

# The Place of the Psychological Image of the Trinity in the Arguments of Augustine's *de Trinitate*, Anselm's *Monologion*, and Aquinas' *Summa Theologiae*.

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The scholastic character of Neoplatonism after Plotinus involves an increased concern with the explicit systematizing and ordering of material rather than the originality of philosophic solutions. Porphyry's schematization of the *Enneads* and Iamblichus' reification of concepts contained within the Plotinian hypostases, which is thought to show its result in the structure of Proclus' *Elements of Theology*, are instances. Both of these have influence on western Christian theology: Porphyry is thought to be a medium for Augustine's knowledge of the *Platonici*;<sup>1</sup> Iamblichus and Proclus come to Thomas Aquinas at first indirectly — principally through Boethius, the Pseudo-Dionysius and the *Liber de Causis* — and then finally directly through William of Moerbeke's translation of Proclus' *Elements*.<sup>2</sup> Aquinas was himself greatly interested in

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1. This account of Neoplatonism accords with that in R. T. Wallis, *Neoplatonism*, Duckworth, London, 1972. On the crucial role of Iamblichus see Stephen Gersh, *From Iamblichus to Eriugena*, Brill, Leiden, 1978. On the importance of system for the later Neoplatonists see E. R. Dodds' Introduction to his edition of Proclus, *The Elements of Theology*, Oxford, 1963, p. xxv. A. H. Armstrong has written usefully in many places about the differences between Plotinus and his successors and especially on how tradition, reason and experience are differently related in them; see for example his "Tradition, Reason and Experience in the Thought of Plotinus" in *Plotino e il Neoplatonismo in Oriente e in Occidente*, Rome, 1974, pp. 171-194, and "Pagan and Christian Traditionalism in the First Three Centuries, A.D." in the volumes of *Studia Patristica* for the 1975 Conference. The first place to look for this new spirit is in Porphyry's *Vita Plotini*, chapter 24: A. H. Armstrong, *Plotinus*, Loeb, 1964, Vol. 1, pp. 72 ff and comment p.x.

2. We have commentaries by Thomas on Boethius, *de Trinitate*, (The Theological Tractates, Loeb, 1973, pp. 2-37), *de Hebdomadibus* (*Ibid*, pp. 39-51), Dionysius, *De Divinis Nominibus* (P.G. 3, 585-996), and the *Liber de Causis* ("Le Liber de Causis", *Tijdschrift voor Filosofie*, 28, 1966, pp. 90-203) as follows: *In Boethium de Trinitate et de Hebdomadibus Expositio*, ed. M. Calcaterra, *de Re Spirituali, Opuscula Theologica*, II, Marietti, Rome, 1954, 313-468, also *Expositio super Librum Boethii De Trinitate*, ed. B. Decker, Brill, 1959; *In Librum Beati Dionysii de Divinis Nominibus Expositio*, ed. C. Pera,

questions of order from the beginning to the end of his writing; he shows the Neoplatonic *exitus-reditus* to be the true structure underlying Peter Lombard's use of Augustine's *uti-frui* framework in the *Sentences* and the explicit justification of his *Summa Theologiae* was finally to give theology its proper order,<sup>3</sup> something he had

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Marietti, Rome 1950; *In Librum de Causis Expositio*, ed. C. Pera, Marietti, Rome, 1955; also *Super Librum de Causis Expositio*, ed. H. D. Saffrey, Friburg, 1954. Throughout his commentary on the *Liber de Causis*, Thomas discusses its relation to Proclus' *Elements of Theology*. William of Moerbeke's translation of the *Elements* has been printed in the *Tijdschrift voor Filosofie*, 13 (1951), pp. 263-302 and 491-531. That Boethius' thought is strongly Neoplatonic is not doubted and has been asserted since the Carolingian scholars; on this basis Thierry of Chartres is able to find a unity of thought in Boethius' works (see G. Evans, "Thierry of Chartres and the unity of Boethius' Thought", Proceedings of the VIIIth International conference on Patristic Studies, Oxford, 1979, forthcoming) and Thomas was also able to systematize the treatises through the *exitus-reditus* pattern (see *In Boethii de Trinitate, Prologus* and R. D. Crouse "The Doctrine of Creation in Boethius, the 'De hebdomadibus' and the *Consolatio*", *Ibid*). Still just what school or schools he knew is contentious (see A. H. Armstrong, ed. *Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy*, Cambridge, 1967, pp. 554-555). H. Chadwick in his valedictory lecture at Christ Church ("The Christian Platonism of Boethius", June 1979) asserts clear evidence of extensive knowledge of Proclus' work. As far as the principles of order derived by Thomas from Boethius are concerned there can be no doubt that they can be found in Proclus. *The Elements* begins by setting out the priority of the One, its productiveness and the self reversion of the incorporeal (see Props. I-XV), also Wallis, *Neoplatonism*, p. 2. As Thomas knew, the *Liber de Causis* is primarily a selection from the *Elements*, the propositions sometimes altered and with a commentary the exact character of which is only conjectured. Thomas finds the *auctor libri* sometimes occupying the same ground as Dionysius. Dionysius himself is generally agreed to come out of the Iamblichan Proclan school but there are certain crucial differences discerned by modern scholars (cf. S. Gersh *From Iamblichus*, esp. p. 11 and A. H. Armstrong "Negative Theology" in *Downside Review*, Vol. 95, #320, July 1977, pp. 181-184) and also by St. Thomas.

