a form in matter? His answer is as follows: if soul is a separable form (χωριστὸν εἶδος) and substance, it will correspond more to the notion of a principle ‘using body’

51. This sort of expression (e.g. VI.4,8,42-43) is perfectly natural and indeed more comprehensive, if form is prior to the composite.

52. cf. II.6,3,23-24 . . . τὰ δὲ ἀρχέτυπα αὐτῶν, ἐν οἷς πρῶτως ἐστίν, ἐνεργείας ἐκείνων, III.7,3,8-10. And in the case of soul: see VI.2,6,9; IV.3,2,44.

(κατὰ τὸ χρώμενον)⁵³; but if it is like the shape of an axe imposed on the iron⁵⁴, then, *even though the function of the axe depends upon the shape* (κατὰ τὸ σχῆμα), we shall attribute all the common affections to *body*, though a body of a specific kind, physical, organic, potentially having life (18-25).

The inner, vertical analysis of the composite object, therefore, is viewed firstly, in terms of the distinction between shaper and shaped. In fact, Plotinus' critique of Aristotle on time in III.7, as also his remarks in VI.3,6, 29-34, is founded on this distinction. If the measure of motion is understood κατὰ τὸ μεμετρημένον, then the motion is to be ranged in the *substratum*, in the patient. But if it is understood κατὰ τὸ μετροῦν, then the measure will be in the measurer and will, therefore, have to be traced to the proper subject of reference (cf. III.7,9,68-76; 12, 39ff.; 13,10-19). Thus, in III.7 time is the substantial movement of soul between Being and Becoming.

yet surely the effect of such an analysis is to leave the generated object and the whole Aristotelian philosophy pertaining to it far below the immaterial world. In one sense, this is a true impression. In V.1,10 Plotinus says that the *hypostases* — Soul, *Nous* and the One — are παρ' ἡμῖν, not in the sense that they actually reside *in* sensible objects. Rather, they are *outside* and *upon* those objects (ἐπὶ τοῖς αἰσθητῶν ἔξω). They are separate; and separate means having nothing in common with body.

On the other hand, the notion of separation, although so basic to the other-worldly tendency of Neoplatonism, is still more complex than this. 'Outside' and 'upon' are to be explained, Plotinus continues (V.1,10,9-10), by what Plato means when he speaks of the 'inner man' at *Republic* 589 A-B,⁵⁵ a passage which certainly indicates the direct function of the higher nature in historical existence. How, then, are the one over the many and the one in the many to be linked? Here we turn to the question of *logos* and attempt to locate a more fundamental analysis of the whole object in the notion of demiurgic causation.

53. Hence it is not a question of identity of essence and object but of *alignment* of reference, a question of focus of meaning. Here the terminology is of course Platonic (*Alcibiades* I,130C, or *Phaedo* 79A-D, or *Laws* X, 896E-897C) or 'middle' Aristotelian (cf. Nuyens, *L'evolution . . .*), but the notion of alignment is, of course, also Aristotelian (IV.7,1,22; IV,4,18,14 and *Eth. Nic.* 1178A 2f.). On this see G. O'Daly's *Plotinus' Philosophy of the Self*, Irish University Press, Shannon, 1973, pp. 14, 29.

54. cf. *De An.* 412B12.

55. J. Adam observes in his commentary *ad loc.* (*The Republic of Plato*, vol. II, p.363): "according to Plato, the true unity of the individual is realised

B

In II.7,⁵⁶ Plotinus presents two views of corporeity. The first is 'that which is composed from all the body's constituents', that is, "the body made up of all the qualities with the matter" (4-5;⁵⁷ cf. 2, 34-35). The second is a form and a *logos*, which enters into the matter and makes body.⁵⁸ The first view evidently corresponds to the notion of sensible substance set forth in VI.3,8,20ff. The second is more problematic.⁵⁹ Corporeity enters (ἐγγενόμενος), comes to the matter (προσελθών, 6) and makes body; it comprehends all the qualities (7). Plotinus emphasises⁶⁰ that this *logos* is not a sort of definition which declares the nature of the thing merely, but a principle productive of the thing. Hence it can not include the matter. It is a *logos* 'around matter', which perfects the body (7-11). This leads to an important apposition: on the one hand, body is matter and indwelling *logos*; on the other, the *logos* is a form to be contemplated bare without matter, 'even if it is itself as inseparable as it can be from matter. For the separated form is a different one, that which is in intellect' (12-14).

Such a *logos* seems closer perhaps to the Stoic notion of *ratio faciens*⁶¹ or *Spermatikos logos*⁶² than to anything Aristotelian. Yet the view presented has definite affinities with the thought both of

only through the subjection of the two lower 'parts' of soul to the highest; and this subjection is described in 589 A, B."

56. The earlier chapters are a critical discussion of the stoic doctrine that two material substances totally interpenetrate one another when mixed, a discussion which seems to follow Alexander's *De Mixtione*, and *Quaestiones et Solutiones* II.12, p. 57. On this see Bréhier, Notice to II.7.

57. τὸ ἐκ πάντων συγκείμενον . . . τὸ ἐκ πασῶν τῶν ποιότητων σὺν ὅλῃ.

58. cp. II.4,12,35-37.

59. For a discussion of this from the point of view of the Stoic tradition see A. Graeser, *Plotinus and the Stoics*, Leiden, Brill, 1972, pp. 19-22. Graeser's remarks, however, do not interpret the passage under discussion.

60. Probably, as an implicit criticism of Alexander's thesis that body is not *logos* or definition and that the definition of body is obtained by abstraction from particular bodies (*Quaest.*, p. 59, 14-16; 19-20).

61. cf. Cicero, *De Natura Deorum* I, 36-40. Marcus Aurelius, V.32, SVF II, 120, 17-19; 335, 25-6. See further, R.E. Witt, "The Plotinian Logos and its Stoic basis", *Co*, 25, 1931, p. 103ff.

