

The Origin of Genera: *Ennead* VI 2[43] 20

Gary Gurtler, S.J.

In his seminal article, "Neoplatonic logic and Aristotelian logic – I-II," *Phronesis*, 1 (1955-56), 58-72, 146-160, A. C. Lloyd maintained that Plotinus' fusion of Aristotle's *dynamiei* with the Neoplatonic *dynamis* paved the way for the inclusion of Aristotle's logic in the Neoplatonic course of studies. But this fusion leads, he argues, to a dilemma: admitting the abstract universals of Aristotelian logic brings in its train the problem of their relation to concrete universals (the Forms as *ousiai*); or, refusing to separate the two kinds of universals leaves formal logic without a foundation (II, 150). Lloyd further claims that Plotinus tries to hold both sides of this dilemma at once, unlike his successors, explaining this enigmatically as Plotinus' ability to live with antinomies of the understanding, resolved by mysticism, psychology or metaphor.¹

More recent scholarship has still not fully resolved the difficulties Lloyd indicates in his exegesis of VI 2[43] 20. K. Wurm, *Substanz und Qualität* (Berlin, Walter de Gruyter, 1973) for example, continues to see the notion of *dynamis* as eluding rational interpretation, a mystical idea of possibility (p. 233). S. Strange, "Plotinus' Treatise 'On the Genera of Being' " (Ph.D. Diss, University of Texas at Austin, 1981), pp. 201-05, 212-14, on the other hand, provides considerable clarification of Plotinus' subtle use of Aristotle's logic in his overall Platonic scheme. He shows how the production of the intelligible genera follows Aristotle's model of definition by genus and *differentia* (against Lloyd, I, 68-71; II, 147), each genus getting its *differentiae* from the other four (VI 2[43] 19,3-9), the process described in 20,16-23. From this, he argues further

1. A possible source of Lloyd's position in the Plotinian text can be found at V 8[31] 4-7, the only instance where Plotinus demurs at using the analogy of knowledge and its theorems in reference to the Intellect (4,48-50; 5,6;21; 6,1-9; 7,40-45). The point at issue is the tendency to import the discursive character of human thought, as expressed in statements and propositions, into the non-discursiveness of the intelligible world. For Plotinus, ultimate reality is not reducible to any sort of logic precisely because it is prior to logic. It is not because of our explanations that things are so (7,36-37), though they are so disposed that we can reason from them to their cause. This point is also made explicitly in VI 2[43] 21, where Plotinus describes the relation between human reasoning and its source in the non-discursive interweaving of intellects as *logoi* in the intelligible world. F. Bazán, *Plotino y la Gnosis* (Buenos Aires, 1981), pp. 94-109, shows the essential role this plays in Plotinus' struggle with Gnostic claims to capture true wisdom in human formulation.

that Lloyd is mistaken in his claim that there is no direct description of the structure of the Ideas (II, 148), but his tendency to import discursiveness into the Intellect errs in the opposite direction.

Thus Plotinus still appears incapable of accomplishing his general purpose in VI 1-3[42-44] and his specific task in VI 2[43] 20 of relating Neoplatonic ontology and Aristotelian logic. The difficulty, however, can be traced to a mistranslation and consequent misinterpretation of two specific sections of this controversial chapter, 20,4-6 and 20,20-23. In both instances, Plotinus is answering Aristotle's charge that Plato cannot account for the causal relation between the forms and their participants, and that applying the same universal term to both the form and the participants makes the form just one more object alongside them. Plotinus must, therefore, establish a causality that will maintain the ontological independence of the form and at the same time allow the same universal to be predicated of the form and its participants.²

The discussion begins with the listing of various aporiai in VI 2[43] 18-19. This is not atypical of Plotinus' method, clearly borrowed from Aristotle. The particular focus is the relationship of Intellect to the intelligible genera. The conflict is between Intellect as in some sense not a genus at all, but nonetheless seemingly

