

# Aristotle's Concept of Analogy

Alexander Edwards  
DALHOUSIE UNIVERSITY

## 1. INTRODUCTION

*those who inquire without first coming to an impasse are  
like those who are ignorant of where they need to walk.  
(Meta. B.1, 995a35–6)*

Aristotle's concept of analogy is the source of an interesting controversy. At root, the question concerns Aristotle's concept of the unity of first philosophy, ἡ πρώτη φιλοσοφία, as it is articulated in the books of the *Metaphysics*. One central thesis of these books is that being (ὄν), though predicated in a manifold of ways, is always understood πρὸς ἓν, that is, in relation or reference to one thing: substance (οὐσία).<sup>1</sup> By Aquinas' time, such unity of reference to a single source was known as the analogy of attribution.<sup>2</sup> The controversy concerns whether Aristotle *himself* conceives of analogy in this sense. Recently, Wood (2013) has argued that the concept of analogy presented in the *Metaphysics* offers a "middle ground between strict ontological univocity, which collapses the distinction between the different modes of being altogether, and a radical equivocity in which these modes lack any relation to one another."<sup>3</sup> Central to this position is the thesis of Brentano (1862), which distinguishes two kinds of analogy in Aristotle: the analogy of proportion, where A is to B as C is to D, and the analogy of

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1. I do not mean to imply that this unity of reference secures the unity of first philosophy, which is why I am calling it one rather than *the* central thesis. I develop this point in chapter 3 of my "Aristotle's Concept of Analogy and its Function in the *Metaphysics*" (master's thesis, Dalhousie University, 2016), henceforth *Concept & Function*. The present article distills the essential argument of chapter 2.

2. See Ashworth, "Medieval Theories of Analogy" (Stanford: SEP, 2013) for a brief account of the genesis of this concept, which I treat near the end of *Concept & Function* ch.2. The concept, if not the term, is present e.g. at *de Principiis Naturae* 6.46: "Analogice dicitur praedicari, quod praedicatur de pluribus quorum rationes diversae sunt sed attribuuntur uni alicui eidem."

3. "Aristotelian Ontology and its Contemporary Appropriation: Some Thoughts on the Concept of Analogy," *Dionysius* XXXI (2013): 1.

reference to the same thing as a terminus: *ad eadem terminem*, or *ad unum* (πρός ἕν) in the style of Latin scholastics. If we may argue that Aristotle conceives of πρός ἕν reference as a certain type of analogy, we may not exclude the possibility, maintained by Wood but denied e.g. by Aubenque (2009), that "the *pros hen* relationship of *Metaphysics* IV lays the groundwork for the fully developed theory of the *analogia entis* that is elaborated in late Scholastic Philosophy."<sup>4</sup>

Most scholars are in agreement with Aubenque on this point. Lonfat (2004) for instance has argued at length that "la doctrine de l'*analogia entis* n'est pas une doctrine aristotélicienne, mais une invention médiévale, correspondant à diverses relectures des corpus aristotéliciens grecs et arabes, successivement apparus en traduction chez les latins."<sup>5</sup> *Mutatis mutandis*, this position was endorsed by Owens (1951) who insists that "[t]he nature and functions of the two kinds of equivocals should not be confused. To call the πρός ἕν type 'analogous' is not Aristotelian usage, though common in later Scholastic works... F. Brentano also follows this later scholastic interpretation of the Aristotelian texts."<sup>6</sup> Hesse (1965) puts the dispute in stark relief: "[contra] those neo-scholastics and others who try to elucidate analogy in metaphysical and theological contexts from an Aristotelian standpoint," "[t]here are, I submit, no further resources in Aristotle for this undertaking, precisely because the elucidation of analogy was not his problem."<sup>7</sup>

I argue that this disagreement may be reduced to the question of Aristotle's 'concept' of analogy and, specifically, to the grounds on which it is tenable to claim that Aristotle conceives of focal (πρός ἕν) unity as a kind of analogical unity. In his Introduction to *Being and Time*, Heidegger claims that "Aristotle himself had already understood the unity of [being], as opposed to the manifold of [its] highest [genera], as the unity of analogy."<sup>8</sup> This essay aims to

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4. *Ibid.*, 6.

5. "Archéologie De La Notion D'analogie D'Aristote à Saint Thomas D'Aquin," *Archives d'histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Âge* (2004): 106.

6. *The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics: A Study in the Greek Background of Mediaeval Thought* (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1963), 59 & n.76.

7. "Aristotle's Logic of Analogy," *The Philosophical Quarterly* 15, no. 61 (October 1965): 340.

8. *Sein und Zeit* (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1967), 3. His lectures on  $\Theta$ .1 –3 contain a brief discussion of the *analogia attributionis* with the claim that

elucidate the grounds of this assumption, and to judge whether they are tenable. For there are grounds on which to argue that such claims anachronistically attribute ‘une invention médiévale’ to Aristotle. In what follows, I aim to bring these grounds to light. As Aristotle writes, “one who has heard all the disputing arguments as if they were opponents in a lawsuit is necessarily better able to judge.”<sup>9</sup>

## 2. ANALOGY, FOCALITY, AND ARISTOTLE’S CONCEPT OF THE ANALOGIA ENTIS

Generally speaking, Aristotle’s *Metaphysics* is interested in the question of what ‘being’ is: τί τὸ ὄν?<sup>10</sup> In book Γ *et passim*, Aristotle proposes that being, though expressed in a manifold of ways, is understood ‘in reference to’ (πρὸς) one thing and a single nature, rather than homonymously: τὸ δὲ ὄν λέγεται μὲν πολλαχῶς, ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἓν καὶ μίαν τινὰ φύσιν καὶ οὐχ ὁμωνύμως (1003a33–4). Aristotle here draws a seemingly clear distinction between things said in multiple ways but πρὸς ἓν, and things said in multiple ways but ‘homonymously’. This distinction parallels the opening of the *Categories*, where Aristotle draws a clear distinction between things said synonymously or univocally, in the way that ‘animate’ is predicated of a human being and an otter, and things said homonymously or equivocally, in the way that ‘animate’ is predicated of a human being and a cartoon (1a1–12).<sup>11</sup> Thus, his thesis that τὸ ὄν λέγεται πολλαχῶς forecloses the possibility that being is predicated synonymously and univocally of all being(s). On the other hand, he specifies οὐχ ὁμωνύμως. So what is this sudden third possibility – πρὸς ἓν?

This is where the problem begins. Let us begin by reconstructing the positive hypothesis, that is, the thesis that Aristotle conceives of πρὸς ἓν predication as a kind of analogical predication. To that end, I propose we return more directly to Brentano’s thesis that “the categories are various senses of being, which is said of

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<sup>9</sup>Aristotle knows still another form of analogy, although he does not differentiate between the two forms with a specific designation” (trans. Brogan & Warnek, 1995, 48). All translations are my own unless noted otherwise.

9. B.1, 995b2–4.

10. Z.1, 1028b4.

11. The regular English translation of ‘being animate’ (τὸ ζῶν εἶναι) is ‘being an animal’. Another possibility is ‘being alive’. We can predicate any of these of a drawing.

them κατ' ἀναλογίαν, and indeed in a double mode: according to analogy of proportionality, and according to analogy to the same terminus."<sup>12</sup> Brentano explicates his own thesis point by point: (1) being is differentiated not as a univocal concept i.e. as genus into species, but as a homonym is differentiated into its several senses, (2) being is not an accidental homonym (ἀπὸ τύχης ὁμώνυμον), but rather exhibits a unity of analogy, and (3) this in a twofold sense: analogy of proportionality, and analogy of reference to the same thing as a terminus. He devotes the rest of his analysis to explaining each of these claims in order. I am going to set (1) aside, for we have just seen what it stands on, and because it is not particularly controversial.<sup>13</sup> The grounds he provides for (2) and (3), however, are obviously crucial for our purposes.