62. Ravaisson, following Ficino, goes so far as to state that when Plotinus speaks of Logos, one must almost always understand the word 'seminal' (*Essai sur la Métaphysique d'Aristote*, t.2, p. 384, note). Such a view is held, though less explicitly, by Zeller (*Outlines of the History of Greek Philosophy*, New York, 1890, p. 334), Heinze (*Die Lehre vom Logos*, p. 63-64, 317ff.) and Graeser (*op. cit.* p.41-43), although Graeser does point out the difference between the Stoic and Plotinian conceptions from IV.4,39,5-9 and V.9,6,9-24. Other examples of the *spermatikos logos* are III.1,7,4; V.9,9,10;

Aristotle and Alexander. Plotinus' insistence on the insufficiency of the merely indicative definition is paralleled by a passage in VI.7.4. There, it becomes clear that definition must include the productive cause.⁶³ This is evidently the essence or quiddity. And, indeed, if, as Aristotle claims in *Met. Z. 10*, 1036 A 7-8, particulars are "always known by the universal *logos*" and it is the presence of the quiddity in the sensible object which constitutes the substance, then it becomes clearer that corporeity must be a productive *logos*.

What useful context can we give to the function of the verb *ἐγγιγνέσθαι* in this passage and the related notion in the participle *προσελθών*?

The most distinctive positive usage of the verb *ἐγγιγνέσθαι*⁶⁴ is Aristotelian and Peripatetic. Here it is inevitably related to the doctrine of *nous* and to the introduction or development of something different from the members of the body and the composition they represent. At *De Anima* 408 A 20 Aristotle asks if soul is a proportion or if it is in the limbs as something different. At 426 A 4-5 the activity of the producer *is in* that acted upon; and in 408 b 18 *nous* seems to be in us (*ἔοικεν ἐγγινεσθαι*) as a substance, and to be imperishable. Alexander's usage follows especially from this last. In his *De Anima*, p. 81, 20, the practical and opining *nous* is developed first (*ἐγγίνεται*). *Nous*, developed through training, is the form and entelechy of the material *nous* (*ibid.*, 25-6). At 85, 20ff., the verb is used of the *hexis* which strips the forms from their sensible *substratum*. In this context, then, the verb would seem to signify the supervening entry into something of the fuller development and actualisation of an already indwelling capacity.

The notions of pre-existence and entry from outside, notions necessarily connected with Aristotle's doctrine of the *nous thurathen*,⁶⁵ provide a further context for Plotinus' "*προσελθών*". Even though the *logos* is inseparable from matter, its 'approach' intimates the two philosophical *directions* of thought: universality in the matter because of its pre-existent intelligibility, on the one hand, and on the other, incipient immateriality. Plotinus, however, strictly retains the normal Aristotelian position on separability. This is perhaps only natural on the subject of

V,3,8,7-9; II,3,16,20.

Armstrong and Bréhier, by contrast, seem on the whole to take a more 'Aristotelian' view of the form-*logos* (Armstrong, *Architecture*, p.95; Bréhier, *The Philosophy of Plotinus*, Chicago, 1958, pp.173-5)

63. VI.7.4,20-30 (on which see below); 3,9.

64. cf. also *Philebus* 24D-C2. *Laws* XII, 961D. Especially *Alcibiades* I, 133 B 4 and 9.

65. cf. R. Hicks, *De Anima*, p. 277, note to 408 b 19.

corporeity, but it amounts to the presentation of three, or even four, implicit views of the nature of body: bare composite, *logos* in matter and *logos* to be contemplated in itself, the last of which already impels the thought to the separate *logos* in *nous*. Such a schema corresponds to Alexander's (1) composite-particulars, (2) *enula eide*, (3) *aestheta* or *enula eide* which become *noeta* by abstraction and, finally, (4) intelligibles by virtue of their own nature (cf. *Quaest.*, p. 39, 14ff. *De An. passim.*). Alexander characteristically states of the *enula eide* that *nous* makes them intelligible by separating them from their matter (e.g., *De An.*, 108, 22; 85, 25 etc.). Plotinus' view, as we can see here, is not so simple. The direction of thought for him is all-important in a way that it is not for Alexander. Separation for Plotinus,⁶⁶ as it was for Plato,⁶⁷ is not abstraction but *augmentation*.⁶⁸

66. This must also be the case for Aristotle too, no matter how different the sense, if the form is prior to the particular and universal, and is χωριστόν and τὸδε τι.

67. τὸ βέλτιστον ἐκᾶστω, τοῦτο καὶ οἰκειότατον (*Republic* 586 E). See also F.M. Cornford, *Plato's Theory of Knowledge*, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1951, pp. 268-273, espec. p. 269: "Plato cannot hold that the higher we ascend in the hierarchy of genus and species, the poorer the terms become in content."

68. For instance, in the well known passage, V.8,9, where Plotinus leads us incipiently to the intuitive understanding of the total perfection of *Nous*, there is a separation involved: we must take away places and the phantasm of matter (V.8,9,11-12). But, on the other hand, we must keep the diaphanous sphere of our outer vision (with each of the parts remaining what it is) and also the one which we take from our inner vision. The prayer, then, to the god who has made this, of which we only have the dim realisation, is, of course, a prayer for *augmentation*, and the whole notion of 'separation' is thereby transformed.