2. Plotinus' response to Aristotle's attack on the forms makes use of Aristotle's theory of causality. He accepts the notion that the form in its logical role as universal is posterior to its participants, since it operates as the final cause of definition, but he rejoins that ontologically the form must also be the efficient cause. This introduces a kind of causality not present in Aristotle, although modelled on his moving cause. The difference is that the moving cause is restricted to the sensible world for Aristotle, with the final cause the only one of the four that operates between immaterial substances and sensible substances. Thus, for Aristotle the relation of items on one level of reality to those on another can be explained only through *pros hen* equivocity (cf. J. Owens, *The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics* (Toronto, PIMS, 1957), pp. 49-63). Such a logical structure does not satisfy Plotinus' keen ontological sense, so he adapts Aristotle's notion of act and potency to provide an ontological link between form and participants. As a result, he saves the Platonic position, but at the same time can incorporate Aristotelian logic into it. There are several articles and studies, besides Steven Strange's "On the Genera of Being," that mention this topic, two of which are in *The Structure of Being*, ed. by R. Baine Harris (Albany, SUNY Press, 1982), C. Evangelidou, "The Ontological Basis of Plotinus' Criticism of Aristotle's Theory of Categories," pp. 73-82, and J. Fielder, "Plotinus and Self-Predication," pp. 83-89. In addition, F. M. Cornford, *Plato's Theory of Knowledge* (Bobbs-Merrill, 1957), pp. 274-77, 282, is predictably critical of Plotinus' treatment of the casual selection of Forms in the *Sophist* for this derivation of Platonic categories, especially for excluding unity from among them (VI 2[43] 9-11), but this confuses the transcendentals with the primary genera.

identified with Being (*ousia*) and the four other intelligible genera (motion, rest, sameness and difference), which are its most primitive elements (18,12-15). The difficulty is further specified in terms of the application of Aristotle's notion of definition by genus and *differentia* to the intelligible genera. Is Intellect itself the genus in this case? Do the *differentiae* come from Intellect, or in some combination with the primary genera themselves (19,9-17)? The dilemma posed by these aporiai is finally summarized in the paradoxical proposition that Intellect seems at the same time both prior and subsequent to all existents (19,18-21).

In the next two chapters, Plotinus attempts to resolve these aporiai, relating Intellect to its genera in VI 2[43] 20, and to the rest of the Intelligible World in VI 2[43] 21. Of interest here is the argument in VI 2[43] 20, where he establishes Intellect as ontologically prior to the genera (20,1-16; 25-29), but nonetheless logically posterior to them (20,16-25). He begins with a clear statement of the ontological independence and priority of the Intellect:³

Let us assume then, that the Intellect is in no way that which lays hold of partial intellects nor acts in reference to any of them whatever, lest it become some particular intellect, just as knowledge [as such] is before partial species [of knowledge], and the specific knowledge before the parts within it. (VI 2[43] 20,1-4; my translation)

This first sentence establishes the independence of Intellect as such from any of its participants, on the analogy of knowledge as such in relation to any particular kind of knowledge. It thus expresses the Platonic side of the dilemma, that the Form not be counted in any way as among its own participants; it is ontologically different, and necessarily so if Plotinus is to escape the third man argument in the *Parmenides* or Aristotle's *Metaphysics*.

The next section spells out the workings of the analogy of knowledge, but does so by introducing the logical problem of predication. It has been invariably mistranslated, leading to a

3. There is a phrase in this excerpt (20,1-4) which gives some oblique acknowledgement that the argument of these last chapters concerns not only the derivation of species from the primary genera, but the particulars within the species as well: the movement of the analogy goes from genus to its species, and then from species to its parts. This would be additional support for Rist, "Ideas of Individuals in Plotinus," *Revue Internationale de Philosophie*, 92 (1970), 302, in his argument against Blumenthal, *Plotinus' Psychology* (The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1971), p. 127, who maintains that VI 2[43] 22,11-17 must be counted against ideas of individuals, since it is concerned with genus and species. The present context brings out the possibility of individuals within the species as well as individuals constituting species.

misunderstanding of Plotinus' distinction between *dynamis* and *dynamei*, and making it impossible to decipher the argument of the chapter. I read the text this way:

Then (1) every [specific knowledge] is in no way a potentiality of all partial species, but each one is actually that [which it is] and potentially all [the species of knowledge], and (2) similarly in the case of knowledge universally: the specific ones, which lie potentially in the whole but as grasping the specific, are potentially the whole. For the whole is predicated, not a portion of the whole: indeed it is necessary that it be unmixed by itself. (VI 2[43] 20,4-10.)