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Thesis (2), that being exhibits the unity of analogy, begins with a conclusion Brentano draws from an important passage at Δ.6 (1016b31 –17a2). To be sure, Aristotle does not say expressly e.g. 'being is one by analogy', but this is what Brentano *infers*. Here, with laconic precision, Aristotle distinguishes four qualitatively distinct modes of unity and arranges them in sequence:<sup>14</sup> things that are one in species are not necessarily one in number, things that are one in genus are not necessarily one in species, and things that are one by analogy are not necessarily one in genus. But note the actual conclusion of his inference: "... things that are one in genus are not all one in species, but [are all one] by analogy, while not all things that are one by analogy are one in genus." That is, (a.) all things one in genus are one by analogy, and (b.) not all things that are one by analogy are one in genus. Let us

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12. *Von der Mannigfachen Bedeutung des Seienden des Aristoteles* (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2014), 85.

13. I bypass here the thorny question of Brentano's focus on the categories as *Bedeutungen*. I retain the ambiguity of R. George's 'senses' (vs. meanings) only because Brentano's dissertation was published several decades before Frege's *Über Sinn und Bedeutung*. For a concise treatment of the general question see Fraser, "Aristoteles ex Aristotele: A Response to the Analytical Reconstruction of the Aristotelian Ontology," *Dionysius* XX (2002): 51–69.

14. As distinct from the quantitative series of ones: "the one is always indivisible, either in amount or in kind" (1016b23 –4). For a thorough account of this distinction cf. Halper, "the series of ones," in *One and Many in Aristotle's Metaphysics: Books Alpha – Delta* (Las Vegas: Parmenides Publishing, 2009), 135–45.

focus on this last clause for now, as Brentano does. Analogy here emerges as the most comprehensive mode of unity, capable of uniting even generic difference within itself. And what is more, Aristotle is indicating that the genera he has in mind are the highest genera of all, that is, the categorial genera themselves.<sup>15</sup> It seems natural, then, to infer some concept of their analogical unity.

This is the inference Brentano draws.<sup>16</sup> Then, rather boldly, he goes on to assert that “Aristotle explicitly [attributes the unity of analogy to being] in the fourth book of the *Metaphysics*” at Γ.2.<sup>17</sup> Needless to say, this is false, but the assumption he makes is instructive. Brentano’s assumption that focal unity is a sort of analogical unity, and that the focal analysis of Γ.2 therefore reveals some concept of the *analogia entis*, is justifiable by thesis (3), i.e. that focal predication for Aristotle involves an analogy of attribution to the same thing as a terminus. This, I am arguing, is the decisive point.

Before we consider thesis (3), let us return to the distinction drawn in thesis (2) between accidental homonymy and analogical unity. The relation is not immediately obvious, but when we recall that homonymy implies generic difference, it is easier to see. Brentano makes the following inference: (i.) the division between ὁμώνυμα and συνώνυμα in the *Categories* is exhaustive and excludes any third possibility; (ii.) therefore, since being is not univocally named, it must be equivocally named; (iii.) therefore, Aristotle uses the word equivocally-named (ὁμώνυμον) in a narrow sense, viz. what is equivocally-named by chance (ἀπὸ τύχης ὁμώνυμον), and in another sense: what is equivocally-named by analogy (ὁμώνυμον κατ’ ἀναλογίαν).

There is no modern scholarly consensus about how the theory of naming outlined at the opening of the *Categories* relates to the theory of focal predication articulated in the *Metaphysics*. Most argue, like Brentano, that the division between ὁμώνυμα and

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15. “[T]hings are one... in genus... of which the schema of category is the same.” Halper also argues that since what is one in species is what is one in *logos*, and since “[e]very species, from the lowest to the highest, is one in formula” (*ibid.*, 139), we cannot interpret σχῆμα τῆς κατηγορίας as any lesser genus; a *logos* involves the specification of some higher genus.

16. “Since the concepts belonging to the various categories are all called beings (*onta*), the correctness of [conclusion b.] becomes at once apparent if one attributes to being the unity of analogy” (*ibid.*, 89).

17. “mit klaren Worten,” *ibid.*

συνώνυμα is exhaustive, and that beings (ὄντα) must therefore be said homonymously. In order to account for Aristotle's insistence at Γ.2 and Z.4 that being is not said homonymously (οὐχ ὁμωνύμως) but rather πρὸς ἔν, we assume some kind of implicit distinction between 'accidental' or 'chance' homonymy on the one hand, and 'core-dependent' or 'systematic' homonymy on the other.<sup>18</sup> Brentano rather speaks of 'analogical' homonymy, but effectively conflates this with focal homonymy, because he is arguing that focal unity is a kind of analogical unity. We shall sort this out in due course. Yet there is an alternative. In what follows, I provide the basis of this alternative in brief, so that we might compare it with Brentano's thesis that Aristotle thinks of being(s) as an example, even the paradigmatic example, of what is equivocally-named by analogy (ὁμώνυμον κατ' ἀναλογίαν), a phrase Aristotle never quite uses.<sup>19</sup> Then we shall consider thesis (3).

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In short, the alternative emerges from a subtle reading of the last line of *Categories* 1. It concerns Aristotle's notion of paronymy: "Things are said to be paronymous that have their name from something differing in termination, as the grammarian is from grammar and the courageous is from courage."<sup>20</sup> It is this relationship of derivation that is curious, for it seems to approximate the notion of focal (πρὸς ἔν) reference. I want to clarify the grounds of this alternative reading, for it suggests *inter alia* that Aristotle is preparing here the concept of a *tertium quid* between synonymy and homonymy parallel to the theory of πρὸς ἔν λεγόμενα articulated in the *Metaphysics*.<sup>21</sup> Wood (2013) gives the

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18. Of the latter, the first is Shields, *Order in Multiplicity: Homonymy in the Philosophy of Aristotle* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999), the second Ward, *Aristotle on Homonymy: Dialectic and Science* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008). Shields, "Aristotle" (Stanford: SEP, 2015) explains, "The term 'focal meaning' owes to Owen (1960), who was criticized by Irwin (1981), on the grounds that Aristotle's theory is not, or is not primarily, concerned with meanings. Irwin regarded 'focal connexion' as a more neutral term. Shields (1999) prefers 'core-dependent homonymy' in part because it reflects the asymmetry crucial to Aristotle's most striking uses of homonymy" (n.10).

19. He comes close at EN I.6 (1096b26–32) and *Phys.* VII.4 (248a23–5), which we shall consider in due course.

20. 1a12–4.

21. Ward (*ibid.*, 105–6) takes issue with Owen's (1960) interpretation of focality

outline of its basic premises and passages, but much of this depends on the highly complex and multi-layered analysis conducted by Paul Ricoeur in *The Rule of Metaphor* (309–322). I aim to elaborate only what pertains to the elements of this alternative reading.

Ricoeur begins with the premise that distinguishing paronymy in this way from the other two modes of predication would be pointless unless it clarified something about the formal organization of the categories. The notion of derivation becomes operative in *Cat.* 2, where Aristotle distinguishes between two senses of the copula *is*: “of beings, some are predicated of (*καθ’*) a subject, but are not in a subject,” in the way that human (secondary substance) is said of Socrates (primary substance), while “others are in a subject, but are not predicated of a subject,” in the way that musical (quality) is said of Socrates, though some are subject to both modes of attribution, while others are subject to neither.<sup>22</sup> Encouraged by his explanation “by being in a subject I mean ... being incapable of being independently of that subject,”<sup>23</sup> we may infer that Aristotle has in mind the distinction between essential (*kath’ auto*) and incidental (*kata symbebekos*) predication: ‘human’ is predicated of Socrates essentially, ‘musical’ is predicated of him incidentally. This distinction between essential and incidental modes of the copula, considered according to presence and absence, yields four classes of substantives, two primordial (Socrates, human) and two derivative (musical, tan). Thus, we uncover the concept of derivation.

