Representation and Reflection in Plotinus

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In a recent article in *Dionysius*, [1] I have argued that the language of imitation is, for Plotinus, the most valuable means of speaking about the intelligible world and its relation to sensible reality. This language of imitation is developed through careful consideration of the critique of the Platonic theory of Forms in the Platonic *Parmenides*. It is seen that the language of participation and likeness, used to describe the relation between Form and particular in Plato's middle dialogues, ostensibly does not survive close scrutiny at the hands of the Parmenides of the dialogue. It may nevertheless be shown that the failure of the young Socrates to withstand the arguments of the old Parmenides represents dramatically the failure properly to define Form itself in the middle dialogues. The approach of Plotinus is congruent with the latter interpretation. He employs the language of imitation as a method for so defining Form that the dangers contained in the language used to describe the relation of Form and particular are obviated in the first instance by the proper understanding of the nature of Form in itself.

The concentration upon Form as cause leads to a carelessness with respect to the language used to describe the relation of Form to particular. This inattention is exposed when the precise nature of the relation between Form and particular becomes thematic. It emerges that if the Platonic theory of Forms is to be preserved, the discussion must be diverted from the relation between Form and particular to the definition of Form. The Form must be so defined initially that the problems surrounding the relation of Form to particular are anticipated. Thus if the Form is not to lose its unity and identity in that division among the particulars which might be implicit in the language of participation, it must be defined as immaterial. If Form as exemplar is not to be confused with the particulars which are like it, then its paradigmatic character must be established within the context of a proper understanding of imitation.

The language of imitation allows Plotinus to demonstrate ontological similarity and difference between the realms of

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1. "The Platonic *Parmenides* and Imitation in Plotinus", *Dionysius* 2 (1978) pp. 51-73.

intelligible and sensible reality. He employs the example of the artist for this purpose. In the artist's model there are two kinds of attributes, attributes of similarity and attributes of imitation. Thus blue in the model's eyes and blue in the painting are both attributes of similarity, a symmetrical relation. Eyes in the model, however, are held properly by the model while the image on the canvas has, not eyes, but the appearance of eyes. Eyes are an attribute of imitation which is an asymmetrical relation. The artist analyses and divides the attributes of imitation which inhere in unity in his model into a discrete conglomerate of attributes of similarity. Thus blue colour and oval shape represent eyes, a straight line an aquiline nose and yellow colour and wavy lines blonde hair. This conglomerate in its totality presents in imitation an appearance of its original in quasi-unity. The asymmetrical character of the relation of imitation preserves the transcendence of the model, the symmetrical character of similarity its immanence.

Plotinus insists that, to understand the pattern of imitation, epistemological considerations must first be raised. It depends upon a prior (if timeless) knowledge of the original to recognize the image. This principle is rendered ontological. The hypostasis of Nous, in looking to the One, interprets its attributes of imitation into attributes of similarity. In so doing, it produces itself as a divided image of the One. The same pattern holds true of the Soul and Nous.

The notion of an artist or Demiurge who would mediate between different realities and accomplish the relation of pattern and copy is a useful one. Through this model of artistic imitation, we may undertake a rational comparison, for example, of intelligible and sensible reality and understand the relation between them. We see that the intelligible world is not wholly other than this world; at the same time, we do not confuse the two realms.

We are still left, however, with the problem of how they are actually connected. To illustrate, we may say that the blue paint on the canvas represents the blue in the eyes of the model. The artist is introduced into our discussion to demonstrate that relation. Unless the notion of an artist or Demiurge is understood in a very literal sense, we are left with the question of the actual connexion between these attributes.

We have seen that the notion of the divine artist or Demiurge is internalized as Nous constitutes itself after the pattern of the One. This process is repeated throughout the metaphysical system of Plotinus. The Demiurge is not to be regarded as an agent external to the pattern-copy relationship. Nevertheless there is something wanting even in this model of artistic imitation. Even if Nous

constitutes itself eternally after the pattern of the One, we may still ask after the real connexion between the pattern and the copy. The notion of the artist helps us to understand the relation. It does not provide us with the real link.

I could, for example, imitate someone whom I admire. This fact would explain a great deal about the likeness between us. The relation, however, remains indirect. There is still mediation between pattern and copy, even if I provide this mediation myself. We wish to say that the link between intelligible and sensible reality or between Nous and the One is more immediate than this. The child owes, not only its likeness, but its very existence to its parent. The eternally begotten may not be understood alone through the model of artistic imitation. The problem of our separation from the divine is still with us.

Aristotle objects that the Demiurge does not solve this problem of separation. We shall see that Plotinus shares his uneasiness with that solution. Aristotle argues that if the Platonic Form is separate (χωρὶς) from the particulars, it cannot act as cause for them of their being what they are (*Metaphysics* 991B1 ff.). The argument doubtless reflects the argument of Parmenides in the Platonic *Parmenides* 131B1-2 that if the Form preserves its unity and identity, but is yet immanent in the particulars, it must be separate from itself (αὐτοῦ χωρὶς). The context of this argument is a discussion of the language of participation (μετάληψις 131A5) used to describe the relation of Form to particular. Of course, this language of participation arises in the middle dialogues[2] within the discussion of the Form as cause. Aristotle refers (991B3) to the *Phaedo* (100D ff.) for the notion that the Form is cause.

At *Phaedo* 100D the relation of Form (as cause) to the particulars is described in rather non-commital language as "presence" (παρουσία) or "communion" (κοινωνία). Plato there states that he is not quibbling about the choice of vocabulary. The introductory arguments of the *Parmenides* and Aristotle's criticism show that he should have exercised more caution. At 101C and 102B the relation is described specifically in the language of participation.[3]

In the *Parmenides* the separation of Form from particular is stated as an ontological problem. How can the Form be one and the same and yet be present to the particulars as the object of participation? It would be divided from itself in the attempt to render it both transcendent and immanent. Socrates rejoins (*Parmenides* 131B4-5)

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2. *Phaedo* 101C; 102B; *Symposium* 211B; *Republic* 476D.
3. At 101C as μετάσχεσις and at 102B as μετάληψις, obviously equivalent terms.

that if the Form were like day, it would not be separate from itself in its presence to the particulars any more than day would be separate from itself (αὐτῆς χωρίς) in its presence to various places. Parmenides' substitution of the image of sail for day suppresses the point latent in Socrates' image, that the Form is immaterial.[4] Aristotle, recognizing that the language of participation arises from the doctrine that Form is cause, poses the problem of separation within that context. How can the Form act as cause and yet remain transcendent (separate)? Thus while the problem of separation is posed as ontological in the *Parmenides*, Aristotle sees the difficulty as one of causation. He doubtless thinks that he is going to the heart of the problem by so doing.