The translation agrees with Armstrong and Beutler-Theiler in taking *pasa* in 20,4 as referring to specific sciences rather than the universal as in the older translations.⁴ That is the extent of the agreement, for the next phrase is translated by both of them with the sense that "each science is none of its partial content, but the possibility of all of them." It seems, however, easier to construe *ouden* adverbially, as in 20,1, and take the phrase *ton en merei dynamis panton* as one grammatical unit, the predicate of this initial clause. The result is that Plotinus can be seen to give the exact contrast of *dynamis* and *dynamei* in the explication of the analogy of knowledge as specific and generic. Thus, no specific knowledge is the condition of possibility or causal principle of other specific kinds of knowledge, but is only actually itself and potentially all the others.

At this point (20,6-7), Plotinus introduces knowledge as such, but switches to the logical categories of universal and particulars. He begins again with specific kinds of knowledge as potentially the whole, precisely because they lie potentially in it. They are

4. I have graciously received a copy of Armstrong's translation of VI 2[43] 20, forthcoming in the Loeb Classical Library. R. Beutler and W. Theiler are the revisors of *Plotinus Schriften*, tr. by R. Harder (Hamburg, Felix Meiner Verlag, 1967), with VI 2[43] 20 at IVa, pp. 221 and 223. A sampling of previous translations includes: É. Bréhier, *Plotin* (Paris, Société d'édition "Les Belles Lettres," 1936), VIa, 120, "la science universelle n'est aucune notion particulière, mais elle est la puissance de toutes les notions;" S. MacKenna, *Plotinus: The Enneads* (New York, Pantheon Books, 1969), p. 487, "being none of its particulars it is the potentiality of all," and Lloyd, II, 148, "just as there is a genus, science, which is *dynamis* of its species." The antecedent of *ton en merei . . . panton* in 20,5, however, is the parallel phrase, *ton en merei eidon* in 20,3, ruling out Bréhier's "notion particulière," which is clearly the importation of a concept not at all present in the Greek text. MacKenna's error does less violence to the text, but more to the grammar, since *ouden* becomes inexplicable. Moreover, the particular point that all three make about the genus as "potentiality of all," is actually made at 20,14 in reference to Intellect as genus, and is intended to stand in contrast to the point made here in 20,5.

potentially in the whole, however, not in the same way that they are potentially one another. The horizontal relation among the species is ontologically different from their relation, individually or together, to the whole. They are reciprocally related to one another and are thus similarly related to the whole, but the whole is related to them in some other sense of potentiality. Plotinus clarifies this situation by stating that the whole is related to them like a universal; it can be predicated equally of each of them. This contributes Aristotle's logical theory to the discussion, but he immediately returns to Platonic realism in describing this universal knowledge as unmixed by itself. The general sense of the relation is clear, with the logical role of the universal following Aristotle's categorial theory, but with similar insistence on Platonic realism. What is not clear at this point is the precise mechanism which Plotinus uses for their simultaneous combination.

The issue is crucial for Plotinus' system and the analogy of knowledge is frequent in its explication. One can find it, for example, at the basis of his argument in IV 3[27] 2-6 that the world soul cannot be the genus of individual souls, but must itself be a species, along with them, of the hypostasis Soul. In the context of the Soul, the distinctions are somewhat simpler to make, since the species, the world soul and individual souls, are different from the Hypostasis precisely in their embodiment. An example that might clarify this for the modern reader is the relation of a word to other words of the same language, which form a single network of meaning, or the possibility of translating one language into another, showing the relation between them. This illustrates the type of mutual reciprocity possible among items on the same level of reality. On the other hand, to continue our comparison, the fundamental possibility of language for human beings can in no way be identified with any particular language, nor be exhausted by any number of actual languages. This possibility is something radically different from any instantiation of it, inhering in the power of human beings to communicate.