In a moment, we will see how this is related to paronymy. First, let me recall our primary interest: what is the function of *analogy* in this discussion? We are interested in discussing the modes of naming only insofar as this helps us understand a.) the theory of *πρὸς ἓν λεγόμενα* articulated in *Meta.* Γ and b.) its relation to Aristotle’s concept of analogy. In this regard, Ricoeur poses exactly the right question:

How does analogy enter into this, if not explicitly (since the word is never mentioned), at least implicitly? Its avenue is this, that as the modalities of the copula become more varied, they progressively weaken the sense of the copula in the passage from primordial, essential predication – which alone is held to have a synonymous sense

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as a *tertium quid*. I shall be more precise later on; it is used here mainly for rhetorical effect.

22. 1a20–4.

23. 1a23–4.

– towards derived, accidental predication.<sup>24</sup> A correlation suggests itself, therefore, between the distinction made in the *Categories* on the level of morphology and predication, and the great passage of *Metaphysics* Γ on the reference of all categories to a first term, texts read by medieval thinkers within the framework of the analogy of being. This correlation is set forth in *Metaphysics* Z... which explicitly relates the various forms of predication – and hence the categories – to possible equivocation in regard to the first category, *ousia*.<sup>25</sup>

This 'correlation' is the key. Now inasmuch as it 'suggests itself', it is problematic to claim that this is Aristotle's *own* suggestion. But the hypothesis that it is explicitly 'set forth' in *Meta. Z* gives ground to our thesis concerning the function of paronymy, and possibly of analogy, in *Meta. Γ*. To clarify: we are noticing a connection between the notion of derivative attribution implicit in the *Categories* and the theory of focal (πρὸς ἕν) reference articulated in the *Metaphysics*. In the *Categories*, we found an implicit distinction between primordial and derivative attribution, as well as a more explicit distinction between essential (*per se*) and incidental (*per accidens*) attribution. This makes the distinction of paronymy from synonymy functional: only the *said-of* relation admits of univocal analysis. Primordially, or shall we say *primarily*, this *per se* relation belongs to substance(s). Even so, it is understood to hold *derivatively* of non-substantial being(s). Clearly, this seems to parallel Γ's theory of focal reference. So let us turn toward the relevant passages of book Z to witness Aristotle make the connection between derivation and focality explicit.

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24. Here Ricoeur quotes Vuillemin: "being is said in different ways, but these different acceptations are ordered in that they all derive, more or less directly, from a fundamental acceptation that is the attribution of a secondary substance to a primary substance" (trans. Czerny, 419, n.4). Kosman, *The Activity of Being: An Essay on Aristotle's Ontology* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2013), esp. 27–30, argues that the distinction between primary and secondary substance is overcome in the *Metaphysics*. This is crucial but does not undermine this reading of the *Categories*.

25. *The Rule of Metaphor: Multi-disciplinary Studies of the Creation of Meaning in Language*, trans. Czerny (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1975), 311.



The ‘connection’ between derivative attribution and focal reference is articulated most explicitly at Z.4. The language of derivation emerges at 1030a22:

“Just as *is* belongs to all [beings], though not in the same way, but to [one sort] primarily (πρώτως) and to the rest derivatively (επομένως), so too *what-something-is* belongs simply to substance, but in a qualified way to the rest; for we may also ask what a quality is, such that quality is also what something is, though not simply [i.e. without qualification].”<sup>26</sup>

Notice that Aristotle here correlates primary and derivative attribution of the copula (τὸ ἔστιν) with the unqualified and qualified attribution of quiddity (τὸ τί ἐστιν). The distinction drawn at *Categories* 2 ‘on the level of morphology and predication’ (making the distinction of paronymous attribution functional) is here associated *explicitly* with the ontological project of the *Metaphysics*.

Even so, we have yet to see Aristotle associate this with πρὸς ἔν reference. Thus far the correlation between derivative attribution and focal reference has merely ‘suggested itself’. In the next passage, it becomes explicit:

[B]eing-what-it-is (τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι), just as what-it-is (τὸ τί ἐστιν), will also belong primarily and without qualification to substance, and then to the rest, not being-what-it-is without qualification, but being-what-it-is for a quality or quantity. For it is necessary to say either that these are beings homonymously, or by adding and taking-away [qualifications], in the way we say the unknowable is knowable, since the right thing is to say neither homonymously nor in the same way – but as the ‘medical’ is [said] by relation (τῷ πρὸς) to one and the same thing, not of one and the same thing, though not homonymously either; for a patient, a deed, and a tool are said to be ‘medical’ neither homonymously, nor as one thing (καθ’ ἓν), but in relation to one thing (πρὸς ἓν).<sup>27</sup>

So Aristotle explicitly associates the derivative attribution of being with the πρὸς ἔν reference of being. Being is attributed primarily to substance, and derivatively to the other categories. “This transcendental mode of predication can indeed be called paronymy,” Ricoeur writes, “by reason of its parallelism with *Categories* 1, and analogy, at least implicitly.”<sup>28</sup> This much is clear: Aristotle is arguing that ‘τὸ ἔστιν, τὸ τί ἐστιν, and τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι’

26. 1030a21–5.

27. 1030a29–b3.

28. *Ibid.*, 312.

are predicated *derivatively* (ἐπομένως) of non-substantial being(s). But is 'parallelism' with the implicit argument of the *Categories* enough to justify the claim that being is predicated *paronymously* of non-substantial being(s)?<sup>29</sup> Why should we assume that derivative attribution is paronymous? We have seen Aristotle argue that ὄν is predicated derivatively of non-substantial being(s). Now we need to see why it is justifiable to claim that τὸ ὄν is predicated paronymously of non-substantial beings. This latter thesis involves the additional claim that τὸ ὄν is a paronym. Is it possible to justify such a claim? Interestingly enough, the *only* way to do this is to refer to Γ.2.

There, after explaining the focal predication of 'τὸ ὄν' by analogy with 'the healthy' and 'the medical', Aristotle concludes: "so it is clear that it also belongs to one science to contemplate beings *qua* beings (τὰ ὄντα ἧ ὄντα). And science in every instance chiefly concerns what is primary, i.e., that from which the other things depend and on account of which they are called [what they are] (δι' ὃ λέγονται)" (1003b15–7). In the case of ontology, he specifies, this is οὐσία. Most translators jump the proverbial gun here by translating δι' ὃ λέγονται 'in virtue of which they get their names' (Ross), 'from which they get their names' (Tredennick), and 'through which they are named' (Sachs). Needless to say, it is impermissible to ignore the distinction between τὸ ὀνομάζειν and τὸ λέγειν. On the other hand, it is clear that Aristotle is drawing our attention to the linguistic relationship between οὐσία and ὄντα. My translation 'on account of which they are called [in this case ὄντα]' preserves the ambiguity: Aristotle is making a point about the *way* in which all beings are called beings. Let us recall his definition of paronymy: "[t]hings are said to be paronymous that have their name from something differing in termination (ἀπό τινος διαφέροντα τῆ πτώσει), as the grammarian is from grammar and the courageous is from courage." In principle, this applies to the examples at Γ.2 and Z.4 of 'the healthy' and 'the medical'. Does it apply to τὸ ὄν?