69. In VI.2,8,1-5 Plotinus brings the same understanding to bear. He has been arguing for the necessity of Being, Motion and Rest as three of the genera of the intelligible world, since *nous* thinks each of them as separate. *Nous* simultaneously thinks and posits since it thinks, and they are, since they are thought. Of Things whose being is with matter, he continues, the being is not in *nous*. Henry-Schwyzler bracket the following words ἀλλ' ἔστιν ἄυλα, whose understood subject is probably the three genera mentioned above. If Plotinus actually wrote these words, and I think he did, then it seems possible to me that there is an intentional ambiguity here; for whilst it is axiomatic that *enula eide, qua enula*, are not in *nous*, it is not the case that what they really are is not in *nous*. Now the thought that is uppermost in Plotinus' mind in these first five lines is the independence of these genera, and all immaterial forms, of our particularized thinking of them, and their self-identity of real priority in the thought of *nous*. Hence, he continues: things without matter, if they have been thought (that is, if they are *a priori* to our intellects), this is their being. Evidently this applies not only to the prime genera, but to all essences. But the point Plotinus

Arguing against the Stoics in IV.7,4 Plotinus says that if the *schesis* or disposition of things is different from the matter, ἐν ὕλῃ μὲν, ἄυλον δὲ αὐτὰ τῷ μὴ πάλιν ἄυ συγκεῖσθαι ἐφ' ὕλης it would be a *logos* and not just body in the sense that the Stoics propose. We might conclude, therefore, that whilst the *enulon eidos* belongs to the sensible as such, its real being is intelligible.⁶⁹

In II.7,3,9-10 the *logos* is, in fact, the classical *enulos logos* of the Aristotelian commentators.⁷⁰ It is immanent in matter, but does not have matter in itself. Like the shape 'around' the bronze introduced by the craftsman, the *logos* is 'around' the matter and can, therefore, create the composite (10-11). How is this so? How can an inseparable *logos* make the thing?

Towards the end of III.8,2, Plotinus draws an analogous distinction. Nature is a *logos* which makes another *logos*. This gives something to the substrate, but stays unmoved itself. In the lines which follow this is seen as two *logoi*: one according to the visible shape is already ultimate, a corpse, no longer capable of making another, whilst that which has life is the brother of the one that makes the shape. It has the same power itself and makes in that which comes to be. These are puzzling statements, since the *logos* which is no longer productive turns out in line 33 to have been the producer and the brother is said to create in the object which comes to be.⁷¹ What does Plotinus mean?

In the next chapter the question is asked how the *logos* has any contemplation (πῶς θεωρίας τινὸς ἂν ἐφάπτοιτο); if it makes in this way. Plotinus answers: if the *logos* stays in itself, it must be contemplation. Action, although κατὰ λόγον, is not *logos*; but the

probably wishes to make is that 'separate' in this case is not merely separate in the sense of 'free of matter', but prior in fact to our thinking, which is discursive. It seems, then, that he would naturally recall some such passage as *De Anima*, p.87, 24-28, where Alexander states that *nous* makes intelligible for itself the guiddities and forms of composites by separating them from the things with which being is to them (τῶν σὺν οἷς αὐτοῖς τὸ εἶναι). If there are any forms which are intelligible in the strict sense (κυρίως νοητά), these have being in their own nature without the assistance of the thinker. These, he concludes, are κατ' ἐνέργειαν νοητά, the *enula* δυνάμει νοητά (28-29).

If we understand VI.2,8,1-5 in the light of this, we might conclude that whilst the *enulon eidos* belongs to the sensible, its real Being is intelligible — but that the discovery of this Being is not a process of separation and abstraction.

70. See Hicks, *De Anima*, note to 403 A 25 on *logoi enuloi*.

71. ὁ μὲν οὖν λόγος ὁ κατὰ τὴν μορφήν τὴν ὁρωμένην ἔσχατος ἤδη καὶ νεκρὸς καὶ οὐκέτι ποιεῖν δύναται ἄλλον, ὁ δὲ ζῶν ἔχων ὁ τοῦ ποιήσαντος τὴν μορφήν ἀδελφὸς ὢν καὶ αὐτὸς τὴν αὐτὴν δυνάμιν ἔχων ἐν τῷ γενομένῳ.

logos together with the action and supervising it (συνὼν καὶ ἐπιστατῶν) must be pure contemplation.⁷²

With every *logos*, then, the last proceeds from contemplation and is contemplation ὡς θεωρημένος, that is, as an object of prior contemplation, it is now too an object of and for contemplation; the *logos* before this is complete, that which is not nature, but soul, and that in nature and nature itself (7-10). This last-mentioned *logos* in nature should, for reasons of symmetry, correspond to the 'brother' of the previous chapter. It is complete or universal, whilst the ultimate *logos* is ranged with the particular (cf. κατὰ τὴν μορφήν τὴν ὀρωμένην κ.τ.ἔ. 2,31), yet is incipiently universal as an object for contemplation (cf. II. 7,3, 12-13). Implicitly they go together as do the two acts, that of the substance and that from the substance (cf. V.4,2).

This creative connection is even clearer in II.7,3. The *logos* does not "become inseparable" until it has completed its work, so to speak. In lines 6-12 Plotinus emphasises the meaning of its approach in just these terms and, only when its full creative power is evidently indwelling and constituting *body* with matter, does the viewpoint change in line 12 and following.

A similar, and more comprehensive, view of this need to contemplate the *logos* bare of matter is presented in the passage from III.8.

The first *logos* has created the shape, but when seen in that shape it evidently does not and can not produce further. Thus it must be seen in itself, not in what it has given, and the argument, which is following the objective articulation of the *logoi*, returns upon itself to discover the source of the same power which is both self-abiding and productive *in* the thing which comes to be. Hence, the first *logos* is said to 'make *in* the thing which has come to be' (III.8,2,34).

What emerges from an examination of both these texts is the importance of the dynamic direction of thought. Production for Plotinus is now and always. The coming-to-be of the composite, sensible object as the productive power of the *logos* in matter is not something that we create, anymore than 'we' produce the world (IV.3,6,17-18; IV.9,26-29). But in trying to understand the creativity of this power we must first follow in image the direction of the power; and this is not unconnected with our higher natures.