3. See *Scriptum super libros Sententiarum*, ed. Mandonnet, Paris, 1929, principally I, *Prologus*, pp. 2 ff; I, *Distinctio 2, Divisio textus*, p. 57 (for relation of *exitus-reditus* to *uti-frui*); I, *Epilogus*, p. 1092 (for philosophical difficulty of the theological order from God to creatures); *In Boetii de Trinitate, Prologus* and Q.5, a.1 ad 9; *Summa Contra Gentiles*, II, 4; *Summa Theologiae, Prologus*. As the place cited in S.C.G. and S.T. I, 7 and S.T. II, *Prologus* make clear, the order of theology is determined by the order of God's knowing; cf. G. Lafont, *Structures et Méthode dans la Somma Théologique de Saint Thomas*, T.E.T., Paris, 1961, pp. 470-471. The theological sense of an idea can be determined by its order; cf. K. Rahner, *Spirit in the World*, London, 1968, p. 17; further, this determines whether it is theological or philosophical — P. T. Durbin, Appendix 5, in St. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, Volume 12, Blackfriars, London, 1968, p. 179. Indeed in the view of the Louvain school, the opposed orders of

not been able to accomplish in his earlier systematizations.<sup>4</sup> Surely the *reductio ad absurdum* of the tendency begun with the followers of Plotinus is to be seen not in the largely derivative character of all medieval systems but in those works where the originality of the author is seen only in his selection and structuring of finished

philosophy and theology prevent the existence of "Christian philosophy" (cf. M. Nédoncelle, *Is there a Christian Philosophy?*, London, 1960, p. 96).

4. As R. L. Richards, "The Problem of an Apologetical Perspective in The Trinitarian Theology of St. Thomas Aquinas", *Analecta Gregoriana*, 131, 1963, p. 64) notes, "his approach . . . consists in three simple steps, moving out from the oneness of the divine essence, to the plurality of the rationally distinct attributes, and finally to the plurality of the really distinct persons." This approach is able to be carried through in *Commentary on the Sentences* only in the structure of the articles in Distinction II: further, in a crucial respect this is not the original structure or content of this distinction. Confer B. M. Lemaigre, O.P. "Perfection de Dieu et multiplicité des attributs divins, Pourquoi S. Thomas a-t-il inséré la dispute des attributs divins (I *Sent.*, d. 2, qu. I, a. 3) dans son *Commentaire des Sentences?*" *Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques*, 1966 (50), pp 198-227. The structure of the *Sentences* themselves compels him to follow Lombard in dealing with knowledge, power, will after the Trinity of persons; "in secunda determinatur attributa quaedam, ex quorum rationalibus completur causalitas in divinis personis respectu productionis creaturarum, scilicet de scientia, potentia, voluntate" (*Dist. II. div. textus.*, p. 57).

Thomas is only one of the many followers of Peter Lombard to discover the need for a more logical ordering of the material in the first book; for some of the first cf. P.S. Moore, *The Works of Peter of Poitiers*, Notre Dame, Indiana, 1943, pp. 48-50 and *Sententia Petri Pictaviensis*, ed. Moore and Dulong, Notre Dame, Indiana, 1943, I, pp. 2 and 11; II, p. xxi. The indirectly missionary purposes (despite the brilliant argument of A. Gautier in his introduction to *Contra Gentes*, Livre Première, Paris, 1961) of the *Summa Contra Gentes* require the separation of the Trinity, as beyond natural reason, from its proper place in a disinterestedly theoretical theological structure. (A. Pegis, Introduction, *St. Thomas Aquinas Summa Contra Gentes, Book One, God*, Univ. of Notre Dame Press, London, 1975, pp. 26-44 seems right). The organization of the *Compendium of Theology* around the theological virtues indicates its imperfection from a theoretical standpoint. Thus, only in the *Summa Theologiae* was Thomas able to carry out the Neoplatonic structure of the *de Deo*, the theoretical principles of which he understood generally in the *Commentary on the Sentences*. Similar problems arise in respect to structure at other points. For how the *exitus-reditus* is present in the general structure of the S.C.G., the *Compendium*, and the S.T. cf. E. H. Weber, *Dialogue et Dissensions entre Saint Bonaventure et Saint Thomas d'Aquin à Paris (1252-1273)*, Vrin, Paris, 1974, pp. 460-463. That it is the *ordo disciplinae* just because with Thomas the *subiectum* of theology is exactly God and the basis of this in his understanding of Dionysius cf. Th.-André Audet "Approches historiques de la *Summa Theologiae*," *Études d'histoire Littéraire et Doctrinale*, Univ. of Montréal, Publ. XVII, Montreal/Paris, 1962, pp. 7-29.