With these distinctions in view, the difficulties in the interpretations of Lloyd and Wurm can be resolved. Lloyd eliminates the difference between specific knowledge and universal knowledge by treating them as if they were reciprocal, misconstruing the Greek in the process.⁵ The result is an Aristotelian system,

5. Lloyd, II, 148, rightly sees that the species is actually itself, but takes the next phrase as implying that it is potentially the genus in extension. This, however, is to construe the *panta* of 20,6 as if it were singular and referred to the genus, but Plotinus is, in fact, speaking about the reciprocity among species. Thus, a species is not the universal in extension, but all the other species. The reason is simple, all are derived from the

with only horizontal relations between terms. Wurm makes this Aristotelian dimension even more apparent in his comparison of the present passage with *Metaphysics* M 10, 1087a15-25. This has the advantage of indicating that the universal, from the point of view of human thought, is logically posterior to the particulars, but leaves out of account its ontological priority, which is the particular point of Platonic realism.

Wurm's difficulty, therefore, is misunderstanding the role of genus and species, or whole and part, in the discussion of this chapter. He is correct in seeing that Plotinus, turning away from the individual things of the sense world, takes the simile as making a direct statement about the intellectual world, as the content of Intellect's thought, and that thinking is the way in which this content is possessed. He continues, however, to hold Lloyd's position that genus and species, and by extension whole and parts, are not applicable to the relation of Intellect and its content, the one as implying a discursive mode of thinking and the other as bound up with the senses. Both of their positions, however, are based on an erroneous translation in the next section of the text, at 20,20-21.

Let us take this to say in one way that Intellect is the whole altogether, the one before the actually singular beings, but in another way that the intellects are each singular, partial ones filled from all the rest. Intellect, however, as supplier for all the singulars, is their potentiality and has them universally [*en to katholou*], but they, being partial in themselves, have the universal [*ton katholou*], as particular knowledge has knowledge. (20,10-16.)

The opening statement sets up the case to be examined: (1) the Intellect as such, which is before the actually singular beings, and (2) those partial intellects, which are filled from all the rest. It thus continues the situation of the analogy, the genus by itself, and the mutually interrelated species. Lloyd correctly notes that the species are completed by the totality in the sense that each single theorem of a science gets its meaning from the remaining

same genus and are therefore on the same horizontal level of reality. He next claims that the same properties and relations hold for the generic and specific universal, taking *tes katholou* this time as if it were plural and the subject of the following clauses, referring to the whole of the genus in its intension. It seems, however, more accurate to take *tes katholou* (*sc. epistemes*) as introducing the contrasting case of knowledge universally taken, that is the relation of the species to their genus, rather than to one another, as in 20,4-6, and that the relation in this case will not be reciprocal. The intensional dimension refers instead to the vertical relation of each species to the genus, in which they each capture it as a whole, though differently from one another.

theorems (II, 148). It is only after this that Plotinus brings in the Intellect as supplier of all the singulars, precisely as their *dynamis*, the very thing denied to any of the species in 20,5. He ends with the affirmation that Intellect has them universally, while those particulars have the universal, an exact parallel to the earlier analogy.

The argument in the next section seeks to unravel the complex relation between Intellect and specific intellects. The first point establishes the numerical distinction between Intellect and the intellects, while the second speaks of their relation through the Platonic term "embrace," (cf. *Soph* 253d8; *Parm* 145c), the ontological ground for the application of the universal to both. The first two points thus provide a fine example of the use of the whole-part relation in its authentic Plotinian sense where its immateriality removes it from the link to the sense realm that Wurm suspects keeps it from being a proper analogy for the relation of universal and particular, a position more fully articulated in VI 4-5[22-23], where he analyzes at great length the immateriality operative in the relation of whole and part.