More importantly still, when in II.6,3,10-14 Plotinus says that the *logos* separates the individual characteristic mark in the

72. This is equivalent to the theory of the practical syllogism, equivalent in the sense that the 'universal' *logos* remains unmoved and yet is in a real way the source and director of the action (see e.g. *De Anima* 434 A 16-21).

intelligibles, not taking it away from the intelligible world, but rather, in grasping it and producing something else, it produces the qualitative as a sort of part of substance, grasping what appears on the surface, he means *exactly* what he says. The movement of thought into and in sense perception is, on the one hand, *production* and, on the other, a *reduction* which therein finds itself bankrupt and perplexed. It is production because, as Plotinus often emphasises, there is “nothing in between” Pure Form and Matter.⁷³ The phrase “nothing in between” is a ‘quotation’ from Aristotle’s *Physics* 243 A 32-34, where Aristotle asserts in the context of physical motion that there is nothing in between agent and patient. If, however, as Aristotle also asserts at *Physics* 198 A 35ff., there are two principles which produce physical motion, one of which is not physical — for example, *both* transcendent and immanent ends,⁷⁴ that is, the first Unmoved Mover and the $\tau\acute{\iota}\ \acute{\epsilon}\sigma\tau\iota$ and $\acute{\eta}\ \mu\omicron\rho\omicron\phi\acute{\eta}$ —, then one understands the justification in Plotinus’ interpretative extension of the Aristotelian doctrine of production. Plotinus often emphasises that we are ‘not cut off from’ the intelligible reality which is ‘our’ original nature.⁷⁵ He uses the verb $\acute{\alpha}\pi\omicron\tau\acute{\epsilon}\mu\upsilon\omega$ and is citing — at least subtextually — *Physics* 202 B 5-8, where Aristotle states that the act of the agent is in the patient and cannot be cut off from the latter. It is $\tau\acute{\omicron}\delta\epsilon\ \acute{\epsilon}\nu\ \tau\acute{\omicron}\delta\epsilon$. For Plotinus too, although there is a necessary, natural distinction between the *energeia*, or power, of soul as *power*, the *energeia*, as power *manifested in* the sensible composite, and, finally, the quality,⁷⁶ nonetheless, since they are not extra material objects, there is also the sense in which the *energeia* of agent and patient is *one*.⁷⁷ So in IV.6,3, 16-19, where Plotinus is explicitly treating the relation between the *noeta* and *aestheta* in perception (cf. VI.7,6), the soul is linked also with the *aestheta* and “makes them shine out, so to speak, by its own power and fashions them before its eyes since its power is ready

73. eg. VI.5,8,20; V.8,7,13; V.9,9,8-15, etc.

74. See W.D. Ross, *Aristotle’s Physics*, Oxford, 1960, note *ad loc.*, p. 527.

75. See VI.4,14,21-22; VI, 9, 9, 7 etc.

76. cf. e.g. II.6,2-3.

77. The ‘everlasting nature’ $\tau\acute{\omicron}\ \pi\acute{\alpha}\nu\ \kappa\alpha\tau\acute{\epsilon}\iota\lambda\eta\phi\epsilon$, $\mu\acute{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\omicron\nu\ \delta\acute{\epsilon}\ \acute{\alpha}\upsilon\tau\eta\ \acute{\epsilon}\sigma\tau\iota\ \tau\acute{\omicron}\ \pi\acute{\alpha}\nu$ (VI.4,5,8-9). The distinction is one between “natures”. Here I disagree with C. Rutten, who towards the end of his otherwise excellent article, “La Doctrine des deux actes dans la philosophie de Plotin” (*Revue Philosophique de Louvain*, 1956) p. 106, overemphasises the gulf between agent and patient in Plotinian thought without understanding — in my view — the real sense of their unity, a unity, of course, obscured and complicated by the fact that a real difference between Plotinus and Aristotle here is the foci of their respective visions (on this see below), not to mention the centuries separating the requirements and circumstances of their thought.

for them and, as it were, has birth pains towards them"⁷⁸ These are powerful words. The productive *logos* is not a merely external entity, but actually comprises our own vision too, linking the subjective to its proper object. As demiurgic soul we *create* the object; as perceptive soul we give it *logos* or simply qualify it further (cf. III.3,4,37-40). But the two are *not* abstractedly separate. Thus, the birth pangs experienced before the objects of sense (IV.6,3) cease when one comes to *Nous* "and not before" (V.9,2,9-10). Plotinus' use of metaphor is often philosophically precise. In a real sense, therefore, it is 'ourselves' who generate not only *substrata* (to the degree that they are *formed*) but also universals, quality and quantity (cf. VI.6,16,50-54; II.6,3; VI.2,21, 11-59⁷⁹).

Therefore the form which is *upon* the matter is also the form which is *in* the sensible object.⁸⁰ For Aristotle the form can be in matter in two ways: as quality in a substrate or as form in a determinate thing. It is cause of being in both these ways. When examining the formation and creation of the sensible object, Plotinus will draw this distinction between the relation of matter to the creating form, on the one hand, and shaped matter to the completing form, on the other (cf. V.9,4,10-12; III. 4, 1 *ad fin.*). This he also does — in one flowing movement of thought, so to speak, — in II.7,3,7-14. And in II.5,2,31-32 it is clear that a discussion of the form which shapes the already determinate substrate is located *simply* in the context of historico-sensible being.