The reason I said the *only* way to justify the claim that τὸ ὄν is attributed paronymously to non-substantial being(s) is to refer

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29. Note the shift in premise: before we were inquiring about how ὄν is predicated of *all* beings. Now the claim is that τὸ ὄν is predicated paronymously of *non-substantial* beings. Different inquiries yield different answers; homonymy and paronymy do not exclude each other. We will address this more fully in what follows.

to the conclusion of Γ.2 that οὐσία is δι' [ὄντα] λέγονται that by contemporary lights, the derivation is really the reverse: the term οὐσία derives from οὔσα, the feminine form of ὄν.<sup>30</sup> But Aristotle's idiosyncrasy in this regard only serves to support the claim that derivative attribution for him is paronymous, and that paronymy is the nominal reflection of derivative and focal reference. As Fraser (2002) writes, "[paronymy] is just the linguistic counterpart of an underlying ontological dependency."<sup>31</sup> Hence, τὸ ὄν is not only predicated *derivatively* of non-substantial beings, it is predicated *paronymously* of them, though this latter claim is justifiable only via recourse to Aristotle himself.<sup>32</sup>

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Before comparing this with Brentano's account, there remains one last ambiguity in need of clarification. In the last paragraph, I spoke indifferently of 'derivative and focal reference'. Are these simply interchangeable? Are they two ways of saying the same thing? At Z.4, Aristotle associates the derivative attribution of τὸ ὄν with πρὸς ἓν reference through the figure of 'adding and subtracting qualifications'. We learn from Z.5 that 'definition by addition' means defining a property by making the name (ὄνομα) or account (λόγος) of its underlying subject explicit, in the way that 'number' must eventually be 'added' to the definition of 'odd': "[a]nd these are those things in which there is present either the account or the name of that of which they are an attribute, and which cannot be explained separately (δηλωῶσαι χωρὶς), as whiteness can be explained without human being, but

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30. This is in every contemporary discussion of the etymology; cf. e.g. the LJS Greek-English Lexicon.

31. "Demonstrative Science and the Science of Being qua Being," *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* XXII (Summer 2002): 67. Cf. "a paronymous or otherwise derivative term ... expresses the common status of a group of derivative properties relative to their principle" (68); "πρὸς ἓν predications express the derivative status of a group of properties relative to their common subject genus" (81), though these properties need not be species of this subject genus e.g. *odd* and *even* are 'numerical' not because they are numbers but because their very definition requires reference to what is 'numerical' in the primary way; they are numerical in the 'derivative' way.

32. Fraser speculates, "It is perhaps adequate for Aristotle's purposes that the grammar *appears* to reflect the underlying relations of ontic priority" (*ibid.*, 67).

femaleness cannot be explained without animal."<sup>33</sup> So the process of 'addition' is the explication of this underlying dependency.

This mode of definition, Fraser observes, "applies, at the most general level of analysis, to the non-substance categories themselves; a point that is borne out by Aristotle's observation, at Θ 1045b31, that the non-substance categories each contain the definition of substance ... just as each *particular* kind of non-substance contains the definition of its proper subject" (66–7). It is easy enough to see how 'defining by addition' – explicating the underlying dependency – may be called focal explication. But does this help us understand how focal reference corresponds to derivative attribution?<sup>34</sup>

With our eye on this connection, I suggest we return to Aristotle's distinction between adding and taking-away. Sachs (2002) offers a brief gloss on the difference: "[t]hat is, since a quantity (say) is a being only in a qualified sense (with an addition), it is a being in less than the full sense (with a subtraction)" (123). That is to say, defining 'by subtraction' is simply the inverse correlate of defining by addition. Derivative attribution is 'by subtraction' in the same way that focal explication is 'by addition'; each is the inverse of the other. To answer the question we posed earlier: they are interchangeable *because* they are two ways of saying the same thing.<sup>35</sup>

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The foregoing illustrates that a qualified identification of focal reference with derivative attribution can be justified by recourse to the *Metaphysics* alone, though the definition of paronymy required recourse to the *Categories*. Before we compare this with Brentano's account, I want to draw our attention to a striking confirmation of this reading in the well-known argument of *Nicomachean Ethics*

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33. 1030b23–6.

34. The sense in which 'reference' is equivalent to 'explication' is present at the outset of Θ: "περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ πρώτως ὄντος καὶ πρὸς ὃ πᾶσαι αἰ ἄλλαι κατηγορίαι τοῦ ὄντος ἀναφέρονται εἰρηται" (1045b27–8), where ἀναφέρονται is equivalent to reference, which Aristotle explains by citing the principle of definitional inclusion. Heidegger (*ibid.*, 35) takes ἀναφέρονται to be equivalent to ἀναλέγονται 'are said back'. As we shall see, this is not Aristotle's usage.

35. For similar conclusions cf. Owens (*ibid.*, 54); Wilson, *Aristotle's Theory of the Unity of Science*, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000: 198; and Fraser "Seriality and Demonstration in Aristotle's Ontology," *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* XXV (Winter 2003): 138, n.7.

I.6 about ‘the good’, an argument that begins with Aristotle’s critique of the failure to distinguish between primary and derivative instances of a form: “ἰδέας ἐν οἷς τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον ἔλεγον” (1096a17). He proceeds to distinguish between goodness in the category of substance, goodness in quality, quantity, and so on.<sup>36</sup> So ‘good’ is not predicated univocally. Yet Aristotle eventually raises an objection to his own critique:

[O]n the grounds that the [Academic] arguments were not meant to concern every good, but that the goods said according to one form are those that are pursued and desired *per se*, while the things that are productive or somehow protective of them, or are preventative of their opposites, are said [to be goods] on account of these (διὰ ταῦτα) and in another way. And so it is clear that ‘goods’ would be said in two ways: some *per se*, and others on account of these.<sup>37</sup>

Clearly, this corresponds to the argument of *Metaphysics* Γ.2. There are the signs of paronymy and derivation: what is ποιητικὰ (stressed in both passages) or φυλακτικὰ of what is good *per se* is called good in a derivative way, i.e. with qualification. To define what it is for them to be good is to specify their relation to what is good without qualification. The concept of focal reference is all but explicit. Further, just as in Γ.2, Aristotle is drawing our attention to the *way* in which all goods are called goods: there is what is called good in the primary way, ‘on account of itself’, and what is called good διὰ what is called good in the primary way. The good is attributed primarily to some things, and derivatively to others.

It is clear enough that good is not predicated univocally or synonymously of all goods. Even so, is there not any intrinsic connection? Something like this leads to that critical passage of EN I.6 on which most discussions of analogy and focality in Aristotle depend.<sup>38</sup> I reserved it until now,

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36. This is an egregious oversimplification; I offer only a sketch of the argument preceding the passages I want to emphasize. For a concise treatment of the interpretive issues involved in this part of the text see Kosman, “Predicating the Good,” *Phronesis: A Journal for Ancient Philosophy* 13 (1968): 171–74.

37. 1096b9–14. For διὰ ταῦτα, Sachs translates, ‘are spoken of as good by derivation from these’ and ‘some on account of themselves and others derived from these.’

38. So e.g. Brentano takes the class of *apo tychēs homonymia* at EN I.6 as a premise in order to explain *ouk homonymōs* at *Meta.* Γ.2 & Z.4, but this is widespread. Also, ‘something like this’ is another sketchy oversimplification. Wilson (*ibid.*, 197) explains, “[Aristotle] claims that the definitions of honour, prudence, and

because I wanted it to confirm (not control) our reading of the *Metaphysics*, and because it links our current discussion of focality and paronymy back to our earlier discussion of focality and homonymy by analogy (*kat' analogian*). Aristotle writes,

But then in what way *is* good said? For it certainly doesn't seem like those things that are homonymous by chance. But then [are goods homonymous] by being [derived] from one thing or [by] all contributing toward one thing, or rather by analogy? For as sight is in body, intellect is in soul, and another is in another. But perhaps these things ought to be let go for now, since to be completely precise about them would belong more to another [mode of] philosophy.<sup>39</sup>

Aristotle here distinguishes derivative (ἀφ' ἑνός) and focal (πρός ἕν) homonymy on the one hand from homonymy by analogy (κατ' ἀναλογίαν) on the other.<sup>40</sup> The distinction between derivative

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pleasure are different and distinct *qua* goods... Since they are not related as ends and means and do not share a common definition *qua* goods, we are forced to consider whether they are chance homonyms."