In a discussion of the Platonic Form as cause, Aristotle addresses himself to the problem of separation in examining the Platonic language of imitation as a means for describing the relation of Form and particular. He asks the question (*Metaphysics* 991A20-23) what agent could fashion the particulars after the pattern of the Form? The student of Plato might rush to advance the Demiurge as a suitable candidate for this position. I have suggested[5] that Plotinus resists the notion that the Demiurge may be used as a convenient solution to Aristotle's question, if the Demiurge is conceived as an agent external both to Form and to particular.

Surely the Demiurge must be external? While Plotinus makes use of demiurgic language, or terminology pertaining to the Demiurge,[6] this language is carefully qualified. He stresses that the "making" which this imagery (in the case of Nous or Soul) involves is not the making of a human craftsman.[7] An hypostasis may itself be a Demiurge in the sense that it stands as cause for another and inferior reality. The hypostasis as Demiurge does not address itself to external material[8] or to an external pattern.[9] Divine action does not require deliberative thought, but contemplation.[10]

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4. Cf. "The Platonic *Parmenides* etc." *cit.* note 1 above, pp. 51-54. I there discuss the question of whether the Form is to be divided among the particulars; here the question is whether, in its presence to the particulars, it is to be divided from itself. The immaterial nature of Form is, of course, relevant to this matter as well.

5. *Ibid.* pp. 71 ff.

6. Nous as Demiurge, 2.3 (52).18.15; the world soul as Demiurge: 4.4 (28).9.9

7. 5.8 (31).7.10-11, cf. 2.9 (33).12.

8. 5.8 (31).7.10.

9. 5.8 (31).7.18 ff.

10. Cf. 3.8 (30).1.15; 5.8 (31).7.40 ff.; 6.7 (38).1.28 ff. and generally R. Arnou, ΠΡΑΞΙΣ *et* ΘΕΩΡΙΑ *chez Plotin* (Rome 1972) pp. 54-64; 81-83; A. H. Armstrong, "Platonic Eros and Christian Agape", *Downside Review*

The definition of the hypostasis as in some sense a Demiurge in its creation, with no need for an intermediary to relate the created to the creator in imitation, determines (from the definition itself) the creative and dynamic relation of the hypostasis to that which it creates. In 2.3 (52).18.14-15 Nous is described as Demiurge and then (lines 19-22) it is observed:

> As long as Nous and Soul are, the seminal reasons will flow into the Soul of the World, just as, as long as there is a sun, all rays of light will flow from it.

By the use of this imagery Plotinus emphasizes that the hypostasis as Demiurge may produce its inferior simply by being what it is.[11] No intermediary is required to accomplish its immediate and continuous act of creation.[12] As we have seen, the One serves as model to Nous in its self-constitution as image of the One. Here the One can act as cause simply by being the model after which Nous fashions itself. The same relation pertains between Nous and the Soul.

Plotinus wishes to resist the notion that the Dermiurge must be regarded as an agent external to both original and image. He often prefers the language of "begetting" to the language of "making" (as of a craftsman). This preference stems from a desire to avoid the notion of external agency. At *Timaeus* 28C3-4 Plato calls the Demiurge "creator and father of this universe" (ποιητὴν καὶ πατέρα τοῦδε τοῦ παντός).[13] In Plotinus' interpretation, the words "and father" would explain the content of "creator": The creation of the Demiurge is interpreted as "begetting" toward the elimination of the Demiurge as an external agent suggested by the language of artificial "making".[14]

The relation of father and son prevails between the One as Uranus and Nous as Kronos and also between Nous as Kronos and the Soul of the World as Zeus (5.8(31).13). Plotinus says (5.1 (10).3.20-22):

> Nous makes the Soul more divine by being its father and by its presence (καὶ τῷ πατὴρ εἶναι καὶ τῷ παρεῖναι); nothing separates them but otherness.

(1961) pp. 114-115; P. P. Matter, *Zum Einfluss des Platonischen "Timaios" auf das Denken Plotins* (Winterthur 1964) pp. 111-119.

11. 5.8 (31).12.22-25; 2.3 (52).18.17-19.

12. 5.8 (31).7.12 ff.

13. At *Timaeus* 37C7 the Demiurge is described as "the father who begat"; cf. *Politicus* 273B1-2.

14. For the distinction between the making of the craftsman and begetting cf. 2.9 (33) 12.13 ff.; 5.8 (31).12.20-22; 3.8 (30).2.

"Presence" (*parousia*) is a Platonic term used to describe the
relation between Form and particular, as we have seen. This
relation is direct if it is described in language of "begetting",
indirect if it is described in language of craftsmanship. It is
germane to observe that Aristotle argues against the Platonic
theory of Forms that the Forms cannot be the cause of genesis: One
man begets another; it is not the Form which begets man.[15]

Plotinus combines the language of begetting with the language
of imitation to overcome separation (5.1(10).6.48 — 5.1 (10).7.1):[16]

> Nous sees the One without having been separated (οὐ
> χωρισθείς), but because it is after the One and there is nothing in
> between (μεταξὺ οὐδὲν) as is also the case with the Soul and
> Nous. All that which is begotten desires that which begets and
> loves it and especially whenever the begetter and the begotten
> are alone: Whenever that which begets is the best, then the
> begotten is necessarily together with it so that it is separated
> (κεχωρίσθαι) by otherness alone. And we say that Nous is an
> image of the One.

The relation between particular and Form, or among the various
entities in Plotinus' metaphysical system, is immediate. "Im-
mediate" is a negative term which indicates the absence of a
mediator. In a positive sense the relation may be described as
continuous; it is also dynamic. The dynamic character of the
relation is an essential ingredient of its continuity. Aristotle
distinguishes a number of meanings for the term *dynamis*; these
include the power to act as well as the power to be acted upon.[17]
Plotinus employs the term *dynamis* in the sense of being acted upon
in his description of the sensible world.[18] This sense of the term is
not, however, the subject of the present discussion.

Each hypostasis is, in relation to the hypostasis inferior to itself,
a *dynamis* in the sense of power to act. The hypostasis of Nous is
the act (*energeia*) of the One, while the One is the potency or power
(*dynamis*) which creates all things (δύναμις τῶν πάντων, 5.3
(49).15.32-33). Plotinus explains (5.3 (49).15.33-35):[19]

> But it (*sc.* the One) is the *dynamis* of all things. But what is the
> manner of this *dynamis*? Not as matter is said to be potentially,

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15. *Metaphysics* 1033B26 ff.; 1049B24-27; 1070B27-28; 1071A20 ff.
16. Cf. 5.1 (10).3.20
17. *Metaphysics* 1046A.
18. Cf. 2.5 (25).1.17 ff. and H. Buchner, *Plotins Möglichkeitslehre* (Munich
and Salzburg 1970) pp. 17-20.
19. Cf. 3.8 (30).10.1; 5.1 (10).7.9-10 for the One as "power which creates
all things".

because it receives form, for matter is passive. Rather this manner of potency is to be placed in the category of action.