material chosen from other, sometimes incompatible, works.<sup>5</sup> In this context, it may be of some use to inquire into the significance of Aquinas' reversal of the order of Augustine's *de Trinitate*<sup>6</sup> in his *Summa Theologiae*<sup>7</sup> and its relation to Anselm's *Monologion*<sup>8</sup> which has appeared to some as the inspiration in this process. This reversal can be seen in the alteration of the position of the psychological image of the Trinity by Anselm and Aquinas as against Augustine.

The movement from faith to understanding which structures the *de Trinitate*, not only involves a thinking of how Father, Son, and Spirit are one God, but also a process by which the mind knowing the Trinity is "united with [it as] its illuminating source" and so comes to "see itself solely as *memoria Dei, intellectus Dei, voluntas Dei*, that is to see itself as precisely nothing other than *imago Trinitatis*."<sup>9</sup> By this the mind returns to itself in its source through its experience in the outer world and the visible Word. Because this experience is absolutely necessary for the return, because the beginning must be in faith and the exterior Word, the proper order for this characteristically Plotinian spiritual motion of return<sup>10</sup> is determined so that the consideration of the trinitarian image in the soul can only occur in the last of the three parts of the work. The order in Thomas' *Summa Theologiae* has turned this upside down.

5. See for example the "Transcription of the Initial Folios of the *Summa de Bono*, Codex Vaticanus Latinus 4305" by Leo Sweeney and others in *Manuscripta*, VII, 1963, pp. 131 ff. or the elaborate *Prolegomena* of the Quaracchi editors necessary to determine that Alexander of Hales' *Summa Theologica* was not a similar work (Alexander of Hales, *Summa Theologica*, Tomus IV, *Prolegomena*, Quaracchi, 1947).

6. Augustine, *De Trinitate*, ed. Mountain and Glorie, *Corpus Christianorum*, Brepols, 1968.

7. Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, Piana, *editio altera*, 1953.

8. Anselm, *Opera Omnia*, ed. Schmitt, Vol. I, Edinburgh, 1946.

9. R. D. Crouse, "St. Augustine's *De Trinitate*: Philosophical Method", *Studia Patristica* for the 1975 Conference.

10. J. J. O'Meara, "*Magnum Vivorum Quendam Consensum, Velimus Machinari*, Eriugena's Use of Augustine's *de Genesi ad Litteram* in the *de divisione naturae*", a paper for the Third International Eriugena Colloquium, Freiburg i. Br., 1979, gives useful examples from the *Confessions* and *de Genesi ad litteram* (e.g. *de Gen* I. ix, 17), finds their source in *Enneads* V. i, 6, 7; ii, 1, iii, 8; and refers us to the *Notes Complementaires* of Agaësse and Solignac in *Bibliothèque Augustinienne*, Volumes 48 and 49. For the return as a structural principle in Augustine see R. D. Crouse, "*Recurrans in te unum*: The Pattern of St. Augustine's *Confessions*", *Studia Patristica* XIV, Part III, *Texte und Untersuchungen*, Berlin, 1976, pp. 389-392. "*La procession plotinienne est avant tout ascendante*" (J. Trouillard, *La procession plotinienne*, p. 6 quoted by Weber, *Dialogue*, p. 460).

Despite sharing with Boethius<sup>11</sup> and Anselm<sup>12</sup> a professed dependence on Augustine, Thomas follows Boethius<sup>13</sup> in what he regards as proper theological order which begins from the unity of God and moves from that to the plurality of attributes, persons and creatures, and he agrees with Anselm in moving from the knowledge and love of God to the treatment of the persons. As a result, Thomas' argument is able to proceed from God's substance to his operations of knowledge, will and power; knowledge and will, the intrinsic operations, determine that the processions in God are — and can only be — those of Word and love. They produce the Divine relations and the relations the persons. The extrinsic operation, power, is the ground of the divine emanation into creatures.<sup>14</sup> Anselm's *Monologion* uses the Trinitarian image of the soul twice; once, as the structure of Spirit itself from which the Trinity can be demonstrated, then again, with Augustine, after the Trinity has been demonstrated, in order to judge how much we can understand it and to show how it is our beatitude.<sup>15</sup> It is the first use which concerns us; for, although Anselm begins by showing the existence of the Word in God from the fact of creation, he later maintains that the Supreme Spirit would have this character whether or not anything were created. This seems to correspond with Thomas' movement from the pure spirituality of God's being, from his immateriality to his knowing, thus to his will, from whence as Word and love, the persons are derived.<sup>16</sup> The

11. *Summa Theologiae*, I, 32, 1 and 2; *de Trinitate*, Prologus, 31-33, p. 4: "ex beati Augustini scriptis . . . fructus".