39. "Ἀλλὰ πῶς δὴ λέγεται; οὐ γὰρ ἔουκε τοῖς γε ἀπὸ τύχης ὁμωνύμοις. ἀλλ' ἄρ' ἀφ' ἑνός ἔνός εἶναι ἢ πρὸς ἕν ἅπαντα συντελεῖν, ἢ μᾶλλον κατ' ἀναλογίαν..." (1096b26–32).

40. It may be objected that I am conflating πρὸς ἕν and πρὸς ἕν συντελεῖν. The latter implies hypothetical necessity: X (e.g. self-nourishment) needs to be there in order for Y (e.g. sense-perception) to be accomplished, such that Y necessitates X. By contrast, there is no obvious sense in which substance necessitates the non-substantial categories; indeed, the reverse seems to hold: they are πρὸς ἕν because they require substance, not because substance requires them. (On the other hand, cf. Fraser [2002, 73]: "It is one thing to suggest that Socrates can exist apart from his present sickly pallor, or his present state of lying at rest. As soon as Socrates returns to health his complexion will improve and he will rise from bed to resume his normal routine. But it is quite another thing to claim that Socrates can exist without *any* complexion, *any* quantity, or *any* position. The categories of non-substantial being determine the very conditions for the concrete existence of substances... In this sense the relation of substance to the non-substantial categories is a necessary and essential relation, which should admit in principle of a demonstrative explication;" though cf. [2003, 150–3] for the qualification that this explication would be *a posteriori*). By contrast, goods are πρὸς ἕν not because they require what is good *per se*, but because what is good *per se* requires them. Even so, both exhibit the πρὸς ἕν structure of predication. συντελεῖν simply switches the order of dependency. Thus, both may be included under discussion of focality in general. See Wilson (*ibid.*, 198–200) for a different argument leading to the conclusion that "[t]he traditional interpretation that reads this phrase as a reference to focality, then, is not likely to be far off the mark." Wilson also points to PA III.5 667b21–6, which "suggests that ἀφ' ἑνός and πρὸς ἕν represent two ways of looking at the same phenomenon" (198).

attribution and focal reference, we saw, though crucial, is a question of inversion. But Aristotle appears to be drawing a distinction ( $\mu\tilde{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\omicron\nu$ ) between this mode of homonymy on the one hand, and homonymy ‘by analogy’ on the other. Eventually, I will indicate why I think it is important for Aristotle to distinguish analogy from focality. For now, let us note the fact that all three modes of predication are here said to be modes of homonymy.<sup>41</sup> How are we to understand this? The obvious affinity between these passages and our discussion of the homonymy of being seems sufficient to justify their comparison. Of course, this is fundamentally justified by Aristotle’s insistence that  $\tau\acute{\alpha}\gamma\alpha\theta\acute{\omicron}\nu$   $\text{ισα}\chi\acute{\omega}\varsigma$   $\lambda\acute{\epsilon}\gamma\epsilon\tau\alpha\iota$   $\tau\tilde{\omega}$   $\acute{\omicron}\nu\tau\iota$  (1096a23), taken in reverse. Let us return then to our consideration of being *qua* being, to see whether we can be ‘completely precise’.

### §

Here are the results of the inquiry so far:  $\tau\acute{\omicron}$   $\acute{\omicron}\nu$  in the *Metaphysics* is predicated derivatively and paronymously of non-substantial being(s):  $\Gamma.2$  &  $Z.4$ –5. This answers the question ‘how is  $\tau\acute{\omicron}$   $\acute{\omicron}\nu$  predicated of non-substantial beings?’ To define what being is for a quality or a quantity, one must ‘add’ or ‘subtract’ its dependency on substance. But it is quite another question to ask ‘how is  $\tau\acute{\omicron}$   $\acute{\omicron}\nu$  predicated of *all* beings?’ One cannot answer ‘derivatively’ or ‘paronymously’ without infinite regression. The question concerning all beings includes substance, the primary and focal sense of being. If we include substance in the account, we must answer: *homonymously*, but not  $\acute{\alpha}\pi\acute{\omicron}$   $\tau\acute{\upsilon}\chi\eta\varsigma$ .<sup>42</sup> Thus, we may understand  $\tau\acute{\omicron}$   $\acute{\omicron}\nu$  as a paronym, when predicated of non-substantial

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41. This is clear from the context. Some scholars follow Ross in translating  $\tau\tilde{\omega}$   $\epsilon\acute{\iota}\nu\alpha\iota$  as ‘[are goods one] by’, which is less specific and keeps the ambiguity open. But Aristotle has just asked  $\pi\acute{\omega}\varsigma$   $\lambda\acute{\epsilon}\gamma\epsilon\tau\alpha\iota$ ?

42. Fraser (2002, 69–70) makes this point indirectly: “the properties of number are ‘numerical’ (derived from number), just as the properties of substance are ‘beings’ (dependent on  $\omicron\upsilon\sigma\acute{\iota}\alpha$ ). One may, of course, predicate ‘being’ of an  $\omicron\upsilon\sigma\acute{\iota}\alpha$ , just as one may call a number ‘numerical’. But on Aristotle’s view this is an understatement:  $\omicron\upsilon\sigma\acute{\iota}\alpha$  is not simply a ‘being’, it is the primary or genuine being; and number is not simply ‘numerical’, but is the principle of what is numerical. Moreover, there *is* homonymy in the case of mathematics: it emerges not in the articulation of the genus, ‘number’, but in the articulation of what is ‘numerical’, i.e. the articulation of the multiple ways in which numerical properties depend upon number. Similarly the homonymy of being concerns the articulation of the various kinds of dependent beings and their modes of dependency.”

being(s), or as a homonym predicated of all being(s). Different inquiries yield different answers. The dilemma resolves itself.

But in what *way* is τὸ ὄν said homonymously? In the *N. Ethics*, Aristotle distinguishes between two forms of systematic homonymy: derivative and focal homonymy, and homonymy by analogy. In *Metaphysics* Γ.2 and Z.4, where the focal paronymy of being is at issue, Aristotle specifies οὐχ ὁμωνύμως. But as we saw, including substance in the question requires the answer 'homonymous τῷ ἀφ' ἑνὸς or πρὸς ἓν, or rather κατ' ἀναλογίαν.' Paronymy and homonymy do not exclude each other. Understood in its proper context, Aristotle's argument that being is said πρὸς ἓν but οὐχ ὁμωνύμως does not preclude thesis (2), that being is the paradigmatic species of 'what is equivocally-named by analogy'. Indeed, it is precisely this passage from the *Ethics* that Brentano cites as evidence. Interestingly enough, he assumes that Aristotle's example of predicating the good by analogy – as sight is in body, intellect is in soul, etc. – is Aristotle's *answer* to the question he has just posed. It is on the basis of this assumption that Brentano proceeds to distinguish two types of analogy in Aristotle, and to argue that being is predicated by analogy in both ways: thesis (3).

### §

Before turning directly to thesis (3), let us reinforce thesis (2) by recognizing that EN I.6 is not the only place that Aristotle considers the possibility of being homonymous by analogy. The crucial instance of this, as Ward (2008) has argued, occurs in *Physics* VII.4, where Aristotle is considering the comparability ("commensurability") of motions, specifically motions of different kinds. As in the *Ethics*, the homonymy of motion is essentially determined by the homonymy of being, for "there is no motion apart from things. For what changes always changes either with respect to substance, quantity, quality, or place, and there is nothing common to these to grasp ... which is neither 'this' nor quantity nor quality nor one of the other categories; such that neither motion nor change will be something besides the things mentioned, since indeed, there is no being besides the things mentioned."<sup>43</sup> The

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43. 200b35–1a4. Kosman (2013, 70) writes, "Becoming is for Aristotle the active exercise of something's being able to be otherwise. Becoming is therefore not an ontological category separate from being; the analysis that shows motion to be



ensuing conclusion that “there are just as many kinds of motion and of change as there are of being”<sup>44</sup> justifies comparing the *Physics* on motion with the *Metaphysics* on being in the same way that τὰγαθὸν ἰσαχῶς λέγεται τῷ ὄντι warranted comparison with the *Ethics*.