In the same way the hypostasis of Soul is the *energeia* of Nous[20] and the Soul has the *dynamis* in virtue of which it creates the sensible world.[21] Each hypostasis produces its inferior in virtue of its *dynamis*.[22] Each hypostasis is thus creative power (*dynamis*) with respect to its inferior and act (*energeia*) in relation to its superior within the Plotinian hierarchy.[23]

We have seen that creation in Plotinus does not demand a Demiurge in the sense that the Demiurge is to be conceived as an agent external to Form and particular. Plotinus argues that a *dynamis* in the sense of power to act does not derive its complementary *energeia* from any external source; rather it itself produces this *energeia*, without the aid of an agent external to itself.[24] On the basis of this distinction, it will be observed that the hypostasis is defined in terms of *dynamis* in the sense of power to act so that no intermediary will be required to link it with inferior levels of reality.

While each hypostasis is described as a *dynamis* (in the sense of power to act) in its relation to inferior levels of being, each hypostasis is also defined in terms of act (*energeia*). This definition of the hypostasis as act will also be seen to be of importance for the way in which relation and definition are connected and mediation avoided. Aristotle distinguishes between an activity such as sight which contains its end within itself and an activity which, like house-building, has as its end the finished product which is external to the activity itself. He considers the first kind of activity as superior to the second: Because it need seek no goal beyond itself for its fulfillment, it is *qua* action superior.[25] Implicit in this reasoning is a criticism of Plato's exaltation of the craftsman's activity.[26]

The Plotinian doctrine of potency and act which we have just examined applies not only to the relations generally among the

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20. 4.7 (2).13.17
21. 4.3 (27).10.10-11.
22. 5.1 (10).6.30 ff.
23. Cf. *Theologia* VIII (Henry and Schwyzer II, 73) for a good summary of this doctrine; cf. H. Buchner, *Plotins Möglichkeitslehre cit.* note 18 above, p. 75.
24. 2.5 (25).2.31-36.
25. *E. N.* 1174A.
26. *Crat.* 432BC and V. Goldschmidt, *Le Système Stoïcien et l'Idée du Temps* (Paris 1953) pp. 146-147; cf. *Tim.* 28A-29A for the activity of the divine Demiurge in the creation of the world.

hypostases, but also to the relation of intelligible Form to sensible particular. Plotinus states that the *dynamis* of courage (ἀνδρία) produces the *energeia* of courageous behaviour (τὸ ἀνδρίζεσθαι).[27] This recalls the language of Zeno where he argues that quality is the cause of a predicate: He states that wisdom (φρόνησις) is the cause of acting wisely (τὸ φρονεῖν) and moderation (σωφροσύνη) of acting moderately (σωφρονεῖν).[28] Chrysippus viewed quality both as a *dynamis* (in the sense of power to act) and as cause.[29] (*Dynamis* as an active principle occurs frequently in Stoic writers).[30] Plotinus calls the Forms *dynameis* in the sense of power to act.[31] Where the Stoics speak of quality as a cause, therefore, Plotinus will speak of intelligible Form as a cause. Plotinus regards the intelligible Form of courage as the cause of the act of courage in the courageous man.

A certain ambiguity in Stoic statements of their teleology left them open to Carneades' criticism that they seek to make virtue an end in itself, without reference to its fulfillment in moral action.[32] Under attack from the criticism of Carneades, Antipater tries to show that it is virtuous, not only to realize, but to attempt to realize the goals of moral action.[33]

The Stoics traditionally compare virtuous action to arts such as

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27. 2.5 (25).2.33-36.
28. *SVF* I, 89; cf. M. E. Reesor, "The Stoic Concept of Quality", *AJP* 75 (1954) pp. 41-42.
29. Cf. M. E. Reesor *ibid.* pp. 42-43:
    Since Chrysippus believed that quality was a manifestation of the logos, and that the logos was corporeal (I, 153), he must have held that quality was also corporeal (σῶμα). Zeno defined the corporeal as that which can act or be acted upon (I, 90). Chrysippus also seems to have considered that which is either active or passive as corporeal. He argued that soul was corporeal since it touched and was separated from the body (II, 790; cf. Cleanthes, I, 518), and again, that voice was corporeal and voice acted upon its hearers (II, 140). The argument in regard to voice was attributed to Diogenes of Babylon (III, 18), Antipater of Tarsus (III,16) and Archedemus of Tarsus (III,6). We can conclude, therefore, that if quality in Chrysippus' philosophy was a corporeal logos, it was also a δύναμις.
30. Cf. SVF I,176; II,311 and II,1044. See also W. Theiler, "Plotin zwischen Platon and Stoa", *Entretiens Hardt* V (Vandoeuvres and Geneva 1957) p. 73 and references there cited, also M. E. Reesor, "The Stoic Concept of Quality", *cit.* note 28 above, p. 43, note 11.
31. 6.2 (43).21.7-8.
32. Cf. A. A. Long, "Carneades and the Stoic Telos", *Phronesis* 12 (1967) pp. 59-90; on Carneades cf. Cic. *De Fin.* 5.16 and Long *ibid.* p. 76; Plut. *Comm. Not.* 1071C and Long *ibid.* p. 77.
33. Cf. Plut. *Comm. Not.* 1071A and Long *ibid.* p. 69; Cic. *De Fin.* 5.20 and Long *ibid.* pp. 80, 83.

dancing and acting in which the act contains its end within itself, without reference to an external object.[34] The analogy of the arts is drawn by Carneades when he objects that every art has an external end which defines its action.[35] The Stoics define virtuous action in terms of the supposedly self-contained act which consists in selecting natural advantages rather than in their attainment. We may think of an archer who expends his effort with the sole object of aiming at a target rather than hitting it.[36] Antipater's reply to these arguments is typified in Cato's argument in Cicero[37] that the archer's immediate goal is to hit the target, the final goal of his activity is to do everything in his power to hit the target. Therefore two goals, an immediate and a final goal, are established to answer Carneades' objections.

This Stoic teleological discussion takes place within the framework of ethical argument. It appears to be reflected in ethical contexts in Plotinus.[38] He also adapts distinctions similar to those advanced by Antipater to the metaphysical problems which surround the relation of Form to particular. He does this in the attempt to avoid resort to a Demiurge conceived as an external agent. In the course of so doing, he improves upon the analogy of archery by employing an image more adequate to his purposes. There are two kinds of act: The act which inheres in the essence of a being and the act which proceeds from that being to affect an object external to itself.[39] For example, when fire burns, its act of burning is complete in itself and it seeks no end outside itself. At the same time, heat proceeds from the fire which is other than the