But the position of II.7,3, is different. At line 12 the phrase "λόγον ἐνόντα" among the welter of Peripatetic associations would, in such a context, have been most likely to remind the reader of a central text in the *Metaphysics*, where the present participle of the verb ἐνεῖναι is used in a very distinctive manner. At Z11, 1037 A 29-30 Aristotle says that substance is the indwelling form (τὸ εἶδος τὸ ἐνόν), out of which and the matter the composite substance is said to be substance. He has just stated that in one way there is a definition of the composite substance and, in another, no definition is possible. The latter case is when the substance is with the matter, for here it is indefinite;⁸¹ the former is

78. . . . παρ' αὐτῆς οἷον ἐκλάμπειν ποιεῖ καὶ πρὸ ὀμμάτων εἶναι ἐργάζεται ἐτοιμῆς οὐσης καὶ πρὸ οἷον ὠδινούσης πρὸς αὐτὰ τῆς δυνάμεως (IV.6,3,17-19).

79. Note ἰδὼν ὄραξ, VI. 2,21,13, 11-18.

80. It is not, however, "united" with it: See I,8,14,27-34. A good example of what Plotinus means by τὸ ἐξῶ can be seen in his criticism of the Stoics at VI.1,27,7-9.

81. Rather like the infinite plurality of particulars in Philebus 16 E and 17 E.

when it is taken in accordance with primary substance. He gives as an example of primary substance the *logos* of soul for the case of man. In the substantial aspect of the "compound substance" (*synolos ousia*) it is concavity and the nose which give rise to snubness and snub nose; and in the compound substance (*synolos ousia*) matter is also present. This view which refuses to separate or abstract essences from the sensible object and which is always prepared to remember in the whole which is composite substance the importance and necessity of the role of matter, nonetheless gives a special place to the successive manifestations of the formal and causal essences in the matter, which demonstration and definition attempt respectively to unravel and formulate. But the definition is a real object and the importance of this throughout Aristotle's treatment of sensible substance is especially evident at the beginning of Z 15 where the two kinds of substance noted above are the *logos* ὄλως and the *logos* taken together with the matter (cf. *Metaph.* 1039 b 20-22).

In II.7,3, whether the chapter is consciously Aristotelian or not, it is clear that the *logos* which makes the thing, in contradistinction to that which merely indicates the essence, is in fact the real object which a causal definition would claim to be. It unites in itself *form* (ἐμπεριλαβὼν τὰς ποιότητας ἀπάσας), *end* (ἐγγενόμενον ἀποτελεῖν τὸ σῶμα) and *mover* (προσελθὼν . . . ποιῶν). Since it is the analytic reconstruction-image of the dynamic presence of intelligibility in matter, it must be at once inseparable, and yet primary substance remaining in itself. Only in this way can the essence, which this definition is, be seen to *make*. It must be admitted, then, that the term *logos* also includes the Aristotelian notion of definition. Precisely as the composite substance for Aristotle derives this title from the possession of *eidos*, so too for Plotinus the composite is in this sense matter and indwelling *logos*, which one must try to contemplate purely as the substantial *energeia* it really is already. The notion of creativity, which seems at first an element alien to that of definition is simply, and justifiably, to take account of the fact that what we see before us is not just an object of perception, but, earlier in reality, if not in time, an object of thought.⁸²

82. In his *De Anima*, p. 87, 5ff., Alexander states that in composites of form and matter the τὸδε τι is one thing and the quiddity (τὸ τῷδε εἶναι) another (cf. Aristotle, *Metaph.* 1037 b 1-6). For bronze is the *synamphoteron*, but what it means to be bronze is no longer κατὰ τὸ συναμφοτέρον, but is according to the form and *logos*, which ἐν τῇ ὑποκειμένῃ ὕλῃ γενόμενος ἐποίησεν χαλκὸν αὐτήν (11). Alexander's purpose is to show the difference between the judgments of intellect and perception in the case of forms. Perception grasps the form in matter. It is judgemental of the

Thus, we come naturally to the third, and more fundamental, position. Body is not just shaped matter. It is also *logos*, the result of creativity, manifestation of creativity and indication of its source.⁸³ In VI, 7,4, for instance, Plotinus argues that in the definition of “this man” (τὸν τῆδε ἄνθρωπον line 3), it is not sufficient to indicate the conjunct of body and soul, for this does not even begin to unravel the meaning of the *enulon eidos*. In definition one must state “according to what” man is (21-23). Even though it is necessary to define ‘with matter’ (24), one must nonetheless grasp the *logos*, that is, the real essence, which makes man what he is; and this is ἐνυπάρχον, οὐ χωριστόν (29-30)⁸⁴. Plotinus suggests, therefore, a different kind of τὸδε ἐν τῷδε: “soul in a determinate *logos*, the *logos* being an activity of a certain kind which has no power without the acting subject.”

In effect, Plotinus points out that the most fundamental sense in

synamphoteron. *Nous*, on the other hand, is contemplative of the form καθ’ ὃν ἔστι τὸδε τι (14-15). So where the essence and the thing are different, perception knows the thing and *nous* the essence. Where they are identical, *nous* alone contemplates such things (18-24). One can see that such a schematisation, if rigidly upheld, is ultimately no more Aristotelian (cf. *Post. An.*, 90 A 15 ff., espec. 28-31) than it could be Plotinian (cf. VI.7,2,11-12). On the other hand, it is of course correct that primary substance (cf. *Metaph.* 1037 b 1-4), understood as the identity of object and essence, must, properly speaking, be an object of thought. But the primary interest of this passage for ourselves lies in the relation of the essence to the sensible object and the matter. The essence in the matter *makes* the sensible object. This is Aristotle’s view of sensible substance. It is also that of Plotinus. Compare also Theophrastus, *Metaph.* 8A 8ff. . . . ἡ οὐσία γ’ αὐτῶν (things in genesis) τῷ μορφοῦσθαι κατὰ τοῦς λόγους.