*Physics* VII.4 essentially concerns the comparability of motion. If this sounds odd, it is because we have yet to recognize that motion is a homonym. Motion, like being, is said homonymously. Indeed, motion is said homonymously *because* being is said homonymously. Not only are there different motions, there are different *kinds* of motion. The homonymy of motion reflects the homonymy of being. Any discussion of the commensurability of generically distinct kinds of motion must therefore take into account the problem of homonymy. In discussing the homonymy of motion, Aristotle writes, “among *homonymia*, some are far removed, others have a certain similarity, and others are close either by genus or by analogy, for which reason they seem not to be homonymous, though they are.”<sup>45</sup> Here, the possibility of being homonymous by analogy is explicitly affirmed. Aristotle’s concept of homonymy thus includes things that are so close ‘by analogy’ that their generic difference may go unnoticed (λανθάνει). As Ward writes, “[t]his passage ... states that there is a range of homonymous things delimited by two extremes: at one end, we find little similarity, and at the other, the degree of similarity reaches the point at which it may escape our notice and so, we run the risk of assuming synonymy.”<sup>46</sup>

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a mode of activity is aimed precisely at explaining the respect in which becoming is a mode of being.”

44. 201a9.

45. “τὸ γένος οὐχ ἔν τι, ἀλλὰ παρὰ τοῦτο λανθάνει πολλά, εἰσὶν τε τῶν ὁμωνυμιῶν αἱ μὲν πολὺ ἀπέχουσαι, αἱ δὲ ἔχουσαι τινα ὁμοιότητα, αἱ δὲ ἐγγύς ἢ γένει ἢ ἀναλογίᾳ, διὸ οὐ δοκοῦσιν ὁμωνυμία εἶναι οὐσαί” (248a23–5).

46. *ibid.*, 106. I have omitted, “... is central to our position insofar as it ...”

This seems to refer in particular to the thesis that being is said homonymously (despite οὐχ ὁμωνύμως) and in general to the term ‘systematic homonymy’, which I used to describe the theory of non-accidental homonymy outlined at EN I.6. However, Ward (14–16) follows Shields’ (1999, n.23) critique of Ross (1923, i.256) for “supposing that being must be paronymous, because it is ‘intermediate between’ homonymy and synonymy. This is evidently because he thinks the *Categories* recognizes only discrete homonyms. Since we have shown that Aristotle accepts [comprehensive homonymy] and not [discrete homonymy], we are free not to follow Ross in this inference.” But this assumes that the homonymy and paronymy of being exclude one another, which is unnecessary. Cf. *Top.* I.15,

The foregoing considerations show that the distinction drawn in thesis (2) between homonymy 'by chance' and homonymy 'by analogy' is genuinely Aristotelian. So we may speak of Aristotle's concept of analogical homonymy without anachronism. Both the *Physics* and the *Ethics* essentially affirm the class of *homonyma kat' analogian*.<sup>47</sup> Thesis (2) does not attribute a medieval discovery to an ancient thinker. To be sure, critiques in this respect concern the analogy of being, not Aristotle's concept of *homonyma kat' analogian*. But I have just argued that being for Aristotle is the paradigmatic species of what is homonymous by analogy. But what about the actual *content* of this concept? In what follows, we turn at last to thesis (3), which claims to explain Aristotle's twofold concept of the analogy of being.

### §

The first aspect of thesis (3) concerns what may be termed the proportionality of being. The analogy of proportion is undoubtedly Aristotelian.<sup>48</sup> Aristotle himself gives its origin and definition in book V of the *Ethics*: "the just, therefore, is a certain proportion (ἀνάλογόν τι). For proportion belongs not only to the numbers of arithmetic, but to number in general, for proportionality (ἀναλογία) is equality of ratios, and in at least four things."<sup>49</sup> In this sense, analogy is

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where Aristotle gives the example of someone saying "what is σημαντικόν and what is ποιητικόν of health" are both "commensurately in relation to health / τὸ συμμετρως ἔχον πρὸς υγίειαν". The concept of focal paronymy is all but explicit. What is explicit is the failure to recognize the implicit equivocation. This exemplifies the fact that homonymy and paronymy are not necessarily exclusive. In this example, the focal dependents are paronymous, while their common reference is homonymous insofar as the *mode* of reference differs. So the paronyms are homonymously πρὸς ἓν.

47. I speak of the *Ethics* indifferently only because the EE clearly recognizes the possibility of non-accidental homonymy: the three species of friendship "are said neither all as one (καθ' ἓν) nor as species of one genus, nor wholly homonymously (πάμπαν ὁμωνύμως)" (1236a17). As Irwin (1981, 532, n.14) writes, "'completely homonymously' ... suggests that there is a type of homonymy that is not complete."

48. I will not distinguish 'analogy of proportion' from 'analogy of proportionality' here, which is crucial in medieval debates. As Ricoeur writes, "both [are] capable of falling within the Aristotelian *analogia*" (*ibid.*, 324–5). For an account of Aquinas' labor on this question see *ibid.*, 322–30. Cf. Hesse (*ibid.*, 329–33) for an account of the two senses in Aristotle.

49. "ἔστιν ἄρα τὸ δίκαιον ἀνάλογόν τι. τὸ γὰρ ἀνάλογον οὐ μόνον ἐστὶ

quantitative proportionality, which consists in the equality of ratio: for instance, 8:4::4:2, namely *double*. That is to say, quantitative proportionality is equality of quantitative *relation*. There are still four terms here because, as Aristotle points out, “even a continuous proportion is in four terms, since it uses one [term] as two and says it twice, e.g. ‘as A is to (πρὸς) B, so is B to (πρὸς) C’.”<sup>50</sup> Whether or not this analogy is mathematical (or μοναδικοῦ ἀριθμοῦ ἴδιον), it is *quantitative* proportionality, i.e., equality of quantitative relation.

The next mode of analogy is qualitative, in the sense that it concerns similarity or likeness (ὁμοιότητα): “those things are the same (τὰντὰ) of which the substance is one, similar (ὅμοια) of which the quality is one, and equal (ἴσα) of which the quantity is one.”<sup>51</sup> So similarity is oneness in quality, equality is oneness in quantity, and so on. Similarity is therefore *qualitative* unity. Analogy in this sense is qualitative proportion. A clear expression of qualitative proportionality is present in the *Topics*: “Similarity of things in different genera needs to be examined: as A is to (πρὸς) B, C is to D (e.g. as knowledge is to the knowable, sense-perception is to the sensible), and as A is in B, C is in D (e.g. as sight is in the eye, intellect is in the soul, and as calmness is in the sea, stillness is in the air).”<sup>52</sup> The comparison here is not between quantities. In this sense, analogy is qualitative proportionality, which consists in the similarity of form.<sup>53</sup>

Brentano divides qualitative analogy in two, based on a distinction Aristotle draws at *de. Gen. et Corr.* II.6. Aristotle himself refers only to the second of these as analogy. The first consists of one and the same quality belonging to different subjects to the same or different degrees – for “qualities admit of the more and less” (*Cat.* 8, 10b26) – e.g., body A is warmer than body B to the same degree that body B is warmer than body C. As Brentano points out, this comparison is still quantitative, inasmuch as the actual terms of comparison are quantities. In Aristotle’s example, it is the *amount* of cooling power (δύναται ψύχειν) possessed by one measure of

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μοναδικοῦ ἀριθμοῦ ἴδιον, ἀλλ’ ὅλως ἀριθμοῦ: ἡ γὰρ ἀναλογία ἰσότης ἐστὶ λόγων, καὶ ἐν τέτταρσιν ἐλαχίστοις” (1131a29–32).

50. 1131a33–b1.

51. *Meta.* Δ.15, 1021a11–3.