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34. Cf. Cic. *De Fin.* 3.24 and Long *ibid.* pp. 83-84.
35. Cf. Cic. *De Fin.* 5.16 and Long *ibid.* p. 76.
36. Cf. Plut. *Comm. Not.* 1071C and Long, "Carneades and the Stoic Telos" *cit.* note 32 above, p. 77; J. M. Rist, *Stoic Philosophy* (Cambridge 1969) pp. 6-7; 12; 221 argues correctly that Long is in error when he asserts that, according to the Stoics, man chooses natural advantages; he chooses the end, but selects natural advantages; cf. especially *SVF* III, 44, p. 12; 191 and Rist pp. 6-7; *SVF* III, 131 and Rist p. 12; Long now accepts this distinction, cf. "The Early Stoic Concept of Moral Choice", *Images of Man in Ancient and Mediaeval Thought, Studia Gerardo Verbeke ab amicis et collegis dicata*, ed. C. Laga (Louvain 1976) pp. 81-84.
37. Cf. Cic. *De Fin.* 3.22 and Long, "Carneades and the Stoic Telos" *cit.* note 32 above pp. 77-78.
38. Cf. 6.8 (39).5.5; 1.4 (46).2.40 and A. Graeser, *Plotinus and the Stoics* (Leiden 1972) pp. 66-67; on this subject see further R. Alpers-Gölz, *Der Begriff ΣΚΟΠΟΣ in der Stoa und seine Vorgeschichte* (Hildesheim and New York 1976) pp. 66 ff. and p. 113, note 4.
39. For a full discussion of this doctrine see C. Rutten, "La doctrine des deux actes dans la philosophie de Plotin", *Revue Philosophique* 146 (1956) pp. 100-106.

fire itself. In the same way, the act of the One is complete in itself and needs no external end for its completion; yet, simply by being this act, it produces the hypostasis of Nous which is other than itself.[40] The hypostasis defined as act in the above sense will, by definition, produce the level of being inferior to itself. The definition of the hypostasis as act may be seen in other images of the procession of one level of being from another and superior level.[41]

The Stoic ethical discussion which surrounds immediate and final goals has reference to a world where men's efforts may be frustrated. The Plotinian metaphysical adaptation of the Stoic refinements is addressed primarily to a realm beyond the vagaries of fortune. Therefore the nexus between final and immediate goals is a bond of inevitability. If the correct stance is adopted, the arrow may yet not hit the target. If fire burns, it must shed warmth. In the latter example, there is no deliberation or externally directed effort necessary to the accomplishment of the task.

Now that it has been established that Plotinus takes this view of the hypostasis as *energeia*, it will be seen that there is no real contradiction between the notion that the hypostasis is act (in this sense) and that it is *dynamis* in the sense of the power to act. Fire is, on the one hand, a *dynamis* (in the sense of power to act) productive of warmth. As *energeia* its act of burning is fulfilled without reference to an external goal. Yet this act is such, that by its very nature it is productive of a second act which is embodied in the heat which is external to itself. This is to say that it is an *energeia* in the sense of a self-contained and self-fulfilling act; yet this does not prevent it from producing an act external to itself. Indeed it is by being such an *energeia* that it is also a *dynamis*, in the sense of power to act, which produces an act external to itself.

Since there is no real contradiction between the terms *dynamis* and *energeia* as defined above, Plotinus is able to speak of the hypostasis as *dynamis* in language similar to that which he uses of

40. 5.4 (7).2.26 ff.; 5.3 (49).12; cf. 5.3 (49).7.22 for the same imagery of fire applied to Nous and the Soul.
41. E.g. the One as the sun giving forth light, 5.3 (49).12; cf. 6.4 (22).7; the spring and stream and root and tree of 3.8 (30).10; the flower and scent and snow and cold of 5.1 (10).6. I have avoided the misleading term "emanation" throughout this discussion. Where such language is used by Plotinus, it is employed with great care to avoid any confusion of spiritual with corporeal reality, cf. 5.1 (10).3.10-12; 2.1 (40).8.3-4 and H. Dörrie, "Emanation: Ein unphilosophisches Wort im spätantiken Denken", *Parusia, Studien zur Philosophie Platons und zur Problemgeschichte des Platonismus, Festgabe für Johannes Hirschberger* (Frankfurt am Main 1965) pp. 135-137.

the hypostasis as *energeia*. It has been shown that for Plotinus there are two kinds of act: The act which inheres in the essence of a being and the act which proceeds from that being to affect an object external to itself; as fire produces heat, so each hypostasis produces an inferior level of being. The hypostasis has one act which is complete and fulfilled in itself without reference to an external goal; yet just by being in act in this sense, a second act, which consists of an inferior level of being, is produced.

In the same manner Plotinus says that there are two kinds of *dynamis* (in the sense of power to act): There is the *dynamis* which inheres in the essence of a being and the *dynamis* which proceeds from it, as a weaker light proceeds from a stronger.[42] Fire both contains heat within itself and yet produces a heat which is external to itself. Even so does each hypostasis produce from the *dynamis* inherent in its essence an inferior level of being. Such production is not the fulfillment of an imperfect *dynamis* in an external object; it is already perfect when it produces.[43] We must not then be too surprised if Plotinus, since he defines both terms in the special senses discussed above, tends to use the words *dynamis* and *energeia* interchangeably.

In a discussion of how the intelligible reality may be present to the sensible world without sacrifice of its unity and identity (6.4 (22).9),[44] Plotinus considers that it might be present by its *dynameis*, or creative powers. These powers are not divorced or separated from the being of the intelligible world. The intelligible must not be rendered powerless by their procession. The powers cannot continue to exist unless they remain grounded in the being of the intelligible. Thus there is no power without substance, nor substance without power (καίτοι οὐχ οἷον τε, ὥσπερ οὐσίαν ἄνευ δυνάμεως, οὕτως οὐδὲ δύναμιν ἄνευ οὐσίας, 6.4 (22).9.23-24). The power which is together with substance in the intelligible world may proceed to the world of sense. Yet it is never without substance. Power and substance are yoked together in procession from the intelligible world and both may become progressively more weak as they proceed (6.4 (22).9.25 ff.). Yet the powers are not divided among the particulars. They are not cut off from the substance of the intelligible and are therefore indivisible as they

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42. 6.4 (22).9.25 ff.
43. 5.1 (10).6.30 ff.
44. The question is that of the "day and sail" argument in Plato *Parmenides* 130E5-131E7, cf. my "The Platonic *Parmenides* etc." *cit.* note 1 above; Henry and Schwyzer refer to the further extension of this argument in *Parmenides* 142DE.

partake in its indivisible nature.[45] This procession is compared to the procession of light from a source. The light is an image of the source and cannot survive if its source and model is removed.[46] We may see that in 6.4 (22).9 there is a progressive, dynamic continuity between the substance of the intelligible world and a particular expression of that reality in the world of sense. This doctrine of dynamic continuity is designed to overcome the separation between intelligible and sensible reality. Thus Plotinus asks (lines 14-16) how the powers exist in separation from (χωρίς) their substances in the intelligible world?