83. That the form is ‘from elsewhere’ — ‘from another’ (V.1,3,19) is basic to the thought of Plotinus: πᾶν εἶδος ἐν ἄλλῳ παρ’ ἄλλου εἰς ἐκεῖνο ἔρχεται (V.9,5,18-19). Plotinus’ use of ὄθεν (V.9,3,20; III.2,2,40; V.2,2,13; III.9,3,4-5; etc.) indicates the ‘distance’ between the quality in the substrate and the substance, the internal nature, between the crafted object and the intelligible craft-*techne*, i.e. cause and caused. In other words, it signifies *efficient cause*, not just another member of the same species prior in time, but the formal meaning of this precisely as form, that is, in terms of the *efficient causality of soul*. This seems a natural ‘extension’ of the Aristotelian theory (cf. *De An.* 416 b, 8-27; *Physics* 198 A 14 -198 B 9). Indeed, it reflects the major question of the central books of the *Metaphysics*: *From where* does the substantiality of the concrete particular come? From the form or from the matter?

84. This is almost a direct reference to *De Anima* 413 A 13-16 (cf. *Post. An.* II. 93 A 4-5), where it is stated that it is not sufficient for the defining *logos* to indicate the fact (τὸ ὅτι . . . τὸν ὀριστικὸν λόγον) as the majority of definitions do, it must also contain and manifest the cause (ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν αἰτίαν ἐνυπάρχειν καὶ ἐμφαίνεσθαι).

which soul is the *τί ἦν εἶναι τῷ τοιωδὶ σώματι*⁸⁵ (*De Anima*, 412 b 11) is that in which the pure *logos* and subject, soul, is present in a composite object of a determinate kind which is knowable in virtue of its essence.⁸⁶ This is to say that the pure *logos* resides in a *logos* of a specific kind which includes *definitory τὰ ἐνυπάρχοντα*⁸⁷ and *proceeds all the way to the bare substratum*, and that it is in the light of this alone that the generated object can be understood; for this is what it means to be man.⁸⁸ So, in III.3,4 31ff. The substrate to the *arche* is said to be *logos*. What has come to be from the *logos* is to be ranged *κατὰ τὸν λόγον*. In II.6,2 *logos* is form, not quality, and what is compounded of *logos* and *substratum* is not a visible object.

Not only, then, does Plotinus unite the efficient and final causes in the formal, he also brings the material cause within the intelligibility of the form.⁸⁹ This is why Nature is both an 'immanent' and a 'transcendent' principle in his thought.⁹⁰ It is, therefore, evident that for Plotinus, soul is also the form of life at whatever level a living thing has life.⁹¹

85. In a passage cited above, I.1,4, 18-25, the force of *μέντοι* at line 24 is just this, that the determinate body is *also* a *logos*. The question of alignment is, therefore, more complex in this case.

86. Hence Porphyry holds that the soul *σχέσιν ἔσχε πρὸς τὸ ποιὸν σῶμα* (*Sent.* 29. 1 Gomperz) See also Nemesius, *De Nat. Hom.* 1, 505 AB. On this see J. Pépin *Idées Grecques sur l'Homme et sur Dieu*, Paris, 1971, p. 101, n. 2.

87. *cf.* VI. 7,3,13-15; VI. 8,14,20-29.

88. See VI.7,4,14: *ὑπόστασις αἰδίου*.

89. Hence, in III.3,4,37ff. (*cf.* IV. 4,39,5-17; III.6,19,3ff.) the *logos* is said to contain in itself the *logos* of matter, "which it will make suitable for itself, either, giving it qualities corresponding to itself or finding it already consonant." Alexander also speaks of the '*logos* of matter' (*De Anima* p.26, 27-28, Bruns).

90. In III.8,2,21ff., Nature must be a form and unmoved, Plotinus argues. It can not be composite (*cf.* *Physics* 193 B 5-6), for what need could it have of hot or cold matter? The matter which underlies it and is fashioned by it comes bringing this (*cf.* *Phys.* 193 A 28-30, nature is the proximate, material substrate of things which have a principle of motion or change in themselves) or it becomes of this kind, although not possessing quality, by being given form by a rational principle (*cf.* *Phys.* 193 B 12 nature *ὡς γένεσις ὁδὸς ἐστὶν εἰς φύσιν*. 18ff. what grows, grows into something (*ἔρχεται*). The shape is nature). It is not fire, Plotinus continues, which must come to matter in order that it might become fire, but a *logos* (*cf.* *Phys.* 193 A 30 in a different way nature is *ἡ μορφή καὶ τὸ εἶδος κατὰ τὸν λόγον*).

Such a view effectively comprises the schematic essentials of Aristotle's doctrine of nature as set forth in *Physics* B 1. Nature remains the shaping principle above its developing expressions (*cf.* IV.4,20,30).

91. Hence the Platonic and early Aristotelian notion (*cf.* Jaeger, *Aristotle*, p. 44. Nuyens, *L'évolution de la psychologie d'Aristote* p. 85., Fr. 46 (Rose, p.52,1.19)), of the soul as absolute substance is brought together with the positive notion of its being the proper formative principle of the body. This

And, on the other hand, although man *is* most fundamentally his essence (i.e. the fullest meaning of even man in the sensible is soul and Intellect, for the object and the essence are not abstractly separate), nonetheless, “this” man and his essence are not *identical*⁹² (cf. VI.8,14,1ff.; I.1 passim; VI.7,2,54-56; VI.7,3,18-19).