52. 108a4–12.

53. Owens (*ibid.*, 58) writes, “[t]he proportion can be of actions or habits to their objects, or of forms to their subjects of inhesion.”

water and ten of air that is being compared. These are comparable according to quantity, as Aristotle says, not *qua* quantity, but *qua* so-much power (ἡ δύναταί τι). This proportion is still quantitative, for it is essentially quantifiable. I am not sure whether to follow Brentano here in treating this as a (qualified) type of qualitative analogy. We are still considering a quantity of power. At any rate, Aristotle reserves the term for the next kind of comparison.

This one is the most important for our purposes, for it appears in the *Metaphysics*. Unlike the former, it involves the proportion of *different* qualities belonging to different subjects in the same way. Aristotle writes, “instead of comparing the powers by measure of the quantity, they may be compared by proportion (κατ’ ἀναλογίαν), e.g. as this is white, this is hot. Yet this ‘as’ indicates likeness in quality, but equality in quantity.”<sup>54</sup> Such sensible qualities are comparable by analogy, in that this subject is πρὸς white in the same way that (*as*) this subject is πρὸς hot.<sup>55</sup> Yet this proportionality, Aristotle suggests, is not restricted to beings of the same category. This point is articulated somewhat more clearly in another cryptic remark he makes near the end of *Metaphysics* N: “in each category of being there is the analogous: as the straight is in length, so is the flat in breadth, and maybe the odd in number and the white in color.”<sup>56</sup> The analogy here is transcategorical: odd is πρὸς number in the same way that white is πρὸς color. There are several disanalogies here, chief being the difference between a property (of number) and a species (of color). Yet these serve to clarify the analogy at issue, which concerns the relation of different subjects to their qualitative determinations. What I want to draw from these relatively obscure examples is the fact that Aristotle is pointing to the possibility of transcategorical analogy. For this is what is crucial for understanding the proportionality (ἀναλογία) of being, what we might call ontological proportionality.

### §

In what follows, I elucidate what I take to be the two types or aspects of ontological proportionality. In order to ground this in the text, we must return our attention to the passage from Δ.6 on

54. GC II.6, 333a27–31.

55. Cf. DA III.7, 431a20–b1.

56. 1093b18–21.

the series of ones. Earlier, I explained its implication thus: things one in species are not necessarily one in number, things one in genus are not necessarily one in species, things one by analogy are not necessarily one in genus. Now I want to draw our attention to the inverse claim: things one in number (e.g. Socrates and Socrates sitting) are necessarily one in species (i.e. are necessarily particular instances of a certain species<sup>57</sup> e.g. this individual who happens to be sitting in the Lyceum is a particular instance of human-being), things one in species are necessarily one in genus (e.g. this human is a certain kind of animal and substance), and things one in genus are necessarily one by analogy. Halper (2009) argues that the consequence of this is that “Socrates’ being one in species should make him also one in genus and one by analogy; and each determination in this series would characterize an individual” (136). It is easy enough to see why being one in species implies being one in genus: any individual is one instance of its species, and is therefore one instance of its genus and categorical genus (e.g. animal and substance). The reverse does not hold: an instance of substance-being is not necessarily therefore an instance of human-being. What is not so clear is why being one instance of a genus should also make Socrates one by analogy.

Halper argues that there are two ways in which Socrates is one by analogy. The first is purely tautological. At *Metaphysics* Z.17, Aristotle argues that one must answer the question ‘why is something itself?’ with the equally tautological ‘because a thing is itself’ (e.g. why a human being is a human being, or why the musical is musical), and that the only way to expand on this is to explain that each thing is indivisible with respect to itself, and that this is what ‘being one’ is: ἀδιαίρετον πρὸς αὐτὸ ἕκαστον, τοῦτο δ’ ἦν τὸ ἐνὶ εἶναι (1041a18–9). The explanation that something is one πρὸς itself fits the characterization of analogical unity at Δ.6: “[things are one by analogy] that stand as something in relation to another (ἔχει ὡς ἄλλο πρὸς ἄλλο).” As Halper points out, “[s]omething’ and ‘another’ need not be distinct; Aristotle means only that an analogy is a four term relation, a/b :: c/d. Different letters here indicate different terms, not necessarily different values. Thus, man and musical are *each* called ‘one’ by

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57. “[T]he one in number means nothing different from the particular; for we speak of the particular in that way, as one in number” (B.4, 999b33–5).

analogy because man stands to itself, as musical stands to itself" (137–8). The priority of substance is irrelevant to the equation: each being is  $\pi\rho\acute{o}\varsigma$  itself in the same way that every other being is  $\pi\rho\acute{o}\varsigma$  itself, so tautological unity is predicated by analogy.<sup>58</sup>

The second way in which Socrates is one by analogy is non-tautological; it concerns the relation of each instance of a genus to its genus, e.g. the relation of Socrates to substance. Halper writes, "Socrates is also one by analogy in this way; that is, he is called 'one' because he is one by analogy with everything else that is an instance of its genus. This analogy makes clear why whatever is one in genus is also one by analogy."<sup>59</sup> Now this analogy holds indifferently of substances and non-substances alike, and even at the most general level of analysis, which is where Brentano makes the crucial point: "as the human is related to its substantial being ( $\text{o}\ddot{\upsilon}\sigma\acute{\iota}\alpha$ ), so is the white related to quality as its corresponding being ( $\delta\ddot{\upsilon}\nu$ ), as is the number seven to quantity, etc. There is therefore an equality of relations here, an analogy, just as Trendelenburg explains, and just as Aristotle himself claimed for his categories."<sup>60</sup> The proportionality here is purely ontological, and may thus be called the proportionality of being. Each instance of being is related to its categorial genus in the same way that all other instances are related to their categorial genera. That relation, we should specify, is the  $\kappa\alpha\theta'\ \acute{\epsilon}\nu$  relation of an individual to its species and genus.<sup>61</sup> Every instance of being is  $\pi\rho\acute{o}\varsigma$  its categorial genus in the same way, namely  $\kappa\alpha\theta'\ \acute{\epsilon}\nu$ . In this way, all beings are analogous, regardless of their categorial genus. Yet by the very same token, we notice

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58. Of course, Aristotle is arguing that such self-relation is common and uninformative; we will return to this.

59. *Ibid.*, 138, which continues, "but the universality of such analogies also signals their relative insignificance." Again, we will return to this.

60. *Ibid.*, 93. Corresponding is *entsprechenden*, equality of relations is *Gleichheit der Verhältnisse*. Brentano's account of proportional analogy is explicitly indebted to the work of Trendelenburg (1846).

61. Cf. Fraser (2002, 57–64): "[t]he  $\kappa\alpha\theta'\ \acute{\epsilon}\nu$  connection denotes precisely and exclusively the connection of *synonymy* shared by the species kinds when viewed under their common generic nature" (57); "[a]ctually...  $\kappa\alpha\theta'\ \acute{\epsilon}\nu$  inclusion applies throughout the descending structure of genus-species-individual, wherever a more universal term is 'said of' its inferiors" (n.23). "The subject of the predication can be either an individual or a species, and the predicate can be a species, genus, or differentia (3a37–b2). This scheme applies equally to the hierarchy of *non-substantial* genera, species, differentiae, and individuals" (n.26).

that the proportionality (*ἀναλογία*) of being is distinct, or at least distinguishable, from the focality (*πρὸς ἓν*) of being. Evidently, ontological analogy is distinguishable from ontological focality.