Plotinus then entertains the objection (6.4 (22).10) that an image may exist in the absence of its archetype, as in the case of a portrait when the model has departed. In the same way, the powers which proceed to the world of sense could be cut off from their source in the intelligible world and yet the sensible images of the intelligible world could continue in existence. In answer to this objection, Plotinus distinguishes between an image in a portrait and an image in a mirror. The image in the portrait may exist in the absence of the model. In this case, of course, the artist, not the model, creates the image.[47] In the case of the mirror image, the model itself creates the image. Even so do the weaker powers in the world of sense proceed from the stronger powers in the intelligible world as their mirror image.

In the context of a discussion of the doctrine of the double act, that each being is in act and that from that act there proceeds another act (which is its image) (4.5 (29).7.17 ff.), Plotinus invokes the example of the mirror (lines 44 ff.). The image in the mirror is the act (*energeia*) of the object which stands before the mirror. When the object before the mirror is withdrawn, then the image cannot continue in existence.

From 6.4 (22).9-10 it is obvious that the entire body of doctrine which surrounds the concept of the double act and the relation of creative power to act, i.e. the entire notion of dynamic continuity, is applicable to the relation of a mirror image to its source. We have

45. We might expect that power (*dynamis*) would become act (*energeia*) in the world of sense, instead of remaining *dynamis*. As we have seen, however, it is not surprising that Plotinus should use these terms interchangeably.

46. We may compare the "light and sphere" analogy in 6.4 (22).7, cf. my "The Platonic *Parmenides* etc." *cit.* note 1 above, pp. 52-53.

47. Plotinus dismisses the objection (lines 8-11) that, in the case of a self-portrait, the model may be said to create its image. This case is distinguished from that of the mirror image on the grounds that it is not *qua* object of imitation that the artist produces the image.

seen that Plotinus wishes to stress the dynamic continuity which exists between the intelligible and sensible worlds. Frequently in these contexts he alludes to the model-image relation which exists between the two realms.[48] In the case of the mirror, the language of imitation becomes thematic within the context of dynamic continuity, so that the language of imitation and the language of dynamic continuity are brought firmly together under one roof.

Perhaps we may refer to the example of the artist which Plotinus uses to demonstrate the relation between intelligible and sensible reality as language of representation. Although the figure of the Demiurge occurs in Plotinus, we have seen how the notion of external agency is attenuated. Nevertheless some residual traces of externality remain. The model of the artist is used to demonstrate the relations of similarity and difference between the intelligible and sensible worlds *as if* these realms were separate rather than continuous. The device of separation allows intelligent comparison of the two realms.

Since reflection is the paradigmatic expression both of dynamic continuity and of imitation, we may speak of a model of reflection in Plotinus which supplements the model of representation in stressing dynamic continuity as well as imitation. Imitation, of course, is embraced by both models.

In 4.5 (29).7, where Plotinus argues that the image in a mirror is an act which proceeds from the source alone, he stresses, as we have seen, that as long as the subject is before the mirror, the image remains; when the subject withdraws, the image disappears. Applying this mirror illustration to the soul, he argues (lines 49-51):

> Indeed in the case of soul to the degree that it is an act proceeding from a superior act, as long as the superior act remains (μενούσης τῆς προτέρας), it remains (μένει) as does its subsequent act.

The language of "remaining" is used of creation throughout the system of Plotinus in the context of dynamic continuity. Thus the Soul proceeds from Nous while Nous remains, even as Nous proceeds from the One while the One remains.[49] Nature, a phase of Soul, creates the sensible world while remaining what it is.[50]

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48. 5.1 (10).6.30 ff.; 6.4 (22).9.37 ff.; 5.3 (49).7.21-25.
49. Cf. 5.2 (11).1.16-18; 4.7 (2).13.17.
50. In 5.2 (11).1.18 ff. Soul is said not to create while remaining. This seems to contradict 3.8 (30).3.1-3. In the rest of 5.2 (11).1 the fall of the Soul into the world of sense is described. Plotinus may be reluctant to ascribe remaining to Soul in a context which speaks of creative descent.

In 5.8 (31).12 we see a crystallization of themes as the language of imitation, begetting and remaining is brought together and opposed to the notion of the Demiurge as craftsman and external agent. The birth of Soul as Zeus from Nous (doubtless Kronos) as image of its father provides the context of the passage. Plotinus says (of the Soul in relation to Nous, lines 17-20):

> It has the perpetuity of Nous, as its image (otherwise it would sometimes bear the image of Nous and sometimes not), since the image did not come about by craft (τέχνῃ). Every image exists by nature if it continues as long as its archetype remains (μένει).

There is yet another important way in which reflection corrects the model of imitation. This may be shown by illustration. The blue placed upon the canvas by the artist and the blue in his subject's eyes are two distinct instances of blue. If the subject is reflected in a mirror, then the blue in the mirror is, on Plotinus' view, a dynamic procession from the blue in the eyes of the subject. It is furthermore ontically continuous with that blue and *is* that blue as separated out from and yet continuous with that blue. On this model, an attribute of similarity in the intelligible original may be reflected in the sensible world in such a way that the reflected attribute will be separated out from the unity of intelligible substance and yet be continuous with it.

The significance of this lies in the proposition that the intelligible world is not merely represented by the things in the world of sense. It is truly present to them. In philosophical discourse, we employ images from the sensible world to represent the intelligible model to ourselves. The model of reflection bids us not to forget that in those things we may experience the real presence of intelligible reality. This experience may prove the vehicle of our return to God, as distinct from our ability to engage in correct discourse about the divine. Thus Plotinus stresses (6.4 (22).10.11 ff.) that mirror images cannot exist in separation from their models; even so, he argues, the creative powers which descend from the intelligible world cannot exist in isolation from the creative powers in the intelligible world from which they descend.

Plotinus employs two models of predication, one representational and the other reflective, to speak about the relation between

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Such descent is not to be conceived in spatial terms, cf. 6.4 (22). 7-8 and "The Platonic *Parmenides* etc." *cit.* note 1 above, pp. 52-53. Nevertheless the descent of Soul is measured in many phases; this would not seem to be characteristic of Nous where the bonds of unity and thought are less relaxed, cf. "The Platonic *Parmenides* etc.", *cit.* note 1 above, note 32.

intelligible and sensible reality. If it is realized that he does use
these different models, apparently contradictory statements can be
reconciled and the unity of Plotinus defended.

We may explore such a use of the different models in Plotinus'
doctrine with respect to quality. Plotinus does not allow that
quality can exist in the intelligible world, for everything in the
intelligible world is substance.[51] There remains, however, the
question of the status of quality in the sensible world. In 2.6
(17).1.16 ff. it is asked whether a distinction is to be drawn between
specific difference and accidental quality in the sensible world. The
distinction is rejected. It would mean that the same quality could
be an essential completion of one thing (as white in white lead) and
an accidental quality in another (as white in white swan). While
Plotinus rejects the distinction between essential and accidental
qualities, he introduces a fresh distinction between quality which
always exists apart from substance and an act (*energeia*) which
proceeds from substance as a creative power (*dynamis*) (2.6
(17).2.20 ff.).