Let us assume further, (1) both that the great Intellect is by itself while each of those are in themselves, and (2) that the partial intellects are embraced by the whole and the whole by the partial ones, each of them by itself and in the other and that by itself and in them, and (3) that all are potentially in that which is by itself, which is actually all things together, but each one is potentially separate, those which are, actually what they are, but potentially the whole thing. (20,16-23.)

This translation certainly makes sense of the passage, but needs some justification, since it has not been so construed before. The major section at issue is the part that I have translated, "but each one is potentially separate" (20,21-22), which Armstrong translates, "but potentially each particular separately," taking Intellect as the subject as do most other translations (cf. Lloyd, II, 149; Wurm, p. 233, Beutler-Theiler, IVa, 223). There is, however, no justification for taking the *de* as related to the previous phrases about Intellect, which are both participial and subordinate to the main clause concerning all intellects. The contrast, therefore, much more easily concerns all these intellects as potentially in Intellect or as potentially separate from it, the circumstance for bringing into play the final description of these intellects as actually themselves and potentially the whole.

The third point, therefore, deals once more with the nature of *dynamis* and *dynamei*. The first part repeats what we have seen already in the analysis of the analogy in 20,4-10, that the species are in the genus potentially, and the genus is again described as that which is by itself, with the additional comment that it is actually

all things together. The second part clarifies the different meanings of *dynamei* operative in this chapter. As potentially separate from Intellect, intellects are described in terms of their ontological source, but once they actually exist, they are potentially that whole logically speaking. Thus, when potentially in Intellect, they do not actually exist, but this describes Intellect as their condition of possibility. It should be noted that Intellect, as the genus, is not described as potentially the species, but as actually all of them together. Plotinus' one remaining task is to clarify the status of Intellect as the genus.

These last two sections have provided two points of clarification. First, the whole-part relationship of Intellect to intellects is explained, on the one hand, in terms of the role of Intellect as *dynamis*, and, on the other, in the twofold manner in which the intellects relate potentially to Intellect. Second, the whole-part relation thus described is the basis for the application of the universal to the whole as well as to the particulars. In the following section, Plotinus uses these foregoing distinctions to articulate the causal link between genus and species.

Insofar as they are this, which they are said to be, they are actually that which they are said to be; but *qua* that [whole] generically, they are that [whole] potentially. The whole on the contrary, *qua* the genus, is the potentiality of all the species under it and none of them actually, but all of them are quiet within it; but *qua* what it is, is actually before the species, among the non-singulars. It is necessary, therefore, if the specific intellects are actually going to be, that the act from it become the cause. (20,23-29.)

This section acts as the conclusion to the argument, summing up previous material precisely in terms of the distinction between genus and species. He begins with the species, which have been the major topic of the previous discussion. If they have been described adequately, then the genus can be predicated of them logically. As a reminder, they have been described as (1) in no way the productive source (*dynamis*) of other species, but (2) potentially (*dynamei*) all the others while actually themselves; but, in relation to the genus, (3) potentially in it as well as potentially separate from it ontologically, and, (4) once separate and actual, potentially the genus logically.

Next, the whole is considered from two different points of view, as the genus and as what it is in itself. First, as the genus, it is what none of the species can be: their productive source (*dynamis*). Along with this, Plotinus maintains that it is not one of them actually (*energeia*), which seems to contradict 20,21 where he said that it is actually all of them together, rendered now in the words

that all of them are quiet within it. The present passage thus clarifies the other, emphasizing the undifferentiated nature of their presence in the whole, precisely as the condition of possibility.

Finally, it is not only a genus, but something which has a nature of its own, thereby going beyond the Aristotelian understanding of a genus as merely a universal and analyzing it as a higher and independent reality. It is defined, therefore, as before the species and not the kind of thing that is a particular at all. What this means is that Plotinus has come to that point where there is no higher genus of which this would be a species and thus in some sense a particular. Further, if there are to be particulars, the act from this independent reality must become their cause.