### §

Let me now raise several objections to this account of ontological proportionality. First, we should note that each passage I introduced as an example of Aristotle's concept of ontological proportionality (the 'proportional' analogy of being) emerges in a critical context: GC II.6 versus Empedocles, *Meta.* N.6 versus the (broadly speaking) Pythagorean desire to ascribe causal agency to numbers, and Z.17 vis-à-vis tautology. None constitutes a 'positive' argument concerning the *ἀναλογία* of being. Second, I should point out that Halper's account is intended to show that "an analogy has little ontological status and is not the sort of unity that can be the object of knowledge. In contrast, being can be known and be the object of the science of metaphysics *because* it is a *pros hen*" (145). The categorial (vs. tautological) aspect of ontological proportionality is "equally trivial" (138). Aristotle is clearly aware of the proportionality of being. But he seems relatively uninterested in its implications. Why? Assuming that the general project of the *Metaphysics* is to understand what being is, we might note that Aristotle is interested in ontological *focality* because understanding the being of substance is supposed to enable the understanding of being in general: τί τὸ ὄν, τοῦτὸ ἐστὶ τίς ἢ οὐσία (1028b4). It is this 'pedagogical' function of focality that makes it worth pursuing.<sup>62</sup> By contrast, it is the pedagogical failure or "triviality" of ontological proportionality that makes it comparatively uninteresting, for Aristotle's purpose at least.

Now attend to what this seems to entail: if *ἀναλογία* in Aristotle is absolutely equivalent to 'proportionality' in the sense of EN V.3,<sup>63</sup> he would necessarily distinguish analogy from focality. If, on the other hand, Brentano is right, and Aristotle does

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62. Technically 'anagogical'.

63. Another crucial instance of this definition is *Poet.* 21: "by analogy I mean where B stands to A as D stands to C / [κατὰ] τὸ δὲ ἀνάλογον λέγω, ὅταν ὁμοίως ἔχη τὸ δεύτερον πρὸς τὸ πρῶτον καὶ τὸ τέταρτον πρὸς τὸ τρίτον" (1457b16–7). Hence Δ.6: "[things are one] by analogy... that stand as another in relation to another / κατ' ἀναλογίαν δὲ ὅσα ἔχει ὡς ἄλλο πρὸς ἄλλο."

conceive of  $\pi\rho\acute{o}\varsigma\ \acute{\epsilon}\nu$  reference as a kind of analogy, viz. analogy of reference to the same terminus, the distinction would collapse. The decision is of some importance, for it bears directly on the question of whether the theory of *ad unum* analogy articulated during the Middle Ages has any "genuine" basis in the text of the *Metaphysics*, in the sense of being exegesis of Aristotle's own doctrine. This, I take it, is what Wood (2013, 6) means by "suggesting that the *proshen* relationship of *Metaphysics* IV lays the groundwork for the fully developed theory of the *analogia entis* that is elaborated in late Scholastic Philosophy." Evidently, the question is not 'whether it lays the groundwork', which is beyond dispute, but whether this theory is constituted in exegesis of Aristotle's own doctrine, or rather in a profound instance of creative misinterpretation.

Let me reveal my conclusion at the outset: I am not convinced by Brentano's argument: the crucial inference is invalid. First, he recognizes that Aristotle's claim is not that the categories are "beings" because each instance of them is related to them in the same way, i.e. because of their proportionality; rather, the claim is that they are  $\pi\rho\acute{o}\varsigma\ \acute{\epsilon}\nu$ . Aristotle does not say that they are one by analogy, but rather that they are  $\pi\rho\acute{o}\varsigma\ \acute{\epsilon}\nu$ . Next, Brentano explains the difference: focal ( $\pi\rho\acute{o}\varsigma\ \acute{\epsilon}\nu$ ) predication is precisely (by definition) *disproportionate*. Focal dependents, say something indicative of health and something productive of it, form a proportion relative to health only if they related to it in the same way: urine is to health as the medic is to health. But the relation is different in each case.<sup>64</sup> The 'equality of relation' that defines *ἀναλογία* is absent. From this, Brentano infers that it is necessary to assume a second type of analogy.<sup>65</sup> This is obviously invalid. In fact, it is entirely

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64. Halper (*ibid.*, 144, n.92) puts the difference *in nuce*: "either two things are related to one thing differently or two things are related to two other things in the same way."

65. "We believe, for these reasons, that we must assume a second type of analogy in addition to the one discussed by Trendelenburg, which occupies, together with the first kind, an intermediate position between the univocal and the merely equivocal... While the analoga discussed in the first place displayed an equality of relations together with a difference of concepts, we here find an entirely different relation, but a relation to the same concept as terminus, a relation to the same ἀρχή" (trans. George, 64–5, modified). Aubenque (2009, 238) maintains that "il ne suffit pas qu'il y ait rapport pour qu'il y ait, au sens propre du terme, analogie: il faut qu'il y ait en outre égalité de rapports." Wood (*ibid.*, 7–9) takes issue with this, and invokes Brentano in support.



groundless unless we are assuming from the outset that Aristotle conceives of focal reference as disproportionate analogy. But we cannot assume what we are trying to prove.<sup>66</sup> The conclusion must be implied in the premises. But it cannot be one of the premises. The fact remains that Aristotle never calls focal unity analogical. Indeed, he may have good reason not to. On any account, it is important to distinguish focality from proportionality. What we are trying to understand is whether Aristotle's concept of analogy is broad enough to include both. Brentano gives no reason to suppose that it does. On the contrary, assuming that Aristotle does distinguish between proportionality and focality, we have good reason to suppose he would draw a sharp distinction between *analogia*, things said by analogy, and *pros hen legomena*, things said in reference to a single term.<sup>67</sup> To conclude this inquiry, allow me to sum up its basic conclusions, and to indicate why I think this distinction is crucial.

### 3. CONCLUSION

Thus far, we have reviewed two theses in particular. The first concerns the homonymy of being. I argued that Aristotle explicitly admits of two sorts of non-incidentally homonymy: analogical and focal. Being is predicated by analogy, insofar as all instances of being are related to their categorial genera in the same way, such that human is to substance as color is to quality and so on. Upon closer inspection, however, we recognize that being ( $\tau\acute{o} \delta\upsilon\nu$ ) exhibits the same focused homonymy as 'the healthy' and 'the medical'. Tangentially, we also considered the paronymy of being, that is, the fact that being ( $\tau\acute{o} \delta\upsilon\nu$ ) for Aristotle literally derives from substance-being ( $\omicron\upsilon\sigma\acute{\iota}\alpha$ ), just as 'the healthy' and 'the medical' derive from 'health' and 'medicine'. Against the assumption that homonymy and paronymy are mutually exclusive, I argued that  $\tau\acute{o} \delta\upsilon\nu$  is understood as a paronym when predicated of non-substantial being(s) and as a homonym predicated of all being(s). Again, the homonymy of being is twofold: analogical and focal. *Pace* Wood, Heidegger, Brentano, and the entire scholastic tradition, I insist that Aristotle nowhere treats focal unity as a type of analogical unity, where the distinction

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66. Apart from attempting to prove the indemonstrable, which is "laughable" (*Phys.* II.1, 193a1–9).

67. Thus Owens (see note 6). See *Concept & Function* (39–44) for an account of the roots of this conflation.

between analogical and focal homonymy would collapse. Rather, he consistently distinguishes them for good theoretical reasons.

Future research on this question should set out to explore what these reasons might be. Broadly speaking, my conclusion is that analogy and focality must be carefully distinguished in order to understand how they are intrinsically connected. We can speak of things as being analogous by virtue of their common reference to a single source, in the way of the *analogia attributionis* as distinct from the *analogia proportionalitatis*. However, this way of speaking conceals the fact that the particular *mode* of reference in each case differs. Since the distinctive mark of analogical identity is 'equality of relation' (EN V.3), the fact that things predicated in reference to a single term (πρὸς ἓν λεγόμενα) relate to that term in different ways distinguishes them from the class of things that are homonymous by analogy (ὁμώνυμα κατ' ἀναλογίαν). Yet, we may note, the fact that being is amenable to focal explication does not preclude the legitimacy of analogies such as 'human is to substance as color is to quality'. It just means that being is capable of focal (and even serial) explication in terms of priority and posteriority in a hierarchy whose principle is primarily what its analogues are derivatively.