Whiteness in you may be not a quality, but an act which
proceeds from the power of whitening (ἐνέργειαν δηλονότι ἐκ
δυνάμεως τῆς τοῦ λευκαίνειν) (2.6 (17).3.1-2). A distinction is drawn
between heat as an act of fire and heat which is separated from fire
and lingers on in some other thing. The first is an act of fire; the
second is a quality (2.6 (17).3.14-20). Only what is deprived of
substance is quality, while that which is with substance is
substance or form or act.

Plotinus speaks of heat as the act of fire and not a quality (so long
as it is not isolated from the substance of fire) and of the power of
whitening producing the act (and not the quality) of white. The
intelligible correlates of these acts of substance are themselves acts
of substance (2.6 (17).3.4-6). It may be inferred that such an act,
present in the sensible world, is not isolated from intelligible
substance, form and act. It would be the culmination of dynamic
and continuous expression of a distinctive individuality in the
intelligible world. Such a doctrine emerges with clarity in other
texts.

We have, of course, encountered this doctrine of the procession
of creative power from substance in 6.4 (22).9 and 10 where it is
specifically joined with the language of reflection. In 6.4 (22).10 the
mirror image is compared with heat which lingers after the

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51. Cf.2.6 (17).1.7-10, 6.3 (44).15 and "The Platonic *Parmenides* etc." *cit.*
note 1 above, pp. 67-68; if the word quality is used of intelligible reality, it
is equivocal: 6.3 (44).16.5-6.

extinction of fire. When Plotinus does allow quality in the world of sense, he follows the representational model of discourse. The quality is not regarded as continuous with the substance of the intelligible world. In 2.6 (17).3.10-14, for example, where Plotinus does speak of quality in the world of sense, it may easily be inferred that he is resorting to the representational model.[52] Discursive reason, it is argued in this text, isolates a distinctive individuality of substance, regards it as if it were quality and produces the qualitative as a part which exists in isolation from substance. This passage contains implicitly the imagery of the artist who acts as an external agent or mediator to relate Form to particular. Plotinus might argue that the image of the artist who performs the mental act of analysis does not fully demonstrate the relation of Form to particular and of substance to quality. A simple comparison of sensible image and intelligible model would show that the content of the world of Form is individuated and separated in the world of sense. Yet if we were to explore the connexions between Form and particular on the reflective model, the relation between the particular and the distinctive intelligible reality which it represents is continuous and dynamic. The reflective may correct the representational model.

In 6.3 (44).15, where the entire content of the world of sense is to be conceived as a quality, in the sense that it bears an adjectival relation to the intelligible world, Plotinus explicitly invokes the representational model. The portrait of Socrates bears such a relation to Socrates.[53]

Wurm argues[54] that in 2.6 (17) a distinction is drawn between essential and accidental qualities in the world of sense. Essential quality is the act of Form, while accidental quality is separable from substance. He contends that this view is expressly corrected in the later treatises on the categories, 6.2 (43) and 6.3 (44), so that the distinction is erased and all qualities are, so to speak, accidental.

As we have seen, the distinction drawn in 2.6 (17) is not between essential and accidental qualities, but between acts of substance and qualities. In 2.6 (17).3.25-26 a distinction is drawn between the qualitative defined as that which is isolated from substance and the form or act which is with substance. Wurm supplies here a distinction between essential quality and accidental quality. The text mentions only quality, on the one hand, and act or form on the other.

52. Cf. "The Platonic *Parmenides* etc." *cit.* note 1 above, p. 67.
53. Cf. "The Platonic *Parmenides* etc." *cit.* note 1 above, pp. 67-68.
54. K. Wurm, *Substanz und Qualität. Ein Beitrag zur Interpretation der plotinischen Traktate VI 1, 2 und 3* (Berlin and New York 1973) p. 255.

In 6.2 (43).14.11-22 a distinction is drawn between the "substance" of the particular and substance in the intelligible. Since the "substance" of the particular, its individual character, is already external to intelligible substance, it may in some sense be said to be "completed" by quality. Intelligible substance, however, may not be completed by the addition of quality. Plotinus says (lines 14-22), in an apparent reference to 2.6 (17).1 (compare, however, the other references supplied by Henry and Schwyzer):

> Indeed we elsewhere thought it correct to say that the completions of substance were by equivocation qualities and that those characteristics which were external and posterior to substance were qualities and that those features which were in substances were acts and those which were after them were their effects. Yet now we say that the characteristics of a particular "substance" are not the completions of intelligible substance; there is no accretion of substance to Man *qua* Man; rather he is substance above, before he enters into differentiation, just as he is already living being before he enters into rational species.

Wurm contends that the doctrine of 2.6 (17) is here expressly corrected. It is rather supplemented and further explained. In 2.6 (17) Plotinus does not, as we have seen, distinguish between essential and accidental qualities, but rather between acts or forms associated with substance and qualities which are external to substance. Here he adds that quality may complete the "substance" of the particular (i.e. its sensible substance as an image of intelligible substance) but may not complete intelligible substance. There is nothing here which contradicts the doctrine of 2.6 (17).

As Wurm correctly observes,[55] in 6.3 (44).15.24-27 all qualities make an equal contribution, with no distinction between specific difference and accidental quality. Here it is argued that sensible "substance" is not substance, but is really all quality and bears an adjectival relation to the world of intelligible substance. As we have observed, this text invokes the representational rather than the reflective model of predication. Again there is no necessary contradiction and there is no need to explain differences on the basis of chronological or developmental considerations.

We have seen how Plotinus corrects the representational model of discourse with the reflective model in order to stress the dynamic continuity which exists between the intelligible world and the world of sense. He wishes to emphasize the real presence of

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55. *Ibid.*

intelligible to sensible reality. This supplementation of the one model by the other affects the Plotinian view of art.

Art for Plotinus may be representational in the sense that it produces a likeness of sensible reality. This kind of representation is, however, transcended when it imitates, not sensible, but intelligible reality.[56] The model of representation is very useful to Plotinus when he comes to describe the relation between intelligible and sensible reality. This philosophical use of the model of the artist as mediator between two realities does not, however, capture the sense of dynamic continuity and real presence provided by the model of reflection. Apart from the question of the artist as a model or illustration of philosophical predication, actual art, in so far as it imitates successfully the intelligible world, is itself reflective.

Plotinus' view of religious art is of interest in this connexion. True art is not (as in Plato) an imitation of an imitation, at a third remove from the reality of the Form. It expresses rather the essence of the Form in the world of sense. We have seen that there is, in Plotinus' account of creation, a subtle correction of demiurgic imagery in the direction of dynamic continuity. Demiurgic imagery may indeed have been largely understood by Plotinus in terms of plastic art. In Plotinus' account of the higher form of artistic imitation, however, we find the motif of reflection at work. The artist in effect creates a mirror which is capable of reflecting the divine which is truly present to it. The work of art is thus not just a representation, but a reflection in real presence of the divine reality. Plotinus says (4.3 (27).11.1-8):

> And the ancient sages who made temples and statues because they wished the gods to be present to them seem to me to have looked to the nature of the All and to have kept in mind that the nature of Soul is everywhere adaptable, that it would be most easy of all things to receive, if one were to fashion something which may be affected by it, which was capable of receiving some portion of it. Something which was made in imitation of it would be receptive and, like a mirror, able to receive some form.