12. *Monologion*, Prologus, p. 8, 8-14; Ep. 77 (i, 68) quoted in R. Southern, *Saint Anselm and His Biographer*, Cambridge, 1963, p. 31. See also *Ibid*, p. 50 and T. A. Losoncy, "St. Anselm's *Proslogion*: Variation on an Augustinian Problem", Third International Anselm Conference, Anselm at Canterbury, July, 1979.

13. In *Boethii de Trinitate*, Prologus (Calcaterra, pp. 313-314). Boethius' order differs from the philosophical order and his *modus tractandi* differs from Augustine's *per auctoritates* by being *secundum rationes*.

14. *Summa Theologiae*, I, qq. 3-45.

15. The first use begins at Chapter X (p. 24) with the *locutio rerum* but the crucial turning round is in Chapter XXXII: *Sive igitur ille cogitetur nulla alia existente essentia, sive aliis existentibus: necesse est verbum illius coaeternum illi esse cum illo* (p. 51). From Chapter XXVII (p. 45) the Divine is treated as *individuus spiritus* and compared to *mens rationalis* (p. 51); this development reaches its conclusion in Chapter LI (p. 65): "Palam certe est rationem habentem non idcirco sui memorem esse aut se intelligere quia se amat . . . Patet igitur amorem summi spiritus . . ." The second use begins at Chapter LXVI: "Quod per rationalem mentem maxime accedatur ad cognoscendum summam essentiam" (p. 77).

16. The crucial texts are *Summa Theologiae* I, 14, 1, *resp.*, "Unde cum Deus in summo immaterialitatis . . . sequitur quod ipse sit in summo cognitionis", I, 19,

common order of the two arguments and the rational necessity with which Thomas' argument proceeds has persuaded some that, despite his protests to the contrary, Thomas, "haunted"<sup>17</sup> by Anselm's procedure by reason alone<sup>18</sup> is at least unconsciously imitating him.

This by no means follows. Aquinas pushes very strongly the arguments which show why the Trinity cannot be produced by philosophical reason<sup>19</sup> and, since it has been clearly shown that such a procedure would violate a first principle of his theological method — i.e. that in theology the articles of faith are the premises, not the conclusions, of the argument<sup>20</sup> — and also that there is no need for the order of theological argument to follow the order by which a doctrine is produced (*via disciplinae* is not *via inventionis*) but rather that theology can be made intelligible in precisely the reverse order, there is no reason to disbelieve Thomas' explicit denials that he is deducing the Trinity by natural reason because of the order in which matters appear.<sup>21</sup> But what is the reason of his ordering?

Answering this question has been greatly hindered by viewing Thomas as an Aristotelian.<sup>22</sup> Despite the fact that with equal lack of

1, resp., "Unde in quolibet habente intellectum est voluntas" and I, 27, 5, resp., "actiones in natura intellectuali et divina non sunt nisi duae, scilicet intellegere et velle . . . Relinquitur igitur quod nulla alia processio possit esse in Deo, nisi verbi et amoris".

17. Dom Cyprien Vagaggini, "La hantise de *rationes necessariae* de Saint Anselme dans la théologie des processions trinitaires des Saint Thomas", *Spicilegium Beccense*, Paris, 1959, pp. 103-140.

18. "sola ratione:" *Monologion*, Chapter I, b. 11, p. 13; Eadmer, *Vita Sancti Anselmi*, ed. Southern, Nelson, 1962, p. 29.

19. *Summa Theologiae*, I, 32, 1; *I Sent.* 3, 1, 4; *de Veritate* X, 13; *In Rom.* I, 6; *In Boetii de Trinitate* 1, 4.