It is on this basis that the last sentence functions as an *inclusio*, returning to the Intellect posited in the opening statement as uninvolved with the partial and particular. In its essential act, Intellect is just itself; only in the act from itself does it become the cause of its species. The detailed analysis of the relationship of the species to their genus is thus joined to the fundamental principles of Plotinus' ontology. It is in fact only within this overall framework that the elusive causality connecting genus and species is finally articulated and the initial *aporiai* are resolved. Thus the Intellect, as just what it is, is not the genus, only functioning as genus in terms of that second act which is cause of the specific intellects; it is ontologically prior as cause of the species, but logically subsequent as their goal; as what it is in itself, it is a complete whole, and as complete, pours forth a second act generative of its species. The first of these species and source of all the others are, in fact, the five intelligible genera, each mutually defined by Intellect in combination with the other four.

Are these distinctions enough, however, to meet all the challenges of Lloyd and Wurm concerning Plotinus' consistency, especially logically considered? Wurm's case, as already mentioned, seems the weaker of the two, and therefore can be dealt with more expeditiously. It is clear, for example, that Plotinus is not concerned in VI 2[43] 20 primarily with the relation of universal and particular knowledge, but the comparison of his position to that of Aristotle in *Metaph* M 10, 1087a15-21, is still illuminating. Aristotle's *aporia* combines a position he shares with the Platonists, that knowledge is always of the universal, together with his own position attacking Platonism, that only the particular is real. His solution comes in the distinction of potential and actual knowledge. Thus, potential knowledge is like matter, indefinite and universal, about the indefinite and universal, while actual knowledge is definite and about something definite, a "this" about a "this." Wurm himself captures the radical difference between the

two philosophical approaches in the apt contrast of frozen particularity and vital totality.

In the present context, however, it is the logical implications of Aristotle's position that are most directly relevant. Though he does not mention this passage, Lloyd's later article, "Genus, Species and Ordered Series in Aristotle," *Phronesis* 7 (1962), 67-90, is useful in determining what Aristotle means by the contrast between potential and actual knowledge. Potential knowledge can be taken to indicate a P-series, a predicate or universal applied to a whole class of objects, with no definition in terms of genus and species implied. Actual knowledge, however, as of some "this," whether a singular object or a physical form (separate in notion, as Owens comments, *The Doctrine of Being*, p. 272), is precisely concerned with definition in terms of genus and species. There is, nevertheless, no indication how these two types of knowledge intersect. This supports Wurm's assessment that Aristotle's use of the *dynamai-energeia* relation for the connection between universal and particular is not adequate for his two quite contrary activities of breaking down an entity into its component elements and then deciding which of those elements are essential and thus expressed in the verbal formula of its definition.

Using the *dynamai-energeia* relation in this logical form, there is a remarkable coherence between Aristotle and Plotinus, but it is only in that instance where Plotinus is discussing the interrelation among the species. Thus, when Plotinus states that each species is potentially all the others, he is indicating that they are all members of the same class in a P-series (Strange, "On the Genera of Being," pp. 49-59, 69-74, discusses Plotinus' use of the P-principle as a means of answering Aristotle's objections to the theory of forms).⁶ When, moreover, he defines each one as actually itself and potentially the whole, he is indicating that each species is defined by genus and *differentia*.

By stating, on the other hand, that the genus is *dynamis* of all the species under it, but not one of them actually, he is maintaining the Platonic position that the genus cannot be a member of a P-series (Lloyd, 1962, pp. 69, 72). He further refines his position by

6. Strange, "Plotinus 'On the Genera of Being,'" in his further claim, however, that the Forms, as *logoi* having a definitional structure, make the thought of Intellect somehow propositional (n. 29, p. 214), seems to fall into the very trap Plotinus seeks to avoid, identifying thought with ratiocination (21,28-33; and V 8[31] 4-7, discussed in n. 1). His final paragraph modifies this for the higher genera, which as entirely primitive cannot have definitions (pp. 204-05), and is thus closer to Lloyd's position. The Forms themselves, however, though they can be defined in terms of genus and species, are not for that propositions, anymore than sensible objects definable by genus and species are propositions.

distinguishing between what Intellect is in itself, that is, actually not a genus, and how it becomes the genus by being the cause of the species through the act flowing from it. This vertical relation of genus to species and the horizontal relation among the species provides the point of intersection missing in Aristotle.