In, with and under the sensible particularity of the work of art, the mind is opened to the real presence of the divine. We may reasonably expect that the image which proceeds from it is such that we may speak not just of representation but, in reflection, of a real presence of the attribute of the original in the image.[57]

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56. Cf. "The Platonic *Parmenides* etc." *cit.* note 1 above, p. 56.
57. Cf. A Grabar, "Plotin et les origines de l'esthétique médiévale", *Cahiers Archéologiques* 1 (1945) p. 17, reprinted A. Grabar, *L'art de la fin de*

The mirror as artifact was not, for the Greeks, any more than it is for us, the only reflective surface.[58] When any object becomes a mirror, it loses its own character to reflect something else. In this we may see a root of the practice of divination by means of reflective surfaces.[59] The object which becomes a mirror keeps us from seeing itself and thus may be thought to point beyond itself, in the case of divination, to the future. In Plotinus, the work of art as mirror points beyond itself, not to the future, but to the eternal and intelligible. I do not wish to show the origin of the Plotinian theory of art in divination. The parallel establishes that the work of art is not merely symbolic. The work of art is a mirror in its ability to reflect in such a way that it points beyond itself. It is also a mirror in that its image stands in a relation of dynamic continuity with its source.

Reflection has both an ontological and an intellectual sense. It is of interest to observe that the word "reflect" in English bears both senses. A mirror reflects and so does a mind. Any object in the sensible world may function as a mirror which reflects intelligble form. The person who beholds such an object may see it, either

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l'antiquité et du moyen age (Paris 1968) I pp. 16-17: "Ce miroir vaut non seulement pour refléter l'apparence des choses matérielles, mais aussi et surtout pour capter l'âme universelle — Toute chose est munie d'une âme, l'univers entier est animé, et cette âme, présente en toute chose matérielle, n'est autre qu'un reflet du Noῦς-Intelligence supérieur. Bien plus, ce reflet du Noῦς, cet élément spirituel, est la seule chose réele qu'on y trouve. Le reste est matière pure, c'est-à-dire le Non-être vide". That this kind of reflection may prove the vehicle of return for the soul is suggested in a remark of A. H. Armstrong, "The real meaning of Plotinus' intelligible world", *The Aquinas Society of London, Aquinas Paper no. 11* (Oxford 1949) p. 8: "I would like to suggest quite simply that we enter the intelligible world and ourselves become Noῦς when and in so far as we contemplate (that is, know intuitively and love) creatures in their being, as created participations and images of the being of God".

58. Cf. von Netoliczka *sub* κάτοπτρον, *RE* XI, col. 29, 14-18 and Ovid *Met.* III.339; Pausanias IX.31.7 for water as such a surface; cf. Aristophanes *Acharnians* 1128-29 for a shield as a reflective surface in divination. The word ἔσοπτρον may refer equally either to the mirror as artifact or to water as reflective surface, *v.* Plutarch *Quaest. Conviv.* 682E11-12: ἀπὸ τῶν πρὸς ὕδασιν ἢ τισιν ἄλλοις ἐσόπτροις ὑφισταμένων ρευμάτων.

59. Cf. A. Delatte, *La Catoptromancie Grecque et ses dérivés* (Paris 1932) pp. 131 ff. and Aristophanes *Acharnians* 1128-29; Delatte *ibid.* p. 135 ff. and Pausanias VII.21.12. Delatte suggests (*ibid.* p. 134) that the shining of the reflective surface prevents us from seeing the object itself and that a psychological effect is induced which favours divination; on the subject of classical and late antique scrying see further Delatte *ibid.* pp. 151 ff. and E.R. Dodds, "Supernormal Phenomena in Classical Antiquity", *Proceedings of the Society for Psychical Research* 55, Part 203 (March 1971) pp. 215-221.

simply as a sensible particular, or as a mirror reflecting Form. If it is
beheld as a mirror reflecting Form, then the mind which beholds it
sees both the object and, in it, the Form. The mind thus itself may
become a mirror which reflects Form. Thus both the object beheld
and the mind which beholds may be mirrors which reflect
intelligible reality.[60]

Plotinus asks (1.4 (46).10) after the awareness on the part of the
discursive mind of the noetic thought of the soul. The discursive
mind is compared with a mirror which may reflect this activity in a
mind-picture (φαντασία). If the mirror is shattered, there is no
reflection. If, however, the soul is in a state of quiet, then the
reflection takes place. The act of noetic thought is then beheld in a
manner analogous to sensation. In Nous thought and being are at
unity; thus what is reflected is both thought and object of thought.
If we read 1.4 (46).10 in the light of 4.3 (27).11, we may conclude
that as the artistic object may be a mirror in the world of sense
which reflects the divine in real presence, so may the discursive
mind reflect divine thought and being as truly present in mental
images.[61]

It is obvious that intelligible Form may be reflected in both a
sensible object and in the intelligence in such a way that the mind
is exalted toward the vision of Form. The ratiocination of the
representational model of discourse is finally suspended in noetic
ascent. The representational discourse allows an objective observer
to talk about the relations between intelligible and sensible reality.
The model of reflection, with its aspects of dynamic continuity and
real presence, may also contribute to such an objective and
Archimedean understanding. It exhibits a major difference,
however, in the invitation which it extends to transcend discursive
thought in the calm reflection of God.

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60. It is to be stressed that this study is not intended as an essay in source
research. It is also to be noted that the mirror image is much richer than
the uses examined here might suggest; we are here concerned only with
the positive aspects of mirror imagery in its role in overcoming the
separation between sensible and intelligible reality. For the origins of
intellectual reflection, especially in *Alcibiades* I 132D-133C and Plato
Phaedrus 255D, its subsequent development and further bibliography see
H. Leisegang, "Die Erkenntnis Gottes im Spiegel der Seele und der
Natur", *Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung*, 4 (1949/50) pp. 161-183; R.
Ferwerda, *La Signification des Images et des Métaphores dans la Pensée de Plotin*
(Groningen 1965) pp. 9 ff.; J. Pépin, *Idées grecques sur l'homme et sur Dieu*
(Paris 1971) esp. pp. 73; 80; 192-196; P. Courcelle, *Connais-toi toi-même de
Socrate à Saint Bernard* (Paris 1974) pp. 14 ff.
61. On intellectual reflection in these texts cf. C. T. Wagner, *Die vielen
Metaphern und das eine Modell der Plotinischen Metaphysik* (Diss. Heidelberg
1957) pp. 72-73.