20. See E. Persson, *Sacra Doctrina*, Oxford, 1970 and E. Schillebeeckx *Revelation and Theology*, London, 1967.

21. Richards, *op. cit.* is a complete discussion of Vagaggini's argument and makes this point at the conclusion.

22. It is remarkable in the vast sea of Thomist literature how little serious attention is given to Thomas' Platonism. There have always been Platonists like Inge (*The Philosophy of Plotinus*, 2nd ed., Vol. I, p. 15) or J. N. D. Findlay (*Plato, The Written and Unwritten Doctrines*, London, 1974) to claim him as one of their own but the sense given to his thought in the Thomist revival since Leo XIII has allowed this aspect to fall out of sight. There is little of significance beyond: L. B. Gieger, *La Participation dans la philosophie de S. Thomas d'Aquin*, Paris, 1942; Victor White, "The Platonic Tradition in St. Thomas Aquinas", in *God the Unknown*, London, 1956, pp. 62-71; R. J. Henle, *Saint Thomas and Platonism*, The Hague, 1956; Cornelio Fabro, *Participation et Causalité selon S. Thomas d'Aquin*, Louvain/Paris 1961; K. Kremer, *Die Neuplatonische Seinsphilosophie und ihre wirkung auf Thomas von Aquin*, Leiden, Brill, 1966; J. Moreau, "Le Platonisme dans la *Somme*

reason Augustine's trinitarian theology has been called Aristotelian Latin in contrast to Greek Platonist,<sup>23</sup> Anselm and Aquinas are also contrasted with Augustine at this point as Aristotelians.<sup>24</sup> Apparently to proceed by such deductions as they are supposed to employ here provides the justification for this categorization. If, in fact, the structure and order of Thomas' questions are examined directly, the principles turn out to be Neoplatonic from beginning to end. Thomas himself acknowledges the source of his conception of theological order as Boethius' *de Trinitate*. Here he learns what Boethius surely did not derive from Augustine but from his Platonist sources: to separate the one from the many — whether the multitude is of the three or of creatures — and to make the one the source of these two processions. Further the order of attributes treated under the substance of God (simplicity, goodness, infinity,

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*Théologique*”, *Atti de Congresso Internazionale Thomistico, Tommaso d’Aquino nel suo settimo Centenario*, I, Naples, 1976, pp. 238-247; J. Moreau, *De la Connaissance selon S. Thomas D’Aquin*, Beauchesne, Paris, 1976; E. H. Weber, *Dialogue et Dissensions entre Saint Bonaventure et Saint Thomas d’Aquin à Paris (1252-1273)*, Vrin, Paris, 1974, chapter vii; E. H. Weber, *L’Homme en discussion à l’université de Paris en 1270*, Vrin, Paris, 1970, pp. 21 ff.; T. Litte, *Les corps célestes dans l’univers de saint Thomas d’Aquin*, Louvain/Paris, 1963, pp. 367 ff. This aspect of Thomas did not accord well with the search for a theology which allowed a meeting with modern natural reason in the form of natural science (cf. Georges Van Riet, *Thomistic Epistemology, Studies concerning the Problem of Cognition in the Contemporary Thomistic School*, Herder, St. Louis and London, 1963, Vol. I, pages 126, 188) or with the realism and existentialism of contemporary philosophy and theology (cf. for example, Jacques Maritain, *Bergsonian Philosophy and Thomism*, Phil. Library, New York, 1955, esp. Preface; E. Gilson, *L’être et l’essence*, 2nd Ed. Paris, Vrin, 1962, especially Appendix II; and K. Rahner, *Spirit in the World*, especially conclusion). This is best treated in F. van Steenberghen, *Introduction à l’étude de la philosophie médiévale*, Louvain/Paris, 1974, pp. 56-77 and 211-282.

23. P. Vanier, *Théologie Trinitaire chez Saint Thomas D’Aquin*, Paris, 1953, p. 15; see Augustine's own statement on the categories, *Confessiones*, IV, 16. Augustine is to be contrasted with Boethius, Eriugena and perhaps Anselm in this (cf. J. A. Doull “Augustinian Trinitarianism and Existential Theology”, elsewhere in this volume). In fact, Boethius, Eriugena and St. Thomas are more Aristotelian and more Platonist than Augustine, something perfectly possible for Neoplatonists. Eriugena's *de Divisione Naturae* is in some ways the purest statement of Platonism ever put forward” (J. N. Findlay, *op. cit.*, p. 387) and yet the first book is devoted largely to a consideration of God in terms of Aristotle's categories. For the return to Aristotle in late Neoplatonism cf. Dodds, *Elements*, p. xxiii, note 5, and Gersh, *From Iamblichus*, p. 28, Note 4. Thomas' Platonic and Arabic sources share with him this feature of late Neoplatonism.