Furthermore, the analysis founded on production provides a substantial view of even the external nature of the sensible object. In V.8,4,49 Plotinus states that not even the sciences which are least theoretical treat simply of a *symphoresis* of propositions. Rather, all objects of nature or art are created by τις σοφία and in his technical *sophia* the craftsman goes back again to the σοφία φυσική⁹³, καθ’ ἣν γεγένηται, οὐκέτι συντεθεῖσαν ἐκ θεωρημάτων, ἀλλ’ ὄλην ἐν τι, οὐ τὴν συγκειμένην ἐκ πολλῶν εἰς ἓν⁹⁴ ἀλλὰ μάλλον ἀναλυομένην εἰς πλῆθος ἐξ ἑνός⁹⁵ — and from here he concludes, one naturally proceeds to *nous*. In VI.6,13 Plotinus passes without

is, of course, Plotinus’ view of the essence of soul (IV.2,1), drawn from *Timaeus* 35 A-B. In II.6,3 it is argued that only what is never the form of another is quality. In this context to be the form of another is taken positively. In my view, it has a force similar to that of the phrase τὴν ἄλλου ἐνέργειαν at *Physics* 202 b 6. However this may be, when something is taken together with substance, then it is substance, form, act, even the *shape* of substance (17-18; 24-29). The quality taken alone ἐν ἄλλῳ (cf. *Metaphysics* 1037 b 3-4; *Phaedrus* 247 D7-E1) is only an image and a shadow. The difference between this view and that in VI. 1-3 is indicated in the forceful νῦν of VI. 2,14,18. There, the general contrast is between the Plotinian prime genera and intelligible simple entities, on the one hand, and the Aristotelian Categories and composites, on the other. The phrase ἡ τις οὐσία (11-12, 19) refers, therefore, in this chapter to the primary, composite substance of the *Categories* and, as the argument of VI.3, 1-8 shows, all attempts to liberate this notion from the bare *substratum* must fail. What is most striking in Plotinus’ position is that at the level of the immanent form, one still does not know what substance is VI.1,3,8-10: VI.3,3,15-17; VI.7,4, 21-23; IV.2,1,1ff.). One must include the cause (VI.7,4), in its most eminent form (VI.1,3,9-10) and then the thought has a solid foundation (cf. VI.2,8,13: ἐπερείδετο. VI.1,3,9: οὐπω ἔχομεν ἐπερείσασθαι τῇ οὐσίᾳ) in its object. One must, therefore, grasp the object at its highest in order to understand the dynamic of its presence in the sensible world. Hence, soul is substance not from being in body, ἀλλ’ οὐσα πρὶν καὶ τοῦδε γενέσθαι οἶον ζῶου, οὐ τὸ σῶμα τὴν ψυχὴν γ ἐννήσει (IV.7,85, 40-43).

92. And, therefore, pure forms are *not* the essences of material things, whilst on the other hand material things can only be *understood* in virtue of the forms they possess which will in turn indicate separate substance.

93. cf. *Metaphysics* 1005 b 1-2.

94. cf. VI.3,8; II.7,3,2; VI.3,2,15-16; VI.5,9,24.

95. cf. VI.4,14,10-12; I.6,2,18 ad fin.; of course the sensible All, in manifesting form, is also a complete perfect whole (III.2, 17, 64f.; *Timaeus* 30 C-D.)

pause from one position to another: from the house which is one “ἐκ πολλῶν λίθων” to (μᾶλλον μέντοι) “τὸ ἐν ἐπ’ οἰκίας” (24-5). Plotinus’ use of the preposition ἐπί in such cases, therefore, is comprehensive of much more than the straightforward Platonic position. The indwelling nature, and all that is to be referred to that nature, ‘sits upon’ or ‘hovers over’ the basic sensible compound. For instance, the artefact is to be referred via its shape to the *technē* (V.9,3,11-14) and the ἔνδον εἶδος (I.6,3). For Aristotle too, οἶον ἢ οἰκία ἐξ οἰκίας, ἢ ὑπὸ νοῦ. ἢ γὰρ τέχνη τὸ εἶδος (*Metaph.* Z9, 1034A 23-24). Natural, *complex objects*, then, are to be “analysed into the form upon all the compounded materials” (ἀναλύσεις εἰς τὸ ἐπὶ πᾶσι τοῖς συγκριθεῖσιν εἶδος V.9,3,14-17). And in everything, from the elements to soul and *nous*, one seeks not just the shape, but the *cause*.⁹⁶ The analysis into cause and determinate matter, therefore, is comprehensive of, but not identical with, that into shape and matter. The former is a more fundamental description of the latter. *Nous*, for instance, is in one way, Plotinus says, the form of soul and, in another, the provider of form, like the maker of the statue. (νοῦν δὲ τὸν μὲν ὡς εἶδος τῆς ψυχῆς, τὸν κατὰ τὴν μορθὴν, τὸν δὲ τὸν τὴν μορθὴν παρέχοντα ὡς τὸν ποιητὴν τοῦ ἀνδριαντος, ᾧ πάντα ἐνυπάρχει, ἃ δίδωσιν V.9,3,33-35). In the same way even the “arrangement”, the schema or *schesis*, though in matter, is substantially the principle of arrangement, soul (cf. IV.7,4,18-21; VI.7,3, 18-19).

IV

We may, therefore, conclude that the πρὸς ἓν — ἀφ’ ἑνός equivocal view of substance proposed in VI.1,3 is indeed for Plotinus a view which brings together “intelligible substance, matter, form and compound”⁹⁷; for it is in the light of soul and the already ‘intelligible’ compound of form and matter, τὸδε ἐν τῷδε, that the generated object itself is substantial (i.e. κατὰ λόγον). Take away the soul in this sense (VI.3.1ff.) the form as intelligible content, which is in no way dependent upon its substrate (VI.3,7), and one is effectively left with the dependence of the accident upon the bare *substratum* (VI.3,8; *Metaph.* Z1, 1028 A 20-32). If on the other hand, as we find in *Metaph.* Z.10, the ἐνυπάρχοντα or parts of a thing are included in its definition only when they are included in its form, then the inner causal nature of the *composite object* (not the matter simply), which we analyse in the form of the

96. V.9,3,18-19: ἐξ ὅλης καὶ τοῦ μορφοῦντος i.e. not only the *shapes* (lines 26-28), but the fact that the shapes come from another (28-29).