A reflective surface must be calm, quiet and undisturbed if it is to reflect. If the soul is to reflect, its quietness must not be disturbed. We have seen (1.4 (46).10.13) that it is when the soul is in a state of quiet (ἡσυχίαν — ἄγοντος) that it may reflect the activity of the higher soul as in a mirror. In 1.4 (46).10.17 this mirror, it is said, can be shattered when the harmony of the body is disturbed. We may deduce that its quiet is also alarmed.[62] If we accept the association of quiet and reflection, then a consultation of other texts which treat of quiet may shed light on reflection as well. In a poetic and protreptic exhortation to the soul to return to its divine origins, it is bidden to let the "wave of body" be quiet, together with the earth, the sea and the heaven (5.1 (10).2.14-17). The sage must then forbid the shocks of the body to disturb his quiet and his sensations and perceptions must enter into tranquillity. (We may ask, does the "wave of body" disturb the reflective surface of the soul?)[63]

The state of quiet involves as well the suspension of discursive thought. If we were able to ask Nature after the manner of her creation, she would reply (3.8 (30).4.3-4):

> You ought not to ask, but to understand in silence, just as I am silent and not in the habit of talking.[64]

As the rest of the passage makes clear, we may understand the creation of Nature, not through discursive thought, but by joining in her creative contemplation.

While there is no mirror imagery in this passage, there is something very like it (3.8 (30).4.7-10):

> And my act of contemplation makes what it contemplates, as the geometers draw their figures while they contemplate. But I do not draw, yet I contemplate, the lines which bound bodies come to be as if they fell from my contemplation.[65]

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62. The activity of the higher soul continues, however, unimpeded.
63. Cf. V. Cilento, "Estasi e Silenzio", *Saggi su Plotino* (Milan 1973) pp. 263-294 who (p. 292) compares St. Augustine *Confessions* IX.10.25: *Si cui sileat tumultus carnis, sileant phantasiae terrae et aquarum et aeris, sileant et poli, et ipsa sibi anima sileat et transeat se, non se cogitando.* Cilento (p. 273) discusses 1.6 (1).3.28-29 where, in a treatment of music, Plotinus insists that "unheard sounds are sweeter". For a further study of mystical silence in Plotinus see also O. Casel, *De Philosophorum Graecorum silentio mystico, Religionsgeschichtliche Versuche und Vorarbeiten* 16, 2 (Giessen 1919) pp. 113-117; G. Mensching, *Das heilige Schweigen, Religionsgeschichtliche Versuche und Vorarbeiten* 20, 2 (Giessen 1926) pp. 70-71; 136.
64. Trans. Armstrong.
65. Trans. Armstrong who compares the geometrical passage in *Timaeus* 53C-55C and remarks, "But the intuitive spontaneity of the process here, as contrasted with the careful and deliberative mathematical planning in

The lines fall as if they were a reflection and are not produced by a deliberative, demiurgic and representational act.

The language of quiet or silence (ἡσυχία, σιώπη) is used to describe the effortless and non-deliberative creation of the source.[66] The language of "remaining" (μένειν) is also employed to describe how an hypostasis can create while preserving its unity and integrity, remaining what it is and not becoming lost or divided among its products.[67] It has been argued above that from 4.5 (29).7 it may be shown that the language of "remaining" is common to reflection proper and to the whole concept of creation as procession in dynamic continuity from an undiminished source.

As Plotinus rehearses the language of quietness or silence (which is associated with the condition of the source in creation and reflection), so does he rehearse the language of "remaining" when he describes the return of the soul to her source. When seeking the vision of the One in the *unio mystica*, we must not seek or pursue (ζητεῖν, διώκειν), but rather remain (μένειν). This act of remaining is vividly compared to waiting for the sunrise (5.5 (32). 8.1-7).

In 5.5 (32).8.1-3 the language of "coming" (ἔρχεται) and "departure" (ἄπεισιν) are rejected as inadequate to the relation between the soul (in its noetic phase) and the One. A "remaining" (μένειν, line 3), which is not to be construed in a locative sense (lines 16 ff.), is appropriate both to the soul and to the One. In 4.5 (29).7.41-44, the language of "departure" (ἀπελήλυθε) and "presence" (πάρεστιν) are rejected as inappropriate to light which, even if its source is corporeal, is itself incorporeal. It is not body, but act. Plotinus then proceeds (lines 44-49) to remark that the image in a mirror is the act of the subject reflected in the mirror. If the source is present, so is the image; if the source departs, so does the image. The language of presence and departure may be appropriate to the subject before the mirror *qua* corporeal. It would not be appropriate to the image itself, which is here the analogue of light, also incorporeal and incapable of presence (at least in a locative sense) or departure. When he comes to the procession of the lower from

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Plato's symbolical description, brings out clearly an important difference in the mentality of the two philosophers". We may see in this the tendency to eliminate the interpretation of the Demiurge of the *Timaeus* as a mediator between intelligible and sensible reality and the correction of the representational by the reflective model.
66. 3.8 (30).4.
67. Of the One and Nous and the Soul: 5.2 (11).1.16-18; of Nous and the Soul: 4.2 (4).1.23-29 and 4.7 (2).13.17; of Nature and the sensible world: 3.8 (30).3.2.

the higher soul, Plotinus speaks of the "remaining" of the higher soul and of the "remaining" of the lower soul which is its act (lines 50-51). In this case, the language of presence and departure is wholly inadequate because both the source and the act which proceeds from it are incorporeal. It is obvious that the carefully pruned language of reflection and illumination developed in the chronologically earlier 4.5 (29).7 is applied to mystical union in 5.5 (32).8. It is significant that Plotinus speaks of "remaining" and "silence", not just as descriptive terms, but as a prescription for the spiritual life. The metaphysics of Plotinus in the imperative mood is a technique for meditation.

   In 5.5 (32).8, the language of silence or quiet occurs and is joined with the language of "remaining". The soul must not pursue the One, but remain in silence (ἡσυχῇ μένειν, line 3). We are enjoined (5.1 (10).6.9-16) not to approach the One in noisy prayer, but in quiet contemplation, as the One remains in silence (μένοντος ἡσύχου) beyond all things. If the language of remaining and quiet pertain to reflection, then we may wish to see here that the remaining and quiet of God are rehearsed in reflection. Demiurgic representation is a moment in a process by which Nous and Soul contstitute themselves as images in division of a superior reality.[68] Reflection may for the soul be her return to the condition of her source.

   We have seen that in 3.8 (30).4 man may join in the silent, creative contemplation of the Soul in himself entering silence and ceasing from deliberative thought. In 5.1 (10).2, where the prescription for silence is offered as a means of the soul's return, the soul is exhorted to consider that it was she who created "all living things and breathed them life, all that is nurtured by the earth or the sea, all that are in the air, the divine stars, the sun, the great heaven and adorned them". The creative source (Nature, Nous or the One) creates in silence; when man enters that silence, he joins in the creation of the world.

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68. Cf. "The Platonic *Parmenides* etc." *cit.* above note 1, pp. 70-71.