24. Vagaggini, *art. cit.*, p. 111: “le verbe et l’amour chez Augustin servent de base à un procédé de dialectique platonicienne, chez Anselme au contraire, à la preuve apodictique de la déduction aristotélicienne.”

being, immutability, aeternity from whence we arrive again at unity) is to be derived from the Iamblichan — Proclan tradition known to him, at this point, in the *Divine Names* of Dionysius and the *Liber de Causis*.<sup>25</sup> The distinction between *esse* and operations in the form he uses it has a similar source<sup>26</sup> and he gives the *Liber de Causis* as the authority for his use of the notion of the *redire ad seipsum*.<sup>27</sup> This idea, so important in Proclus, not only structures

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25. The order of the attributes in the *de Divinis Nominibus* should be compared with that in the *Summa Theologiae* qq. 3-11 — remembering that *de unitate divina* (11) is a return to the simplicity (3) which formed the beginning (as is clear from its content and from *Exp. in Librum de causis*, Pera 370, p. 115) — and with the order of hypostases in Proclus as this is known to Thomas in the *Liber de Causis* (cf. Pera's edition of the *Expositio* at 318, p. 97; 55, p. 15; 57, p. 16; 58, p. 16; 78, p. 21; 107, p. 29). In two instances, Thomas follows Aristotle against Proclus: the ordering of intelligence and life and of intelligence and providence. In so far as life is associated with soul it follows mind in the Neoplatonic ordering of hypostases (e.g. *Expositio*, 78, p. 21) but in so far as it is more generic (the principle of priority for the Platonists (*Expositio*, 17, p. 5) and less internally divided (the more common is nearer the one and more perfect, *Expositio*, 98, p. 28, and 116, p. 30) life precedes intelligence (Gersh, *From Iamblichus*, pp. 83, 87, 113, 115, etc.; Proclus, *Elements*, 101-3, Dodd's comments on 101, 102, pp. 252-3; order of *Caput VI: de Vita* and *VII: De Sapientia, Mente, Ratione, Veritate et Fide* of *In de Divinis Nominibus Expositio*, and Thomas' comments 674, p. 254, and 697, pp. 261-2). This question of order involves the greatest difficulties of Proclus' system (cf. James Lowry, *The Logical Principles of Proclus' Στοιχειώσις Θεολογική as Systematic Ground of the Cosmos*, Doctoral Thesis, Dept. of Classics, Dalhousie University, 1976, chapter V, to be published in *Elementa, Schriften zum Philosophie und ihrer Problemgeschichte*, Amsterdam, 1980). Thomas thinks that God's life is a consequence of his thinking and that this is Aristotle's view (*Summa Theologiae*, I, 18, 3) and orders the *Summa Theologiae* accordingly. Proclus places providence above intelligence (*Elements*, 120); Thomas places it under intellect and will (*Summa Theologiae*, I, 22-24).

26. *Summa Theologiae* I, 75, *Prologus*; cf. Weber *Dialogue et Dissensions*, pp. 459, ff. cited above. Thomas also cites Aristotle for *operatio sequitur esse* but, as Weber makes it clear, in *L'Homme en discussion*, pp. 88-98, the division between powers and *esse* of the soul made by Thomas means that he is thinking about operations in a Neoplatonic rather than Aristotelian way.

27. For example, *Summa Theologiae*, I, 14, 2 *ad* 1; for the origins and importance of this notion see S. Gersh, Κίνησις Ἀκίνητος, *A Study of Spiritual Motion in the Philosophy of Proclus*, Leiden, Brill, 1973; *Idem*, *From Iamblichus to Eriugena*; *Idem*, "Per se ipsum, The Problem of Immediate and Mediate Causation in Eriugena and his Neoplatonic Predecessors", *Jean Scot Érigène et l'histoire de la Philosophie*, C.N.R.S., Paris, 1977, pp. 367-376. For a beginning of an understanding of how the principle works structurally in Thomas see my "The Structure of Aristotle's logic and the Knowledge of God in the *Pars Prima* of the *Summa Theologiae* of Thomas Aquinas" to be published in the Proceedings of the Sixth International Congress for Mediaeval Philosophy (Bonn, 1977).



being itself for Thomas — thus enabling the questions on God's *esse* to be bound together, and God's knowledge to be deduced from his being (and thus also his will)<sup>28</sup> — but it also binds the operations to the substance — being returns to itself through them<sup>29</sup> — and ties the operations and persons together — the movement from knowledge through will to power is a movement towards the external but beatitude belongs to intellectual life,<sup>30</sup> the Spirit as love is a kind of unity of the Father and his distinct Word<sup>31</sup> — giving a common internal form to *esse*, operations, and persons. Finally, it provides the notion by which the procession into creatures and redemption are related to the idea of God himself — creatures return to God through man and man through Christ.<sup>32</sup> Thus, with the anthropology of the Greek Fathers mediated through John Damascene,<sup>33</sup> and perhaps as well through Thomas' twelfth century predecessors who derived it from Eriugena and Honorius Augustodunensis,<sup>34</sup> we arrive at the structure of the *Summa Theologiae* as a whole. Even the basis of the division between our rational knowledge of the Divine unity and the necessarily revealed character of our knowledge of the Trinity, which is rightly used to distinguish Thomas from his predecessors, is credited by him to Dionysius and belongs to the aspect of Dionysius' thought which is most Neoplatonic and is controversially orthodox.<sup>35</sup> In fact, the only structural principle which he

28. *Summa Theologiae*, I, 14, 2 ad 1 and see note 16 above.