97. VI.1,3,1-2. cf. VI.6,13,36: εἰς ἀναφορὰν . . . ἐνός . . .

question why one thing belongs to another (cf. *Metaph.* Z.17, 1041 A 10-11 διὰ τί ἄλλο ἄλλῳ τινὶ ὑπάρχει), will *really be* the one *logos* — of the *diaphorae* and the *enuparchonta* — which the discursive definition resolves into discrete, ‘universal’ elements or qualities, which present an analogy to substance (cf. *Metaphysics* H.2, 1043 A 2ff.). For Plotinus the distinction between soul, as soul, and ensouled body, as body, also rests upon the logical and real difference between the residence of soul in the determinate *logos*, which is the substance constitutive of the sensible object as its true activity or form, and the basic sensible compound, substantial κατὰ λόγον, *sensible* substance as a whole, but indefinable κατὰ ὑποκειμένον. For both thinkers, then, it is true in a sense to say that the last differentia is the *substance* of the thing (cf. *Met.* Z.12; II.6,3) and yet that this is not substance in the fullest sense. In the *vision* of Aristotle, however, the form is immanent to the ‘matter’ in such a way that as actuality to potency there is no need of any other abstract *entity* to explain why the object is one (cf. *Metaph.* H 6), and this view of the co-relativity of form and matter in the non-abstract grasp of the sensible object is, to some extent, the conclusion of his analysis of sensible substance. But for Plotinus the “immanent” source of the unity of the sensible object is *the beginning of a vision* of the Intelligible Cosmos. Perhaps, our treatment has made it clearer that the many passages descriptive of the great life of Intellect must include in their content all that *body* really is. This is why in VI.2,21,52-3 Plotinus says that bodies are There too, because matter and quality are. The Intelligible includes the inner nature in all its successive forms; and this is also why the ‘Platonic *diagnosis*’ which stretches ultimately to the last form (e.g. VI.2,22,1-32; VI.7,14; cf. also V.3,9,28-36) “shaping” the matter and “touching upon” it (cf. VI.2,22,31-32) is the primary reality which the generated object, as such, reflects, and is secondarily.

On the other hand, the distinction between the inner and the outer nature does not, for Plotinus, involve any abstract separation. In the quality is glimpsed the *energeia*, or form, of the composite, sensible object; and the *energeia* itself manifests power; it is, as it were, the ‘embodiment’ of the primacy of form. To give but one example: walking is not feet *simpliciter*, Plotinus says, but an activity ‘around’ the feet from a power (VI.3,23,6-7).⁹⁸ The Plotinian form at this level of reference, therefore, is a subject acting in the sensible object, a true demiurgic cause.

On the one hand, then, Plotinus rejects the Aristotelian

98. The development of this theme must, for lack of space, belong to a different treatment.

categories, as genera of Being, and criticises the restricted substantiality of sensible substance, *qua sensible*.⁹⁹ Evidently this criticism is not limited to the *Categories* alone, but also applies to Aristotle's view of the composite sensible particular in the *Metaphysics* and elsewhere.¹⁰⁰ Thus, Plotinus undoubtedly makes Porphyry's detachment of Aristotle's logic and its eventual incorporation in the Platonist's curriculum¹⁰¹ (Ammonius, *In Categ.* 5, 31-6, 8 Busse; Simplicius, *In Categ.* 5, 3-6, 5) philosophically possible.¹⁰²

On the other hand, Plotinus is aware of 'another' Aristotle for whom the matter and the composite are to be 'derived' from, and referred to, the form in a way that is not abstraction or reduction, and for whom the form itself is not abstract universal, but augmentation, a fuller reality which must ultimately indicate separate substance; and if it is correct to see the *Metaphysics* theory of substance and action also in this light (just as we have argued above for the logical necessity of Plotinus' development of the "Physics" theory of matter), then we may rightly claim that the dynamic, 360 degree analysis which uncovers the internal dimensions of the sensible object is not only distinctively Plotinian, but is also a development or extension of Aristotle's thought, which from start to finish strikes a genuine vein of interpretation¹⁰³ — and, perhaps, all the more so for the fact that it is "hidden".¹⁰⁴ These two approaches, the 'implicit' and explicit 'critiques', when seen in the context of the *Enneads* as a whole, reveal vividly — not only for the critical Platonist, but for any interpreter who possesses good will towards "the blessed philosophers of ancient time" (III.7,1, 13-16) — how the conflicting, even irreconcilable, poles of

99. This does not preclude a 'substantial' view of "categories" when seen *κατὰ λόγον*. Hence although in VI.3,3,31-2 Plotinus virtually reduces the categories to the Platonic scheme as reported by Hermodorus (Simplicius, *In Phys.*, 247, 30-248, 15), one finds even in VI.2,21 a positive account of quality and quantity in their *intelligible genesis*, so to speak, and this is related specifically to 'logos' at VI.2,21, 27ff.

100. See note 42 above.

101. cf. A.C. Lloyd, "Neoplatonic and Aristotelian Logic II", *Phronesis*, 1955, pp. 150-151.

102. In the *Isagoge* Porphyry does not use the phrase 'first substance' at all and in the *In Categorias* he explains that perceptible individuals are 'first' only in the sense that they come first in the *ordo cognoscendi* (p.91, 10ff., ed. Busse). On this see C. Stead, *Divine Substance*, Oxford, 1977. p. 118.

103. Hence Porphyry's statement that "Aristotle's *Metaphysics* is concentrated" in Plotinus' writings (*Vita Plot.*, 14, 5-7) is *literally* true.

104. cf. *Vita Plot.* 14, 4-5.

Aristotle's thought, or of Aristotelian interpretation at least, can in fact be held in one dynamic, philosophical view.

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