The direct concern of Plotinus, therefore, is the relation of Intellect as genus to the intelligible genera as species, and the simile of knowledge is meant to clarify this relation of genus and species, and not, as Wurm states, to indicate the relation of potential and actual knowledge in terms of the logical categories of universal and particular, as in the Aristotelian text. Lloyd, for his part, carefully points out the difference between *dynamis* and *dynamei* in Aristotle and Plotinus, but then misses the careful distinctions in VI 2[43] 20 between them. Both Wurm and Lloyd are misled by the common mistranslations of the text. *Dynamis* is specifically denied to the species in 20,5, and applied to the genus in 20,14 and 25, while *dynamei*, contrary to both Lloyd and Wurm, is not applied to the genus at all, but only to the species. This usage is not accidental, but indicates instead that Plotinus actually does define the intelligible genera by genus and *differentia*, since Intellect acts as genus and the other genera as the *differentiae*, a point already noted by S. Strange, "On the Genera of Being," pp. 200-05, (although his n.28 continues the mistranslation, pp. 213-14).

In sum, then, Wurm's final comment that genus and species and whole and part only improperly characterize the connection of universal and particular misses the subtlety of Plotinus' argument. In fact, his actual position is almost the reverse, since genus and species, operating in the ontological production of the intellectual world, serve as the basis for applying the notions of whole and part, once dissociated from the materiality of the sense world, and universal and particular, once seen in terms of the causal relation between genus and species.

Lloyd's more serious charge, that the abstract universals of Aristotelian logic cannot be related to the Platonic concrete universals without resort to mysticism or metaphor, is also traceable to this mistranslation. Recall first that on the horizontal level of the species, Plotinus is able to use Aristotle's logical categories without substantial change. Each species can be defined by genus and *differentia*, and is related to other species on the same level in a P-series. Thus the genus is not a member of a P-series, but its cause. Both relationships, from Plotinus' point of view, however, depend on the vertical relation to a genus that is at the same time causal principle of, but ontologically independent of, the species. Lloyd's mistranslation in two crucial places, 20,5 and 20,21, obscures this carefully constructed distinction.

In addition, the intelligible genera produce further genera and species, as reality continues to unfold, producing finally the sensible world as a perfect image of the intellectual.⁷ This image will have a structure similar to its archetype, the clear distinction of vertical and horizontal dimensions preserving both the correspondence of logical categories and ontological principles as well as their difference. The ontological principles are pre-logical, source of logic but never reducible to a specific logical form. This is not mysticism, but common sense. The alternative would be to make some specific, spatio-temporally conditioned view of the world into an absolute.

Loyola University of Chicago

7. F. Schroeder, "The Platonic Parmenides and Imitation," *Dionysius* 2 (1978), 51-73, discusses similar issues in terms of the special kind of equivocation operative in Plotinus' understanding of imitation (n. 13, pp. 58-59) and, in "Representation and Reflection in Plotinus," *Dionysius* 4 (1980), 37-59, emphasizes the continuity of intelligible and sensible worlds precisely through this reflective model of discourse (pp. 52-54). Finally, K. Corrigan, "The Internal Dimensions of the Sensible Object in the Thought of Plotinus and Aristotle," *Dionysius*, 5 (1981), 98-126, shows that even when Plotinus is rejecting the Aristotelian categories on one level, he can incorporate them on another, giving their intelligible genesis in relation to logos (VI 2[43] 21,27), and that under his explicit critique of Aristotle there is an implicit development of Aristotle's own thought, as expressed in *Phys* 243a32-34, where there is nothing between agent and patient (p. 117), and in *Metaph* 1037a29-30, where logos is used as definition when taken with primary substance (pp. 118-19, 125).