29. Weber, *Dialogue et Dissensions*, pp. 463 ff.

30. "Attribuenda ergo est Deo beatitudo secundum intellectum" (I, 26, 2 resp.); "In actu intellectus attenditur beatitudo" (I, 26, 2 ad 2); and below.

31. *Summa Theologiae*, I, 37, 1 obj 3 and ad 3.

32. *Ibid.*, III, Prologus understood with I, 2, prologus: "Christ, who as man, is our way into God." Man, as conjoining the material and spiritual, draws creation together and concludes the *Prima Pars*, concerning God and his work (I, 50 and I, 75, prologues). As rational, irrational creatures are ordered to him (I, 20, 2, ad 3), and, because of his union with God in Christ, he is better and more loved by God than the angels (I, 20, 4 ad 2).

33. *Ibid.*, I, 93, 5, obj. 2; I, 93, 9 and I-II, Prologus, cf. G. Lafont *Structures et Méthode dans la Somme Théologique de Saint Thomas*, T.E.T., Paris, 1961.

34. R. D. Crouse, "Honorius Augustodunensis, The Arts as *via ad patriam*", *Arts Libéraux et Philosophie au Moyen Âge*, Paris, 1969, pp. 531-539; *Idem*, "Intentio Moysi: Bede, Augustine, Eriugena and Plato in the Hexameron of Honorius Augustodunensis", *Dionysius*, 1978, pp. 137-157; M.O. Garrigues, *L'oeuvre d'Honorius Augustodunensis: Inventaire critique* (Ph.D. diss. Université de Montréal, 1979) pp. 280-281; M. Nedoncelle, *Is there a Christian Philosophy?* London, 1960, p. 52; Weber, *Dialogue*, note 2, p. 460 and p. 466.

35. *Summa Theologiae*, I, 45, 6 *sed contra*; see notes 17 and 19 with appropriate text in A. H. Armstrong, "Negative Theology, Myth and Incarnation", *Mélanges Trouillard* (forthcoming) and J. Pelikan, "The

credits to Aristotle is that of uniting all the hypostases of the Platonists as attributes of the Divine being. This he correctly finds also and less anachronistically in Dionysius (for him Dionysius and Aristotle agree in this)<sup>36</sup> and it is surely also in this tradition that he found the commonplace of medieval Neoplatonism<sup>37</sup> that existence and essence are distinguished in creation but are united in God, wrongly elevated to be the special characteristic of his 'existential' philosophy when in fact God's *esse* is treated by Aquinas under his unity or simplicity.<sup>38</sup>

What may we conclude from this analysis? First, that in the treatment of God in Aquinas and in Augustine's *de Trinitate* we have two Neoplatonic structures: Augustine's involving primarily the return into unity of a soul which has necessarily had to go out to the external world where faith operates so that its principle

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Domestication of Dionysius", Proceedings of the VIIIth International Conference on Patristic Studies, Oxford, 1979, forthcoming.

But, the use to which St. Thomas has been put by the church has resulted in an overstatement of the separation of philosophy and theology in his system. For a presentation of the history of this problem in contemporary Thomist scholarship cf. van Steenberghen, *op. cit.* pp. 56 ff. and the following chapter (for his own solution). For arguments for seeing a greater unity of the two cf. R. D. Crouse, "*Philosophia Ancilla Theologiae*, some texts from Aristotle's *Metaphysics* in the Interpretation of Albertus Magnus", *Proceedings of the Fifth International Congress of Medieval Philosophy*, Madrid, 1972; *Idem*, "St. Thomas, St. Albert, Aristotle: *Philosophia Ancilla Theologiae*," *Atti de Congresso Inter. Thomistico, Tommaso d'Aquino nel suo settimo Centenario*, I, Naples, 1976, pp. 181-185; A. Patfoort, "Théorie de la théologie ou réflexion sur le corpus des Écritures?", *Angelicum*, 54, 1977, pp. 459-488. The less careful article of J. H. Walgrave "The Use of Philosophy in the Theology of Thomas Aquinas", *Aquinas and the Problems of His Time, Mediaevalia Lovaniensis*, I, V, Leuven — the Hague, 1976, pp. 161-193 brings out the "structural likeness" and "union in the plane of first principle"; "... both our natural light and the light of faith are participations in the divine light (p. 189)."

36. *In II Sent.* d. 14, Q.1, a 2, p. 350; *Exp. in Librum de Causis*, 344, p. 103; modern scholarship also finds this step to belong to Dionysius, cf. S. Gersh, *From Iamblichus to Eriugena*, p. 11, and Armstrong "Negative Theology, Myth . . .", note 19.

37. A beginning might be made with James F. Anderson, *St. Augustine and Being*, The Hague, 1965; M. L. Colish, "Avicenna's Theory of Efficient Causation and its Influence on St. Thomas Aquinas", *Atti de Congresso Int. Thomistico*, I, p. 297, note 3; and Bonaventure, *Itinerarium mentis in Deum, Opera Theologica Selecta*, V, Quaracchi, 1964, Chapter v, pp. 203-208. H. Kremer, *op. cit.* pp. 299-313, 356-372, 390-396; F. van Steenberghen, *op. cit.* pp. 100-101.

38. *De Ente et Essentia*, ed. Roland-Gosselin, Vrin, Paris, 1948, Chapter iv, p. 30 ff; *De Potentia*, VII, 2 which like *Summa Theologiae* I, 3, 4 occurs under *de divinae essentiae simplicitate*.

could speak to it and draw it back into unity with itself, the other where theological method is identified precisely as beginning with the inner being of that principle as it comes to us. Neither the philosophical nor the theological structures are fundamentally different — no greater than say the difference between Plotinus and Proclus — although in Thomas' case the interest in structure appears to be greater and the structural devices are more elaborated and complex. Second, Anselm's *rationes necessariae* have not been shown to haunt Aquinas.<sup>39</sup> He is acquainted with Anselm's argument but shows no evidence of being particularly interested in it and his own argument has been shown to have a structure in no way dependent upon it. Anselm's argument can be looked at either in an Augustinian or a Dionysian-Eriugenan context. In an Augustinian view, Anselm has dogmatically taken one side of Augustine's necessarily two-sided dialectic — i.e. the side where the understanding of self is a kind of demonstration of the principle by which, on the other side, the self is itself understood, and endeavoured to represent the former alone<sup>40</sup> — in fact this is completed in the sequel to the *Monologion*; in the *Proslogion*, the second part of the argument is altogether dropped. Such a procedure Thomas finds unsatisfactory. Alternatively, on the basis of the structural similarity of the *de Deo* of the *Summa Theologiae* and the *Monologion*, together with some of its language, we may regard Anselm as at some point on the way from Augustine to the Proclan Platonism of St. Thomas.<sup>41</sup> Neither way

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39. Judged by the evidence of the new *Index Thomisticus* (ed. Busa, frommann — Holzboog, 1975) — if explicit citations count for anything — the influence of Anselm on the first book of the *Commentary on the Sentences* and of the *Summa Theologiae* is less than of Boethius, for example, and when compared with Augustine, Aristotle, Dionysius and even Origen only his number of citations decreases (to almost half) whereas the others all at least double. This apparent decline in influence on Thomas, from his *Commentary on the Sentences*, may stem from the dependence of that work on Bonaventure's *Commentary* (for part of the evidence cf. M. D. Chenu, *Toward Understanding St. Thomas*, Chicago, Regnery, 1964, p. 273). For Anselm's considerable effect on Bonaventure's theology confer J. G. Bougerol, "Saint Bonaventure et saint Anselm"; *Antonianum*, 47, 1972, pp. 333-361.

40. Augustine's argument necessarily involves these two sides, cf. R. D. Crouse, "St. Augustine's *De Trinitate*," conclusion; also J. A. Doull, "Augustinian Trinitarianism" in this volume.

41. For further light on the disputed question of Anselm's relation to Dionysian-Eriugenan Neoplatonism see the papers for the Third International Anselm Conference, Anselm at Canterbury, July 1979, by E. Briansco, T. A. Losoncy, M. L. Colish, D. F. Duclow, J. McIntyre ("Premises and Conclusions in the System of St. Anselm" *Spicilegium*

of treating him is very satisfactory but since he tells us so little about what he is trying to do and virtually nothing about his sources,<sup>42</sup> it is hard indeed for us to do better.

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*Beccense* p. 95), A. Koyré (*L'idée de Dieu dans la philosophie de S. Anselme*, Vrin, Paris, 1923, p. 10), G. R. Evans (*Anselm and Talking about God*, Oxford, 1978, pp. 3, 11, 12) find an implicit system in Anselm's works which ought to be taken into account on this problem. On the other hand, Southern regards Anselm's Platonism as Augustinian (*St. Anselm and His Biographer*, p. 63). Evidence for thinking Anselm's Platonism to be Augustinian and not Dionysian is collected in R. D. Crouse, "Honorius Augustodunensis, Disciple of Anselm?" *Die Wirkungsgeschichte Anselms von Canterbury*, Frankfurt, Minerva, 1975, note 33, p. 138.

42. For a complete list of references confer Southern, *St. Anselm and His Biographer*, p. 17; for his consequent difference from developed medieval scholasticism see p. 52.