20. Λάβωμεν οὖν τὸν μὲν εἶναι νοῦν οὐδὲν ἐφαπτόμενον τῶν ἐν μέρει οὐδ' ἐνεργούντα περὶ ὅτιοῦν, ἵνα μὴ τις νοῦς γίγνοιτο, ὡσπερ ἐπιστήμη πρὸ τῶν ἐν μέρει εἰδῶν, καὶ ἡ ἐν εἶδει δὲ ἐπιστήμη πρὸ τῶν ἐν αὐτῇ μερῶν· πᾶσα μὲν οὐδὲν τῶν ἐν μέρει δύνάμις πάντων, ἕκαστον δὲ ἐνεργεία 5 ἐκεῖνο, καὶ δυνάμει δὲ πάντα, καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς καθόλου ὡσαύτως· αἱ μὲν ἐν εἶδει, αἱ ἐν τῇ ὅλῃ δυνάμει κεῖνται, αἱ δὲ τὸ ἐν εἶδει λαβοῦσαι, δυνάμει εἰσὶν ἡ ὅλη· κατηγορεῖται γὰρ ἡ πᾶσα, οὐ μόριον τῆς πάσης· αὐτὴν γε μὴν δεῖ ἀκέραιον ἐφ' αὐτῆς εἶναι. Οὕτω δὲ ἄλλως μὲν νοῦν τὸν ξύμπαντα εἰπεῖν 10 εἶναι, τὸν πρὸ τῶν καθέκαστον ἐνεργεία ὄντων, ἄλλως δὲ ἐκδέ(χεσθαι) ἐκάστους, τοὺς μὲν ἐν μέρει ἐκ πάντων πληρωθέντας, τὸν δ' ἐπὶ πᾶσι νοῦν χορηγὸν μὲν τοῖς καθέκαστα, δυνάμει δὲ αὐτῶν εἶναι καὶ ἔχειν ἐν τῷ καθόλου ἐκείνους, ἐκείνους τε αὖ ἐν αὐτοῖς ἐν μέρει οὔσιν ἔχειν τὸν καθόλου, 15 ὡς ἡ τις ἐπιστήμη τὴν ἐπιστήμην. Καὶ εἶναι καὶ καθ' αὐτὸν τὸν μέγαν νοῦν καὶ ἐκάστους αὖ ἐν αὐτοῖς ὄντας, καὶ ἐμπεριέχεσθαι αὖ τοὺς ἐν μέρει τῷ ὅλῳ καὶ τὸν ὅλον τοῖς ἐν μέρει, ἐκάστους ἐφ' ἑαυτῶν καὶ ἐν ἄλλῳ καὶ ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ 20 ἐκεῖνον καὶ ἐν ἐκείνοις, καὶ ἐν ἐκείνῳ μὲν πάντα ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ ὄντι δυνάμει, ἐνεργεία ὄντι τὰ πάντα ἅμα, δυνάμει δὲ ἕκαστον χωρὶς, τοὺς δ' αὖ ἐνεργεία μὲν ὁ εἰσι, δυνάμει δὲ τὸ ὅλον. Καθόσον μὲν γὰρ τοῦτο ὁ λέγονται εἶσιν, ἐνεργεία εἰσὶν ἐκεῖνο ὁ λέγονται· ἡ δ' ἐν γένει ἐκεῖνο, δυνάμει ἐκεῖνο. Ὁ δ' αὖ, ἡ μὲν γένος, δυνάμις πάντων τῶν 25 ὑπ' αὐτὸ εἰδῶν καὶ οὐδὲν ἐνεργεία ἐκείνων, ἀλλὰ πάντα ἐν αὐτῷ ἡσυχᾶ· ἡ δὲ ὁ ἐστὶ πρὸ τῶν εἰδῶν ἐνεργεία, τῶν οὐ καθέκαστα. Δεῖ δὲ, εἴπερ ἐνεργεία ἔσσονται οἱ ἐν εἶδει, τὴν ἀπ' αὐτοῦ ἐνεργείαν αἰτίαν γίγνεσθαι.

PLOTINI OPERA III

1973

DESCLÉE DE BROUWER

76^{bis}, rue des Saints-Pères, PARIS VII^e — 217b, rue de la Loi, BRUXELLES

E. J. BRILL, Oude Rijn, 33a, LEIDEN